# Why the Futile Crusade?

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Sidney Lens, by his analysis of the roots of the Cold War in The Futile Crusade, Anti-Communism as American Credo, challenges observers of American politics to a total re-examination of the American political scene. Lens demolishes the anti-Communist crusade's claim to be the preserver of individual liberty by contrasting the claim with its actual policy of Cold War militarism and political control "which subvert the individualist elan which is the mainspring of democracy."

> But since we are only in a "half-war", a Cold War, we stand midpoint between the values of individualism and those of the garrison state, continuing to manifest characteristics of the former, but yielding to the demands of the latter. In this Cold War the central government inevitably gains more power over its citizens. Countervailing checks and balances by the people are reduced, and "participative" democracy is subtly transformed into "manipulative" democracy. Citizens are remade in the image of foreign policy--in the image, that is, of militarism. . . The curbing of dissent and individualism is therefore neither an accident nor an incidental feature of modern America, but a sine qua non of Anti-Communist strategy. . . Anti-Communism, though it pays ceaseless obeisance to the virtues of freedom, has made us less, rather than more, free.[1]

This statement by Sidney Lens marks a milestone in the American political scene. That a widely recognized spokesman of the American left should find the Cold War not only evil in itself, but evil because it centralizes political power, destroys constitutional limitations on government, and relies upon control and regulation by government, all of which "subvert the individualist elan which is the mainspring of democracy," alters the contemporary American political spectrum to an extent which may have fundamental and radical significance.

It is difficult to determine which is more striking: that individualism has such basic importance for Lens, or that he has said what few if any so-called individualists have said during the last decade or more. While the spokesmen of American liberalism, individualism, and constitutionalism, not to mention those who use the word "liberty" as a facade to gain the illiberal ends of anti-Communism, have blessed the Cold War deprivations of constitutional rights and civil liberties, it has been spokesmen of the American left, stigmatized for their use of centralization and government power to eliminate injustices, who have defended the Constitution and struggled to preserve individual rights against the government, and who proclaim individualism as a good in itself. Although sterile rhetoric and false categories have established unreal divisions between libertarians, casting them left and right, it is

1. Sidney Lens, The Futile Crusade: Anti-Communism as American Credo (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), pp. 143-45.

nothing new that the current American left leads in the struggle to maintain constitutional rights and civil liberties in America. What is new is that spokesmen for American liberalism, individualism, and constitutionalism are not beside them in the forefront of the struggle. Here is a major contrast between the post-World War I period with its relative freedom and relatively limited government, and, as Lens indicates, the current post-World War II era with its suppressions and deprivations of freedom and its increasingly total government. For, in the present epoch, leading liberals and individualists have betrayed their principles and have entered the service of their historic statist and militarist enemies. When the reasons for this phenomenon are clearly understood, much will have been contributed to answering the question posed by Linus Pauling in the introduction to Lens' book:

> Why did our national leaders decide upon this policy of increased nuclear militarism?...And why did the sensible American people permit it to be done?[2]

In his contribution to the solution of that question, Lens provides the answer to this fundamental problem: that the Cold War, the anti-Communist crusade, may have its roots not in European radical thought or Soviet military power or non-Western movements of national liberation, but in a deep flaw in Western society, in the absence of a basic perfection, of which Soviet strength, radical thought and national liberation movements are only the reflection and result.

> Is it possible that somewhere along the way America had taken the wrong fork in the road? Has its analysis of world problems, perhaps, been faulty? Is it possible that communism has been misjudged as the cause of Western travail, when in fact it has been its effect?[3]

The class conflict between European peoples and their rulers, between the exploited and the exploiters, was based on the idea of liberty, on eliminating exploitation to permit capitalism, progress, and freedom to flourish. The capitalist revolutions, culminating in the late eighteenth century American-European revolutions, although sustained by the strength of nationalism against counter-revolutions supported by foreign powers, remained far from achieving completion. Instead of the radical reorientation of society implicit in capitalism, the application of capitalism was circumscribed within a narrow range by the pre-capitalist institutional instruments of exploitation which continued in force. Thus, not only was the capitalist revolution thwarted in Western Europe and America, but their ruling classes were able to exploit the feudal conditions existing in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America through the system of imperialism. The imperialist power of the Western countries prevented the overthrow of feudalism by capitalist revolutions in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America and imposed on the world's peoples a double or reinforced system of exploitation--imperialism--by which the power of the Western governments maintains the local ruling class in exchange for the opportunity to superimpose Western exploitation upon existing exploitation by local states. Imperialism or double exploitation has caused the twentieth century struggle against feudalism and for progress to take a form different from the earlier Western European struggle against feudalism. Lens describes the

2. Ibid., p. 8.
3. Ibid., p. 20.

legacy of the thwarted progress of the capitalist revolutions:

> Had this process continued without interruption, it is more than likely that the world would never have known either Leninist, Stalinist, or Khrushchevist communism. But the very nations which liberated themselves during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries prevented the spread of nationalism and capitalism to other areas--China, India, Russia, Egypt, etc.--during the nineteenth century. This self-aggrandizing folly, in which Britain was to play the major role, has become known in history as "imperialism". In their own interests, the Western nations restored the power of feudal lords when that power was tottering. If it were not for the throttling effect of imperialism, the nationalist revolutions we confront in the twentieth century might very well have been completed in the nineteenth.[4]

But, due to the development of imperialism, the twentieth century capitalist revolutions could not be successful in ending either imperialism or feudalism. Success was thwarted by the incompleteness of capitalist ideology among the nationalist leaders and the publics of the imperialist countries. Thus, the earliest twentieth century nationalist revolutions: in Mexico in 1910 and China in 1911, were unsuccessful under leaders possessing the spirit though not the ideology of revolutionary capitalism.

In place of the thwarted capitalist revolutions, the Soviet Revolution provided the model and support for successful nationalist revolutions, including the partial one in Mexico and the ultimately complete one in China. The Soviet Revolution achieved immediate and complete success because the socialists under the leadership of Lenin supplied both the objectives and the methods of revolutionary capitalism: that destruction of feudalism and imperialism which is the precondition for freedom and progress. Lens indicates that the twentieth century revolutions pursue the same objectives as did the European and American revolutions, and are motivated by the same revolutionary hatred of exploitation:

> The communist upsurge, good or bad, aborted or not, is not an isolated phenomenon but an intrinsic link in a chain of events that began four hundred years ago, and is part of the same chain as capitalism itself.
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> . . . in point of fact the communist revolution has been a movement away from feudalism, slavery, and tribalism, just as the early capitalist revolutions and the present nationalist revolutions are links on the same historical chain....it is a medicine for the same type of social disease...it is a response to the same challenge as the French Revolution of 1789, or the British Revolution of 1642, or the Indian Revolution of 1947. It is part of a cycle much broader than itself, and if it had not occurred under Bolshevik leadership it would have found some other radical force to guide it to its destiny.[5]

The Soviet Revolution was successful because it alone combined the two necessary revolutionary principles of destruction of feudalism, especially by distribution of feudal land and state industries to the peasants and workers, and of imperialism, by establishing peace and withdrawing from the World War.

The Russian Revolution created not just another strong nation changing the balance of power among the Great Powers, but also a new phenomenon in the twentieth century--a completely successful

4. Ibid., p. 33.
5. Ibid., pp. 33-34.

revolution dedicated to assisting the world-wide eradication of imperialist and feudal exploitation. As Lens notes, this has created a profound fear of communism:

> The fact is that communism has caused so pervasive an anxiety because it has altered not only the balance of power among nations, but the very character of our epoch. . .
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> The Russian Revolution added a new dimension to international affairs--much as the American and French Revolutions did in the nineteenth century. Here, finally, was an organized state that could--and did--offer moral encouragement, material aid, and organized support to radical nationalists.... By its very nature it came to be a "third force" in class and colonial conflicts. Whether it gave direct aid to rebellious forces or played a passive role as an example to be emulated, it was an inevitable encouragement to revolutionary aspiration. . . . The emergence of a leftist regime in Russia was not just another problem for Western statesmen, but a problem of a different kind.[6]

The immediate effect of the revolution was Russian withdrawal from the World War and the attempt of the Soviet government to induce the Western powers to negotiate a general peace by making concessions to their adversaries. Rather than make peace, and thus tend to prevent further revolutions, the Western powers determined to meet the revolutionary threat to their world dominance as they had met the threat of the central powers. In fact, they classified the Soviet government as an ally of the central powers and Lenin as a German satellite. The challenge posed by the Soviet Union to imperialist world domination had to be destroyed by the ultimate imperialist weapon: military intervention, including the forces of the American army.

> The first reaction of the West to Soviet communism revealed little new insight. In its frustration it could think of no more imaginative policy than the one it had used so frequently in the colonies, military intervention. From 1918 to 1920, fourteen foreign armies occupied parts of the Soviet Union, and Britain and France donated hundreds of millions of dollars to former Czarist officers engaged in civil war against the red regime. It proved, after two and a half years, a futile effort. Equally inept was the wave of repression in the United States that followed the Bolshevik Revolution.[7]

Already, for more than six months before the Soviet Revolution, the United States had experienced suppression of civil liberties and deprivation of constitutional rights through conscription, economic controls, government censorship, propaganda, elimination of freedom of speech, and espionage and sedition acts against opponents of American intervention into World War I. Randolph Bourne, horrified at the support of the war by so-called liberals and progressives, had insisted that an unconditionally defeated Germany would become a greater menace to European peace; the war itself, he charged, was the only real enemy of American freedom. Oswald Garrison Villard, the publisher of the Nation, had warned businessmen against supporting conscription and the war since "militarism is the best friend of the Socialist. . . ."[8] But, it was precisely

6. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
7. Ibid., p. 15.
8. Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Decline of American Liberalism

the socialists in America led by Eugene Debs who, like European socialists from Jaures in France to Lenin in Russia, opposed the war and assumed the leadership of the struggle to preserve civil liberties and constitutional rights, and who suffered most gravely from the war tyranny of persecution, censorship and imprisonment for this commitment to liberal principles. The crucifixion of the socialist bearers of American liberalism was intensified following the Soviet Revolution. The Post Office Department completely excluded socialist journals from the mails as pro-German by definition, and banned single issues of other journals for what was called "pro-Germanism, pacifism, and 'high-browism'."[9] The Nation's September 18, 1918 issue was banned for Albert Jay Nock's editorial attacking the government's use of AFL president Samuel Gompers as an agent in Europe. The government insisted that no attacks on Gompers would be permitted because he had aided the government in preventing American workers from seeking their rights during the war. At the end of the World War the United States, of all the belligerents, alone refused amnesty to political prisoners; rather it increased the suppression of American liberties in revenge for the defeats inflicted by the Russian people on the foreign invaders, including the American army.

However, the unity of the American left--individualist and socialist--made this domestic violence only temporary. Lens contrasts the suppression of liberties during the deep conflict over American intervention into World War I followed by post-war restoration of traditional freedoms, with the general conformity to American intervention into World War II and the post-war deprivation of constitutional rights during the Futile Crusade of the Cold War. He emphasizes that this unusual development has been accompanied by the expansion of the anti-Communist right and the disappearance of an American left which would have opposed the right and the Cold War.

> It is all the more striking, therefore, that today - when there is so little challenge from the left - there should be so continuing a state of repression. . . Never has there been less pressure from radicalism.[10]

However, in his necessary concentration upon the Cold War, and especially its international developments, Lens does not present a detailed consideration of why a wave of domestic repression followed World War II accompanied by a disappearance of the American left; whereas following World War I, constitutional rights were restored under the influence of a strong and united American left-socialist and individualist. Certainly, the separation of American libertarians into mutually excluding socialist and individualist groupings was an important factor in weakening the American left, in contrast to its strength after World War I. Yet, as indicated by Lens' views quoted at the beginning of this article, this separation is entirely artificial and unreal. The clear commitment to individualism by spokesmen of the American left requires a re-evaluation of recent American political developments as interpreted by scholars representing individualism and the American left. Although these groups have been assumed to have conflicting views of recent political developments, Lens indicates

(New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1955) p. 212.

9. D. Joy Humes, Oswald Garrison Villard (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1960), pp. 37-38.
10. Lens, op. cit., p. 148.

that they may in fact have corresponding or identical comprehension of the meaning and results of the recent past. Lens' work suggests a method for such a re-evaluation in his references to the leading historians of the two points of view, William Appleman Williams and Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr. Their analyses of the crucial developments in recent American history provide important guides to the destruction of mythical stereotypes contributing to the divisions among libertarians that have weakened the American opposition to the Cold War. As with Lens and the American left, Cold War policies have awakened American individualists anew to the basic causes of the loss of American liberty, as indicated most clearly in the works of Ekirch.

> In our own era it is difficult to reconcile the militarism left in the wake of two world wars and the prospect of a third, with a philosophy of liberalism.[11]

Senator Robert M. LaFollette, as Ekirch indicates, had recognized that war and militarism would contribute to a decline of American liberalism. Thus, he opposed American intervention both in World War I and in the Russian Revolution, for which he was dubbed the "Bolshevik spokesman in America." In a war declared under the excuse of democratic aims, LaFollette had questioned whether Germans were less free than Americans if popular support of the war were measured by the violence of the espionage and conscription laws. And LaFollette had asked: "Are we seizing upon this war to consolidate and extend our imperialistic policy?"[12] American intervention, as LaFollette had predicted, lengthened the war by substituting concepts of total war and total victory for a negotiated and reasonable peace. The American left then united in opposition to the peace treaty dictated at the Versailles conference from which Germany and the Soviet Union were excluded. The treaty was recognized as the foundation for an inevitable second world war. The New Republic said of the treaty:

> THIS IS NOT PEACE. Americans would be fools if they permitted themselves to be embroiled in a system of European alliances.[13]

Even greater disquiet was caused by the creation of a League of Nations with the power to threaten the use of force in the preservation of the status quo established under the treaty for the benefit of the major imperialist founders of the League. Villard, the publisher of the Nation, wrote to Senator LaFollette on the treaty and the League:

> The more I study it, the more I am convinced that it is the most iniquitous peace document ever drawn, that it dishonors America because it violates our solemn national pledge given to the Germans at the time of the Armistice and because it reeks with bad faith, revengefulness and inhumanity. It is worse than the Treaty of Vienna.
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> ... it not only retains the old and vicious order of the world, but makes it worse and then puts the whole control of the situation in the hands of four or five statesmen--and, incidentally, of the International Bankers. To my mind it seals the ruin of the modern capitalistic system and constitutes a veritable Pandora's Box out

11. Ekirch, American Liberalism, p. xi.
12. Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., ed., Voices in Dissent, An Anthology of Individualist Thought in the United States (New York: Citadel Press, 1964), p. 218; Ekirch, American Liberalism, pp. 215-20.
13. Ibid., p. 228.

of which will come evils of which we have not as yet any conception.[14]

Villard believed that the League would encourage the imperialist powers to refuse to solve international problems by peaceful means because the League would give the imperialist powers the sanctity of legality when countries such as Germany would seek to terminate such deprivations as Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and prohibition of union with Austria. And, for Villard, the League not only contributed to the prevention of peaceful settlement of the injuries of the Versailles system in Europe, but also enshrined the whole imperialist system which the national liberation movements in China, India, Egypt, Africa and Latin America were striving to destroy.[15]

The American left was triumphant in defeating the Versailles treaty and American participation in that guarantor of the imperialist status quo which Lenin trenchantly described as the "League of Bandits". Williams presents a penetrating analysis of the leadership in the Senate by the American left:

> At the other extreme was an even smaller group of men who were almost doctrinaire laissez-faire liberals in domestic affairs and antiempire men in foreign policy. Led by Senator William E. Borah, they made many perceptive criticisms of existing policy . . . . The argument advanced by Borah and other antiempire spokesmen was based on the proposition that America neither could nor should undertake to make or keep the world safe for democracy.
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> . . . . And even if it were possible to build such an empire, they concluded, the effort violated the spirit of democracy itself. Borah provided a classic summary of these two arguments in one of his speeches attacking the proposal to clamp a lid on the revolutionary ferment in China after 1917. "Four hundred million people imbued with the spirit of independence and of national integrity are in the end invincible." . . . He concluded that a rapprochement with the Soviet Union was "the key to a restored Europe, to a peaceful Europe." In addition, he thought that the United States could play a crucial role in creating the circumstances in which there could "emerge a freer, a more relaxed, a more democratic Russia." ". . . So long as you have a hundred and fifty million people outlawed in a sense, it necessarily follows that you cannot have peace." . . . Of all Americans, the group around Borah most clearly understood the principle and practice of self determination in foreign affairs. For that reason, as well as other aspects of Borah's criticism, President Wilson singled out Borah as his most important critic--as the man who might turn out to be right.[16]

Borah's insights constituted the basic principles of the American left in the post-war period; the attempts of the great imperialist powers, victorious in World War I, to oppose and suppress the movements for national liberation, especially the successful Russian Revolution,, were resolutely opposed and exposed by American liberalism. Support of the Soviet Union against the attacks of the imperialist powers and opposition to the concepts and provisions of

14. Humes, op. cit., p. 227; Ekirch, American Liberalism, pp. 226-27.
15. Humes, op. cit., pp. 223-28.
16. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 118-22.

the Versailles treaty, were the inter-connected bases for the unity of the American left. This unity was especially accomplished through revisionist studies of the origins of World War I, to which the Soviet Union had made a major contribution by making public the secret records and agreements of Imperial Russia's Western allies. Liberal journals, such as the Nation, the New Republic, and the Freeman, and such liberals as John Maynard Keynes, Harry Elmer Barnes, H. L. Mencken, Francis Neilson and Albert Jay Nock provided perceptive studies of the imperialist origins of the war and its imperialist conclusion in the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations.

Despite the American rejection, the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations remained very much in force, and the American left was dedicated to the complete abolition of the horrors of the Versailles system in order to insure a peaceful world. The foundations of the position of the American left on the treaty and the League were established by John Maynard Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920), in which he described the role of the League as an instrument of the major imperialist powers to protect the status quo that they had created in the Versailles treaty. The requirement to preserve the existing borders of the members, protected against peaceful change by the prescription of unanimity, insured the undisturbed maintenance of the status quo. According to Keynes:

> These two Articles together go some way to destroy the conception of the League as an instrument of progress, and to equip it from the outset with an almost fatal bias towards the status quo. It is these Articles which have reconciled to the League some of its original opponents, who now hope to make of it another Holy Alliance for the perpetuation of the economic ruin of their enemies and the Balance of Power in their own interests which they believe themselves to have established by the Peace.[17]

The Versailles treaty had created or maintained local exploiting groups in the countries of Eastern Europe. As clients of the imperialist powers, these allies of the West preserved their expoitation against the movements for national liberation in Eastern Europe through special economic privileges which, to the exclusion of Russian and German economic and political interests, were granted to the West. Keynes demonstrated that there could not be peace if the major imperialist powers did not negotiate revisions of the treaty, especially with Germany and Russia. Excluded from Eastern Europe by the political and economic privileges of the Western powers, Russia and Germany would become natural allies and the leaders of the movements of national liberation seeking to end the yoke of exploitation exercised by the major imperialist powers and their allies, the Versailles-formed governments.[18]

After two decades during which the Western imperialist powers sought to intensify rather than rectify the evils of the status quo, the events which Keynes and the American left had foreseen did transpire. Germany, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, substituted nationalist governments for the imperialists' client regimes in Eastern Europe. As indicated by the liberal analysis of the world

17. John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), pp. 259-60.

18. Ibid., pp. 267-68, 290-95; Howard K. Smith, The State of Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 271-73.

situation, the alliance of Germany and the Soviet Union was neither an accident nor a great betrayal by one or the other. Rather this alliance was the necessary and natural development of the struggle between the forces of world imperialism defending their status quo, and the revolutionary forces of national liberation and anti-imperialism. Williams provides a clear description of this world-wide revolutionary challenge to the imperialist system:

> However they distorted or misused the upsurge of dissatisfaction with the status quo, the leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy were working with the most powerful weapon available--the determination, born equally of desperation and hope, of large numbers of people to improve, radically and immediately, the substance and tone of their daily lives.[19]

In Asia, the movement against the imperialist status quo was not only newer and more radical but also of more immediate concern to the American government; for more than half of America's imports of raw materials was derived from exploitation of the colonies of England, France and the Netherlands, and of China, which was viewed as the major growth-area for American imperialism. The system of exploitation of China through privileges and monopoly concessions to American corporations and banks was threatened, both by the desire of the Japanese for free and equal competition in the China market and by the Chinese revolution, which had begun in 1911 by the declaration of a republic. American interests wished to maintain their privileges by "working with and through Chinese conservative nationalists who were dependent upon American aid"[20] to prevent the completion of the Chinese revolution by liberal-radical or left-wing Chinese nationalists. Japan was invited to share in the China market subject to the primacy of American privileges and concessions in China, and in access to colonial raw materials subject to the control of the Western powers. In the struggle of the Japanese against the conservative Chinese government which protected American monopoly privileges and concessions, the United States increasingly applied economic restrictions to Japan and granted loans and military assistance to the conservative government of China. Opposition to American government support of the privileged economic interests in China and of the conservative government attempting to suppress the movement for national liberation in China, was continued by such traditional leaders of the American left as Senator Borah. But they were unsuccessful in the contest with the "China lobby", which propagandized the glories of the imperialist puppet regime of the Chiang dictatorship.[21]

19. Williams, American Diplomacy, p. 163.
20. Ibid., pp. 143, 190-92; William L. Neumann, "Ambiguity and Ambivalence in Ideas of National Interest in Asia," in Alexander DeConde, ed., Isolation and Security (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1957), pp. 157-58.
21. Williams, American Diplomacy, pp. 162-200; Marian C. McKenna, Borah (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), pp. 355-85; Orde S. Pinckney, "William E. Borah: Critic of American Foreign Policy," Studies on the Left (Vol. I, No. 3, 1960), pp. 54-61; William L. Neumann, America Encounters Japan (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 228-89; William L. Neumann, "Determinism, Destiny and Myth in the American Image of China," in George L. Anderson, ed., Issues and Conflicts, Studies in Twentieth Century American Diplomacy (Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas Press, 1959), pp. 1-20.

Of fundamental importance for the history of the Cold War was the development of the Asian movements of national liberation through Japan's challenge to the Western imperialist powers and its encouragement of anti-imperialist objectives, a challenge described by Lens and others. The Burmese nationalists, influenced by socialism, enlisted the aid of the Japanese to form a Burma Independence Army, and, when the English colonialists were expelled, the Japanese formed a Burmese national government. The radical and socialist elements of the Indian Congress party under the leadership of Subha Chandra Bose looked to Japanese liberation from English imperialism; and when Bose was forced out of the Congress party presidency in favor of the weaker Nehru, the radicals in Bengal assisted the Japanese invasion while Nehru merely declared against cooperation with the English army. In the Philippines, the Japanese granted independence to the government formed by the pre-war nationalist party led by Jose P. Laurel and Claro R. Recto, both formerly justices of the supreme court and post-war members of the Philippine senate; this nationalist party won the presidential election of 1953, and Jose P. Laurel, Jr., who had represented his father's wartime government in Tokyo, became speaker of the house of representatives. In Indochina the Japanese protected Vietnamese engaged in nationalist activities and ultimately abolished French colonialism and recognized the independence of Vietnam. The Japanese encouraged the national liberation movement in the Dutch East Indies by promising independence and by establishing local and national Indonesian councils in which a leading figure was the pro-Japanese nationalist, Achmed Sukarno. With the completion of independence plans, Sukarno became president of the Indonesian Republic before Japanese rule came to an end.[22]

The function of the Atlantic Charter issued by Churchill and Roosevelt was to counter the rising tide of anti-imperialism and to gain the adherence of the peoples of the world, a role emphasized by Lens as an early aspect of the events that culminated in the Cold War. While for Churchill, the Atlantic Charter's call for self-government had more than propagandistic application only to England's allies in Western Europe and their client states in Eastern Europe, President Roosevelt considered the charter a binding commitment to end much if not all of the imperialist status quo, especially in Asia, which had contributed so greatly to the war and to American involvement. For the prosecution of the war this situation further empasized the primacy of Europe.

> Most of the energy of the government in India was devoted, however, not to the prosecution of the war but to the maintenance of British rule. What military strength India could spare for the war against the Axis was diverted to the war against Germany, in which there was little danger that Indian troops would be contaminated by dangerous ideas. The British in India, like Chiang K'ai-shek in China, put most of their strength behind maintaining internal stability. . . The British were fighting two separate wars. In Europe they stood with all honor for the

22. Lens, op. cit., pp. 94-99, 113-19, 126-39; Smith, op. cit., p. 272. Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1946), pp. 82-96.

freedom of humanity and the destruction of the Nazi slave system; in Asia, for the status quo, for the Empire, for colonialism.[23] Roosevelt had realized that the assault on imperialism, represented by the Second World War and the movements of national liberation which the war intensified, could not be prevented or destroyed by force. For conservatives, like Churchill, the war was the means to restore the status quo of exploitation by the traditional imperialist states. To bulwark the imperialist status quo against the spirit of national liberation, which would receive the encouragement of the major center of anti-imperialism, the Soviet Union, Churchill hoped to contain the Soviet Union's influence by threatening it in Eastern Europe with recreation of the "cordon sanitaire" of Western client states. But Roosevelt intended to gain a permanent peace through the peaceful liquidation of the war-shattered imperialist system by means of American pressure. This would eliminate any threat from the Soviet Union, since the basic revolutionary urge to national liberation would be satisfied, while the security of the Soviet Union from the traditional threat of Western aggression would be protected by the natural development of Eastern European governments friendly to Soviet Russia. Roosevelt concluded that peace could be maintained by a permanent Soviet-American alliance supporting national liberation to replace the imperialist system. "Roosevelt, like most Americans, disliked Stalin's communism, but he had no pathological fear of it. He recognized its pliability."[24]

Unfortunately, in the absence of Roosevelt's personal policy of Soviet-American collaboration in furthering the movements of national liberation, his concept of American leadership in the world could easily be perverted into opposition to the national liberation movements and to the Soviet Union in defense of the conservative policies of imperialism. Indeed, the Second World War policies of Roosevelt established foundations on which such a perversion of his own post-war aims could thrive. Robert M. Hutchins echoed LaFollette's criticisms when he noted that America's growing involvement in World War II was based upon the ability of the President to create military commitments without Congressional approval and to dramatize external forces as the cause of world difficulties. Instead of countering the materialism at the root of world difficulties by the peaceful example of American progress, Hutchins declared, an America that persecuted radicals, whether labor, communists, racial minorities or teachers as did the Nazis was making a scapegoat of Hitler just as Hitler had made a scapegoat of the Jews.[25] In this way the proponents of American intervention on the American left separated themselves by a wide gulf from that public which had continued its support of the American left's traditional anti-imperialist and isolationist policy. This split in the American left permitted revived attacks on civil liberties when the national and state legislatures initiated violations of constitutional rights to destroy those who still defended traditional American neutrality. The peacetime sedition or Smith Act with its guilt-by-association clause, although unsuccessfully applied in suits against pro-German opponents of the war, was the successful basis for general persecution of the American left, beginning with the neu-

23. Ibid., pp. 150-52; Lens, op. cit., pp. 21-26.
24. Ibid., p. 24.
25. Ekirch, Voices in Dissent, pp. 275, 281.

tralist leaders of the CIO Minneapolis Transport Workers Union.[26] Norman Thomas, answering the question "Who are the Liberals?", noted that many who called themselves liberals had forgotten that "war is the enemy of liberalism," and had caused violations of civil liberties in opposition to the very essence of the liberal creed.

> In recent years those Americans who most stridently proclaimed their liberalism were usually the most vociferous preachers of a peace of vengeance against Germany and Japan. . . They were far better able to discover seditionists at home than the FBI, and far surer than the Supreme Court that foolish speech constituted sedition.[27]

Thus, insisted Thomas, while so-called liberals in Congress and the press supported or were silent over America's militarism, conscription, and deportation of one hundred thousand Americans of Japanese ancestry to American concentration camps, the burden of the civil libertarian struggle was borne by such isolationists as "Senator Taft who spoke out most openly concerning various aspects of conscription and the treatment of the Japanese Americans."[28]

But the domestic violations of civil liberties could be continued, as the post-World War I period had demonstrated, only through the maintenance of a war mentality by failure of the American left to re-unite on its traditional principles. Unfortunately, that disunity was intensified by the long-term economic and political conditions and policies created by the war, especially by the interrelation of economic concentration and the government's contracts and economic aid programs, and the significant role in decision-making assumed by the military.

While it has long been a commonplace that New Deal policies were shelved in favor of a war economy, recent scholarship holds that the pre-war New Deal benefited big business through government privileges and concentration of economic power as much as had Hoover's policies, of which the New Deal was basically a continuation. However, the most significant result of the war economy was the increased concentration of economic power which big business derived from government contracts, and the establishment of a close relationship between big business and the military, as has been indicated by Ekirch and by C. Wright Mills.[29] Ekirch describes the importance which American foreign aid, under the guise of internationalism, has played in the post-war economic concentration of big business:

> Nationalism in the guise of internationalism was most attractive to the postwar group of business, political, and military leaders whom C. Wright Mills dubbed "the sophisticated conservatives." . . . the foreign aid program, with its stimulation to American industry, became the "spinal nerve" of the sophisticated conservatives' postwar plans for the expansion of American export markets. . . . Admirably suited to the conservatives' purposes were the solid ties forged among industry, armed forces, and State Department - ties that were constantly being strengthened under the duress of the cold war and the policy of a permanent

26. Ibid., p. 357; Ekirch, American Liberalism, pp. 299-301; Lens, op. cit., pp. 146-48.
27. Norman Thomas, "Who Are The Liberals?", American Mercury (November, 1947), pp. 550, 553.
28. Ibid., p. 552; Ekirch, American Liberalism, p. 316.
29. Ibid., pp. 308, 327-31; Ekirch, Voices in Dissent, pp. 368-76.

war economy. Aided by the widespread propaganda in behalf of a bipartisan foreign policy, these new-type conservatives were able to assume a dominant position in both major political parties.[30]

Similarly, Lens examines the basis for the post-war development of conservatism in America:

> Self-interest drove the military-industrial complex, after the war to upgrade the menace of communism and communist Russia. The points of conflict between East and West were enlarged to give the impression of an immediate war danger. To its surprise, this power complex found an ally among certain ex-radicals and . . . among certain liberals who came to Anti-Communism from other motivations. Together with the ultra-Right, which had been relatively dormant, this conjunction of forces pushed the center of gravity in American political life to the right, to a barren defense of the status quo.[31]

Ekirch examines the motivations of those liberals who became allies of the anti-Communism of the new conservatism in the post-war American government:

> Accustomed to power and office, New Deal liberals had lost the capacity of self-criticism and vigorous opposition, qualities that might have served them in good stead in the postwar years of hysteria and reaction. . . .
>
> One of the ironies of the postwar period was that anti-revisionist liberals, in their anxiety lest the United States return to a post-World War I intellectual pattern of isolationist pacifism, came to condone and even to abet a resort to the opposite extreme of a militant, interventionist nationalism, masquerading as idealistic internationalism. At the same time, talk of bipartisanship often concealed the essentially conservative nature of American postwar foreign policy. In what was really a turn to the right in American diplomacy, war liberals, who had formerly shared in many a leftist cause or program, now vied with conservatives for leadership in the crusade against communism.[32]

Thus, some liberals became either complete or partial allies of the new conservative establishment on the basis of anti-Communism. Other liberals, eschewing this anti-Communism, became critics of varying effectiveness of the new conservativism in the American government, as did the isolationists who continued to pursue consistently the traditional program of American liberalism.

In his very valuable chapter, "The Alliance of Conservatives and Ex-Radicals," Lens provides an incisive analysis of the fundamental importance in the development of the Anti-Communist Crusade of the former communists and socialists. The disintegration of the liberal position in America was paralleled by the "concomitant emergence of a segment of ex-radicals as savants of Anti-Communism."

> Perhaps the most interesting development in the United States since World War II, in terms of power alignment, has been the simultaneous decline of the Left and the conversion of some of its adherents into an Anti-Communist phalanx. . . many ex-radicals, whose impact was negligible when they were associated with the Left, have gained a new and impressive status by becoming the most fervid proponents of Anti-Communism... Old

30. Ekirch, American Liberalism, p. 333.
31. Lens, op. cit., p. 78.
32. Ekirch, American Liberalism, pp. 317-20.

friends of the Soviet Union with socialist, communist, Trotskyist, or liberal backgrounds, such as Max Eastman, J. B. Matthews, Eugene Lyons, James Burnham, Sidney Hook, and Jay Lovestone, became the intellectual leavening for Anti-Communism and, in some cases, for ultra-right organizations. Many of these men reflected the factional struggles within the Soviet Union, between Stalin and Trotsky, for the most part, but also between Stalin and Bukharin. . . But in recoiling from such transgressions, many American leftists went far in the opposite direction, centering their new dogma in the primacy of communism as the enemy of mankind, and joining with certain rightists, on occasion, whom they would have eschewed in the past. The establishment, instead of finding resistance to its negative, Anti-Communist policy, was thus reinforced. Where in the first postwar period the establishment's hysteria was counteracted by liberals and radicals, in the second postwar period it was aided and abetted by many radical defectors. The ex-radical, like the civilian militarist, found a new and exciting place in the sun. The phenomenon was so widespread it prompted the witticism from Ignazio Silone that the next war would be fought between communists and ex-communists.[33]

Like the socialists who moved comfortably into the establishment's new conservatism, "the nucleus of the ADA was a group of dissident former socialists."[34] Led by ex-socialists such as Walter Reuther and James Loeb, the Americans for Democratic Action sought to maintain their channels to government power through participation in the Anti-Communist Crusade. Ekirch sketched the dangers of that policy:

> What many anti-communist liberals overlooked, in the zeal of their often new-found faith, was that a society could create a class of political untouchables only at the peril of being itself affected by the very virus it sought to isolate. The danger in the anti-radical and anti-communist crusade after World War II did not stem primarily from the irresponsible tactics of the various Congressional investigating committees or individuals like Senator Joseph McCarthy, reprehensible though their methods were. "McCarthyism," after all, was a result or a symptom, not a cause. The danger rather lay in the assumption that there was a minority class or group of political lepers guilty of so-called wrong thinking. The contention, popular with some liberals, that communism was not heresy but conspiracy, even if true, overlooked the fact that all heresy which went beyond mere academic protest contained the seeds of possible conspiracy and subversion.[35]

In contrast to the socialist-oriented ADA, those New Dealers who had come from a liberal or reform tradition - businessmen and leaders of farmer, labor and civil rights groups - naturally took a position more firmly based on the traditional principles of American liberalism. Important segments of the business community at the end of World War II considered American capitalism's prosperity dependent on peace and American - Soviet friendship; and the major business figures of the Roosevelt cabinet, Harold Ickes, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and Henry Wallace led in the founding of

33. Lens, op. cit., pp. 65, 72-74.
34. Ibid., p. 27.
35. Ekirch, American Liberalism, p. 343.

the Progressive Citizens of America. The PCA sought to act on the principles of American capitalism and to cooperate with the Soviet Union to achieve world peace and prosperity through the liquidation of imperialism and feudalism, and the development of international trade. The ex-radical and anti-communist crusader, Eugene Lyons, recognized the socialist basis of anti-communism and the capitalist basis of Soviet-American cooperation when he noted that "organized labor, being more consciously anti-Communist than some capitalists, has gone sour on Wallace."[36] However, the enthusiasm of these New Deal businessmen carried them dangerously close to condoning American imperialism through its vanguard, the government's foreign aid program. Williams directs attention to this flaw in his examination of the opposition to Henry Wallace's desire to expand his role as secretary of commerce to gaining direct government subsidies for American corporations:

> Wallace's version of the expansionist outlook won him sharp criticism from Senator Robert A. Taft. Along with his repeated warnings that American policy might well provoke the Soviets into even more militant retaliation, and perhaps even war, Taft's attack on Wallace serves to illustrate the misleading nature of the popular stereotype of the Senator. Taft immediately spotted the contradiction between the rhetoric of the New Deal and the reality of its policies. "Dollar diplomacy is decried," he commented very pointedly in 1945, "although it is exactly the policy of Government aid to our exporters which Mr. Wallace himself advocates to develop foreign trade, except that it did not (in its earlier forms) involve our lending abroad the money to pay for all our exports."

Yet despite the perceptiveness of his analysis, Taft stood virtually alone.[37] As indicated by Williams, if the stereotypes of American politics are discarded for the reality, Senator Taft and the isolationists remained the most consistently committed to the traditional principles of American liberalism. This is seen in their opposition to American imperialism and to American support of imperialist regimes abroad through foreign aid, as well as to the American provocations to the Soviet Union which created the Cold War and could cause World War III. Taft strongly opposed the almost four billion dollar loan to Great Britain which permitted the maintenance of its colonial system and of its military interventions in support of Greek rightists and of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. In addition, American capabilities for imperialism would have been drastically reduced by Taft's proposals for ending the draft, limiting executive power, reducing government revenues, and recalling American troops from centers of friction in Asia and Europe. The American occupation armies particularly provided an excuse for continuing the war-time importance of the military in decision-making and for keeping American forces on the threshold of the Soviet Union.

The World War II policy of total war had given the military unprecedented power. The American conduct of the war repeated the World War I policy of total war, unconditional surrender and application of the concept of "guilty" nations. This policy, including the indiscriminate strategic bombing of civilian populations

36. American Mercury (August, 1947), p. 137.
37. Williams, American Diplomacy, p. 238.

culminating in the first and only use of atomic weapons in warfare, could not but alienate those who consistently maintained the values of American liberalism. But after the killing ended, more basic military developments continued into the post-war era, especially their new-found role in decision-making and in holding key ambassadorial posts. Along with Lens, Ekirch has emphasized that the very continuation after the war of the military role in decision-making markedly altered American policy:

> Such vast military expenditures naturally gave the armed forces increasing influence within the government, and top military men moved into key positions in federal agencies. Admiral William D. Leahy stayed on at the White House as President Truman's personal military adviser or private chief of staff. General Marshall replaced James Byrnes as Secretary of State, and the department itself came more and more under military control. Abroad in overseas posts, General Walter B. Smith, United States Ambassador to Russia, General Lucius Clay, High Commissioner of the American occupied zone in Germany, and General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commissioner for Japan, gave a militarist cast to our postwar policy. At home, unification of the armed forces in a single department and establishment of the National Security Council enabled the Secretary of National Defense to work with the State Department in determining foreign policy.
>
> The practical results of the new integration of American foreign and military policy was the continued acceptance of the doctrine of peace through strength. The first step in this direction had been the wartime Allied insistence on the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers and the military occupation of their territory. ... Military control of American foreign policy, as a wide variety of critical observers pointed out, involved not only a sharp break with the American past but also posed a strong threat to peace and democracy. The military's lifelong identification with the use of force and contempt for the workings of diplomacy was viewed in the long run as likely to lead the United States into war. Even if such a contingency were avoided, there was the danger that the almost exclusive reliance on armed power in the conduct of American foreign relations would go far to stifle the workings of democracy at home.[38]

As indicated by Ekirch, the total war policy led directly to the post-war policy of occupation by large forces of American troops as the first step to postwar military participation in decision-making. Not only did military government involve a confusion of military and political roles inconsistent with American traditions, but American military leaders gained important influence since American occupation forces were located at the very edge of the Soviet Union's security zones. To insure proper coordination between the military and civilian authorities, State Department officials came to be trained by the National War College. And American foreign policy was partially determined by the Secretary of Defense in the National Security Council advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as a special national security staff and central intelligence agency which were beyond the regular diplomacy of the State Department.[39]

38. Arthur A. Ekrich, Jr., The Civilian and the Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 273-75.
39. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 244-45.

The role of the military was further aggrandized by the uncritical admiration for military leaders of the first post-war presidential incumbent. Ekirch notes:

> Even before relations with Russia descended to the point of an avowed cold war, the armed forces began to exert their influence upon American foreign policy. Somewhat paradoxically, this influence became greater in peace than it had been in war, when President Roosevelt and his civilian advisers had exercised a large measure of control over military strategy as well as over general foreign and domestic policy. In contrast to his predecessor, President Truman seemed peculiarly susceptible to military influence and advice. "No President since Grant," as Sumner Welles later wrote with some malice, "has had such childlike faith in the omniscience of the high brass as the present occupant of the White House." "The truth is," Oswald Garrison Villard wrote to Charles Beard, "we have a highly militaristic, lower middle class, back-slapping American legionnaire in the White House who has given free rein to the Militarists, and we are being made over under our own eyes into a tremendous military imperialistic Power--exactly what we went to war with Germany to prevent their becoming!"[40]

This was borne out on March 5, 1946 when, at the instigation and in the applauding presence of President Truman, Winston Churchill proclaimed America's world primacy on the basis of its overwhelming military power. Through a theory of racial superiority by which the English-speaking nations were destined to determine the fate of the world's peoples, Churchill called for the maintenance of the special alliance among the English-speaking states founded on America's military dominance. This alliance would intervene to prevent conflict and insure the existence of regimes conforming to the rules issuing from the master English-speaking race. Except in English-speaking countries benefiting from this status quo, opposition parties and revolutionary movements had arisen against privilege, feudalism and imperialism (as President Roosevelt had foreseen). In the absence of Roosevelt's intended liquidation of imperialism under the leadership of the United States with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, the resistance to national liberation by English military intervention supported by American aid, caused these opposition and revolutionary movements to seek the diplomatic guidance and material aid of the Soviet Union (as President Roosevelt had also foreseen). According to Churchill, timely action would defeat the challenge to Christian civilization by the revolutionary movements under absolute obedience to the orders of international Communism, and the Soviet Union in turn would be forced to accept a world system dominated by Anglo-American strength. Since America's interests in Asia insured its continued attention to China, Churchill emphasized Europe and the Middle East. The English-speaking alliance had to maintain its control of Greece, Turkey and Iran, which dominated the invasion routes to southern Russia and the approaches to the Anglo-American oil concessions in the Middle East. The popularly supported communist parties of Western Europe had to be checked.

However, it was events in Central and Eastern Europe that most aggravated Churchill, and he sought to have the United States

40. Ekirch, American Liberalism, p. 323.

reverse the policy of President Roosevelt of recognizing Russia's security needs in Eastern Europe through the formation of friendly governments in that area. His suggestion that "an iron curtain has descended across the Continent" over the security zone granted to the Soviet Union under the Three Power accords, echoed almost to a year Joseph Goebbels' similar outburst at the temporary failure of the German generals to gain American support of German power aimed at the Soviet Union. On February 23, 1945 Goebbels had lashed out at the Allied unity established at Yalta:

> the agreement between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin would allow the Soviets to occupy all Eastern and Southeastern Europe, together with the major part of the Reich. An iron curtain would at once descend on this territory which, including the Soviet Union, would be of tremendous dimensions. Behind this curtain there would then begin a mass slaughter of peoples, probably with acclamation from the Jewish press in London and New York.[41]

Churchill had only begrudgingly accepted the World War II alliance with the Soviet Union; he had reminded Russia that he considered her an evil equal to the German threat which had to be destroyed, and that he had been a leader in the intervention in Russia and the creation of the "cordon sanitaire" states in Eastern Europe. Churchill knew that his harsh words were supported by more than America's general military superiority. The American forces of occupation in Germany were located on the very edge of the security zone granted to the Soviet Union and in the very midst of the European cockpit from which the two world wars had been spawned. American military commanders had direct charge of the most significant diplomatic negotiations affecting the vital security of the Soviet Union, and their crucial changes in American policies in Germany immediately following Truman's applause of Churchill's speech, were major steps in the development of the Cold War. Williams has described this development:

> ... on May 3, 1946, the United States abruptly and unilaterally announced that it was terminating reparations to Russia from the Western zones of occupied Germany. These reparations, never large, had been arranged as part of interzone economic rehabilitation after the Potsdam Conference.
>
> This decision, apparently taken on his own responsibility by General Lucius Clay, the Military Governor of the American zone, very probably had a crucial effect on the deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. ... By cutting off reparations so soon thereafter (Churchill's speech) from the western, industrial zones of Germany, Clay in effect put real and positive, as well as verbal and negative, pressure on the Russians.[42]

Already General Clay had assumed the lead in the creation of a huge radio station in Germany to broadcast American propaganda to Russia and Eastern Europe, when the State Department decided to launch the Voice of America as the continuation of Elmer Davis' OWI and Nelson Rockefeller's OIAA. When the Russians criticized Clay's German policies, Clay encouraged Secretary of State Byrnes

41. John Lukacs, Decline and Rise of Europe (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), p. 47; Smith, op. cit., p. 270.
42. Williams, American Diplomacy, pp. 259-61; Smith, op. cit., pp. 117-21.

to make a major policy declaration in support of his actions in Germany. Clay provided an impressive setting for Byrnes' Stuttgart speech delivered before the American occupation forces in Germany on September 6, 1946. Byrnes' proposals added up to an American attempt to use Germany for American military purposes while excluding Russian influence. He rejected controls to prevent German remilitarization based on the Ruhr industries, and declared that American forces would "remain in Germany for a long period" after the end of the occupation. Byrnes received immediate personal congratulations for his Stuttgart ultimata from Winston Churchill.[43]

Within a week, Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace made a general criticism of American foreign policy, including the German policy of Byrnes and Clay and the growing American support of the British military intervention in the Greek civil war. And the debate on foreign policy quickly became nation-wide when President Truman forced Wallace to resign. Professor Clyde Eagleton suggested that the United States should act properly before complaining about Russia, and that the American government should learn not to seek foreign scapegoats to blame for world problems, especially when the United States had contributed to the development of those problems. He noted that the United States was creating a global sphere of influence extending to Europe and Africa and the Far East. By MacArthur's monopolization of Allied control in Japan and American intervention in the Chinese civil war, and by the demand that American influence in Europe be increased by joint Allied controls, the United States was creating the conditions for a response from Russia in the form of greater security along its borders in Eastern Europe and Manchuria. Of the major post-war interventions-England in Greece and Indonesia, the United States in China, and Russia in north-western Iran only the Russians in Iran had withdrawn, and in response the Americans might be forced out of their influence in China.[44] In his article, "Isolationism and the Middle West", Professor William Carleton predicted that the traditional supporters of an American alliance with England would support American imperialism--the natural ally, partner and heir of the objectives and concessions of English imperialism, as for example in the Middle East oil cartel. In contrast, the Americans who were committed to the traditional liberal principles of anti-imperialism and isolationism would continue to oppose the American alliance with England; in this way they would aid rather than combat the inevitable movements of national liberation whose struggles to end imperialist exploitation by allied American and English interests would otherwise turn America away from cooperation with the Soviet Union and toward a possible World War III. Thus, the choice for American foreign policy was whether or not America would accept Churchill's policy and become for the rest of the world the "citadel of reaction," supporting through American military and foreign aid the exploitation of the world's peoples by the feudal landlords, monopolists and war lords.[45]

On October 5, 1946, a month before the important post-war

43. Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 187-96, 242, 253.
44. Ekirch, Voices in Dissent, pp. 294-95, 299.
45. William Carleton, "Isolationism and the Middle West," Mississippi Valley Historical Review (December, 1946), pp. 377-90.

Congressional elections, Senator Taft delivered a widely- publicized speech at the Kenyon College symposium on English-speaking peoples. Under the title "Equal Justice under Law", Taft offered a strong attack upon the premisses that had formed the basis for Churchill's declaration of the Cold War and his proclamation of world rule. Taft questioned whether the English-speaking peoples had in fact maintained the traditional principles of liberty and justice, an assumption on which was based the Truman Administration's adoption of Churchill's policies. Instead, in domestic and foreign affairs the American government had greatly restricted or denied fundamental civil liberties, and a new philosophy of increased government power had been substituted for traditional liberty and justice:

> Of course the new philosophy has been promoted by two world wars, for war is a denial both of liberty and of justice.[46]

An immediate example of the denial of international justice was the ex post facto war trials in Germany and Japan, which had been anticipated by General MacArthur's summary trial and execution of General Yamashita in which the United States Supreme Court had refused to intervene.[47] But the Truman foreign policy had generally abandoned international law and substituted naked power politics as a so-called world policeman; here it followed in the footsteps of English imperialism, which had also claimed to be the world policeman. Taft noted that the Truman policy had lost sight of the basic truth that the policeman is incidental to the law, and that without adherence to domestic or to international law a domestic or so-called world policeman is a tyrant and creator of disorder or anarchy.

> This whole policy is no accident. For years we have been accepting at home the theory that the people are too dumb to understand and that a benevolent Executive must be given power to describe policy and administer policy ... Such a policy in the world, as at home, can only lead to tyranny or to anarchy.[48]

Thus, an Administration which denied the capacity of Americans for self-government would certainly deny the capacity for self-government of other peoples in the world and would intervene to support the paternalism of feudal landlords, monopolists, bureaucrats and war lords. Taft emphasized that the existing problems and American reactions were the direct results of the American intervention in World War II. The American opposition to neutralism during the war had created the attitude that no country could be neutral in the Cold War. The barbarism during the war and the year after its end had caused the grave crisis in American attitudes which had launched the Cold War:

> Our whole attitude in the world, for a year after V-E Day, including the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, seems to me a departure from the principle of fair and equal treatment which has made America respected throughout the world before the second World War.[49]

Taft concluded with the hope that the English-speaking peoples would recover from the post-war disillusionment caused by the

46. Ekirch, Voices in Dissent, p. 312.
47. Ibid., p. 321; 1946 Britannica Book of the Year (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1946), p. 852.
48. Ekirch, Voices in Dissent, p. 319.
49. Ibid., p. 321.

barbarity of World War II and would replace the Churchill-Truman foreign policy of force and imperialist world policeman with a restoration of justice and liberty.

Although the Republicans won the 1946 Congressional elections, the well-known division in that party between the internationalists and the isolationists permitted the Truman Administration to gain the support of the internationalist Republicans for a bipartisan foreign policy and to frustrate attempts to restrict American imperialism. With the power and publicity facilities of the Executive Department, President Truman was able to seize the initiative by declaration of the Truman Doctrine of aid to the Greek and Turkish governments, on March 12, 1947. In place of English imperialism's collapsing effort to impose an oppressive rightist government and suppress the movement for Greek national liberation, American money, arms, planes and military "advisers" would be rushed to Greece. Lens notes the varied reactions in America to Truman's challenge to national liberation movements by dividing the world into two camps:

> The decisive moment for the pragmatic liberal came in 1947 when Harry Truman promulgated the Truman Doctrine. The Cold War was now formalized. The Progressive Citizens of America immediately denounced the plan as an "invitation to war," replacing the "American policy based on one world" for one which "divides the world into two camps." The Nation decried the Doctrine as "a plain declaration of political war against Russia," and the New Republic said "the U. S. is now ready to excuse unholy alliances of its own by adopting the apology that the end might justify the means." But the ADA ... endorsed the Doctrine. ... On this, the decisive issue of our time, the gap between the ADA and the conservatives narrowed to derivative and peripheral issues, such as the extent of economic aid.[50]

Against this bipartisan unity of the ADA and the conservatives, the isolationists alone offered an effective challenge in Congress; they opposed American military assistance to support the Truman Doctrine because they viewed it as the formal launching of a war against the Soviet Union. Senator Taft denounced Truman's intention "to make a loan to set up armies in Greece and Turkey against Russia,"[51] and Truman's "policy of dividing the world into zones of political influence, Communist and non-Communist."[52] The isolationists feared that Truman's program would create a cartelized, monopolistic American economy based on government contracts which, whether or not a Cold War remained, would create an undemocratic domestic atmosphere. Representative George Bender, leading Taft spokesman in the House and later his successor in the Senate, maintained a consistent critique of Truman's launching of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. In an attack on the corrupt Greek government and the fradulent elections which had kept it in power, Bender declared, on March 28, 1947:

> I believe that the White House program is a reaffirmation of the nineteenth century belief in power politics. It is a refinement of the policy first adopted after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 designed to encircle Russia and establish a "Cordon

50. Lens, op. cit., pp. 31-32; Smith, op. cit., pp. 224-40.
51. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, p. 3031.
52. Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), pp. 174-75.

Sanitaire" around the Soviet Union. It is a program which points to a new policy of interventionism in Europe as a corollary to our Monroe Doctrine in South America. Let there be no mistake about the far-reaching implications of this plan. Once we have taken the historic step of sending financial aid, military experts and loans to Greece and Turkey, we shall be irrevocably committed to a course of action from which it will be impossible to withdraw. More and larger demands will follow. Greater needs will arise throughout the many areas of friction in the world.[53]

Bender was among the few Congressional defenders of Henry Wallace when the latter was widely attacked for his proposals, made in England and France, that Europe oppose the Truman Doctrine's division of the world into two camps and instead act as a balance between them. Wallace's speeches in Europe led to a bipartisan demand for the revocation of his passport; and in answer to such attacks as Representative Kenneth Keating's accusation of treason against Wallace, Bender lashed out at the open season on Wallace. Bender replied to Churchill's attack on Wallace for speaking abroad, that if Churchill could seek to launch the Cold War by speeches in America, Wallace could seek to prevent that war by speeches in Europe.[54]

What appears to be an impossible unity of 'left' and 'right', a unity contrary to the whole system of stereotypes created for America's recent history, was well and fearfully understood by the Truman Administration. For the Administration knew that the success of its bipartisan foreign policy depended on division among the groups opposed to American imperialism. Joseph M. Jones, who played an important role in the development of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, has revealed such understanding:

Most of the outright opposition came from the extreme Left and the extreme Right of the political spectrum; from a certain school of "liberals" who had long been strongly critical of the administration's stiffening policy toward the Soviet Union, and from the "isolationists" who had been consistent opponents of all foreign-policy measures that projected the United States actively into World affairs. Thus Henry A. Wallace, Fiorello La Guardia, Senators Claude Pepper and Glen H. Taylor found themselves in the same bed with Colonel Robert McCormick, John O'Donnell, Representatives Harold Knutson and Everett M. Dirksen; and the Marshall Field papers (P. M. and the Chicago Sun), the Chicago Daily News, the Nation, the New Republic and the Christian Century found themselves in the same corner with the McCormick-Patterson press. The opposition of the Left emphasized that American aid to the existing Greek and Turkish governments would not promote freedom but would protect anti-democratic and reactionary regimes; and that the proposed action by-passed the United Nations and endangered its future. The opposition of the Right emphasized that the President's policy would probably, if not inevitably, lead to war; and that the American economy could not stand the strains of trying to stop Communism with dollars. But both Right and Left used the full range of arguments in a bitter attack. "Power politics," "militarism," "intervention," were charged against the adminis-

53. Cong. Record, 80th Congress, pp. 2831-32.
54. Ibid., pp. 3350-54.

tration. "You can't fight Communism with dollars," "the new policy means the end of One World," "the Moscow Conference will be undermined," "We should not bail out the British Empire" --these were among the arguments used.[55]

The military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey engendered the strongest partisanship of any foreign policy bill before the Congress in that session. While receiving almost unanimous Democratic support, it met the strongest opposition from a deeply divided Republican party. The only comparably strong isolationist action in the Eightieth Congress was the even larger Republican vote against the bipartisan reimposition of Selective Service in 1948; this vote came after the Republicans had honored their campaign commitment to end the draft by letting it expire despite Truman's militaristic appeals for renewal.

An over-all criticism of the bipartisan foreign policy was presented by Rep. Bender, on June 6, 1947, during the debate on Representative Karl Mundt's attempt to give a cover of legality to the Voice of America program which the State Department had been operating. Bender said:

> The Voice of America broadcasts are just one piece of the Truman Doctrine.
>
> The pieces are beginning to fall into place, and the pattern is becoming clear. It is not a pretty pattern; it is not a pattern which the people of the United States can look on with confidence or with a sense of hope for the future.... But we have learned to look behind the titles or labels of measures prepared by the Truman administration.
>
> The Greek-Turkey-aid bill was presented to this Congress as a humanitarian measure, designed to relieve hunger and suffering. The Truman administration attempted to conceal and disguise its true character, which was admitted only after the measure was subjected to searching examination on the floor of the House. Then it was admitted that all of the so-called aid to Turkey was to be military aid, and most of the aid to Greece was to be military aid. The humanitarian purpose turned out to be hypocrisy.
>
> No, we must look behind the high-sounding title in the present bill about the interchange of knowledge and seek out the true character of this measure. Its true character is not difficult to discover. The Voice of America program is nothing more or less than the propaganda arm of the Truman Doctrine. It is just one more piece in the pattern of the Truman adventure in international relations.
>
> What are some of the other pieces in the Truman program which have become apparent in the past few days?
>
> On May 26, Mr. Truman urged the Congress to authorize a program of military collaboration with all the petty and not so petty dictators of South America. Mr. Truman submitted a draft bill which would authorize the United States to take over the arming of South America on a scale far beyond that involved in the $400,000,000 hand-out to Greece and Turkey.
>
> Mr. Truman continued his campaign for universal peacetime military training in the United States ....
>
> But military control at home is a part of the emerging Truman program. The Truman administration is using all its propaganda resources in an attempt to soften up the American people to accept this idea.

55. Jones, op. cit., p. 177.

Yes; the Truman administration is busy in its attempt to sell the idea of military control to the people of America. And hand in hand with the propaganda campaign go secret meetings for industrial mobilization.

This is the kind of thing which is taking place behind barred doors in the Pentagon Building, about which the people of the United States learn only by accident. This is a part of the emerging Truman program.

It is against this backgound that the Voice of America program must be considered. This vast foreign propaganda machine prepared by the administration is a part of this program. It is a part just as Mr. Truman's friendship with the dictator Peron of South America is a part. It is a part just as Mr. Truman's eagerness for universal military training in the United States is a part. It is a part just as Mr. Truman's proposal for arming every South American country to the teeth is a part. It is a part of the whole Truman doctrine of drawing off the resources of the United States in support of every reactionary government in the world.

I am opposed to the Voice of America just as I am opposed to every part of the dangerous and irresponsible Truman doctrine.[56]

Against Rep. Bender and in favor of Rep. Mundt's Voice of America bill, Representative Walter Judd declared that it was absolutely necessary to combat the belief of the Chinese people that there were still one hundred thousand American troops aiding Chiang's armies; instead, there were now only about ten thousand American troops in China. Another common belief held that Chiang's 'China Lobby' in Washington had granted privileges and concessions to Americans who had helped Chiang get American foreign aid; also, that the Sino-American commercial treaty of November, 1946, had opened China to American economic exploitation. From Judd's wide contacts inside the Chiang regime, he suggested that the Chinese people had been asking such embarrassing questions as:

Is it true that American troops in China number 100,000?.... Is it true that the new Sino-American commercial treaty makes China a vassal of America?[57]

But Rep. Bender and the isolationists in Congress were not unprepared; they had already experienced the strength of the China Lobby in gaining the American loans, American foreign aid, and American economic snactions against Japan which had led to American intervention in World War II. Rep. Bender, in an attack on Truman's support of the fascist Greek dictatorship, indicated that this aid would become a precedent for the support of other fascist dictatorships, especially the reactionary Chiang regime. Already, the powerful China Lobby in Washington was seeking to get the Administration to struggle against the Congressional isolationists who had slashed foreign aid to Chiang. On May 7, 1947 Rep. Bender warned the Congress of the China Lobby's "intense pressure placed upon our State Department:"

I charge here on the floor of the House that the Chinese Embassy here has had the arrogance to invade our State Department and attempt to tell our State Department that the Truman Doctrine has committed our Government and this Congress to all-out

56. Cong. Record, 80th Congress, pp. 6562-63.
57. Ibid., pp. 6547-6551.

support of the present Fascist Chinese Government.[58]

Early in 1947, the internationalist Republicans, led by Senator Arthur Vandenburg and State Department Adviser John Foster Dulles, initiated a campaign for heavy American aid to the Nationalist Chinese and against the isolationist Republicans who had opposed aid to Chiang. At that time, American troops in China were being reduced to 12,000 men while an United States Military Advisory Group sought to develop a modern Nationalist army. But, at the end of the war in September, 1945, as an addition to the sixty thousand American troops already in China another fifty-three thousand American marines were sent into North China where the Chinese Communists had wrested control of the countryside from the Japanese. The United States air-lifted and shipped a half million Nationalist troops to North China and Manchuria, where the Russians turned over the cities they had occupied to the Nationalist forces. The Chinese Communists protested the involvement of over one hundred thousand American troops in the internal affairs of China, but withdrew before the American marines and the American-equipped Nationalist armies. It was not until one year later that the American marines began to be withdrawn from North China, and they turned over thousands of tons of their equipment to the Nationalist armies. The arms, however, were eventually lost to the Communists, who were generally equipped with American arms.[59] America's crucial role against the Chinese Communists in the civil war was described at the time by two American reporters, Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby:

> Americans must realize now one of the hard facts of Chinese politics-that in the eyes of millions of the Chinese their civil war was made in America. We were the architects of its strategy; we flew government troops into Communist territory, we transported and supplied Kuomintang armies marching into the Communists' Yellow River basin and into the no man's land of Manchuria, we issued the orders to the Japanese garrisons that made the railway lines of the north the spoils of civil war. Our marines were moved into North China and remained there to support Chinag's regime - though fiction succeeded fiction to explain their continued presence in noble words. . . When the Japanese began to leave and that fiction exploded, they remained to counter the Russian troops in Manchuria. When the Russians evacuated Manchuria and that fiction too exploded, it was announced that the marines were remaining indefinitely merely to "guard" supply lines from coal mines to the coast. These fictions hold only for the American people themselves; in China it is clear to all that the chief duty of our marines there is to preserve, protect, and defend Chiang K'ai-shek's government in the northern areas where he is under attack. Both parties in China realize this. . . The Communists, too, realize it; all

58. Ibid., p. 4694; Felix Greene, A Curtain of Ignorance (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1964), p. 48.
59. Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 448-49; O. Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 250-63, 276-79; Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 362-63, 396-401, 420-27.
60. White and Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 318-19.

North China and Manchuria might have been theirs long since had it not been for American intervention, and their bitterness has grown with each passing month.[60]

When General George Marshall proposed the Marshall Plan in 1947 as an economic lever upon Western European governments to create the basis for a military system directed against the Soviet Union, Senator Taft undertook a campaign to defeat it.

> Taft said that he was "absolutely opposed" to extending $2,657 million in additional foreign aid. . . In his view, granting aid to Europe would only furnish the Communists with further arguments against the "imperialist" policy of the United States.[61]

Taft declared on September 25, 1947:

> I have not believed that Russia intends or desires conquest by force of arms of additional territory.[62]

Although the internationalist Republicans supported the bipartisan foreign policy and foreign aid, under the leadership of Senator Vandenburg and Governor Thomas E. Dewey they conditioned their support for the Marshall Plan upon the Administration's inclusion of aid to Chiang. Faced by a choice between the isolationists and the China Lobby, Truman did not hesitate to support the China Lobby and to commit his Administration to the support of the Chiang regime:

> For the greatest danger confronting the global policy of the administration, of which the Marshall Plan was the key, came not so much from the China bloc in Congress, of which Judd and Vorys in the House and Bridges in the Senate were the leading figures, as from the combined forces of the economy bloc and the unreconstructed isolationists, of which Representative John Taber in the House and Taft in the Senate were the spokesmen. Subsequent events show that by making limited concessions to the China bloc, the administration succeeded in averting serious opposition from that quarter to its European program.[63]

Nevertheless, the isolationists maintained their criticism of the Marshall Plan, and were not deterred by the claim that without foreign aid European peoples might elect governments that included Communists. Taft answered that this would only be proof that capitalism, well-developed in America, had hardly received application elsewhere and that America's granting of funds to the privilege-ridden, cartel-minded European bureaucrats and businessmen would not reduce Communist votes in Italy and France. For the non-capitalist mentality of such governments would prevent the peoples from receiving the benefit of foreign aid. In place of Truman's threat to use military aggression as it did in Greece to battle Communist opposition, Taft opposed the use of military intervention; he would limit American action to ending American aid when Communists had assumed power. Taft insisted that America's conflict with the Soviet Union was purely one of ideas and ideology for the minds of men, and not a physical battle as Truman claimed. Characteristic was Taft's response to the settlement by the leftist majority in the Czechoslovak government of the crisis caused by the resignation of the rightist minority.

61. Tang Tsou, op. cit., pp. 465-66.
62. United Labor League of Ohio, A Speakers' Handbook on Robert Alphonso Taft, 1950, p. 166.
63. Tang Tsou, op. cit., p. 470.

Taft held that this was "just a consolidation of the Russian sphere of influence," and that he "had no knowledge of any Russian intention for initiating aggression."[64] As Williams indicates, unlike the internationalist Republicans, Senator Taft opposed the attempts of the Truman Administration to proclaim a Russian menace and create a crisis atmosphere whenever it wished to rally support for foreign intervention against the isolationist opposition. When Truman attempted to use domestic political developments in Czechoslovakia to gain passage of the Marshall Plan, Taft declared, on March 12, 1948:

> I do not quite understand the statements made yesterday by Secretary Marshall and President Truman. They do not imply that they believe that we do face a war question; and then they seem to use the concern which is aroused to urge the passage of this particular program. I do not believe that the two are connected. . . .
>
> I believe that the tone of the President's statement that his confidence in ultimate world peace has been shaken is unfortunate. Certainly it is no argument for the passage of the present bill. . . . But let me say that I myself know of no particular indication of Russian intentions to undertake military aggression beyond the sphere of influence which was originally assigned to the Russians. The situation in Czechoslovakia is indeed a tragic one; but the Russian influence has been predominant in Czechoslovakia since the end of the war. The Communists are merely consolidating their position in Czechoslovakia; but there has been no military aggression, since the end of the war.[65]

Charles A. Beard found that the good objectives by which "the advocates of war in the name of perpetual and durable peace" had justified American intervention in World War II remained unfulfilled. The development of a siege or fortress mentality in America, a permanent draft, high arms budgets, high taxes and a huge national debt--all of which the defeat of German dominance in Europe was supposed to prevent--were installed and institutionalized by the war.

> Furthermore, it was now claimed by former advocates of war that huge armed forces were necessary in "peacetime" to "secure the fruits of victory" and "win the peace" by extirpating the spirit of tyranny in Germany and Japan, and by restraining the expansion of Russian imperial power. . . .
>
> In 1947, under President Truman's direction, the Government of the United States set out on an unlimited program of underwriting by money and military "advice," poverty-striken, feeble, and instable governments (around the Soviet Union). . . Of necessity, if this program was to be more than a brutum fulmen, it had to be predicated upon present and ultimate support by the blood and treasure of the United States. . . In short, with the Government of the United States committed under a so-called bipartisan foreign policy to supporting by money and other forms of power for an indefinite time an indefinite number of other governments around the globe, the domestic affairs of the American people became appendages to an aleatory expedition in the management of the world.[66]

64. Labor League, op. cit., p. 167; Smith, op. cit., pp. 343-48.
65. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 2643-44.
66. Ekirch, Voices in Dissent, pp. 337-40.

The Truman Administration's next global intervention in its Anti-Communist Crusade, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was thoroughly criticized by American isolationists on the ground that America's re-arming of Europe against the Soviet Union, which had not shown aggressive intent, would increase world tension and would require Soviet moves in self-defense leading to a world war. Against the Truman Administration, Senator Taft insisted that the Soviet Union did not use war as an instrument of national policy; however, in self-defense against American interventions like the Truman Doctrine and NATO, the Soviet Union might be forced to use similar means. NATO "was likely to incite Russia to start a war because of the threat involved to its satellite countries and therefore to its own safety."[67] Sharing the views of such other critics of Truman's policies as Walter Lippmann, Taft said:

> In Europe the building up of a great army surrounding Russia from Norway to Turkey and Iran might produce a fear of the invasion of Russia or some of the satellite countries regarded by Russia as essential to the defense of Moscow.[68]

Taft shared the concern which President Roosevelt had shown to respect the fears of the Soviet Union about security in its vicinity. Although he did not care for the methods used at Yalta, Taft insisted that the United States was required to observe its international obligations under the Yalta agreement rather than compound the trouble by further treaty involvements in Europe. Along with the growing American tendency to disregard international law, such entanglement would lead to further American betrayals of its treaty obligations, this time to its European allies. The American government's insincere recourse to treaty built upon treaty was repugnant to Taft's sense of international law and justice. Taft said:

> I voted against it (NATO) because I felt it was contrary to the whole theory of the United Nations charter . . . because I felt that it might develop aggressive features more likely to incite Russia to war than to deter it from war. . . (NATO was) a violation of its (UN's) spirit if not its language. The pact apparently is not made under Articles 52 to 54, inclusive, because we do not propose to consult the Security Council as there contemplated, we do plan to take enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council, and we do not plan to keep it fully informed. . . An undertaking by the most powerful nation in the world to arm half the world against the other half goes far beyond any "right of collective defense if an armed attack occurs." It violates the whole spirit of the United Nations Charter. That charter looks to the reduction of armaments by agreement between individual nations. The Atlantic Pact moves in exactly the opposite direction from the purposes of the charter and makes a farce of further efforts to secure international justice through law and justice. It necessarily divides the world into two armed camps. . . . This treaty, therefore, means inevitably an armament race, and armament races in the past have led to war.[69]

In a major debate over NATO between Senators Taft and John Foster Dulles (July 11-12, 1949), Taft insisted that the alliance

67. Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1951), p. 91.
68. Ibid., p. 113.
69. Ibid., pp. 89-90.

was a rejection not only of the United Nations Charter and international law, but also of Soviet-American negotiations. It also reflected dominance over American policy of the soldiers and advisers of the Defense establishment rather than the diplomats and experts of the State Department. Taft said, in the debate of July 11, 1949:

> I cannot vote for a treaty which, in my opinion, will do far more to bring about a third world war than it ever will to maintain the peace of the world.[70]

Taft's speeches received the following welcome in the Daily Worker, July 13, 1949:

> Senator Robert Taft's announced opposition to the Atlantic Pact is a political fact of real significance.[71]

Such support along with such statements by Taft as:

> No Russian military attack is threatened in Western Europe. (The Russians) have not moved beyond the borders agreed to at Yalta (July, 1949),[72]

or,

> Does the Russian possession of the atomic bomb make a third world war likely? On the whole I do not think so. I certainly do not pretend to understand the Russian mind, but for four years they have shown no intention of making a military advance beyond the zones of influence in Central Europe and Manchuria allotted to them at Yalta (October, 1949),[73]

led to Democratic charges during his re-election campaign in 1950 which renewed the question of Taft's loyalty that had been raised because of his opposition to intervention in World War II. Taft's loyalty was attacked because of his opposition to the Cold War against Russia, his refusal to consider the Soviet Union an enemy or a danger to the American people, and his insistence upon settlement of disputes with Russia through ordinary diplomacy rather than military encirclement. Taft was contrasted with Truman, who was praised for his so-called wisdom in torpedoing the Yalta agreement and in supporting the Chiang regime; Taft, on the other hand, was criticized for insisting on American fulfillment of its Yalta obligations and for his lack of support for aid to Chiang against the Chinese Communists.[74]

More than three billion dollars were expended in military aid to Chiang, most of which came quickly into the hands of the Chinese Communists. (General Chu Teh said: "In these operations we have seized much United States equipment. It is very good. We hope to get more of it."[75]) Yet, the Chiang regime, in December, 1949, fled from China to Formosa which, as a former Japanese possession, was occupied by China until formal settlement by the postponed Japanese peace conference. Preceded by the governments of India, Burma and Pakistan, Britain recognized the Chinese People's Republic on January 5, 1950, followed rapidly by the Scandinavian countries and some Asian governments (the Soviet bloc countries had done so during October, 1949). On January 8, the Chinese People's Republic requested the UN Security Council to accept its seating as the legal and effective govern-

70. Vital Speeches, 15 (August 1, 1949), 610-24.
71. Labor League, op. cit., pp. 168-69.
72. Ibid., p. 169.
73. Ibid., p. 170.
74. Ibid., passim.
75. Lens, op. cit., p. 110.

ment, and this was officially moved on January 10 by the Soviet Union. On January 11, Taft addressed himself to the question of America's relations with China and with Formosa. If the Truman Administration's commitment to an Anti-Communist Crusade in China was correct, why were huge sums sent to Europe, he asked, where there was never a threat of Russian military activity, but rather the creation of an American threat to Russian security? Taft agreed with the State Department that the United States should not establish American military bases on Formosa, but disagreed with the policy of supplying American aid to the French army suppressing the Indochinese nationalists. He noted the inconsistency of the State Department's providing aid to the French in Indochina and the Rhee regime in Korea, but not to Chiang on Formosa, after spending billions of dollars to support him in China. Taft warned that he would not support any Administration commitment to back Chiang in a war against the Chinese government, and he suggested that the Administration consider whether the American government had any special obligation to the people of Formosa, as former subjects of Japan with which no peace treaty had been negotiated, to maintain their free choice of government uninfluenced by the Communist or the Chiang governments. If such an obligation by America existed, Taft asked that the American fleet be placed between Formosa and the mainland, and that Chiang, his mainland bureaucrats, and his army of occupation be removed from Formosa to permit a free vote by the Formosan people on self-determination:

> In recent months it has of course been very doubtful whether aid to the Nationalist Government could be effective, and no one desires to waste American efforts.... We can determine later whether we ever wish to recognize the Chinese Communists and what the ultimate disposition of Formosa shall be.... as I understand it, the people of Formosa if permitted to vote would probably vote to set up an independent republic of Formosa.... if, at the peace conference, it is decided that Formosa should be set up as an independent republic, we certainly have the means to force the Nationalists' surrender of Formosa.[76]

The following day, Secretary of State Acheson answered Taft. He criticized Taft's rejection of American support for the French in Indochina and his disagreement with the Administration's direct commitment to maintain the Rhee regime in Korea. Acheson indicated that the American fleet was already in the Formosa Strait, and that he expected the Chinese Communists to espouse a nationalist course by preventing the Russian occupation of Manchuria, Sinkiang and other border regions which he claimed the Russians controlled. He felt that Sino-American relations would be restored on the basis of mutual opposition to the Soviet Union and on China's need for American economic aid, and, that until then, the United States would refrain from creating military positions on the borders of China. On January 13 the Security Council failed by one vote to seat the Communist delegate in place of Chiang's delegate, with the United States and France voting against the Communist delegation and Britain abstaining. Immediately, the Soviet delegate announced that he would boycott the Security Council for its failure to seat Communist China and he remained away until a month after the beginning of the Korean war. In response to American and

76. White and Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 320-25; Vital Speeches, 16 (February 1, 1950), 236-37.

French opposition in the UN, China seized their properties and, on January 18, recognized the Vietnamese nationalists under Ho Chi-minh as the government of Indochina. Within a month, the United States recognized the puppet government established in Indochina by the French and increased aid to the armies fighting Ho Chi-minh.

The Truman Administration assumed a non-committal policy with regard to Communist China. American policy was based on the assumption that China was a passive country on which American policy would be applied by degrees to bring it into line with American objectives through eventual American recognition and American economic aid. This was not necessarily an impossible goal; it was merely impossible in the context of the American role in China, especially after 1945, when American marines held cities and railroads for Chiang, American officers 'advised' American-equipped Chiang armies, and American planes and ships transported Chiang's troops against the Communists. Acheson's objectives in China could only be gained by America's seizing the initiative in recognizing China, as Britain had done, in seating China in the UN, and in offering aid without the strings of an anti-Soviet alliance attached. By refusing to seat the Chinese Communists in the UN and by continuing American recognition and aid to Chiang, Acheson only accomplished what his policy was aimed at preventing, namely, Chinese Communist acceptance, in February, 1950, of a Russian alliance. The Chinese, in short, had accepted Truman's policy of two world camps. China's fears were confirmed by United States opposition in the UN caused by the Administration's desire to keep internationalist Republican support for its foreign aid programs; and China responded with activity, instead of passivity, and recognized the government of Ho Chi-minh in Vietnam.[77]

Many internationalist Republicans reacted to this non-committal China policy of Truman by opposing the Administration's sixty million dollar aid bill for South Korea on the ground that aid to that government was a complete waste and that Korea was beyond America's defense interest. The one point on which there was truly bipartisan support and a "phenomenal lack of disagreement"[78] between internationalists and isolationists was that American troops must never be used on the continent of Asia, especially within range of the frontiers of China.

> The attack on the aid to Korea bill was so intense that Representative Judd, one of the most responsible and level-headed members of the China bloc, found it necessary to plead with his fellow congressmen.... Joined by economy-minded and non-interventionist Republicans and Southern Democrats, Vorys and his supporters defeated the bill by a margin of one vote. The Republicans opposed it six to one while only three out of four Democrats supported it. This was the first major setback in Congress's for the administration in the field of foreign policy since the end of the war.[79]

Judd acted so that American support of Korea would eventually involve the United States on the Asian mainland to the benefit of Chiang, and he was able to rally the internationalists against the isolationists and restore the Administration's aid to South Korea.

77. Tang Tsou, op. cit., pp. 518-23, 534-36, 548.
78. Ibid., pp. 358-59.
79. Ibid., pp. 537-38.

Upon the outbreak of conflict between North and South Korea, Truman first ordered the American fleet to prevent military action across the Formosa Strait. Then he decreed the use of American naval and air power in Korea, increased aid to the French forces in Indochina, and finally the use of American troops in Korea, thus reversing the Defense Department's strategic planning as well as MacArthur's previous position that American troops must not be used on the continent of Asia. To the Chinese Communists, American actions appeared to be a repetition of China's invasion by Japan of whom the United States had become the heir in East Asia. The permanent American military position in Japan and Okinawa, followed by the extension of American military activity into Korea, Formosa, and Indochina indicated a pattern all too real for the Chinese to take lightly. For it was the Japanese control of Korea and Formosa, and their occupation of Indochina, which had permitted their invasions and bombardments of various parts of China.[80]

Senator Taft criticized the Truman intervention in its totality. He insisted that Korea was not vital to the United States (as had been determined by American military authorities), while intervention could be a threat to the security of the Soviet bloc. And Taft appealed to the Soviet Union not to match Truman's Korean adventurism. In response to Acheson's criticism that his January 11th speech was adventurist, Taft said that Truman's Korean intervention was a more foolish adventure than his own proposal for an independent Formosa without Chiang, which he continued to deem wiser than Truman's involvement in Korea or Indochina:

> It is fairly obvious that it is far easier to defend Formosa without becoming involved in war than it is to defend Korea or Indochina without becoming involved in war.[81]

In his attack on American involvement in the Indochinese war, the Korean war and in the affairs of Chiang, Taft raised basic constitutional questions about the power of the President to involve the American people in war without the prior and specific consent of Congress:

> If the President can intervene in Korea without congressional approval, he can go to war in Malaya or Indonesia or Iran or South America.[82]

Truman's intervention into the Korean conflict exposed the fundamental if often obscured divisions in recent American politics. The liberal opposition to the Truman Doctrine, such as embodied in the Nation and the New Republic, which had matched the traditional isolationists in the strength of its criticisms, had abandoned its rejection for the comfort of the 'vital center' and of the rhetoric of Truman's Fair Deal. Thus, in July, 1950 the New Republic and the Nation, despite occasional warnings about Korea's becoming a second Spain, welcomed Truman's intervention in Korea, as did such progressive businessmen as Henry Wallace and Harold Ickes, most especially because Truman's actions provided the UN with the army and force which the League had lacked. Even MacArthur was criticized for failure to keep the South Korean army modernized and to act without the delay of consultations. In addition, Senator Taft was attacked for his opposition to the Korean

80. Ibid., pp. 306, 558-64.
81. Vital Speeches, 16 (August 1, 1950), 613-17.
82. Taft. op. cit., pp. 32-33.

intervention, and the Chicago Tribune and the Daily Worker were singled out for their unity in defeatism.[83]

The senatorial campaign of 1950 is well-known for the violence of the onslaught against Taft, and his emphasis on opposition to Truman's war in Korea was the basis for predicting his defeat. Taft's defense of the UN Charter against its abuse for such American policy objectives as the Korean intervention, his refusal to consider the Soviet Union an enemy of the American people, and his insistence that Truman's policies were increasing tension and threatening war by endangering the security of the Soviet Union, were used by the Truman Administration to question Taft's political value within the American bipartisan consensus and to imply his softness toward Soviet policy. The New Republic, in its September 4, 1950 analysis of the foreign policy votes of Congressmen, revealed that the Democrats were much more strongly anti-Communist (87%) than the Republicans, whose total was brought down to 62% by their isolationist members. Even this was deceiving, it was noted, since some Republicans exposed their lack of anti-communist commitment by voting for the final bill, like Senator Taft who had a 53% record, while undermining the measures by amendments; a more clear-cut indication of the isolationists failing the anti-Communist test was the 23% mark of the Republican Senate leader, Kenneth Wherry. Such charges, similar to those made against LaFollette for opposing America's invasion of Siberia, or against Borah and Taft for opposition to America's aid to Britain against the Soviet-German alliance, contributed to the unfortunate developments in American politics during the final years of Truman's Administration which resulted from Truman's adventure in Korea.[84]

The monumental defeat administered by the Chinese to Truman's policy of Korean unification by means of MacArthur's and Rhee's forces, led to a Great Debate on the entire American foreign policy in Asia. For just as Truman's intervention in Korea had sanctified the previously dubious French campaign in Indochina, so the debacle of his attempt to occupy North Korea provided the vast amount of new American equipment, useless to the Russian-equipped Chinese, that permitted General Vo Nguyen Giap's Vietnamese forces to launch the final phase of the campaign against the French in 1951. Giap could do so in the confidence that ever-increasing American military assistance in Indochina would supply a never-ending source of ammunition, captured from the French forces, for the weapons captured by the Chinese in Korea.[85] The Truman Administration refused to make peace in Korea on the basis of the 38th parallel and condemned America to years of heavy casualties in challenging China's national security because negotiations might limit American military positions against China in Japan, Formosa and Indochina. In opposition, Senator Taft, Joseph P. Kennedy and Herbert Hoover insisted that Truman accept the reality, which the defeat of the attempt to unify Korea had exposed, that American military challenges to China in Korea and Indochina were doomed to defeat.

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83. New Republic and Nation, July, 1950 numbers, passim.
84. New Republic (September 4, 1950), p. 9; (October 23, 1950), pp. 10-12.
85. Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1964), pp. 17, 33-36, 55.

Along with the Administration and such internationalist Republicans as Governor Dewey and John Foster Dulles, the Nation and New Republic intimated that the proposal of Hoover and Taft for negotiations and recognition of the security areas of Russia and China were suspiciously close to the Soviet offer to save America from the horrible casualties entailed in continuing the war in Korea. The Nation charged:

> The line they are laying down for their country should set the bells ringing in the Kremlin as nothing has since the triumph of Stalingrad. Actually the line taken by Pravda is that the former President did not carry isolationism far enough.[86]

The New Republic had thus summarized the isolationist position following its demonstration of popular support in the Congressional elections:

> The Korean War was the creation not of Stalin, but of Truman just as Roosevelt, not Hitler, caused the Second World War.[87]

It now continued the theme by describing the desire of Taft and Hoover to accept Soviet offers of negotiation as an:

> opposition who saw nothing alarming in Hitler's conquest of Europe would clearly grab at the bait. Stalin, after raising the ante, as he did with Hitler, and sweeping over Asia, would move on until the Stalinist caucus in the Tribune tower would bring out in triumph the first Communist edition of the Chicago Tribune.[88]

Whatever were the similarities of judgment of the international realities shown by Moscow and by Senator Taft and his "Stalinist caucus in the Tribune tower", it was not incorrect for the New Republic to emphasize Taft's "benign image of the Politburo."[89]

At the opening of the newly elected Congress, the isolationists, led by Senators Wherry and Taft, launched a strong attack on Truman's interventionist policies by introducing a resolution forbidding the President's sending of troops abroad without Congressional approval. They attacked Truman's refusal to accept a cease-fire or to end the war in Korea and asked where the troops for a bloody stalemate in Korea would come from, as the United States had insufficient troops for a land war on the Asian mainland. Taft also attacked Truman's assertion of the right to use atomic weapons or to send American troops outside the country without direct approval of Congress. The isolationists "condemned US participation in Korea as unconstitutional and provided that the only funds available for overseas troops shipment should be funds necessary to facilitate the extrication of US forces now in Korea."[90] In short, the isolationists supplied an answer to the supposedly insoluble riddle of what to do once the President had insinuated American forces into a conflict in the area of Chinese or Russian national security: to have the simple courage to vote no further military funds except the boat fare home from the Asian mainland.

In conjunction with his criticism of Truman's intervention in Korea as a violation of the American Constitution, Taft protested

86. Nation (December 30, 1950), p. 688.
87. New Republic (November 20, 1950), p. 7.
88. Ibid. (January 1, 1951), p. 5.
89. Ibid. (January 15, 1951), p. 7.
90. Ibid. (January 15, 1951), p. 7.

that in so using the UN for purposes of American imperialism the Charter of the United Nations had been violated as well. For Taft, the essential role of the UN was to provide the means of mediation and conciliation between nations, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. But the American misuse of the UN had defeated this primary objective and was also illegal. Taft declared:

> On June 28, 1950, I questioned the legality of the United Nations' action, because Article 27 of the charter clearly provides that decisions of the Security Council on all matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.... There was no concurring vote by Russia, but we overrode this objection.... We have tried to by-pass the limitation on the power of the Security Council by asking for action by the General Assembly when a veto has been exercised in the Council. Under the charter this body has never been intended to have any power to call on government for action or do more than recommend.... Those who are blaming the United Nations should much more blame the limitations of the charter and our own Government for forcing United Nations' action beyond its permanent power to perform.[91]

On the persistent and curious commitment of Taft and the isolationists to legality, whether in supporting the inviolability of the Supreme Court, protesting concentration camps for American citizens or ex post facto war trials, or opposing the violations of the American Constitution and UN Charter by intervention in Korea, the New Republic noted perceptively that:

> there has historically been a working affinity between isolationists and legalists -- the former attacked Roosevelt's 1941 destroyer deal as warmongering, the latter as dictatorship. There are signs that this coalition is again tightening.[92]

In his study of Dean Acheson's foreign policy through 1954, McGeorge Bundy noted that Taft had become the major antagonist of Acheson in a Great Debate: a re-examination of American foreign policy after the failure of the intervention in Asia. Taft's election victory in 1950 after a campaign of strong opposition to American interventionism, had indicated popular support for limiting the executive's tendency to insinuate the United States into conflict and then forcing Congressional approval of a fait accompli. Bundy disagreed with Taft's insistence on limiting foreign crises by eliminating areas of friction, and on refusing to engage in a grand global policy of struggle with Communism. Taft's preference for negotiations rather than wastage of American blood in military interventions, appeared to Bundy as a failure to assert America's global leadership against Communism and as a defective attitude of doubt, mistrust and fear toward America's national purpose in the world.[93] Taft had summarized his attitude toward diplomacy and foreign policy based on military strength as follows:

> Nor do I believe we can justify war by our natural desire to bring freedom to others throughout the world.... There are a good many Americans who talk about an American century in which America will dominate the world.... If we confine our activities to the field of moral leadership we shall be successful

91. Taft. op. cit., pp. 42-43.
92. New Republic (January 15, 1951), p. 7.
93. McGeorge Bundy, The Pattern of Responsibility (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), pp. 83-89.

if our philosophy is sound and appeals to the people of the world. The trouble with those who advocate this policy is that they really do not confine themselves to moral leadership. They are inspired with the same kind of New Deal planned-control ideas abroad as recent Administrations have desired to enforce at home. In their hearts they want to force on these foreign peoples through the use of American money and even, perhaps, American arms the policies which moral leadership is able to advance only through the sound strength of its principles and the force of its persuasion. I do not think this moral leadership ideal justifies our engaging in any preventive war, or going to the defense of one country against another.... I do not believe any policy which has behind it the threat of military force is justified as part of the basic foreign policy of the United States except to defend the liberty of our people.[94]

In two articles in the Reporter, "Appeasement, Provocation, and Policy" (January 9, 1951) and "The Private World of Robert Taft" (December 11, 1951), McGeorge Bundy presented his concept of the future of American foreign relations, a concept of which Senator Taft appeared to be the major foe. Bundy felt that the total war of World War II had failed in its objective of achieving peace but had led rather to a period of Cold War, and he agreed with Taft's criticism of America's World War II policies. Taft was necessarily less isolationist than in 1940 because America had become so deeply involved in world affairs by the interventions of the American government that Taft had to seek positive policies of disengagement. But he remained an isolationist nevertheless, and Bundy declared: "I for one have disagreed with him almost constantly on foreign policy."[95] Taft tended to deny Bundy's major premise that:

The major fact about our world is that it is in the throes of a great struggle for power between the Kremlin and the field.[96]

Taft considered any struggle with the Soviets to be ideological, not military; a struggle for the minds of men, rather than for the control of people and wealth. Since America was strong in wealth and military force and weak in ideas while the Soviets were stronger in ideas and weaker in arms and resources, Taft wanted to reduce American troops and military expenses. For these only weakened America's long-term wealth and military position while at the same time undercutting whatever strength America had had in ideas. Taft's constant theme was warning of the grave danger that America would over-extend itself by too much political commitment and too much military intervention, and thereby destroy American liberty in the resulting militarization. Thus, Taft favored the reduction of the army and navy to eliminate temptation for intervention, and a concentration upon an Air Force which would be defensive if American ground forces were not spread about the world to create tension. Taft's basic aim was to remove power and the threat of military intervention from international relations and to emphasize ordinary defense, normal diplomacy and American respect for the rules of international law. According to Bundy:

They (Taft and the isolationists) do not arm to deal with power,

94. Taft. op. cit., pp. 17-18.
95. McGeorge Bundy, "The Private World of Robert Taft," The Reporter (December 11, 1951), p. 37.
96. Ibid., p. 38.

or even to use power (for Senator Taft is strongly opposed to the notion of preventive war); they arm rather to create a situation in which power is irrelevant and in which the American people can securely proceed to the better realization of the American dream. This is, I think, the basic pattern of thought from which Senator Taft advances to the tough problems of the present world.[97]

For Bundy, however, the statesman's activity for peace must be discarded during the Cold War and replaced by the unique policy-maker who controls diplomacy and military power and applies them in the permanent struggle against Communism in limited wars and limited periods of peace. For him there was no such thing as too much force or too much domination by military factors; but his insistence upon permanent American intervention into the internal affairs of other countries naturally made him fear the American tendency to apply air power to minimize the loss of American life, a loss acceptable to the new policy-maker if not to the American public. While not opposing concessions, negotiations and withdrawals in principle, and accepting them if necessary to end over-commitment and being bogged down in the wrong parts of the world, Bundy considered it appeasement to think that such agreements constituted peace. Thus, while China's recognition by the United States and the United Nations was indeed a proper basis for peace, Bundy considered such actions "appeasement" if applied to the practical problem of ending the war in Korea. He considered Taft in error for his opposition to the encirclement of the Soviet Union by military alliances, his criticism of the hasty involvement of the United States and the United Nations in Korea, and his willingness to compromise in negotiations with the Chinese Communists to extricate America from the Korean debacle.[98]

Bundy differed with Taft also on the role of public opinion and public debate in foreign policy. Bundy's concept of the man of policy manipulating diplomatic and military elements in a long-term series of periods of limited peace and limited war was basically an elitist approach which excluded a positive role for public opinion, and thus, for public debate. For the public was not committed to the rigid national purposes established by the policy-maker; it only reacted to the realities of given situations. Bundy insisted that there should be no recriminations or examinations of the decisions of the policy-makers, so that the public may accept their actions without question. It was in opposition to the government's desire to prevent open debate on an interventionist policy that threatened world war, that Senator Taft launched the Great Debate against which Bundy complained. Taft noted the policy-maker's tendency to insinuate the United States into other countries' affairs, followed by a conflict in which the President would demand unquestioning support:

> After that, if anyone dared to suggest criticism or even a thorough debate, he was at once branded as an isolationist and a saboteur of unity and the bipartisan foreign policy.[99]

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97. Ibid., p. 38.
98. McGeorge Bundy, "'Appeasement,' 'Provocation,' and Policy," The Reporter (January 9, 1951), pp. 14-16.
99. Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, p. 55.

Taft insisted that decision-making should be limited to elected officials, the President and the Congress, because they alone were responsible to the American people, and thus responsive to public opinion enlightened by public debate. Taft's strongly felt commitment to democracy and his belief in the soundness of the well-informed judgment of the American people led him to a basic distrust of policy based on military power or decision-making by military advisers and specialists in the Executive branch. Taft vigorously opposed their insinuation of the United States into commitments and interventions that present the President and Congress with a crisis in which they feel forced to support a military solution. Hence, Bundy was led to call Taft a "Reluctant Dragon" who would not be a President who would wage the permanent Anti-Communist Crusade.[100]

On the eve of the 1952 Presidential elections, Bundy welcomed the nomination of Eisenhower over Taft because Eisenhower's career indicated a strong commitment, lacking in Taft, to oppose the Soviet Union.[101] Eisenhower was also preferred for being dedicated to the principle that the United States must never undertake military action alone, without the cooperation and approval of its major allies. Taft's reasonable Asian policy, which ruled out hostilities with Communist China, had insured the lack of support for Taft's nomination by the China Lobby, especially in the southwestern group including Senators Nixon and Knowland of California and Senatorial candidates Goldwater of Arizona and Hurley of New Mexico, all of whom voted against Taft's candidacy. In the elections, the American people rejected the party that had intervened in Korea, and elected Eisenhower on the basis of his promise--soon to be fulfilled--to end the war in Korea.

In the final statement of foreign policy made before his death, Taft presented, on May 26, 1953, the same criticism which he had directed at Truman, this time aimed at the policies being launched by Secretary of State Dulles: Extending the system of military alliances and aid around the world, especially in Southeast Asia. Not only were these activities "the complete antithesis of the UN Charter itself", and a threat to Russian and Chinese security, but they would be valueless for the defense of the United States.

Taft's last speech was particularly concerned with Dulles' Southeast Asia policy because the United States was increasing to seventy per cent of the costs its support of the French puppet regime against the forces of Ho Chi-minh. Taft feared that Dulles' policy would lead, upon the eventual defeat of French imperialism, to its replacement in Vietnam by American imperialism and--the worst of all possibilities to Taft--the sending of American forces to Vietnam to fight the guerrillas.

> I have never felt that we should send American soldiers to the Continent of Asia, which, of course, included China proper and Indo-China, simply because we are so outnumbered in fighting a land war on the Continent of Asia that it would bring about complete exhaustion even if we were able to win.... So today, as since 1947 in Europe and 1950 in Asia, we are really trying

100. Bundy, "Taft", op. cit., pp. 38-39.
101. McGeorge Bundy, "November 1952: Imperatives of Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs (October, 1952), pp. 2-4.

to arm the world against Communist Russia, or at least furnish all the assistance which can be of use to them in opposing Communism. Is this policy of uniting the free world against Communism in time of peace going to be a practical long-term policy? I have always been a skeptic on the subject of the military practicability of NATO.... I have always felt that we should not attempt to fight Russia on the ground on the Continent of Europe any more than we should attempt to fight China on the Continent of Asia.[102]

In the months immediately following Taft's death, American support of the armies of France and its puppet government in Vietnam was increased heavily by Dulles with the backing of the China Lobbyists, such as Rep. Judd. While, early in 1954, two hundred U. S. Air Force technicians were sent to Vietnam as the conflict moved to its climax in defeat of France and its puppet government at Dien Bien Phu, Bernard Fall notes:

The President, at his press conference of February 10, declared that he "could conceive of no greater tragedy than for the United States to become involved in an all-out war in Indochina."... While the President had once more assured the country that American military intervention was unlikely, the Pentagon was feverishly working out the military implications of such an intervention.... With two American carriers, the Essex and the Boxer, already operating in the Gulf of Tongking, and with American aircraft stationed in Okinawa and Clark Field in the Philippines, a Guernica-type raid had the added advantage of being feasible on a few days' notice. It was also likely to be of doubtful military value. General Matthew B. Ridgeway, then Army chief of staff, had sent his own team of experts to Viet-Nam, and their report had been negative; American intervention, to be of any value at all, would have to involve ground forces, and such an operation could very well unleash the Chinese Reds, just as it had done in Korea. Ridgway thus took the forthright position that the price of a Western victory in Indochina would be "as great, or greater than, that we paid in Korea."[103]

In the face of the demands of Dulles and Nixon for American bombing of Ho Chi-minh's forces, Eisenhower, with the advice of the Taft supporters in the cabinet, insisted that there would be no direct use of American soldiers, naval forces or bombers without the prior approval of Congress, as Taft had consistently demanded. Moreover, America would intervene only with the approval and cooperation of its major allies, England and France, and of important Asian nations, exactly the way that Bundy had expected the American President to act. Neither England nor France, much less an important Asian nation, would approve or cooperate in the proposal to send American bombers or American troops against the Communist guerrillas in Vietnam. The consultation with Congress resulted in a Great Debate on Vietnam in the Senate, and, as Senator Taft had expected, this debate effectively paralyzed any attempt by the President's advisers to launch the United States into

102. Vital Speeches, 19 (June 15, 1953), 530-31.
103. Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 226-27, 243.

the civil war in Vietnam. Detailed examinations of the history of the conflict were presented by Senators Mike Mansfield and John F. Kennedy, the latter noting that the cause of the conflict was the unreasonable demands placed by the French in 1946 upon the independent national government of Vietnam, established by President Ho Chi-minh when the Japanese occupation had ended. These demands had led to French bombardment of Hanoi and to Ho Chi-minh's return to guerrilla warfare. Bernard Fall has described the general Congressional reaction:

> And while Dirksen, along with Vice-President Nixon, and Senators Knowland and Jenner, did not, in his words, "share the anxiety and concern some feel about the danger of sending American troops to Indochina, other than technicians," Senator Alexander Wiley probably summed up the feelings of the majority of his Republican colleagues when he said: "Mr. Speaker, if war comes under this Administration, it could well be the end of the Republican Party." Non-interventionist feelings ran equally high among the often-burned Democrats. Senator Lyndon B. Johnson summed up the view of most of his party by saying that he was "against sending American GI's into the mud and muck of Indochina on a blood-letting spree to perpetuate colonialism and white man's exploitation in Asia.[104]

Thus in death Senator Taft's influence on American foreign policy was greater than it had been in life. When faced with what may have been the crucial question of the decade--another American intervention on the mainland of Asia--President Eisenhower, influenced by the short but deep association he had developed with Senator Taft and by the Taft supporters in the cabinet whom the President respected, followed the Taft proposals of keeping military specialists from decision-making and withholding action until Congress had debated and given prior approval. As Taft realized, prior consultation of Congress for any commitment or intervention tended to prevent American involvement in conflicts short of direct attack on the United States and led to statesmanlike negotiations, which Taft admired. In this case negotiations led to the Geneva Agreement of 1954 by which foreign influences, other than that of France, were forbidden in Indochina; furthermore, general elections were to be held in two years, thus ending the Agreement's temporary division of Vietnam to allow the French army to evacuate its forces. Thus, Taft, head of the isolationist critics of America's post-World War II policy of interventions threatening the security of Soviet Russia and the Chinese Republic, might be singled out, as William notes that Borah, the leader of the isolationists and "almost doctrinaire laissez-faire liberals" who had criticized the post-World War I interventions against the revolutionary movements in Russia and China had been singled out, as "the man who might turn out to be right."[105]

Thus, many on the American left failed to oppose, alongside isolationists like Senator Taft, America's post-World War II interventions and military adventures, in contrast to the unity alongside Senator Borah after World War I. Whatever the historical reasons for this failure, the unity of American liberals--individualists and socialists alike--is logically required for the

104. Ibid., pp. 227-28.
105. Williams, American Diplomacy, p. 122.

present and for the future, as Lens' fundamental intellectual breakthrough has demonstrated. In his conclusion to The Futile Crusade, Lens provides a standard for such unity:

> The most important step we Americans can take to implement a positive strategy is to complete our own revolution begun in 1775. . . . Needless to say, nothing will change in America or in American policy unless there is a severe shift in the power structure, away from the military-industrial complex. Many communists and other leftists argue that this is impossible under the capitalist system, that indeed capitalism must be overthrown before any progress can be made. This is the subject for another book, but we are not convinced that the argument is valid. . . . The process is dual: insofar as a new insurgent impulse in America draws us to co-existence, to joining the world revolution, to completing our own revolution at home, so will the power relationship alter; and insofar as the power relationship changes, momentum will be available for more fulsome co-existence, for joining the world revolution and completing our own.
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> The United States, sidetracked and repressed by a negative Anti-Communism, is r a p i d l y approaching the most critical moment in its history. It is being called on to respond to the most dire challenge it has ever faced. It can follow the principles of the past, toward futility and eclipse, or it can chart a new, positive course that will renew its vigor. If it chooses business-as-usual, the status quo, militarism, and all the other regressive features of Anti-Communism, there is little hope either for itself or for Western civilization. On the other hand, if it correctly analyzes the national, social, technological, and scientific revolutions now underway, and seeks the path based on this analysis, all of mankind will applaud. [106]

106. Lens, op. cit., pp. 235-36.

# *Isolationism, Old and New*

By LEONARD P. LIGGIO

## PART 1

### The Old Isolationism

During the 1964 Democratic National Convention, the American people waited while Lyndon Johnson met with the two senators, Thomas Dodd and Hubert Humphrey, between whom he would choose his vice-president. For those who were not confused by the superficial differences between them, the meeting of the three symbolized one of the major traditions in American politics. Johnson, Dodd, and Humphrey had one major common denominator: their consistent and unswerving support of American imperialism. Johnson was a member of the Southern congressional bloc that was a major force for American intervention in World War II; he supported the Truman Administration's launching of the Cold War and maintained it during the succeeding years; and he was a major proponent of the heavy defense budgets for both strategic missiles and the smaller armaments for conventional limited wars whereby US imperialism is maintained around the globe. Senator Dodd's career as a government bureaucrat and a congressional advocate of the Cold War was interrupted by service as the chief trial prosecutor against German political officials at the Nuremberg trials. Senator Humphrey had risen to mayor of Minneapolis from the havoc wreaked on Minnesota liberalism by advocacy of intervention in World War II. The defectors from Norman Thomas'

isolationist socialism had formed the Union for Democratic Action, which had become the pre-Cold War ADA with Humphrey firmly in the leadership; the Minneapolis Trotskyist teamster leaders were tried for sedition for their anti-imperialism, and the Farmer-Labor party ultimately collapsed from the loss of its isolationist base. Johnson, Dodd, and Humphrey were strong supporters of World War II and the Korean and Vietnam interventions, as well as the imperialist policies which formed and surrounded them.

The tradition of American imperialism is a long one as its proponents keenly emphasize, and this is indicative of the kind of system that has successfully maintained itself in this country, despite occasional major threats, until this very moment. The major threats have been occasional because, unlike the system evidenced by American imperialism, there has not been the organization, continuity and understanding by those whom the system exploits comparable to that displayed by the beneficiaries from the exploitation. The opposition to the tradition of American imperialism has been characterized as the tradition of "isolationism". The statesmen of the American Revolution were the founders of the American isolationist tradition, which combines cosmopolitanism and citizenship of the world with rejection of international political alliances. The concept of cosmopolitan neutrality and non-intervention, established in Washington's Farewell Address, was firmly rooted in American ideals by Thomas Jefferson, who in his First Inaugural Address announced the principle: "Honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." [1] The isolationist creed was maintained by the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians in their opposition to international status quo exploitation.

Significantly, it was also John Quincy Adams who first rebuffed a European suggestion that

1. See Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1957), pp. 10-11.

> the United States assume a share of responsibility for world order. . . Ultimately, John Quincy Adams' precepts were incorporated into isolationist creed: the United States would lend only moral support to the worthy cause of universal freedom, and would not deviate from non-entanglement even for the purpose of preserving world peace.[2]

During the period of American imperialism against Mexico, the aggressive expansionists labelled their opponents as "isolationists".[3] The American South has always been the major center of American overseas expansion and foreign intervention. The South desired to use federal troops to gain additional territory just as it had used them to maintain slavery and then serfdom among the Negroes. Spearheaded by the Texans, the South took the lead in the Mexican aggression, and then pushed for the conquest of Cuba and control of Central America, especially the Isthmus. The Civil War crisis developed through the South's loss of control of the federal troops to a party which preferred continental expansion within the national boundaries to either the conquest of Cuba or the extension of slavery across the continent. The centers of opposition to expansionism and American imperialism during the Mexican and Civil Wars were the Middle West and areas in the East, which were centers of anti-war activities, including non-payment of taxes and draft-riots.

The origins of modern twentieth century isolationism are related to the development of the New Imperialism from the 1880's on, and in which the United States was a major participant. The seizure by the US of the Spanish colonial empire at the turn of the century was a major cause in the development of isolationism. The Anti-Imperialist League under the leadership of the Liberal Republicans (Mugwumps) established the basic traditions of American isolationism, with which the populism of Bryan and the socialism of Debs were

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2. Ibid., p. 14.
3. Ibid., pp. 14, 27.

associated. The Mugwumps were paralyzed by their upper social position from bringing forward and educating those who sympathized with their views; Bryan compromised the Populist commitment which itself was lacking in clarity. It was the incipient Socialist movement in America which, as heir to classical liberalism, possessed in this period the ability to bring together and educate those opposed to American imperialism. The strongest early twentieth century isolationists in America were those most influenced by socialism, whether directly like Debs or indirectly like LaFollette; similarly, in Europe, isolationism was led by Socialists like Jaures and Lenin. Thus, in America as in Europe, it was the Socialists who led the struggle against US Imperialism's intervention in World War I and bore the brunt of the resulting persecutions.

The liberals whose courage had failed with US intervention in World War I rejoined LaFollette, Debs et al. in the two-fronted battle for isolationism and for civil liberties against the Wilson Administration. The government's campaign for the League of Nations coincided with its persecution of progressives in the Red Scare of 1919-20. The League of Nations was recognized as the imperialist instrument of the exploiters that would lead to war by maintaining the status quo imposed by them at Versailles. Oswald Garrison Villard, Walter Lippmann, Albert Jay Nock and Scott Nearing provided the intellectual and polemical ammunition for the anti-League senators of the Battalion of Death led by Robert LaFollette, Hiram Johnson and William Borah. The campaign for isolationism and civil liberties continued during the 1920's as US imperialism continued its course in the Caribbean and in the Far East. But it was the depression of the 1930's which eventually led to a strong popular isolationist movement. Rooted in the close financial collaboration with Britain in the 1920's, the depression forced the "have not" nations into desperate measures against the system of Western imperialism which exploited them, and these desperate measures in turn provided the excuse for

the rearmament by which the US government finally was able to end the depression.[5]

The development of opposition to American intervention in World War II was crucial for the succeeding quarter century of American history. It was the US intervention into World War II that disrupted the isolationist factor in American politics and led to confusion of its basic principles.

> During the course of the protracted twentieth-century debate over foreign policy, the word "isolationist" became a cliche. Through reckless use it acquired, like "appeaser" or even "liberal", a somewhat sinister meaning. . . It was a handy designation for our twin policies of neutrality and non-intervention. . . We can begin by saying that American isolationism has never meant total social, cultural, and economic self-sufficiency . . Ardent isolationists have frequently advocated American leadership in the promotion of peace, provided always that we limit our efforts to moral suasion and scrupulously avoid commitments for coercive action to allay or punish aggression.[6]

The death in January, 1940 of Senator William Borah was a significant blow to American isolationism. Borah had a complete grasp of world problems and understood the nature of imperialism, and especially of American Imperialism. He recognized that it was Asia and not Europe that formed the crisis center of the world because it was there that nations suffered from imperialism and would struggle mightily to free themselves. Furthermore, Asia was the area of the greatest US financial and strategic involvement and expectation. Borah died as the earliest US measures leading to war against Japan were initiated, and no one remained

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5. Cf. Murray N. Rothbard, America's Great Depression (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963), and William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (N.Y.: Dell Pub. Co., 1962.)
6. Adler, op. cit., pp. 26-29.

with the preception to center the attention of American isolationism on the crisis in Asia.

It was the threat of American intervention in the European war that led to the formation of the America First Committee and it was the European situation on which the America First Committee concentrated during the near year-and-a-half of its existence. Founded by R. Douglas Stuart, Jr., Kingman Brewster, Jr., and other Yale students under the influence of the eminent international lawyer, Professor Edwin Borchard, the organization came to include many of the traditional isolationists, like John T. Flynn, Norman Thomas and Harry Elmer Barnes, but was dominated by businessmen with short-run viewpoints. Many of these businessmen were former generals who not only completely lacked understanding of the basic isolationist opposition to militarism and conscription, but even proposed a wide program of militarization for America. Thus, the failure of America First to put itself in complete opposition to the draft permitted the extension of conscription in September, 1941 by but a single vote. Without the extension of conscription the administration would never have pursued the aggressive policy against Japan which led to war in December, 1941. Thus, the insistence upon compromise, moderation and non-principled stands by the businessmen-generals who assumed the leadership of the isolationist movement undercut and ultimately defeated the traditional isolationism of the membership and the intellectuals in America First, as well as of the other isolationist groups. It was the compromises and failures of that very leadership that provided the opportunity for successful US involvement in World War II.

> The noninterventionist strength, which the Committee and other groups represented, definitely affected the strategy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. More than that, persons close to Roosevelt felt that the noninterventionists had fought the president very nearly to a standstill near the end of 1941. . .[7]

7. Wayne S. Cole, America First, the battle against intervention, 1940-1941 (Madison, Wisc.; University of Wisconsin Press, 1953), pp. viii, 199.

With their decision in favor of compromise, moderation, and manipulation, the leadership of America First attempted to play a game that was lost from the beginning. The "instrumentalists" of the pro-war New Republic recognized that their only effective opposition came from the principled and absolutist isolationists, men who had emerged from the original main center of American isolationism, the American Left.[8] In its editorial "Hutchins and the Absolute", the New Republic (February 3, 1941) declared:

> It is worth noting that, whatever their other differences, it is the absolutist philosophies of our time that are united for isolation and appeasement. The Communists and the dogmatic socialists of the Norman Thomas stripe; the pacifists; the Nazis; the liberal absolutists of the Flynn type; and now the Hutchins brand of neo-Thomas (sic) absolutism that speaks and thinks in terms of frozen moral categories.[9]

The "instrumentalist" approach is essentially a conservative one, dedicated as it is to the substantial maintenance of the status quo. Walter Lippmann, who was developing a conservative philosophy, and Herbert Agar, a leader of southern conservative thought, became interventionists, as did conservative critics of the revolutionary aspects of National Socialism, such as Peter Viereck (Metapolitics: From Wagner to Hitler) and William M. McGovern (From Luther to Hitler). American nationalists like Joseph Alsop and William Kintner (American White Paper) were joined by European-born nationalists like Robert Strausz-Hupe (Axis America: Hitler Plans our Future) and Stefan T. Possony.[10]

Stefan T. Possony is an interesting example of the role of nationalist influences - the antithesis of American cosmopolitan isolationism. Until 1939 Possony had lived in Vienna where he published

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8. "America First and the Left," New Republic, June 2, 1941.
9. See James J. Martin, American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941 (New York: Devin-Adair, 1964), II, 1272.
10. Ibid., pp. 1167-68, 1180, 1265, 1274.

a work on economic controls during wartime (English translation, Tomorrow's War, London, 1938). Based on the German experience during and since the First World War, Possony emphasized the development of capital accumulation by the State during wartime in case the European conflict should be resumed. Possony soon fled to France where he became an adviser to the French government, 1939-40, and came to the US after the defeat of France. When it was proposed in the Nation, "Shall we feed Hitler's Victims" as suggested by the work of the Quakers, the Red Cross and Herbert Hoover, Possony effectively answered, no, in "Relief, Limited" (Nation, December 14, 1940). Possony contributed to the hysteria engendered by Hearst's geopolitical theories, under which the US would be invaded by Germany by way of Africa, South and Central America. When John T. Flynn rationally disposed of these ravings, Possony rushed into print in the New Republic (May 12, 1941) making fantastic military predictions, but also significantly appealing to the all-too-real fears that American business in South America could not bear German economic competition.[11]

By early 1941, however, the Nation and New Republic had fallen behind in the intensity of advocacy of belligerency as compared to the Hearst newspapers and the Luce publications, Time and Life. Tex McCrary, Hearst editorialist, declared: "When we have won the war I will become a rampant imperialist - in that I would want to see America enforce the peace. . . It would be a "Roman peace", and we would be the Romans. . ."[12] Clare Boothe Luce's campaign for war won her a nomination in Common Sense (January, 1941) as the American woman who when war came could claim "sole responsibility for the event". Asia, and especially, China, was central to the American dreamers of empire, as William L. Neumann has noted:

> Financial aid to Chiang Kai-shek, another writer promised, would be the "first step toward the

11. Ibid., p. 1258.
12. Ibid., p. 1174.

practical realization of the long-awaited El Dorado of the Chinese market". Henry Luce, perhaps the most influential disseminator of the conventional image of China, warned that failure to assume the responsibilities of the "American Century" would mean a dissolution of the Asian dream, whereas a positive program would mean that Asia "will be worth to us four, five, ten billions of dollars a year."[13]

Henry Luce's "American Century" would establish the US as the dominant world power in alliance with England. Max Lerner (New Republic, April 7, 1941) criticized liberal lack of enthusiasm for Luce's program, and approved of much of the program, especially in contrast to the position of the isolationist liberals like Senator Wheeler and John T. Flynn. Luce represented for Lerner "a new capitalist-conscious group, most of them younger men, who do not fear the war but regard it as an opportunity". Lerner noted that Luce's views were preceded by a New Republic editorial (December 23, 1940) on the necessity of an American-led Anglo-American hegemony. America in cooperation with England should "establish its hegemony in the world, control the world sea lanes and world trade, send out technicians to develop the world and education to teach it and food cargoes to feed it and ideals to inspire it".[14]

The role of American financial and business leaders and their major press organs, such as the Luce publications, was clear to the leading isolationists. They realized, too late, where the real source of American imperialism was seated. Senator Robert Taft's rebuttal (Nation, December 13, 1941) to an article by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (Nation, December 6, 1941) summed up the major forces supporting American intervention in World War II:

Nor is Mr. Schlesinger correct in attributing

13. William L. Neumann, "Determinism, Destiny and Myth in the American Image of China," in George L. Anderson, Issues and Conflicts, (Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas Press, 1959), p. 13.
14. See Martin, op. cit., pp. 1171-72.

the position of the majority of Republicans to their conservatism. The most conservative members of the party - the Wall Street bankers, the society group, nine-tenths of the plutocratic newspapers, and most of the party's financial contributors - are the ones who favor intervention in Europe. . . The war party is made up of the business community of the cities, the newspaper and magazine writers, the radio and movie commentators, the Communists, and the university intelligentsia.[15]

In the period preceding American entrance into World War II there had been a number of persons who sought direct US support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime, among them such individuals as Henry and Clare Boothe Luce, Walter Judd, Alfred Kohlberg, and Joseph Alsop who worked through a number of established groups and specially-formed committees. As part of the limited opposition permitted by themselves during the war, Republicans agreed to limit their attacks to the waste and methods of conduct of the war effort. One of the gravest examples of graft and corruption was the use of American money by the Chiang regime. The exposure of this waste in 1943 caused a split between the businessmen and journalists who continued to support Chiang, and the East Asian scholars who denounced this injury to the war effort; indeed, it has been said that Chiang stopped active fighting when the US came into the war. Alfred Kohlberg then leaped to the charge that anti-Chiang and "therefore" pro-Communist influence had caused these scholars to criticize Chiang Kai-shek. The basis for this wild accusation was the charge that the scholarly journals Pacific Affairs and Far Eastern Survey had contained in the preceding seven years no criticism of Japanese policies except for

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15. Ibid., pp. 1277-78. The Communists' role had of course changed drastically with Germany's invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941. For the Communists though not for the Trotskyists the new turn of events had so changed the nature of the war to justify advocacy of American intervention.

its feudal land system, no major criticism of the Soviet Union, and mixed criticism and praise of Chiang.

Despite the veteran opposition to Chiang by American isolationists, the burgeoning China Lobby in the U. S. was able to execute a cunning maneuver to curry the temporary favor of the isolationists. During the Congressional Pearl Harbor inquiry in 1945, it was revealed that a crucial American proposal for a Japanese modus vivendi in November 1941 had been scuttled by a negative cable from Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang had demanded that the US cancel its proposal, which would have forced him to enter into a coalition with Chiang's former prime minister who now headed a pro-Japanese government in northern China. Whereas Chiang was clearly the person responsible for the note and hence the collapse of the last hope for peace in the Pacific, both the isolationists and the China Lobby, for entirely different reasons, agreed to center their retrospective fire upon Owen Lattimore, who had been sent out by the US some months before as special adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. As a result of this maneuver, the isolationists were effectively disarmed from combatting the China Lobby's smear campaign against the formerly pro-Chiang interventionist Lattimore, a campaign launched by Kohlberg in the pro-Chiang American organ, China Monthly, in October, 1945.

The China Lobby's concentration upon Alger Hiss also served to neutralize any isolationist opposition, for Hiss, as a pro-Chiang and pro-interventionist assistant to Stanley K. Hornbeck at the Far Eastern desk of the State Department, had earned the hatred of the isolationist forces. Thus, despite the fact that the purpose of the China Lobby's campaign was stepped-up US intervention on Chiang's behalf, its early concentration on such formerly pro-war US advisers as Hiss and Lattimore served to stifle any developing isolationist opposition to this early--and crucial--emergence of the Cold War in Asia.

The China Lobby, early in its Cold War campaign, established the American China Policy Association, with Clare Boothe Luce as president and Alfred

Kohlberg as vice-president. In preparation for the 1948 elections, Richard Nixon and the House Un-American Activities Committee began, in the summer of 1948, its parade of ex-Communist witnesses--the Bentleys, the Budenzes, the Chamberses--all distinguished for their often failing memories and their bitterness toward their former comrades. The China Monthly soon claimed (in its September, 1948 issue) the honor of being "the first to distinguish between a loyal and disloyal citizen." It is also perhaps not too far-fetched to collate the pro-Chiang enthusiasm of Senators Knowland and Nixon with the fact that the Bank of America, California's immensely powerful bank, has been the major depository for Chiang's enormous American cash holdings.

The total defeat of Chiang and the establishment of his government on Formosa led to an all-out effort by the China Lobby to preserve that island as the center for future US domination of China. In January, 1950, the Truman Administration indicated its willingness to allow Peking to gain possession of Formosa during the summer of that year. Senator Knowland, with the cooperation of General MacArthur's staff in Tokyo, immediately leaked this information to the public and attacked the idea. Early in February of 1950, Senator McCarthy began his famous attacks on the State Department, concentrating his smear charges especially on Philip Jessup, who had prepared the State Department book demonstrating that the Chiang regime had fallen from its own failings. Jessup was, characteristically, accused of being a Communist. The charge against Jessup revealed that the China Lobby now felt itself strong enough (and the isolationists weak enough) to break with the isolationists in the course of drumming up its multi-sided propaganda for a new American war. For Philip Jessup had been a distinguished leader of American isolationism (after as well as before June 22, 1941). Jessup had been chairman of the Board of Trustees of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations before the War, and editor of the Far Eastern Survey. However, he had been forced out of his posts by the Luce-Kohlberg-China Lobbyists because of his isolationism. He had been a key adviser to the America First Committee and had sponsored its local chapters in Nor-

folk, Conn. and New York City. Philip C. Jessup was as isolationist in 1950 as he had been in 1940 and suffered for this equally; he had opposed US imperialism against Japan just as much as he now opposed it against the New China.[16]

For Philip Jessup to be accused of Communism by the agents of the China Lobby was not a special case. Most isolationists have been so accused for so many years that the charges have lost all meaning. Senator Taft, within a matter of weeks of the Jessup slur, was himself subjected to the same charges by another influential member of the China Lobby, Joseph Alsop. Taft and all other isolationists were characterized as tools of Communism because isolationism basically denies the aggressiveness of any major power other than the US government, the only government that Americans can do anything about.

But it was not only the burgeoning China Lobby wing of the American Right that heartily smeared isolationists as tools of Communism. The charges were enthusiastically joined by the nation's liberals--the Nation, the New Republic, Americans for Democratic Action--who still fixed upon the dwindling ranks of American isolationism as the major enemy. And in a profound sense they were right; for these battered isolationists were the last carriers of a great American tradition, and constituted the last centers of total opposition to expanding and swelling American global imperialism. It was precisely these liberals, moreover, whom the historian William Appleman Williams has brilliantly termed "the corporate liberals", who have provided the major ideological and demagogic rationale for World War II and post-war American imperialism. And so these liberals recognized their main enemy, and were not above the very tactics of "McCarthyism" from which they were later to recoil when McCarthy himself humorlessly began to employ them against the Establishment itself!

16. Cole, op. cit., pp. 76, 161, 188. On Jessup, see also McGeorge Bundy, The Pattern of Responsibility (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), p. 218; and Congressional Record, Vol. 87, Pt. 8 (October, 1941), p. 8321.

As for the Communists themselves, they were not about to favor any kind of political alliance with the isolationists. For one thing, the Communists still suffered from the cultural lag of the World War II thesis that smeared the isolationists as "parroters of the Goebbels line"; for another, the Communist policy was to seek passive adaptation and coalition on virtually any terms with reformist liberals--indeed the very liberals who were cementing the new American imperialism upon the American public. In short, whereas the liberals were astute in recognizing their main enemy, the Communists never succeeded in identifying theirs.

## The Geography of Isolationism

The isolationist tradition in the United States is often associated with geographical regions. Of course, geographical regions are short-hand methods for describing cultural areas, so that a geographical description summarizes a complex of ideological, economic, and ethnic bases of cultural units. Briefly, the region best known in America for isolationism is that embracing the Old and New Northwest, from the Ohio River westward. This region, as the frontier that was settled last, has had the least influence in the decision-making of the federal government, a situation aggravated by the limited economic and intellectual influences of the region. The settlement of this region occurred primarily in the nineteenth century, and its viewpoint reflected the people who migrated there from Europe or the East. The economic reasons for their migration were based on their desire for independent economic development, free from the feudal systems of Europe and even in the American East. Similarly, the European migration from northern Europe and from the American East hoped to avoid the caste and class domination of politics that characterized the established political regimes. The leading migration to this area was German: whether as descendants of the German pacifist sects that had settled at first in Pennsylvania, or as refugees from the militarism and authoritarianism of anti-democratic German governments in the nineteenth century, there was a common

cultural viewpoint shared by the Scandinavians as well as by the migrants from the East and the British Isles.

Samuel Lubell has emphasized the importance of the generally neglected German element in American politics.[17] As the second major ethnic group in the US it could not help but have a strong influence. Yet Lubell limits his analysis to the purely ethnic aspects without fully recognizing their far more significant cultural dimensions. Particularly significant were the democratic and anti-militarist traditions of the German immigrants and their descendants. These groups would not have favored the US entering a war on the side of Germany any more than they favored a war opposed to Germany. Their profound anti-militarism was the significant factor during both of the wars which Lubell perceptively feels could well be described as the first and second German wars. What Lubell fails to notice is that the accusations of pro-Germanism levelled against all opponents of US war were particularly directed against Americans of German descent, since their way of life emphasized their Germanic heritage for religious and cultural reasons. Their use of the German language made them especially suspect, for during the wars all things German were proscribed. The severe persecutions induced in German-Americans an identification with the government of Germany from which they had previously been free. At the same time, the pressures of mass culture have homogenized German-American and other ethnic groups, and have thus helped to undermine the specifically anti-militarist traditions of German America.

Pro-British, pro-League sentiment was always strongest in the Eastern and Southern areas. The Germanic elements were joined in opposition by other western European groups such as the Irish and Italians. While for special reasons Slavic groups led by the Poles supported the League, Southern

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17. Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Poltics (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), and Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956).

sentiment for the League was aroused by the reminder that the anti-English Irish and Germans had provided the margin of victory for the North in the Civil War. The Ku Klux Klan, it must be remembered, was solidly based in the old Anglo-American groupings. Along with the racist Southern groups, the American Legion's Anglophile outlook was in reaction against the revisionism that had exposed the unheroic nature of the war and of deaths in which the Legion gloried.[18]

Internal migrations in the US have altered the sectional divisions based on cultural diversities. The heaviest migrations in the last quarter-century have been out of the South. It has been noted by sociologists that the less progressive attitudes on political, economic, social and especially civil libertarian questions exhibited by blue-collar workers reflects not only their educational level and the effects of mass media but the fact of accelerated Southern origins of America's industrial working class. Not only has there been a vast increase in industrialization in the South but Southerners in huge numbers have migrated to the cities of the Middle West and to southern California. The situation in California is especially instructive. Before World War II, California was a major center for progressivism in America, in liberal and socialist aspects of which were reflected in attitudes toward foreign policy. California's powerful Hiram Johnson was one of the leading opponents of American entrance into World War I, the League of Nations, and World War II, and was a center of isolationism in the Senate until his death in 1945. The Second World War greatly changed the political demography of California, southern California and Los Angeles in particular. For a quarter-century a massive government defense industry has developed there, fed by the labor of largely Southern migrants. The post-war emergence of William F. Knowland and Richard M. Nixon as California's Senators and major centers of Republican power, contrasts strikingly to such pre- World War II Republican leaders as Hiram Johnson and Earl Warren. All this is reflective of the changes

18. Adler, op. cit., pp. 75-92.

in California brought about by the heavy World War II migrations. The migration from the South, however, has also been double-edged, involving as it has large numbers of Southern Negroes seeking the constitutional rights and civil liberties denied them in the South. Their anti-militarist religious traditions and their continued deprivation of civil liberties in the cities of the East, Middle West and southern California, combine with their recent admission to voting in the South to make the Negroes a potentially important anti-imperialist force in both electoral and direct action.

In the meanwhile, the older center of isolationism--the Old and New Northwest--was reduced as such by the swelling of Southern migration to the cities north of the Ohio River. The remaining strongholds of isolationism are the states of the Northwest from Lake Michigan to the Pacific. Surely it is no accident that states like Wisconsin which produced the two Bob LaFollettes are now represented by Senators with strong doubts about America's aggression in Vietnam; or that Montana, which used to be represented by Burton K. Wheeler is now represented by Mike Mansfield; or that Idaho which sent William Borah and Glen Taylor to the Senate now sends Frank Church, or that Oregon's Charles McNary has been succeeded by Wayne Morse.

# *Early Anti-Imperialism*

By LEONARD P. LIGGIO

The anti-imperialist American youth of today are, without realizing it, following in a great tradition of modern anti-imperialism inaugurated during the burgeoning of US imperialism at the time of the Spanish-American War. This applies not only to the opposition as a whole, but even to such tactics as agitating among US troops against the war effort. This heritage applies also to what the statist ideologues of National Review have perceptively called the "anarchist impulse", which they discern at the root of American youth's support of Negroes or Vietnamese oppressed or assaulted by the US State-apparatus. For Conservatives, out of their irreconcilable conflict with libertarians, recognize that isolationism and anti-imperialism in foreign policy is but the other side of the coin of "anarchism" in domestic affairs.

The United States initiated its aggression against Spain on April 20, 1898. The immediate object: to restore stability in Cuba for the benefit of US owners of plantations, mines and other vestiges of feudalism, and to prevent the success of the Cuban revolutionary movement. But the major focus of US aggression had already become the Far East, where the U. S. Asian Squadron, conveniently located at Hong Kong to dominate the South China Sea, made haste to occupy Manila Bay on May 2--considerably before the annexation of Hawaii (July 7) or the occupation of Santiago, Cuba (July 17). In the Far East, the US quickly replaced Spain as the imperialist oppressor of the Philippines national liberation movement. American libertarians had no hesitation then in giving every aid and support to those fighting against the US aggressors, and in urging Americans to disassociate themselves actively from the criminality of the US government. In the absolute forefront of the

anti-imperialist confrontation with the US State-apparatus was the dean of American laissez-faire liberals, the businessman-advocate of free trade and hard money, Edward Atkinson, who founded the American anti-imperialist movement.

> The Philippine situation led to the most sensational episode in the history of the movement, the seizure of the Atkinson pamphlets. . .
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> Long the ardent champion of a score of reforms, Atkinson began writing, publishing, and distributing violent anti-imperialist pamphlets in the fall of 1898. This, of course, was no more than was being done by a dozen other enthusiasts in the movement. In the spring of 1899, however, he wrote to the secretary of war, enclosing his three principal pamphlets, and declaring his intention of sending them to American soldiers in the Philippines. . .
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> The government acted at once. On May 2, 1899, Postmaster-General Charles Emory Smith ordered the San Francisco postmaster to remove all Atkinson pamphlets from the Manila mails. A number of the offending documents were intercepted the following day. This action aroused great interest throughout the United States. The anti-imperialists rushed to Atkinson's defense, the Springfield Republican finding in the seizure "the mailed hand of the rule of blood and iron being gradually disclosed. . . which," it added, "will next fall heavily upon freedom of speech within the old borders of the United States". The postmaster general defended his order in sharp words, and was supported by most of the imperialist press.[1]

Edward Atkinson, along with William Graham Sumner, was the most widely known American exponent of pure liberalism. Atkinson (1827-1905) came to maturity in the most significant period of American intellectual history, the pre-Civil War Jacksonian era. Carl Schurz, radical German refugee from the 1848 Revolution, declared of America in the 1850s:

> Every glance into the political life of America strength-

1. Fred Harvey Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (1935), in Frank Freidel and Norman Pollack, eds. Builders of American Institutions, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963), p. 365.

ens my convictions that the aim of a revolution can be nothing less than to make room for the will of the people - in other words, to break every authority which has its organization in the life of the state, and, as far as is possible, to overturn the barriers to individual liberty. . . Here in America you can see every day how slightly a people needs to be governed. In fact, the thing that is not named in Europe without a shudder, anarchy, exists here in full bloom.[2]

An abundance of authors, of whom Thoreau, Emerson, and Parker were foremost, provided the intellectual analysis for the instinctive and popular no-government philosophy of the Jacksonian era. Opposing all work within State-oriented institutions, they stood outside of them, and called for their total abolition on the basis of absolute moral principles. They not only called for it, they actively worked at it by giving support to the internal revolutionary activists of whom John Brown is justly the most famous. Thoreau, Emerson, and Parker became fully radical when they collected funds to purchase arms, "Beecher's bibles", to overthrow the slave system maintained by the US government.

The grounds for this new resistance to society as order and discipline might be narrower than Emerson would have liked, but rebellion against a pro-slavery government could be a first step in making radical individualism something more than just a literary fancy or a prerogative of isolated genius. Perhaps the time was approaching when every individual would realize that he had no further need of laws and governments. Following the lead of Thoreau, who had first made transcendentalism the basis for defying law in his doctrine of civil disobedience, Emerson passed from a theoretical anti-institutionalism to something approaching straight-out anarchism.[3]

Unfortunately, slave insurrectionism was side-tracked by the US power structure into governmental aggression and aggrandizement in the Civil War, which ended with the Negroes still defrauded of their rights and the property which they had created during generations of enslaved labor. However, the tradition of this radicalism remained a strong undercurrent in nineteenth century America.

2. George M. Fredrickson, The Inner Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 8.
3. Ibid., p. 39.

Edward Atkinson gained his theoretical self-education during this period. He was strongly and totally influenced by the writings of Frederic Bastiat, whose economic writings correcting the errors of Ricardo and Malthus had become important from 1850 on. Atkinson was an Abolitionist in the Garrison tradition, placing moral and political principles above traditional forms and mechanisms. His attitude toward the continued growth of government support of slavery was indicated in February, 1850: "I say damn compromise, if compromise - damn union."[4] However, he did not limit himself tc declamations. Atkinson immediately joined Theodore Parker's Boston Vigilance Committee, which liberated Negroes from federal authorities seeking to restore them to slavery. And, as befitted the most successful New England textile manufacturer, Atkinson was the treasurer of the committee that equipped John Brown's guerrillas in Kansas with weapons and ammunition. During the Civil War Atkinson was the secretary of the Educational Commission, which sought to bridge the failure of the government to leave to the Negroes the confiscated plantations by raising voluntary contributions to gain the properties for the Negroes. Throughout the post-Civil War period Atkinson was convinced that there was an intimate relation between the betrayal of Negro civil and property rights under Reconstruction, and the system of pillage of the general public by government privileges, subsidies, tariffs, and inflation. He fought to end the privileges of tariffs, government-protected banking, and currency. In 1867 he stated: "Capitalists, speculators, and middlemen are stealing the share of annual product which under natural law belongs to labor, by the use of false money (greenbacks)"; while in 1891 he noted: "For the purpose of passing a Force Bill the Republicans have admitted into the Senate the Senators from the so-called 'rotten borough states' (western states);. . . They have sold out the Republicans on the Force Bill for the purpose of gaining a benefit to the silver mines."[5] However, when the exploitation of the general public by speculators and contractors through inflation, privileges and subsidies, and of the Negroes by denial of civil and property rights, was escalated to a higher stage of imperialism, Edward Atkinson was prepared to escalate his opposition to government, despite his advanced age of seventy years and his social position as the leader of industrial fire insurance.

4. Harold Francis Williamson, Edward Atkinson: The Biography of an American Liberal, 1827-1905 (Boston: Old Corner Book Store, Inc., 1934), p. 4.
5. Ibid., pp. 83, 157.

Senator William Borah, perhaps the premier American anti-imperialist, well summarized the contradictions between imperialism and liberty during his own crusade against the imperialist Versailles Treaty and League of Nations:

> You can not yoke a government whose fundamental maxim is that of liberty to a government whose first law is that of force and hope to preserve the former. These things are in eternal war, and one must ultimately destroy the other. You may still keep for a time the outward form, you may still delude yourself, as others have done in the past, with appearances and symbols, but when you shall have committed this Republic to a scheme of world control based upon force. . . you will have soon destroyed the atmosphere of freedom, of confidence in the self-governing capacity of the masses, in which alone a democracy may thrive. . . And what shall it profit us as a Nation if we shall go forth to the dominion of the earth and share with others the glory of world control and lose that fine sense of confidence in the people, the soul of democracy?[6]

In that same speech Borah singled out the US government's protection of the feudal concessions controlled by US interests in Venezuela in 1895, as the origin of the Imperialism that has dominated American foreign policy ever since. The revival of the Monroe Doctrine in 1895 after decades of disuse signalled the beginning of the aggressions that US imperialism would undertake.[7] Atkinson was galvanized into action by the monstrosity of reviving the Monroe Doctrine; for the implicit militarism, especially naval construction, would introduce through the backdoor the subsidies, privileges, government contracts to business and the currency in-

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6. Freidel and Pollack, op. cit., p. 423.
7. It has often been suggested that the outward thrust of US imperialism coincided with the closing of the internal American frontier. Few have noted, what nineteenth century anti-imperialists well knew, that there was not any noteworthy rise in US blood-thirstiness; for the blood-thirst formerly expended in the slaughter of the native Indian tribes now found insufficient release in the growing lynching of Negroes, and was turned toward the black and brown peoples of the Caribbean and the Far East. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that racism stands at the root of US imperialism, militarism, and the conscription system.

flation which libertarians had been combatting for years. Charles Eliot Norton, the Harvard professor, said of our policy in Venezuela: "I fear that America is beginning a long course of error and wrong and is likely to become more and more a power for disturbance and barbarism", while to E. L. Godkin he wrote of the rise of "a barbaric spirit of arrogance and unreasonable self-assertion."[8] Godkin, editor of The Nation and the New York Evening Post, was an intransigent defender of laissez-faire liberalism, sound money, Negro rights, and anti-militarism, as were such of his associates as Carl Schurz, Oswald Garrison Villard and Edward Atkinson. It was to Godkin's Post that Atkinson wrote his first anti-imperialist blast (January 8, 1896), in which he offered the best practical means of distinguishing between true supporters of peace and proponents of war:

> A question has arisen as to whether Jingoism is a chronic disease affecting any great number of persons or only a superficial eruption or eczema developed by the itching for notoriety of a few persons who occupy but do not fill high positions, irritating but not dangerous. A conclusion could be easily reached upon these two phases of the question by drawing up a petition to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States somewhat in the following form:
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> > "It is requested that an act may be passed to the effect that any citizen of the United States who proposes to force this country into a war with Great Britain or with any other country on a dispute about boundaries or any other similar issue, shall be immediately conscripted or entered upon the army roll for service from the beginning to the end of any such war when it shall occur. It is suggested that Senators of the United States shall be assigned to the position of general officers in this addition to the army upon the ground that their military capacity must certainly be equal to their political intelligence. . . It is next suggested that Representatives in Congress shall be assigned to the command of brigades upon the ground that their capacity to lead military bodies had been proved by their capacity to mislead civil organizations. It is suggested that all other persons such as the heads of police departments and the like shall be ranked in the

8. Barbara W. Tuchman, "The First Anti-Imperialists," The Nation, 100th Anniversary Issue, p. 79.

subordinate offices or as privates according to the relative energy which they may have exhibited in the development of the Jingo policy."

Of course, men who in high public position have held that patriotism should not be made subordinate to dollars and cents, and who have expressed such an earnest desire to assert and defend the honor of the country at any cost, would most enthusiastically vote for this enactment and would immediately enroll themselves for active service in the field.

If the Jingo spirit is deeply seated, the army thus recruited would be ample for the defense of the country; while on the other hand, if it is a merely superficial or skin disease of a slightly contagious kind, that fact would be proved by the lack of enrollment of gentlemen in the higher positions which would leave the Jingo army short of officers even if the number of privates should be sufficient to make two or three regiments out of our seventy million people. . . The place for the most effective service would be upon the disputed territory in South America lying between Guiana and Venezuela. A (Henry Cabot) Lodge might be found in some vast wilderness of the Orinoco, from which source the center of direction could be given to the Jingo army. Effective work would be found for young men of previous experience in the police departments of northern cities (Theodore Roosevelt) in the Provost Marshal department of the Jingo army. A place could also be found in the Courts Martial of the Jingo army for the Judges who fear that without an occasional war the young men of the North will be enervated and will become too much imbued with that Christian spirit which we have become so accustomed to consider as one making for peace, order and human welfare. . . This proposal for the immediate enrollment of the Jingo army will at once develop the sincerity of purpose of the advocates of aggression and violence by their enlistment. An indirect but great benefit would then ensue by the removal of these persons from the high positions in which they have proved their incapacity to deal with questions of peace, order and industry and to give them the opportunity to exert and prove their military prowess.[9]

Note has been taken of the swiftness with which US imperialism switched from the point of origin of the

9. Williamson, op. cit., pp. 215-16.

Spanish-American war in the Caribbean to the area of its real interest, the Far East. The presidential message calling for the war stated:

> In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop,

and maintained the theme that US interest was limited to preserving peace and ending the mutual slaughter between the government and the rebels through the salutary intervention of US troops. An indication of the direction of US intent was the recognition of Cuban independence and the repudiation of the republican government in whose name and under whose social program the Cuban guerrillas had been fighting.[10] Although Cubans struggled and rebelled to regain a true independence without the humiliation of US interventions and US naval bases, it was only in 1959 that a beginning was made - and more than a beginning - to repay US imperialism for its crimes; but one portion of Cuban territory, Cuban independence, and Cuban honor remains unredeemed -- at Guantanamo Bay.

The establishment of US imperialism in the strategically crucial and raw materials-rich region of Southeast Asia surrounding the South China Sea reflected the increasing role of US imperialism in the exploitation of China. While the US supported Japan against Russia in the exploitation of north China, the US desired to act directly in competition with France and Britain in south China. From Hong Kong Britain dominated much of south China through privileges and concessions. Similarly, France's domination of Vietnam derived originally from the desire to have an area from which to threaten and exploit China, as in Britain's position at Hong Kong. When south Vietnam proved unsatisfactory for such a role against China, France asserted a "protectorate" over the Vietnamese government in the north. It then defeated a Chinese army which came to the aid of the Vietnamese, and from Vietnam the French extended their imperialism into south China bordering Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin. By conquering Manila the US hoped to use it to the same advantage as a base for exploitation of Southeast Asia and south China. (It has been suggested that the development of Philippine nationalism seeking the end of the US "protectorate",

10. Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1955), pp. 374-81.

and the establishment of real Philippine independence, threatens the use of US strategic bases aimed at China located near Manila at Clark Field and Subic Bay. The result is the large-scale US troop and construction commitment at the strategic bases aimed at China on the coast of south Vietnam.)

The US domination of Manila, culminating in the surrender of the major forts at Corregidor and Cavite (May 2, 1898) "marks a turning point in the history of American territorial expansion. It marks as well the beginning of a protest movement of proportions, a movement led by a strangely assorted group of citizens who fought expansion tooth and nail, and, in the face of overwhelming odds, urged renunciation of the spoils of war".[11] The real meaning of the event was foreseen by such outstanding liberals as the President of Stanford University, David Starr Jordan, who told a San Francisco rally that same day that for the US to embark upon a policy of imperialism "our democracy must necessarily depart from its best principles and traditions. . . The basal principles of the Republic, a cooperative association in which 'all just government is derived from the consent of the governed.'"

The US seizure of Manila short-circuited the social revolution which had been developing in the Philippines. After years of executing rebelling intellectuals and priests, Spanish rule was challenged by a popular national liberation movement led by Emilio Aguinaldo. Upon US seizure of Manila Bay, the rebels proclaimed, on June 12, 1898, the independence of the Philippines under a provisional government with Aguinaldo as president, a proclamation later ratified by a constituent assembly. Three days after the declaration of Philippine independence a meeting to protest US imperialism and US aggression was held at Faneuil Hall in Boston. A Saratoga Conference on foreign policy in August, 1898, however, became an instrument of the government when the anti-imperialists yielded on principles to gain a broad coalition.

> In America the outbreak of a war to be carried to the enemy and posing no danger to the homeland, did not silence but galvanized the war's opponents. Suddenly they became an entity with a name: the Anti-Imperialists. Professor Norton, now over 70, brought upon himself torrents of abuse and threats of violence to his house and person by urging his

11. Freidel & Pollack, op. cit., p. 359.

> students not to enlist in a war in which "we jettison all that was most precious of our national cargo." Although an Irish politician of Boston proposed to send a lynching party for him and the press called him a "traitor". . . (a)t a meeting of the Congregational Church in Cambridge he spoke of how bitter it was that now, at the end of a century which had seen the greatest advance in knowledge and the hope of peace, America should be turning against her ideals and "plunging into an unrighteous war".[12]

The Bostonians, Gamaliel Bradford and Moorfield Storey, past president of the American Bar Association, founded the Committee of Correspondence to pursue the revolutionary purposes of thwarting US imperialism. Finally, to harness the leadership and popular support of the anti-imperialists, a large membership organization was formed. The Anti-Imperialist League was founded in the office of Edward Atkinson, and important league branches were founded in New York, Chicago and San Francisco.

> The quest for power, money and glory abroad, the League maintained, would distract from reform at home and bring in its train a strong central government destructive of traditional states' rights and local liberties. Americans had enough to do to solve the problems of municipal corruption, war between capital and labor, disordered currency, unjust taxation, the use of public office for spoils, the rights of the colored people in the South and of the Indians in the West, before taking alien peoples under their rule. . . The Anti-Imperialists did not sweep up with them the Populists and followers of William Jennings Bryan and those soon to be known as Progressives. While these groups opposed standing armies, big navies and foreign entanglements and were in theory anti-imperialist, anti-militarist and anti-European, they were simultaneously imbued with a fever to fight Spain as a cruel European tyrant stamping out liberty at America's doorstep.[13]

The core of the Anti-Imperialist League was the Liberal Republicans or Mugwumps who supported sound money and free trade against the conservative Republicans' policies of inflation and protection of business. Carl Schurz, Charles Francis Adams, Edward Atkinson, Gamaliel Bradford, Moorfield Storey, E. L. God-

12. Tuchman, op. cit., p. 80.
13. Ibid., pp. 80-81.

kin, and Oswald Garrison Villard stood for the gold standard and free trade, peace and laissez-faire, good, but very little, government if at all. Their pre-Civil War no-government traditions were indicated by the inclusion of the "remnant of the old abolition groups, represented by the son of Garrison, the son of Emerson, the son of James Birney". Also identified with them were reformers and pacifists such as Jane Addams, George C. Mercer, who defended Indian rights, and Ernest Crosby, Charles B. Spahr and Edward Osgood Brown, all supporters of the single tax. The few businessmen, headed by Andrew Carnegie and Atkinson, provided the financing, while even fewer labor leaders were involved. But, intellectuals played a crucial role, whether as popular writers of fiction like Mark Twain or of social thought like Atkinson or college presidents and professors like David Starr Jordan of Stanford, William Graham Sumner of Yale, or Charles Eliot Norton and William James of Harvard.[14]

Richard Clark Sterne, "The Nation and its Century", in The Nation's 100th Anniversary Issue, notes how the crisis of US imperialism imposed a unity upon what had up to then appeared to be competing political philosophies, such as laissez-faire and Henry George's single tax concept.

> But in The Nation of January 2, 1896, George is highly praised for organizing an anti-war demonstration at Cooper Union. The New York Tribune, The Nation angrily remarked, had given "mendacious reports" of the meeting magnifying the number of hecklers, but the occasion had been a success. George had made a "powerful and effective speech in the interest of peace and common sense."[15]

> The paradox of the economically laissez-faire Nation joining hands with economic "radicals", because both the magazine and the radicals were opposed to colonialism, was illustrated on other occasions around the turn of the century. For example, in

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14. The similarity between the present criminal aggression of the US government in Vietnam and that in the Philippines has led to the republication of the statements of leading opponents of the US government, such as Mark Twain's "To the person sitting in darkness", Viet-Report (January, 1966), pp. 25-29, and William James' support of the Philippine guerrilas against the US marines, The Progressive (January, 1966), p. 9.
15. The Nation, op. cit., p. 252.

1896 The Nation noted that the Socialists in Germany had been directing their attacks more and more upon militarism, "which they characterize as the systematic fleecing of the workingman in the interest of a soldier class". The magazine observed:

> They are about right. . . it is hardly too much to say that international socialism is at present about the most promising influence that is making for the disarmament of Europe.

It cannot be stressed too strongly that the journal which thus praises "international socialism" was anti-Marxist and laissez-faire. During the muckracking years at the beginning of the twentieth century, the journal was to remain a most cautious critic, and always from a nineteenth century Liberal standpoint, of the "trusts". But. . . The Nation of that era was a friend of the anti-militaristic Socialists![16]

The Spanish-American war ended effectively within six months of its beginning and was concluded within the year by the Treaty of Paris (December, 1898). Andrew Carnegie assumed the leadership of the lobby of the Anti-Imperialist League to defeat the treaty in the Senate. William Jennings Bryan, who had supported the imperialist war as did so many so-called progres-

16. Ibid., p. 260. However, the founders of the Nation considered, and used radical terms to describe, their laissez-faire principles as radical. "Olmsted *tagged himself a "socialist democrat" and Godkin* called himself a "radical", and they believed any government beyond the intimacy of the town meeting to be a tyranny." Robert Fridlington, "Frederick Law Olmsted: Launching The Nation", Nation (January 3, 1966), p. 12. A founder of the Nation, William Lloyd Garrison, his son, Wendell Phillips Garrison, and his grandson, Oswald Garrison Villard, both editors, were often considered anarchists. Villard sought confrontations with state power as much as Garrison did. "I suspect that one of his greatest disappointments was his discovery that the suspension of The Nation in September, 1918, was not in response to his article blasting the Justice Department for its violation of civil liberties, but for Albert Jay Nock's article characterizing Samuel Gompers as the administration's lackey, traveling in an "atmosphere of sheer bagmanism"." Michael Wreszin, "Oswald Garrison Villard, The Pacifist Rough Rider", Nation (June 21, 1965), p. 671.

sives, lobbied for the passage of treaty ratification so that "peace" could be made, the imperialist issues easily disposed of, and the political situation cleared for another presidential campaign centering on domestic issues. Despite Bryan, the anti-imperialists almost defeated the treaty. But, it was ratified in early February, 1899 by a single vote, with several Democratic and Populist senators voting for it on Bryan's recommendation. A resolution for Philippine independence was missed only by the tie-breaking vote of the Vice-President at the very moment that the Philippine national government of President Aguinaldo, realizing the totality of the American betrayal, attempted to resist the US occupation.

> If The Nation was deeply depressed by our Cuban adventure, it was profoundly ashamed - along with Mark Twain and William James - of our treatment of the Filipinos. . . The United States cooperated with the Filipino patriot leader, Aguinaldo, in taking the islands from the Spaniards, and then American forces took the Philippines from the Filipinos. The official argument used to defend this procedure that the mass of the natives desired American rule - was refuted by The Nation:
>
> > Whenever a small force of Americans undertakes an expedition, the woods and hills become alive with enemies.
>
> Not bands of Filipino "robbers", The Nation continued, were using terrorist tactics; rather,
>
> > The American troops have done the terrorizing. Their conduct in some actions has been so ferocious, and their revenge in so many cases so terrible, as to make them dreaded and hated. The natives submit to the Americans because they are afraid of them. . .
>
> 30,000 Filipinos, the magazine estimated, had been killed by our forces.[17]

The Philippine resistance to the US aggression led to a complete identification with the cause of national liberation and opposition to the US government and its army by the anti-imperialists. The guerilla war against US imperialism led to a rapid growth of the anti-imperialist movement. By May, 1899 the original organization had thirty thousand members.

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17. The Nation, op. cit., p. 256.

> With the outbreak of the Philippine insurrection, in February, 1899, events in the islands came to play a much greater part in the productions of the anti-imperialists. . . Particularly useful to the anti-imperialists were the reports of outrage committed by American troops during the insurrection - instances of the burning of crops and villages, disregard of the rules of civilized warfare, of the "water cure", and orders to "take no prisoners". Ironically enough, these were the sort of stories that had aroused the American nation against the Spaniards in Cuba. The anti-imperialists were quick to note this, and claim that it furnished a concrete example of the inevitable consequences of denying a people the fundamental right of self-government.[18]

Edward Atkinson assumed the forefront of the anti-imperialist publicity campaign.

> In addition to being a vice-president of the Anti-Imperialist League, and contributing material for use by that organization, Mr. Atkinson printed and distributed his own series of pamphlets. . . By some he was branded a traitor to his country, others praised his efforts as being highly patriotic and made substantial monetary contributions for the continuation of his work. Some of his former associates in the tariff and silver fights turned against him, while on the other hand, some of his strongest opponents found common ground with him on this issue.
>
> In April, 1899, Mr. Atkinson conceived the idea of sending some of his pamphlets to some of the officers and soldiers stationed in the Philippines. He outlined his purpose (to the Secretary of the Treasury) on April 22. "In this morning's paper a correspondent of the Boston Herald states that the Departments are going to "expose" the Anti-Imperialist League and others who have as alleged stirred up discontent among the troops in Manila. I do not think the Executive Committee of the Anti-Imperialist League has yet taken any active measures to inform the troops of the facts and conditions there. The suggestion is, however, a valuable one and I have sent to Washington today to get specific addresses of officers and soldiers to the number of five or six hundred so that I may send them my pamphlets, giving them assurance of sympathy. I shall place the same lists

18. Harrington, in Freidel and Pollack, op. cit., pp. 364-65.

in charge of the Executive Committee of the League to keep up the supply". Naturally, no such list of names was forthcoming.

> Washington, May 2 (news dispatch). The Postmaster-General has directed the postmaster at San Francisco to take out of the mails for Manila three pamphlets issued by Edward Atkinson, of Boston, vice-president of the Anti-Imperialist League. This order does not apply to circulation of the pamphlets by mail in this country, but bars their dispatch from this country to the Philippines, discontent, and even mutiny, among the soldiers being stated by the department to be the design of these publications. The three pamphlets are specifically described, and in no circumstances are they to be forwarded by mail to the Philippines![19]

The New England Anti-Imperialist League became skittish over Atkinson's exercise of freedom of speech between American citizens in disregard of the slavery of the US uniform. As a result he turned from the East Coast to the Mid-West as the focus of his pamphlet work and the Chicago Anti-Imperialist League became the major distributor of Atkinson's assaults upon the US government. Of the May 2 seizure and denial of free speech by the government post office, Atkinson drew on his forty years of acquaintance with Cabinet members and other high government officials in declaring:

> I think the members of the Cabinet have graduated from an asylum for the imbecile and feeble-minded. They have evidently found out their blunder because the Administration papers suddenly ceased their attacks on me all on the same day, and I miss the free advertisement. I am now trying to stir them up again to provoke another attack.[20]

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19. Williamson, op. cit., pp. 227-29. Atkinson's pamphlets included: "The Cost of a National Crime" (1898), 34 pp.; "The Hell of War and its Penalties" (1898), 23 pp.; and "Criminal Aggression; by Whom Committed?" (1899), 13 pp.
20. Ibid., pp. 229, 293-95. The New England Anti-Imperialist League again became the center of Atkinson's publication in 1902, especially his pamphlets on the cost of warfare of which five were issued until his death in 1905 soon after his participation in the 1905 International Peace Congress in Boston. Ibid., p. 236.

On June 3, 1899, Atkinson began the publication of The Anti-Imperialist (of which six numbers were issued through October 1, 1900) and by September he was declaring his latest pamphlet "my strongest bid yet for a limited residence in Fort Warren". The distribution of about 135,000 copies of Atkinson's anti-imperialism pamphlets did not in the end result in Atkinson's imprisonment. But the fact that he and others had absolutely no respect for the processes of a government which had embarked upon an imperialist course created the conditions for a strong anti-imperialist and isolationist attitude among the American people, an attitude sufficient to blossom forth in crises two-thirds of a century later.

The American Anti-Imperialist League was founded as a protest against militarism and heavy taxes at home and aggression abroad; it held imperialism to be evil because of its denial of liberty and self-determination equally at home and abroad. The American Anti-Imperialist League held that if there was such a thing as treason, then it consisted of the support of imperialist actions of the US government and not opposition to them; it held that it was the US government that had introduced a civil war in American life, not those who opposed the betrayal of the fundamental ideals of the American people.

> We earnestly condemn the policy of the present National Administration in the Philippines. It seeks to extinguish the spirit of 1776 in those islands. We deplore the sacrifice of our soldiers and sailors, whose bravery deserves admiration even in an unjust war. We denounce the slaughter of the Filipinos as a needless horror. . .
>
> Imperialists assume that with the destruction of self-government in the Philippines by American hands, all opposition here will cease. This is a grievous error. Much as we abhor the war of "criminal aggression" in the Philippines, greatly as we regret that the blood of the Filipinos is on American hands, we more deeply resent the betrayal of American institutions at home. The real firing line is not in the suburbs of Manila. The foe is of our own household. . . Whether the ruthless slaughter of the Filipinos shall end next month or next year is but an incident in a contest that must go on until the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are rescued from the hands of their betrayers. Those who dispute about standards of value while the

> Republic is undermined will be listened to as little as those who would wrangle about the small economies of the household while the household is on fire. The training of a great people for a century, the aspiration for liberty of a vast immigration are forces that will hurl aside those who in the delirium of conquest seek to destroy the character of our institutions. . .
>
> We cordially invite the cooperation of all men and women who remain loyal to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.[21]

Louis Hartz has noted that an imperialist war, since it lacks any military danger to the imperialist country, permits freedom from hysteria and oppression that accompany a general war. An imperialist war may thus contain the conditions out of which a disinterested, uncompromising opposition can rally popular support. Imperialist wars, in contrast to general wars, are not fought against nations who share descendants with America, and therefore there is no clear-cut "fifth column" of Filipinos, Malays, Thais or Vietnamese, or Dominicans or Congolese for that matter, against whom a popularly supported witch-hunt can be directed. Thus, lacking the strong but compromised base of an ethnocentered and political opposition, anti-imperialist opposition can be generally American and moral. The shift in world politics changing US conflicts from inter-European to non-European creates totally new problems for the US government and important new opportunities for American anti-imperialists. Notwithstanding the imperialist messianism of racism, state-interest and chauvanism, imperialist wars fail to permit the ideological progaganda amidst the fears manufactured in a general war. Imperialist wars eliminate ideological debate between conflicting states, and open the most basic internal ideological debate, as Hans Morgenthau has perceptively noted.[22] As Hartz describes it:

> McKinley was involved in no ideological war unless it was a war within the United States. The Filipinos posed no threat to the American way of life, Agui-

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21. Louis L. Snyder, ed., The Imperialism Reader (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 391-93.
22. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955), p. 288. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Where Consensus Breaks Down", New Republic (January 22, 1966), pp. 16-18.

naldo had no agents in Washington or San Francisco, and the current of moral passion, such as it was, came entirely from the American side. . . . The Anti-Imperialist League, far from going underground, had branches openly in all parts of the country, enlisting the allegiance of many of the most prominent men in the country. . . . And when the Secretary of War tried to stop Edward Atkinson from sending anti-imperialist propaganda to the soldiers who were actually fighting in the Philippines, a howl of protest went up which forced a withdrawal of the action and discredited the McKinley Administration. Atkinson, an outraged editorial writer said, was being victimized by a "rule of blood and iron".[23]

Thus, as the case of Atkinson and the Anti-Imperialist League demonstrates, imperialist war provides a particularly fertile ground for a radical and widespread movement of opposition at home. A prolonged imperialist war, especially one leading to a defeat or stalemate for the imperialist power, is the most dangerous threat to its stability and its very continued existence.

A significant discussion of the role of the early Anti-Imperialists was held at the annual meeting April, 1962, of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, and published in Studies on the Left (Vol. III, No. 1, 1962). Under the title "The Anti-Imperialists and Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy," the major paper was presented by John W. Rollins, and comments made by Harold Baron and Thomas J. McCormick.

Rollins properly noted that "the Great Debate over American imperialism that began in the 1890's has never ended." His major thesis holds that American liberal corporatists have attempted to reconcile the imperialism of US foreign policy--the negation of true liberalism--with the claims and rhetoric of liberalism. Hence, they have sought to portray imperialism not as the basic element of US history in the twentieth century but as a mere passing interlude. Thus, while they were dismissed as futile and irrelevant, the Anti-Imperialists emerged, in a sense, as the ideological victors. For imperialist liberal corporatism has been forced to speak as though anti-imperialist principles have formed the basis for American policies. Rollins, however, unfortunately leaps from the use of the Anti-Imperialist viewpoint as a mask for imperialism, to the conclusion that twentieth century imperialism really is the Anti-Imperialism of 1898-1900.

23. Hartz, op. cit., pp. 288, 292.

Baron perceptively pointed out that Rollins' error was caused by a confusion between the expansion of international trade without any support from government, with an expansion of territory or trade resting on government aid. As Baron declares: "all definitions of imperialism include as a central point the use of the power of the state. . . To him (Hobson) imperialism was the antihesis of free trade because it brought forth a neomercantilist policy on the part of the state in order to gain preferred positions in world markets. . . the doctrine of comparative advantage in international trade theory can hardly be classed as expansionism. The free trade concept of developing international trade had nothing in common with the neo-mercantilist governmental policy that prevailed in the United States."[24] Baron also recalled Lenin's comment in his Imperialism that the Anti-Imperialists in America were the "last of the Mohicans of bourgeois democracy," the last to resist the process by which monopoly and imperialism replaced the system of capitalist free competition.

McCormick also stressed the great differences between the current coercive system and the views of the laissez-faire Anti-Imperialists: "it would be fruitless to analyze the domestic scene in the twentieth century by equating 'corporatism' with laissez-faire. . . The primary role played by the State in contemporary expansionism, plus the accepted use of force--moral, economic, and military---to promote that expansion, make twentieth century American diplomacy a far different animal than the 'dead horse' of laissez-faire anti-imperialism."[25]

24. Hans Baron, in Studies on the Left (Vol. III. No. 1, 1962), pp. 25-26.
25. Thomas J. McCormick, in ibid., p. 33.

# Palefaces Or Redskins:

# A Profile Of Americans

## By Leonard P. Liggio

> On the same day that tropical Pearl Harbor stood in flames, in the other part of the world in a snowstorm Russian divisions were first driving back the Germans from their advanced outposts near Moscow. ....7 December 1941 was the turning point of the Second World War. From that day onward the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan was assured.[1]

John Lukacs indicates that the roots of the Cold War are to be found in the beginnings of World War II. Lukacs analyzes how Pearl Harbor resulted from the policy decisions of particular forces in the governments of Washington and Tokyo. Roosevelt's demands on behalf of the US puppet Chiang prevented peaceful relations from prevailing between US imperialism and the Asian national bourgeoisie, for whom Japan had been the traditional spokesman. As a result of the United States' provocative embargo on trade with Japan and its refusal to negotiate in good faith, the nationalist militarists in Japan became predominant over the peaceful traditional and business interests. Lukacs sketches the final efforts by the Japanese to gain US agreement to peace in the Far East, and indicates the central role of Chiang's China Lobby in involving the American people in an Asian conflict which has lasted for the past twenty-five years.

> There is no doubt that the Japanese Emperor and at least part of the Tokyo government really wished to

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1. John Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 36-37

avoid war with the United States in 1941. Even though Roosevelt refused to meet Prince Konoye in Honolulu earlier, around 20 November the situation was such that a possibility for a compromise was discernible from the text of a so-called Japanese "Proposal B" that was not too far apart from an American modus vivendi proposal already drafted. But between 22 and 25 November it was decided in Washington not to present the modus vivendi to the Japanese; and the American note handed to them on 26 November contained conditions that, though excellent in principle, the Japanese government could hardly accept. ...The motives behind this American diplomatic reversal are still somewhat obscure. We know that Chiang's friends, allies, lobbyists, and agents played a very important role.[2]

American intervention in World War II on the side of Chiang had a profound effect on American foreign policy attitudes, particularly upon Isolationism, as noted in Lukacs' analysis of the development of the Cold War. Lukacs says:

> Obviously Isolationism ceased to be respectable after Pearl Harbor. ...Yet, again, we may ask whether this development has been profound rather than superficial and even whether it has been so clear a gain at all?[3]

Lukacs then quotes President De Gaulle's views on the manner in which the undercutting of American isolationism contributed to the origins and maintenance of the Cold War. Lukacs suggests that of all who have written about American foreign policy from World War II "there is but one who saw through Roosevelt's global plans with profound insight. It is General De Gaulle" in his War Memoirs.[4] De Gaulle declared:

> a kind of messianic impulse now swelled the American spirit ...which concealed the instinct for domination.... It was true that the isolationism of the United States was, according to the President, a great error now ended. But passing from one extreme to the other, it was a permanent system of intervention that he intended to institute by international law. In his opinion, a four-power directorate - America,

2. Ibid., pp. 84-85.
3. Ibid., p. 369; Cf. Liggio, "Isolationism, Old and New Part I," LEFT AND RIGHT (Winter, 1966), pp. 19-35.
4. Lukacs, pp. 45, 369-370.

> Soviet Russia, China and Great Britain - should settle the world's problems. ...such an organization, according to him, would have to involve the installation of American forces on bases distributed throughout the world, some of which would be located in French territory. Roosevelt thus intended to lure the Soviets into a group that would contain their ambitions and in which America could unite its dependents. Among the 'four,' he knew, in fact, that Chiang Kai-shek's China needed his cooperation and that the British, in danger of losing their dominions, would yield to his policy. ...the support offered by Washington and the existence of American bases would give rise to new sovereignties in Africa, Asia and Australasia, which would increase the number of states under an obligation to the United States.[5]

De Gaulle concluded by noting that given this limitless global domination by the United States, it was possible to satisfy the limited, defensive needs of the Soviet Union that there be no hostile regimes in Eastern Europe; in fact, as Churchill noted at the time, the recognition of Russia's interest in that region was a perfect way to distract Russia from the areas of the world which were of greater importance to Western imperialism.

Yet the Truman Administration determined to impose Western imperialism's aims upon Eastern Europe as well as on the rest of the world. As the author of The Great Powers and Eastern Europe, Lukacs is especially knowledgeable in Soviet-American relations in Eastern Europe. He concludes that the Soviet Union had made no attempt to interfere with America's new domination of Western Europe.

> Now Stalin did not particularly contest American power: he did not challenge America's sphere; did it not seem to him, however, that the Americans were beginning to challenge his sphere?[6]

The Truman Administration had difficulty in rousing the American people to the Cold War crusade. The American people knew that more than six million Russians had been killed and the major industrial, agricultural and cultural regions destroyed by the war. Americans recognized that only "two of every thousand Americans" had had to die in the war because "fifty out of

5. John Lukacs, Decline and Rise of Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1965), pp. 208-209.
6. Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War, p. 81.

every thousand Russians" had died. It was remembered that "the massive bulk of this (American) aid did not reach Russia until after the Battles of Moscow and Stalingrad" when the tide of war had already been reversed, and that for every enemy division facing the Western allies there were three against the Russians. These facts were reinforced by distrust of Western imperialism "felt by Left-wing Democrats as well as by Right-wing Republicans." Furthermore, Lukacs adds, "the inchoate but deep and widespread inclinations of American isolationism had not yet been spent."[7] To overcome this opposition to the Cold War the Truman Administration called in the Old World to redress the balance of the New. From Winston Churchill to escapees from war crimes trials, the American people were deluged with propaganda totally lacking in the legitimacy of native birth.

The collapse of the Old Regime in Eastern Europe threw up on America's shores an intellectual Iron Guard to reinforce the US' administration's position vis a vis the American people. Lukacs distinguishes in American politics two main traditions: The Redskins and the Palefaces. This concept is transposed to ideology from one long familiar in American literature. The political Redskins, the mass of the American people, came here to flee the feudal systems of the old world to seek freedom from taxes, inspection, control, 'education,' conscription and foreign wars. The Redskin culture is an accumulation of individual decisions, individual desires, individual purposes which conflict with any imposition of grandiose organized schemes. The Redskin, the American, does not wish to be ruled, ordered, taxed or conscripted, but his flight from feudalism has meant a failure to confront the issue of domination by the Palefaces. The Redskins have not yet purged themselves fully by revolutionary experiences of the mentality of the emancipated slave or serf. Thus, the Redskins suffer from disunity and their leadership tends to be prophetic, lacking in the organizational talents necessary to lead a sustained assault on the citadels of privilege and monopoly, the "bureaucratic Welfare State" which the Redskins' weakness has allowed the Palefaces to construct.

The Palefaces represent those who seek to emulate the aristocratic society of Europe, that is, the ways of feuda-

7. Ibid., pp. 4, 38, 46, 62. Cf. Garet Garrett, "The American Empire," LEFT AND RIGHT (Winter, 1966), pp. 36-53.

lism upon which the European ruling classes are based. Thus, the American Palefaces have viewed themselves as a divinely chosen elite who must paternalistically direct, educate and especially control the mass of the American people, the Redskins. To the Palefaces, the Redskins have no sense of the responsibilities and sacrifices outside their natural surroundings which the Palefaces' nation-state's call to greatness entails; thus, to Palefaces the Redskins appear 'uncivilized,' 'uncultured,' and 'uneducated.' For their role in the feudal system of being guides and guards, leaders and teachers, the Palefaces insist upon a sizable part of the productivity of the Redskins. The Redskins' self-interest must be curbed, according to the Palefaces, by their own devotion to the 'common good,' the 'general welfare,' or the 'national interest.' With this rationale, the Palefaces' ultimate role is the administrator-the inspector, the public school teacher, the welfare worker, the tax-collector, the policeman, the army officer. Lukacs asks

> whether the very organization of our societies, too, is not unconsciously moving in a "rightist" direction, away from Capitalism toward older, medieval institutions. Consider only the movement away from money economy, the dependence of the citizen's position not upon birth or wealth but upon his function: a status rather than a contract society, and so forth.[8]

Capitalism has been historically the polar opposite of the Right. Capitalism, freedom, the Left, have challenged feudalism, restriction and status, the right, with all other possible positions falling between these poles. Capitalism, the self-determination of people to decide their own priorities, is precluded by the Palefaces' feudal commercial system of mercantilism or state 'capitalism'. The "rightist" direction, away from Capitalism," has subjected Americans, the Redskins, to the Palefaces' monopoly 'capitalism' or to "government intervention and to the extension of socialist patterns of life and thought."[9] The feudal nature of American statism is best seen in the major instrumentality of Paleface administration - the draft. Control of people's labor is an important element of feudalism, and it is control of people's labor that is the major goal of the Palefaces. Defense Secretary McNamara recently made the 'enlightened' proposal in the face of the popular, Redskin, opposition to conscription, that a system of

8. Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War, pp. 402-13.
9. Ibid., p. 296.

two-year national service for all youth be instituted. That is, a confiscation of two years' labor from most American citizens. Thus, in the tradition of feudalism, the rulers will have an expendable, cheap, and especially dependent ( unprotected by the civil laws and subject to military and administrative slave codes ) labor force. The term-of-years rather than permanent subjection is not alien to feudal institutions; indentured servitude and apprenticeship systems are refinements of the feudal system applied to advanced and complex economic relationships. The government, or to speak plainly, the Pentagon, is the largest consumer of capital and of labor in the country; compared to the Pentagon, all major industrial concerns fall to middle rank category where their profit margins are threatened by the rising firms associated with the Pentagon contract system. "United States industrialists in the name of Free Enterprise clamor for more and more government orders for their own enterprises."[10]

> Thus the United States, now the leader of the Free world, was ahead of the world in bureaucratization. This is an alarming development. ...Just as government, with its cancerously growing number of civil servants (and the less visible but more ominous growth of the number of people indirectly and partly employed by the government), suggests the transformation from the Legislative to the Administrative State, similar developments have taken place in every kind of enterprise and in wide areas of American life. The administrator rather than the producer has become the typical (and respected) American occupation.[11]

The Palefaces' administrator-orientation has been expanded from domestic feudal-paternalism to foreign imperialist-paternalism "of the White Man's Burden, of Liberation, of International Policemanship."[12] With the dominance of the Right, the Palefaces, in the American government, twentieth century American foreign policy has been imperialistic, whether by T. or F. Roosevelt, Wilson or Truman, Eisenhower or Kennedy: "these Presidents were imperialists, imperialists of a new sort, covering up their concepts of national ambitions with high-flown moralistic oratory, eminently successful imperialists of a new kind."[13] The state nationalism at

10. Ibid., p. 298.
11. Ibid., pp. 294-95.
12. Ibid., p. 339.
13. Ibid., p. 371.

the root of imperialism was the dominant ideology during the early modern period until challenged from the Left by the patriotism of the democratic revolutions, based upon Rousseau's conception of human happiness lying in the natural institutions outside the state. To the revolutionary impulse of freedom, the statist or Rightist responded; "in the early nineteenth century, the state is put forward by certain German thinkers as a majestic end in itself."[14] The Palefaces' nationalism, or state consciousness, is loyalty to the state, disregarding and often conflicting with the natural institutions, the traditions, and the specific locality of the people. The Redskins, patriotism, nation (patrie)-consciousness, is loyalty to the natural institutions, the specific locality and the traditions of the people. Thus, imperialism especially conflicts with the traditions of the mass of the American people, the Redskins. Lukacs notes the effects of the development of "an imperial society" based upon the "American world empire:"

> here I am concerned with the effects of this world-wide transformation on American society. For this involved -- and it still involves -- great radical departures from previous American traditions. Together with the development of a welfare state, the bureaucracy of the American government increased in tremendous proportions. The proportionate increase of the personnel and of the powers of federal investigative and intelligence agencies was even greater.[15]

As Lukacs indicates, the FBI and the CIA are the two Paleface instrumentalities furthest removed from the traditional freedom of the American, the Redskin; they are direct transplants from European state nationalism. As typified in Nazi Germany, state nationalism was anti-patriotic, anti-communist and anti-tradition. Thus, in twentieth century Europe, 'National', designating expansionist, anti-patriotic, anti-communist movements, "became a byword for anti-patriotic treachery during the Second World War. This tendency is faintly discernible even in the United States (cf. the McCarthyite, pro-German and sometimes mildly pro-Fascist National Review)."[16]

The anti-patriotism and anti-freedom traditions of the Palefaces have been infused with new reserves from European feudalism since World War II. Having failed in

14. Lukacs, Decline and Rise of Europe, p. 149.
15. Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War, pp. 161-63.
16. Lukacs, Decline and Rise of Europe, p. 159.

Europe with their anti-patriotic, anti-communist, and expansionist state nationalism, these strategic advisers have crossed over to America for one last gamble to prove their discredited theories.

> It may be symbolic that among the myriad Experts of International Relations who have been berating and advising the American people ever since the beginning of the last World War, Americanized immigrant professors have played a large role: they have fashioned, defined, and proposed new kinds of American National interests, of an atomic Realpolitik tailored to what they state are America's needs. Before me lies one of these incantations by a Director of a Foreign Policy Research Institute, consultant to the Government and Pentagon: "For the next fifty years or so, the future belongs to America. The American empire and mankind will not be opposites but merely two names for the universal order under peace and happiness. Novus orbis terrarum." I regard this kind of thing not merely pompous but impertinent.[17]

These European emigre Foreign Policy advisors have become the intellectual vanguard in the State Department, Pentagon and universities for the Paleface Establishment. So far removed are these émigrés from the American, the Redskin, traditions that irony is too weak a word to describe the transferral, the betrayal, involved when these men are appointed the judges of "Un-American" activities. Lukacs notes that "Americanism" had originally meant the instruction of immigrants in traditional American thought; but the "Un-American" activities committees have immigrants teaching their defeated feudal concepts to native-born Americans!

These Palefacé emigres have escaped the judgment of the tribunals of their Redskin compatriots; since their state nationalism was allied with the imperialism of the Western Palefaces, the patriotic and traditional Redskin movements in their countries adopted the methods of communism to achieve liberation from Paleface dominion. Lukacs describes the Bolshevik Revolution as essentially a patriotic or isolationist movement which Lenin led to success: "the great and dreadful disgust of the Russian people with the European war, with Russia's Western allies, including her own cosmopolitan and Francophile aristocracy."[18] Bolshevism was the modern Russian Redskin or isolationist (Slavophile or Eurasian) tra-

17. Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War, p. 380.
18. Lukacs, Decline and Rise of Europe, p. 193.

dition against the aristocratic Palefaces or Westernizers allied with Western imperialism. Thus, the Bolsheviks moved the capital from western St. Petersburg to Moscow in the interior. The same Paleface accusation of 'agent of a foreign power' hurled against the isolationists, the Redskin patriots, Debs, Senator LaFollette, and Congressman Lindbergh, was used by the Russian Palefaces against Lenin. Although Marx himself neglected the importance of the nation as opposed to the state, Lukacs indicates that contemporary communism is a system of achieving patriotic revolutions rather than a philosophical or economic theory, as the careers of Lenin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh and Castro well illustrate; Lukacs says: "A political Marxist, such as Castro, for example, declared himself to be pro-Communist because he was anti-American, and not the reverse."[19]

Cuban resistance to American imperialism is a major subject added to this revised New History of the Cold War. The Cuban Revolution was already over a year old when the first edition of the book was written. As in the case of such few perceptive historians of American foreign relations as William Appleman Williams (Tragedy of American Diplomacy) and John Gerassi (Great Fear in Latin America), Lukacs notes that nationalist movements tend to take on the ideological structure of the major opponents of Western imperialism - fascism before 1945, communism since. Cuba's communism is the consequence of Cuban nationalism's opposition to American domination; Castro adopted Marxism-Leninism as the leading philosophy of irreconcilability with American imperialism and to force the Soviet Union to protect Cuba against American military interventions after 1960. Lukacs is unequivocal in placing the blame for the October 1962 Missile Crisis upon the United States:

> It was this threat of an American invasion and not the so-called Rocket Confrontation which culminated in the fantastic American-Russian crisis over Cuba in October 1962: the former led to the latter and not, as it is commonly believed, the reverse.[20]

The Soviet installation of medium rockets in Cuba is explained as a cautious, defensive move to prevent a widely expected American invasion of Cuba and to stabilize American-Soviet relations. With the discovery of the missile sites, built "in an ostentatious manner, without any attempt to conceal or disguise them," serious negotiations

19. Ibid., p. 193.
20. Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War, p. 237.

led to their dismantlement in exchange for the major American commitment not to invade Cuba, and the minor one of removing American missile bases against Russia in Turkey and Italy. As the Soviets had hoped, the concrete solution of the crisis led to a detente between Russia and America, exemplified by the nuclear test ban treaty and by the wheat agreement. On June 10, 1963 at American University, Kennedy made what Lukacs calls "the most significant speech of his career"; he spoke out against a military and foreign policy of a "Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war."[21] This was succeeded by initiatives in various areas of the world. A new policy reducing the American hostility toward China was about to be launched, along with the actual withdrawal of American troops in Vietnam preceding a negotiated settlement between the anti-Diem Junta and the National Liberation Front. Finally, restoration of amicable relations with Cuba was projected by Kennedy in a Miami speech of November 18, 1963, just four days before his assassination.[22]

A major new contribution by Lukacs is his treatment of the meaning of the 1964 elections. Johnson's electoral mandate was based upon an essentially isolationist program. Johnson's interests drew him toward domestic affairs away from international involvements. "True, this characteristic was inseparable from a certain parochialness of his views," but it was suitable since America "would do well to embark on a policy of broad and cautious retrenchment."[23] This American mood of isolationism was challenged by the Republican candidate who offered, as Lukacs notes, the first clear choice since the isolationist-interventionist contest of 1920; Johnson's plurality was second only to that of 1920 when isolationism also triumphed. Of course, Johnson's isolationism was a fraud and he adopted Goldwater's expansionism soon after the election had repudiated it. Lukacs doubts that Goldwater's nomination represented an increase in "American conservatism":

> It would be wrong to deduce therefrom (Goldwater's nomination) that the appeal for "American conservatism", that is, for an anti-Communist crusade, had grown during that decade; indeed, there is reason to believe that the social base of McCarthy's following was more solid than was Goldwater's.[24]

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21. Ibid., p. 259.
22. Ibid., pp. 246-47.
23. Ibid., pp. 261-62.
24. Ibid., pp. 262-63.

This anti-communist crusading signifies "the weakness of American 'conservatism' - which is, in reality, nothing more than radical nationalism of a shallow and second-rate nature... Adlai Stevenson may be the American Mendes-France; but, mon Dieu, what do Barry Goldwater and Charles de Gaulle have in common? Nothing."[25] De Gaulle is peaceful, patriotic, traditional - isolationist; "American conservatives" are expansionist, anti-patriotic, anti-communist - "National".

Involved in these matters is the civil rights revolution. Negroes in the Black Belt and Black Ghettos have shared with the mass of American people an adherence to patriotic nationalism against state nationalism as represented in their localities by the public welfare workers, school teachers, police forces, etc. In the Black Belt state nationalism has been supported by such community groups as the KKK. Lukacs notes that

> in the South the demonstrations for the enforcement of the long overdue civil rights were resisted by brutal murders committed by members of the reborn Ku Klux Klan, a general sense of malaise appeared in many manifestations of American life, suggesting that the problems of this great people were deeper and more widespread than it has been generally believed; that perhaps it was not only the lack of world historical experience but also the superficiality of domestic cohesiveness which might eventually reduce that American role of world leadership...[26]

Yet, the weaknesses of the domestic foundations of American imperialism have been matched by increasingly wilder gambles on the international scene, especially in Asia. Lukacs indicates that "today that portion of the Russo-Chinese frontier is still along the Amur" where it was fixed by treaty in 1689; in contrast, while Boston and New York were experiencing the English Glorious Revolution, "in 1689 the American frontier was but a few dozen miles inland from the Atlantic coast; today the American flag flies in Okinawa, Japan, Korea, across the Pacific everywhere and even on the Asian mainland."[27] On the Asian mainland, it was in relation to China that American expansion was most clearly evident after 1945, as it had been before; and Chiang's interest remained paramount, dragging the American people into the Cold War just as his interest had led to Pearl Harbor.

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25. Lukacs, Decline and Rise of Europe, p. 262.
26. Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War, p. 263.
27. Ibid., p. 12.

> American marines, and naval units helped to ferry advanced troops of the Nationalist government up North to establish their authority after the Japanese surrender... after all is said, the Russians did evacuate Manchuria by late 1946, turning its cities over not to Communist but to Chinese Nationalist garrisons. Russian support to the Chinese Communists cannot be denied; but, on the other hand, this support was far less than American supplies to the Nationalists during the same period... Stalin's support of Mao was halfhearted. Remembering the occasional enthusiasm of certain American officials for Mao during the war, until mid-1947 the Russians feared that the Chinese Communists would be unduly close to the United States. This was at least one of the principal reasons why Moscow refused to break relations with Chiang's regime even as late as 1948.[28]

Lukacs' discussion of the American intervention in Korea seems relevant to today's events; the inability of modern warfare to defeat popular Asian forces was evident despite the "undisputed superiority of American air power during the first phase of the war." [29]

> The relative victor of the Korean War was not Russia but China; but her victory was one of prestige rather than of power...[30]

Checked in its crusade against China from the northern gateway, Korea, which Japan had used to invade China, the Pentagon shifted to the alternative route which Japan had also adopted, Vietnam.

> American military and political influence was already superseding the French in southern Indochina when the Dien Bien Phu crisis broke... and in view of the experience of the Korean war, it is strange how Dulles and Admiral Radford could believe that the intervention of American air power alone could turn the tide of this guerrilla war fought in millet fields and rice paddies.[31]

Lukacs sketches the American intervention in Vietnam from its encouragement of Diem to violate the Geneva Agreement's election terms "since they feared that they would lose such an election to Ho Chi Minh", to the United

28. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
29. Ibid., p. 96.
30. Ibid., p. 102.
31. Ibid., p. 118.

States' escalation of the Vietnam War in 1965, which Lukacs notes

> did not at all mean that the Americans could do what the French had been unable to do more than a decade earlier: to defeat the Vietcong in the field and to eliminate the guerrilla warfare altogether. Reasonable estimates suggested that no less than one million American soldiers were needed to do the trick - perhaps... the Indochinese situation was different from the Korean one. ...in Vietnam the North and the Vietcong proved to be a match for the Americans without having to depend on the Chinese for their survival... (In Korea) there is every reason to believe that the aerial bombing of Manchuria would have led nowhere. Unfortunately there was little to suggest that Dean Rusk in 1964-65 understood these historical distinctions better than had his predecessor, the other Dean (Acheson), exactly fifteen years earlier; and it seems, too, that Johnson was not sufficiently aware of the singular inefficacy of strategic air power. ...like the strategic bombing of Germany during the last world war, or like the American air superiority during the first phase of the Korean War, this produced no worthwhile effects at all. ...the wooden diplomacy of Dean Rusk deserves most criticism: for, given the by now undoubtedly impressive endurance of the Vietcong and of the Ho Chi Minh regime in the North, it seems that even in the not too likely event of a decisive American victory in the South the Americans' present adversaries may have earned their rights to become virtually the principal power in Indochina in the long run.[32]

Lukacs wonders how many Americans, Left or Right, will consider Vietnam worth the bones of a single US marine. One is reminded of Bismarck's warning on December 5, 1876 during a major crisis between the Great Powers in the newly emerging countries of the Balkans: "They are not worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier." Bismarck and Eisenhower had the sense to stay the hands of the military from engaging in the loss of their people's lives. Bismarck's successors, as well as Johnson, lacked that discretion and have been marked in the ledger of history as war-criminals, as much for what they did to their own people as for the suffering they inflicted upon others.

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32. Ibid., pp. 267-71.

# VIETNAM:
# *Teach-Ins*

Louis Menashe and Ronald Radosh, eds., Teach-Ins: U.S.A., Reports, Opinions, Documents, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, 349 pp., $1.95.

## *By Leonard P. Liggio*

The first teach-in developed at the University of Michigan. It was held on March 24, 1965 in response to the sustained bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the US government. This teach-in was organized by the students and faculty at the University of Michigan and Professor Anatol Rapoport, one of the organizers, has presented this description of it:

> The first teach-in was a demonstration, not a debate. To be sure, the meeting had the format of academic discourse, and, needless to say, the whole gamut of opinon found expression in the night-long discussions. But there was no question about the basis of discussion. The point of departure was our conviction that the present U. S. policy in Southeast Asia was dangerous, ineffective, illegal, and immoral. No Government spokesman and no apologist for the Administration's policy appeared on the "faculty" of the "Free University of Michigan." Whatever opposition was voiced was directed at us from the floor, not from among us. To the critics of this procedure we replied that the Administration had its own channels of communication and its own apparatus of influence. Our task was to establish a counterforce to the engineering of consent.

The "Free University of Michigan's" "faculty" ranged from such long standing critics of US foreign policy as Professor Kenneth Boulding, to such then unrecognized commentators as Carl Oglesby. Kenneth Boulding has summarized the motivation of the teach-in as follows:

> It began as a movement of pure protest and outrage. The motivations which inspired it were no doubt

various. They included a genuine fear of escalation into nuclear warfare; they included also a sense of moral outrage at the use of such things as napalm and the "lazy dog," and the appalling sufferings which we are imposing on the Vietnamese in the supposed name of freedom and democracy.

Professor Boulding has suggested the illusions that were revealed in the teach-ins. Often there were pleas for the US to resume a peaceful role in the world, as though the US government has not been an aggressor throughout its history. This meant that the teach-in needed to instruct the students, i. e., faculty and students, in the reality of American history and in the reality of aggression, neither of which is taught in American universities. As Professor Boulding said: "We are not, and never have been, a peace-loving nation; we are not only ruthless and bloody but we feel no shame about it." Similarly, Professor Christopher Lasch's commentary on the teach-ins indicates the potential role of education which has been rejected by the universities and its professors:

> The real subject that needs to be "taught" is the history of the Cold War and of the relation of the American Left to Communism. The Left needs to reconsider its own history, as a patient therapeutically reconstructs his past . . . These are subjects --as distinguished from "alternatives" in Vietnam - worth teaching. Until the teach-ins begin to teach, they will be politically useless and intellectually boring. It will be interesting to see whether the failures of higher education - the confusion of education with expertise, the idea that students are a needless obstacle to "research" - will now repeat themselves in the political agitation to which teachers find themselves so unexpectedly committed.

The relationship of the origins of the Cold War and the failure of the American Left are really the same subject in that the ability of Liberal Corporatism, centered in the New Deal-Fair Deal, to co-opt the American Left and make it the spokesman of US imperialism against domestic and foreign anti-imperialists insured the existence of the Cold War - the modern expression of US imperialism. Lasch notes:

> Things would be different if the American Left had not long ago committed itself to outdo the Right in its anti-Communist zeal; but, once the Left itself

accepted anti-Communism as the sine qua non of political respectability, it became the prisoner of its own immediate success, surviving the postwar hysteria only to find that hysteria had become a permanent feature of the political scene.

The postwar hysteria resulted from the prewar hysteria which the Left engendered to aid US imperialism's intervention in World War II. The teach-ins provided a beginning for exposing the limited range of difference that has passed for a left or a right in America - that both have alternatively merely been instruments for cooption by Liberal Corporatism. Such a role is revealed, for example, in a comment on the teach-ins by the new-rightist, Russell Kirk: "Fancy Dr. Staughton Lynd, or a professor of the Birchite persuasion, as Secretary of State." What Kirk indicates is not merely the similarity of the anti-Establishmentism of the New Left and the Birchites, but also the frequent identity of their criticisms and conclusions, especially their neo-isolationist analysis of US imperialism.

Echoes of the earlier domestic anti-imperialist critiques were to be found from the beginning of the teach-ins at Michigan, and increased with the constant assertion by supporters of US imperialism in Vietnam that the domestic opposition was a resurgence of the American isolationism which opposed US aggression in 1898, 1917, 1941 and 1950. At the Michigan teach-in, Arthur Waskow, of the Institute for Policy Studies, appears to have initiated the insight when he raised the cry: "stop neo-isolationism." Perhaps as a historian he recognized the essentially Left and revolutionary potentialities of isolationism - the domestic opposition to US imperialism. Liberal Corporatism requires a range of imperialist instruments to achieve its goals, but the most important over the long-run has been the foreign aid program. The conservatives in the Liberal Corporatist Establishment - Fulbright, Kennedy, Morse, etc. - wish to rely on the tried and proven mechanism of imperialism, foreign aid (military and economic), rather than on the aggressive forward strategies of Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Rostow, etc., which raises threats to the existing exploitative system. Arthur Schlesigner, Jr., in his speech to the National Teach-in, quoted Senator Robert Kennedy to emphasize the crucial role of increased foreign aid to achieve the desired objectives of US imperialism, especially in Vietnam. Similarly, Arthur Waskow, to emphasize his opposition to the American neo-isolationism of the New

Left, proposes increased expenditure for the major instrument of US imperialism, foreign aid. Waskow's Michigan teach-in attack on neo-isolationism summarized that opposition to US imperialism as follows:

> There are some Americans who have responded to their own horror over the means we are using in Vietnam by denouncing the use of any means at all, who have responded to the difficulties we have discovered in the way of accomplishing our official noble ends in the underdeveloped world by condemning those ends as irrelevant to, or undesirable for, the underdeveloped world. They have responded to the new American arrogance with what, at first glance, looks like a new American humility: the humility that says we have nothing useful to offer the world.

From the University of Michigan the teach-ins spread to many campuses and some had important repercussions by raising a number of fundamental issues which had remained unresolved beneath the surface of the previously unexamined American society . For example, the teach-in organized on April 23, 1965 by the Rutgers University SDS chapter played the role of raising such issues for the university as well as for the state's electorate. At the teach-in history professor Eugene Genovese declared: "I do not fear or regret the impending Vietcong victory in Vietnam. I welcome it." This statement as well as its repetition by political science professor James Mellen of Drew University, at a Rutgers teach-in in September, became the major issue in the New Jersey gubernatorial campaign; Gov. Hughes was re-elected on his support for academic freedom while Professors Genovese and Mellen were ultimately removed from their academic posts by the subtle means used by university administrators.

The National Teach-in held in Washington, May 15, 1965 departed from the basic nature of the teach-ins, for it was developed and operated in cooperation with the Administration in order to give respectability and distribution to the Administration's postion among the uncommitted. Professor William Appleman Williams, who addressed the National Teach-in, noted the ability of the Administration to manipulate it so that "Deutscher's assault on the assumptions of American policy, and Morgenthau's laying bare the dangerous unreality of officialdom's so-called realism" were blunted. (It is unfortunate that Isaac Deutscher's address was not able to be included in Teach-

ins: U. S. A.) Williams indicates that the failure of the National Teach-in compared to the teach-in movement lay in the absence of students in determining its activities. Williams says:

> The first and crucial thing to understand is that the students largely supplied the initiative and power behind the entire movement . . .
> They are young men and women who are intelligent and perceptive enough to learn from their elders without making all the same mistakes. They have had enough of hipsterism as well as of the jet-set, and of the Old Left as well as of the Establishment. And they are aware that emancipation involves men as well as women, and that it concerns something beyond changing patterns of sexual behavior and beyond the freedom and the opportunity to hustle their wares in the marketplace.
> They are morally committed to the proposition that the American system must treat people as people, and that the system must be changed if that is necessary to achieve that objective. They are deeply angry about the double standard of morality they constantly experience.

In contrast to the students, the faculty who were the organizers of the National Teach-in were, according to Joan Scott's perceptive observation, "confused about whether they loved the existing system or the enduring principle of American democracy."

The most productive teach-in was the Berkeley Teach-in (May 21-22) which led to major political activities in succeeding months. It was addressed by the most significant American critics of US aggression in Vietnam as well as by international figures such as Isaac Deutscher and Bertrand Russell (by tape). Professor Staughton Lynd's speech contained the important contribution to radical politics in America that coalition politics "means coalition with the Marines." Lynd concluded his speech with a call for a revolutionary analysis of the meaning of imperialist war for American society. He said to the government of the United States:

> And if you are worried that the natives all over the world are restless, we want you to know that the natives here at home are restless too, and maybe there should be a contingency plan to keep some of the Marines here to deal with us.

From this there developed the International Days of Protest which were the response to the activity and leadership for the Berkeley teach-in group. Focusing on the support of American opposition to US imperialism, international teach-ins were organized in major world capitals. A teach-in against US aggression in Vietnam was held at the University of Puerto Rico in which the independence movement of Puerto Rico drew the parallel between "Puerto Rico's sturggle for liberation and that of the Vietnamese people." From London to Tokyo (where recently-elected SDS president Carl Oglesby spoke) the response to the Berkeley group's call for international solidarity with the American anti-imperialist movement contributed to the education of the radical movements in many countries. In the Paris teach-in an orthodox Marxist speaker was "reminded that the French working class, largely led by the Communist Party, had never struck for peace in Algeria; he may have begun to understand what a real teach-in might be: the examination of assumptions - even one's own."

# VIETNAM

# And The Republicans

The War In Vietnam. The Text of the Controversial Republican White Paper Prepared by the Staff of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1967, 62 pp., $1.00.

## *By Leonard P. Liggio*

> Early in this staff study it is stated:
> America, no matter how pure its motives, cannot overcome the weight of history insofar as the Vietnamese look at it. In short, their memory of history is what we must learn to deal with, not our concept of it.

And in its conclusions, it declares:

> In short, we Americans cannot simply go to Asia, wipe the slate clean, and say to them, "This is how it shall be." The Vietnamese have their own view of nationalism, quite different from ours, the Vietnamese Communists identify with it, and it renders our involvement immeasurably difficult.

The advantage of the Republicans' study is that it seeks to understand the realities both of the recent history of the Vietnamese people and of the present political situation. Against these facts the Republicans re-examine the U. S. intervention in Vietnam.

The background indicates to the Republicans that the "most crucial moments" came at the end of the Second World War.[1] Ho Chi Minh's leadership brought independence to Vietnam on September 2, 1945, but, based on the decision of the Anglo-Soviet-American Potsdam conference, allied forces under a British general restored the colonial rule of the De Gaulle government in southern Vietnam. "The consequences of this decision are with us today."

While completely condemning the U. S. - supported French aggression, the Republican study merely touches on the original U. S. official involvement in Vietnam - its recognition of the puppet Saigon government in February 1950. It refuses to face the fact that this recognition was intimately involved in U. S. hostility to the newly established Peoples's Republic of China. Throughout the study the relationship of Vietnam to overall U. S. policy, especially to China policy, is neglected as though the Vietnam involvement were an isolated mistake rather than the most obvious aspect of a single foreign policy. Thus, when in mid-January 1950, the Soviet Union objected to the presence of the Chiang delegate in the Security Council, the U.S., supported by France, vetoed the seating of the delegation of the People's Republic of China; China recognized Ho Chi Minh's government, the U. S., to compensate France, recognized the Saigon regime, and the Soviet Union boycotted the Security Council until after the beginning of the Korean war six months later. Again, regarding Truman's intervention in Korea, the Republicans fail to indicate an overall policy in the simultaneous introduction of American forces at the three traditional invasion routes against China: Korea, the Seventh Fleet in the Strait of Taiwan, and the dispatch of American 'advisers' to Vietnam. Nor do they recall the strong Republican opposition to this policy led by Senator Robert Taft. Taft declared:

> I have never felt that we should send American soldiers to the Continent of Asia, which, of course, included China proper and Indo-China, simply because we are so outnumbered in fighting a land war on the Continent of Asia that it would bring about complete exhaustion even if we were able to win.
> If the President can intervene in Korea without congressional approval, we can go to war in Malaya or Indonesia or Iran or South America.

Understandably, the Republicans are proud of the Eisenhower administration's responsible reaction to the Vietnam crisis of 1954.

President Eisenhower was willing to cash in his chips in 1954, no matter how humiliating it might be to admit we had backed a loser, rather than throw good blood after bad money. In other words, he realized the application of military power could not resolve a hopeless political situation in Vietnam.

Eisenhower's American-centered decision for non-intervention in Vietnam contributed to the famous accusation from

careless observers that he was a "conscious agent of communism."

The White Paper's analysis of the Geneva conference of 1954 suggests that US imperialism's defining of all opposition to it as Communist may rest less in ignorance than in conscious policy. By narrowing the alternatives for national liberation struggles in this way, US imperialism insures receiving the benefit of the accomodating influence of the major Communist powers in gaining a negotiated approach to end the struggle and in regaining at the conference table what imperialism lost on the battlefield.

> The Soviet Union . . . pressured Ho Chi Minh to make concessions to France which Ho did not feel were justified. Since the Vietminh controlled three-quarters of all Vietnam, Ho was confident he could quickly capture the rest. . . Communist China, at the time, was trying to present a more moderate image to the world and was willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union in forcing Ho Chi Minh to ease his demands. . . . France emerged from the Conference having salvaged at the negotiating table much of which she had lost on the battlefield. Ho Chi Minh agreed to pull Vietminh forces out of South Vietnam, which they largely controlled, back above the 17th parallel.

This policy of US imperialism further limits the effectiveness of successful liberation movements by narrowing the alternatives for development in the future as well as by reducing the meaningful responses to US imperialism's policies.

The Republican study emphasizes that the Geneva Agreement did not make the 17th parallel a permanent boundary and that elections were required in two years. However, the Republicans attempt to limit the responsibility of the Dulles policy for undermining the Geneva Agreement by placing the blame on Diem. Diem's actions in Vietnam were a phase of U. S. policy in Asia set by Dulles by creating SEATO in September 1954, less than two months after the Geneva conference, and by the U. S. letter to Diem of October 23, 1954 which had been dictated by a Thai represenative. By concentrating upon Diem's actions, however, the Republicans come to present an accurate description of the development of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. The study notes that the guerrilla activity began in 1957 as a result of Diem's refusal to hold the 1956

elections provided for at Geneva. This opposition was intensified when Diem replaced the local village chiefs with Saigon appointees who naturally became the objects of local "terrorism," i.e., popular justice.

The Republican statement, in its attempts to shift blame from bi-partisan US imperialism to the Democratic administration elected in November, 1960, fails to note the importance of that election for the Vietnamese. Diem was so closely identified with the Republican administration that its defeat by the Democrats led the anti-Diem opposition to revolt against Diem, on November 11, 1960. The Kennedy administration, however, was to support Diem as strongly as the Eisenhower administration. Meanwhile, as a result of the unsuccessful revolt of the Saigon military and political leaders supported by the paratroop forces, the only effective opposition to the US-puppet regime was now the guerrilla forces, and "in December 1960, the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) was formed by militant South Vietnamese insurgents."

Challenging the State Department assumptions that the NLF is controlled by the Hanoi government, the Republicans raise a controversial issue for future events in Vietnam. Either there will be a complete national liberation struggle without compromises with American imperialism or, due to pressures within the socialist camp, there will be an opportunity for new manipulations by American imperialism. The Republicans say:

> It should be noted that the NLF has been southern oriented. Forty of their senior leaders were native South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese Communists have, in the past, found Hanoi quite willing to enter into agreements at the expense of the South Vietnamese whether Communist or not. Examples: . . . Three, the Geneva Agreements of July 1954, left the south under control of the Diem government for at least 2 more years - this when most of the south was already under Communist control. Four, thereafter, neither Hanoi nor Peking, nor Moscow made strong representations against dropping elections in 1956, in effect confirming Diem's control and leaving the South Vietnamese Communists out in the cold. All of which is a reminder to the South Vietnamese Communists that North Vietnam has separate in-

terests, and has not in the past been the most reliable of allies.

Besides this must be placed the Four Points of the North Vietnam government of April 13, 1965, quoted by the Republicans, including point three: "The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the South Vietnam Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference."

To emphasize the qualitative change of the U. S. intervention under Kennedy the study notes that Kennedy announced a crisis in Southeast Asia in May 1961. "President Kennedy reverted to old fashioned gunboat diplomacy and sent an aircraft carrier to demonstrate off Haiphong." American troops were landed in Thailand, special forces units were sent to South Vietnam, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson went to Saigon to affirm the U. S. Vietnam policy. Beginning with China's request of February 24, 1962 and General De Gaulle's of August, 1963, both rejected by the Kennedy administration, and the initiatives of U Thant to the Johnson administration in 1963 and 1964, the Republicans detail the consistent refusal to seek peace by the U. S. government, and conclude that by December 1963 Johnson had made his choice: "The President now set the goal as military victory." Following the assumption of their posts in Saigon in July 1964 by Generals Westmoreland and Taylor, the President received full powers in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, sponsored by Senator William Fulbright. The study states: "The series of events leading to the resolution began with a July 30th naval raid on North Vietnamese *island radar and naval installations.*" By early August, the U. S. escalated the war by air attacks on North Vietnam. Ten thousand dead, fifty thousand wounded and several thousand lost aircraft later the Republicans noted: "Yet at the beginning of April 1967, the United States and South Vietnamese were able to claim control over fewer villages and hamlets than in 1962."

The single substantive proposal in the Republican study is that the United States should not be engaged in a land war on the Asian continent. While, if rigorously applied, the proposal would be a positive contribution, it does not deal with the most important, the most basic issue which underlies the Vietnam war: will the United States accept without any kind of intervention the revolutions which will be undertaken against foreign and domestic exploitation

by the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America? A political party which dodges that fundamental question lacks a future.

# ISOLATIONISM RECONSIDERED

Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1966.

## *By Leonard P. Liggio*

It must be stated at the outset that Jonas' work is a disappointment. Like so much recently published scholarship it is superficial. For the sake of general reader interest the material has not been treated with the exhaustive consideration that the topic deserves. There is a great deal of important material that is absent. Nevertheless, Jonas' book is clearly a major break-through. He has moved the consideration of the topic to the level of realism and responsibility from the general immaturity and prejudice which heretofore characterized the discussion of Isolationism. Despite his failure to understand or analyze his topic, Jonas' methodology has accepted Isolationism as a serious approach to world affairs. This will make it possible for scholars to fulfill what Jonas has neglected: an understanding and relevant analysis of the domestic phase of the opposition to twentieth century American imperialism, the reasons for its development and the causes of its ultimate failures.

Jonas indicates how Isolationism is rooted in the events of the American past. Specifically, the past was the First World War - its origins, the American intervention, and its consequences in the post-war political and economic systems. Historical Revisionism, Jonas emphasizes, undermined the official myths of the causation of the war and by a realistic analysis of the data explained the origins of the war and the American intervention, as well as the political and economic crisis of the post-war world. The first general critique was made by Albert Jay Nock in the Freeman. During the war Nock's editorial in the Nation (September, 1918) was singled out for seizure by the government for his analysis of the trade union move-

ment as an instrument of American imperialism. The outstanding social scientist, Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, by his emphasis upon the economic causation for the American intervention in the First World War, opened a new field of research into the role of American banking and corporate interests in foreign policy: for example, C. Hartley Grattan, Why We Fought; George Seldes, Iron, Blood and Profits; and Frank C. Hanighen and H. C. Engelbrecht, Merchants of Death. Harry Elmer Barnes noted in his introduction to Merchants of Death that "through their pressure to put the United States into the War these bankers brought about the results which have well nigh wrecked the contemporary world."

*Jonas devotes a chapter to the Isolationist* concentration upon the economic causes of international crisis. "The isolationist argument was coherent, logical, and self-contained: nations go to war for territorial gain or economic advantage.' The contribution of Historical Revisionism, according to Jonas, was to give Isolationism a general doctrine of economic causation for political events. The works of Scott Nearing, Harry Elmer Barnes and Marine Major General Smedley D. Butler were particularly important. This general doctrine was applied to the analysis of twentieth century American political policy, foreign and domestic. There was the clear recognition that American imperialism was totally enmeshed in the overall world economic system. Charles Beard concluded that "powerful economic and political personalities seeking to avoid one domestic crisis after another by extending credits to the Allies, finally induced President Wilson to avoid an immediate economic collapse by leading this country into war." From this, isolationists understood that the major banks and corporations, according to Jonas, "Were among the leading supporters of a foreign policy designed to safeguard America's overseas economic interests. The line of action they favored risked more general entanglement in European and Asian affairs... meddling in world affairs merely insured profits for bankers and businessmen who were the chief beneficiaries, and therefore its chief advocates."

However, the nature of imperialism was clearly seen by only a few isolationists, even as events moved toward the Second Imperialist War. Quincy Howe in England Expects Every American To Do His Duty said that "the greatest Empire on earth and the world's strongest nation will be putting their combined support behind the status quo everywhere." Senator Burton K. Wheeler wrote to

Oswald Garrison Villard: "All of this talk about lining up with England and France to stop Fascism, by some radicals as well as conservatives . . . might possibly indicate that we were fighting over the colonies in Africa." But, the very terms "by some radicals as well as conservatives" indicates the incomplete nature of the analysis which was made of the system. Jonas, not unlike most other commentators on American foreign policy, fails to begin with the dominant feature of the twentieth century - imperialism. It is imperialism that must define all political forces in each country in the twentieth century; this is how left/right categories should be divided since that is how they divide objectively. Domestic policy is at best secondary compared to foreign policy - imperialism and anti-imperialism. The fact that in the United States almost all the political figures described their own political positions in the superficial terms of domestic rather than foreign policy encouraged the confusions in actual politics as well as in historical analysis. There is a single policy of American imperialism which has to do with the organization of the single domestic-international economy. There have been a number of works which clarify this issue: primarily the overall analysis of William Appleman Williams, and more recently the analysis of the pre-First World War period by Gabriel Kolko, the post-First World War era by Murray N. Rothbard, and the pre-Second World War period by Lloyd Gardner. These authorities indicate that the main thrust for government economic intervention domestically and internationally were and are the banking and related corporate interests, supported by intellectuals and journalists; these have been the conservatives. Those Americans opposed to imperialism were united on the view that interventions were for the benefit of the special interests, and differed only over whether the existing political institutions were sufficient to prevent or overthrow these interventions. The events of a quarter century have demonstrated the weakness of the analysis of those who considered the American Constitution and the party system as a bulwark against special interest. That this should have been believed at all is surprising considering the contributions destroying those myths by the New Historians, Charles Beard, Harry Elmer Barnes, etc. "By rejecting the traditional view of America's uniqueness," Jonas says of Beard, "and emphasizing the principle of economic causation, he was, at least by implication, pointing to the universality of the American experience and to its close relationship to Eruopean ideas and events."

As Jonas indicates, the major isolationist intellectuals

were Charles Beard, Harry Elmer Barnes, Albert J. Nock, Oswald Garrison Villard, Robert M. Hutchins and Norman Thomas. To name them, is to indicate that, except perhaps for Hutchins, Isolationism was a radical or left ideology. Isolationist politicians were also classified on the left, stemming as they did from the Populist Progressivism of the Midwest Republicans. Jonas notes that "the affinity between the tenets of Isolationism and the presuppositions underlying various forms of agrarian radicalism colored the Midwestern response to the wars in Europe and Asia." Gerald Nye fought against the Republican administrations of the 1920s, especially as an investigator of special interest relationships to the government. In 1934 the Nye committee launched investigations of the role of pro-war banking and business interests in determining foreign policy. Nye characterized the major New Deal legislation, NIRA, "as a bird of prey on the masses" which "encouraged monopoly." Borah opposed corporate influences in government as well as most Republican presidents and presidential candidates and opposed major New Deal measures as favorable to the corporatist interests. As chairman of the foreign relations committee (1925-33) he was the major advocate of recognition of the Soviet Union. Borah criticized the Central American interventions by the US as well as the interventions in China, especially the Hoover-Stimson policies.

In a very important analysis, "The Left and the Right," Jonas presents the seemingly conflicting viewpoints which unified in Isolationism. As traditional Isolationism is radical, the major question is how Isolationism has come to be considered a conservative position. Due to the cooption of most radicals by New Deal corporatism, the radicals who refused to betray the cause were then castigated as "reactionary", which label became a self-fulfilling prophecy when these radicals, barred from their former publishing outlets, found that only the publications with a conservative background would publish their radical writings on foreign policy. The New Deal corporatist system had been declared to be "radical" and the radical opponents of that system and its imperialist foreign policy were then declared to be "reactionary." It was in the wake of this development that the America First Committee was organized; that it was conservative was understandable once the radicals had been betrayed and abandoned. Many radicals, such as Villard, Beard and Barnes, cooperated with America First but never fully integrated with it; radical isolatisinism was missing from the American political scene and these people therefore remained iso-

lated: welcomed by the conservatives but hardly similar to them. In general, they found the conservatives lacking not merely on domestic issues, but on the basic issues of foreign policy and the tactics to be used.

The conservatives tended to take essentially moderate positions and to pursue very weak, "respectable," tactics. America First limited itself to influencing public opinion by publications, advertisements and rallies, but eschewed marches on Washington as being too extreme (!) and an embarassment to the political opposition for which they operated as an auxiliary. Ultimately, America First considered entering politics directly as a new political force for peace, but this suggestion led to quick resignations by those traditionally connected to the major parties, not an unhealthy, though a too-long delayed, development. This weakness in tactics was partly caused by the moderation of the positions taken. Lacking any radical isolationist movement to spur them, they developed a defensive foreign policy stance. There was no attack on militarism, but rather an emphasis upon rearmament and preparedness. There was no clear critique of American imperialism due to the leadership role of people with imperialist interests, especially in Latin America. There was no clear repudiation of conscription, but a neutrality on this question which permitted the selective service renewal to pass by a single vote in the House in September, 1941. Had there been a truly radical isolationist movement in the United States, America First would have taken a much stronger stand on some of these issues. The Washington and New York chapters of America First had the advantage of traditional, i. e. radical, Isolationism in their leadership. In New York, the chapter was headed by John T.Flynn, premier radical journalist and investigator of the banking and munitions interests. Flynn made the New York chapter a strong voice of radical anti-imperialism.

A major aspect of Jonas' analysis of Isolationism is to emphasize the importance of the international law strain in that position. He identifies such legislators as Senators Borah and Johnson and Representative Fish as well as the international lawyers, John Bassett Moore and Edwin M. Borchard. They had doubts about the successive neutrality bills. Borah strongly opposed the concept of embargoes which would fulfill the League of Nations' system of economic sanctions against those seeking to change the imperialist status quo. Borah, Johnson, Fish, Moore and Borchard refused to support discretionary powers for the president as that would permit the president to provoke

war. As embargoes would support the League and aid one of the belligerents, Borah and others preferred to relie on "international law to keep American commerce within the accepted standards of neutral behavior." The Roosevelt administration placed an embargo on arms shipments to Spain during the Civil War although the act applied only to wars between states. In similar situations, the US had maintained normal relations with the government while not trading with the rebel forces; any placing of the government and the rebels on the same par was a form of recognition. The rebels in Spain were supplied by Germany and Italy, while England and France embargoed trade with both rivals, effectively depriving the Spanish government of trade while not disturbing the army rebels. Nye suggested that the New Deal had consistently applied the neutrality legislation to the benefit of the fascists. Hamilton Fish agreed with this view. Nye took the lead in the Senate in an attempt to prevent the administration's discriminatory measures against the Spanish Republic. Nye especially objected to the proposal to prohibit the export of medical supplies.

The summer of 1940 was a crucial point for American Isolationism. In May, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies was organized. By July, the major periodicals supporting Isolationism had changed sides; Common Sense, the New Republic which dropped John T. Flynn, and the Nation which dropped Oswald Garrison Villard. Soon after, the America First Committee was founded. While the radical intellectuals continued to write about the meaning of the war, the America First Committee tended to pursue different lines of analysis. Yet, a radical position continued to be articulated. Hugh Johnson said that the sole aim of the war was the British government's desire to "maintain her dominant Empire position with her own kinsmen and also over black, brown and yellow conquered and subject peoples in three continents." Senator Nye reminded Americans of the "other Britain" which was the "very acme of reaction, imperialism and exploitation." The Socialist party's national convention in New York in April 1940 reaffirmed its commitment to Isolationism and its foreign policy resolution, read into the Congressional Record by Hamilton Fish, declared that the Allies had "no purpose of overthrowing fascism except to replace it by a more desperate and brutal government, if need be, that would crush the economic demands of the German workers, and leave England and France free to pursue their star of profit."

The treatment of the isolationist analysis of US Far Eastern policy is limited in Jonas' work. But the US intervention in the war was the result of events centering in the Far East, and it was that intervention that Jonas feels ended the isolationist position. Yet, the suggested failure of isolationists to be concerned with the Far East is not explained or analyzed. Actually, there was a strong isolationist analysis of the Far East. Ralph Townsend, editor of Scribner's Commentator, centered his critiques on the New Deal's attempts "to make Americanism mean support for Chiang Kai-shek." Similarly, Norman Thomas was critical of "the Chinese dictator Chiang." Senator Borah was a close observer of Asian affairs and frequently criticized the Chiang regime as a front for Chinese and Anglo-American corporate interests. In essence, opposition to the Chiang regime represents a distinguishing mark of Isolationism.

Thus, Jonas's book joins the recent works of Wayne Cole and James J. Martin in providing, for the first time, scholarly insight into the much-neglected phenomenon of Isolationism before World War II. But much more needs to be done in exploring the pathways blazoned by these men.

# A BERNARD FALL RETROSPECTIVE

On February 21, 1967, while on patrol with U. S. Marines north of Hue, in South Vietnam, Bernard Fall, distinguished French-born expert on Vietnam and a professor at Howard University, was killed by a land-mine. Left and Right here presents reviews of Fall's last two works, recently published, on Vietnam.

Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness 1953-66, New York, Praeger, 1966, 363 pages, $6.95.

BY LEONARD P. LIGGIO

Bernard Fall has been the principal source for the American public of detailed information and analysis of the political and social developments in South-East Asia and the United States' reaction to them. Time and again, Professor Fall has demonstrated that the facts have been the reverse of the 'official history' presented through the newspapers and magazines by the State Department and the Pentagon. Yet, despite the personal courage which this consistency has required, it is less a compliment to him than a condemnation of the academic and journalistic institutions in this country. That the United States government controls and manipulates information, using it as an instrument of the Administration's policy objectives, and seeks to defame, harass and punish those who seek out and report the actual facts, is well-known to any realistic observer. But, that the academic and journalistic institutions, and thus almost all scholars and journalists, cooperate in the objectives and methods of the government

in foreign policy matters, remains one of the unrecognized facts of contemporary America. As Fall expresses it in his introduction to Viet-Nam Witness:

> When social-science research has reasons-of-state limitations placed upon its conclusions, it runs into heavy risks of losing its validity . . . In the case of Viet-Nam, that situation was finally pushed to a tragic extreme in which practically all specialists dealing with the country were operating under contract either with the Saigon government or with one of the American aid programs . . . University and foundation reports indicate only too clearly and too often that scholarship has in many cases become a new kind of "big business." In the long run, this may well stifle the yearning for the unexplored paths and for dissent of a higher level and greater import than a medieval theologians' debate around safely established basic verities.

Nevertheless, Fall himself established his role with greater sophistication "around safely established basic verities." He expresses the view that the role of the independent scholar or journalist is not to change the direction and objectives of the country's foreign policy but to influence, benefit, or improve the methods of achieving the direction and objectives, the "safely established basic verities," of United States foreign policy. In his Epilogue to Viet-Nam Witness, and despite the evidence he has marshalled over many years, Fall affirms the purpose of aiding the United States to achieve its ends and to work its will in South-East Asia behind the ever-present facade of anti-communism. His subtle recommendation to divide the National Liberation Front from solidarity with North Vietnam, to turn the NLF into an instrument of United States policy, forgets the ultimate fact of contemporary Vietnamese history--popular hostility to Western influence and rejection of any government which may cooperate with the United States. Unable to suffer military defeat, the role of either the NLF or North Vietnam with regard to the South Vietnamese would be totally reversed if either undertook cooperation with the United States, a policy incompatible with national popularity.

Fall's major contributions have been analyses of the military and the social-political aspects of the quarter century of conflict that has centered around the Vietnamese people; many of these analyses, drawn from the New Republic, Nation, New York Times Magazine, Foreign Affairs, Viet-Report among others, have been collected

to form Viet-Nam Witness. The major themes of Fall's analyses are United States policy, the limits of military power in the Vietnam conflict, and the social foundations and political methods of the Vietnamese guerrillas. The theme of United States policy, real and ideal, is generally considered indirectly by Fall. Just as he projects for the future the achieving of continued "American control" in South-East Asia, and thereby in all Asia beyond China's borders, by gaining NLF cooperation with the United States, so Fall projected a similar means for a similar objective in discussing the advantages to the West of the Geneva agreement of July, 1954. In March, 1954 Fall suggested that should a demarcation line be drawn between the Vietminh strongholds of Ho Chi-minh in northern Vietnam and the southern provinces, there would be a "great opportunity" for the application of American foreign aid -- the vanguard of American political objectives since Fall speaks of "political successes almost entirely due to the intelligent dispensation of economic aid." Ho's government, according to Fall, would have had to depend upon the West, essentially the United States, given the economic weakness of the Soviet Union and China in 1954, if the Geneva conference could deprive Ho of the rice-surplus Mekong delta. "Therein lies the great opportunity for the West; massive economic aid might swing the balance." Although United States policy was being implemented by different alternatives (as Fall intimated: "it is certainly not by sheer coincidence that General Donovan, wartime OSS chief, is now Ambassador to Thailand"), it is clear that Ho's government could not have counted on its popular support had it cooperated in these United States designs. The same may be said for Fall's alternative of United States aid and influence on Ho Chi-minh in 1946 to create a center of Western policy against the Soviet Union and China; and again, despite Fall's ambivalence, post-war United States policy was evident from USA markings on the armed vehicles and bombers with which the French returned to Vietnam and from the agreement to sell the French one hundred and sixty million dollars of U. S. military equipment.

"The French, thanks to their U. S. -donated air force, had destroyed every visible target in the Communist-held areas for eight long years." Repeatedly, with reference to the French war against the Vietnamese as well as the American war, Fall emphasizes that faith in the value of air power is an illusion. "The Indochina War had confirmed once more -- the Korean conflict being, by and large, another example -- the limited usefulness of air

superiority in wars involving underdeveloped areas." (Italics Fall's.) "Perhaps it may be useful to stress here again the overwhelming ineffectualness of combat airpower in that type of operation (jungle warfare)." (Fall, of course, is referring to the military ineffectiveness and not to the results of such bombing upon the civilian population.) The same limitations apply to the effectiveness of other heavy weapons and to advanced delivery vehicles. In the final article in Viet-Nam Witness, dated a year ago, Fall compares the airborne operations of the French and the Americans:

> At least four offensives, with airborne and armoured "pincers," and supplemented by navy landing craft, involved *more than 20,000 troops.* (The largest offensive thus far undertaken by U. S. forces in Viet-Nam involved a total of 12,000 troops.) Yet in every case the enemy refused to fight except on his own terms. The French armored pincers would close on a melee of frightened peasants . . . Americans have encountered similar frustration.

For those who are impressed by the firepower and transportation superiority of the United States forces in Viet-Nam, Fall warns: "the technological differences, for all their magnitude and importance, are thus far more superficial than is often realized."

Fall's final comparison between the French war which ended at Geneva in 1954 and the present United States War concerns the State Department-Pentagon claim that the French effort was defeated by the "collapse" of public support in France. Fall answers that it was the military defeat of the French forces (for which the United States paid 80% of the costs) which caused the French public to demand an end of the war in Vietnam.

> It was not civilian morale at home that placed 16,000 troops at Dien Bien Phu and allowed them to be defeated there. Noisy students on U. S. college campuses cannot be held responsible because 96,000 South Vietnamese troops left their units at one time or another this year . . .

When the French war in Vietnam ended at Geneva in 1954 the United States was already a major participant, paying almost the entire cost of the war and already committing U. S. Air Force units to the effort. Bernard Fall has been the major source for information on the early United States involvement in domestic Vietnamese politics

beginning with the end of the Second World War. Much of this was involvement in the hands of the OSS (of which the CIA is the successor). In The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Praeger, 1963) Fall notes that there was a belief in 1946 that the United States was preparing the former emperor Bao Dai, who remained as an adviser to President Ho Chi-minh, as an alternative to Ho; when Bao-Dai abandoned his office in Ho's government for exile in Hong Kong in March, 1946 he left Hanoi on a United States military plane. A year later, after the French had decided to overthrow Ho's elected government, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and had driven it from its capital, Hanoi, into the jungle, Bao-Dai was asked by Ho to act as mediator. Bao-Dai rejected this on the advice of "Dr. Phan Quang Dan, American-trained and an OSS operative during World War II." (Dr. Dan, after two decades of involvement in Vietnamese politics and residence in the United States, was currently a vice-presidential candidate in the newest of many attempts to create a "constitutional" government as rival to the popularity of Ho Chi-minh and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.)

Later in 1947 Bao-Dai agreed to the French offer that he become the "constitutional" chief of state of an "independent" Vietnam regime supported by the French army and the American Treasury, following discussions in Hong Kong with former Ambassador William C. Bullitt. Through United States foreign aid, especially the Marshall Plan, France was able to offset the costs of the war in Vietnam. The United States advanced formal recognition to the Saigon regime of Bao-Dai in February, 1950 to repay the French, who had joined the United States in January, 1950 in vetoing the U. N. membership of the People's Republic of China. China responded within a month by recognizing Ho Chi-minh's Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. American economic and military aid for the Saigon regime was announced in May, 1950 and as it became dominant in the war so did the United States' political influence. The most significant aspect of Fall's account of the municipal and provincial elections of 1953, held under restricted suffrage in safe districts, is the role of the United States. In Hanoi, where the United States Information Service supported a Vietnamese newspaper, American sympathizers were elected over the official candidates. When the United States arranged the appointment of Diem as Premier of the Saigon regime in 1954, United States control became complete.

Fall's Viet-Nam Witness analyzes the situation in Vietnam at the time that Diem came to power in 1954-55, during the Diem regime, and in the most recent period. The Geneva Agreement of 1954 provided for a temporary line to permit the evacuation of foreign (French) forces -- "the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be considered as constituting a political or territorial boundary" -- and for general elections to be held in July, 1956. At that time Fall felt that the Diem regime had several advantages for building itself into a successful rival for national leadership with Ho Chi-minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam. South Vietnam, little damaged by war, and enriched by the refugees from the North and American aid, was the rice-surplus region. Furthermore, the Geneva Agreement gave Diem's regime larger population and territory than the Saigon regime had controlled before the Agreement and gave it a better chance of governing by the completed withdrawal of Vietminh guerrillas to the north under the Agreement. "In other words," Fall concluded, "with an even moderately intelligent policy, southern Viet-Nam should be able to turn the tables on the Viet-Minh and carry out the promises which the Viet-Minh has made during the past seven years, and will find difficult to fulfill in the now greatly impoverished and war-ragged North." Fall was disappointed with the early policy of Diem, especially his failure to exercise the power of the central government in the localities, which merely continued the methods of the past administrations. Soon, Diem did make a complete break with the past by turning upon and destroying the political and military power of the armed Buddhist sects: Cao Dai, Hoa-Hao and Binh Xuyen. Southern Vietnam was little damaged by war because very early after the return of the French these three armed politico-religious sects of the Mekong region, which had been allied against the French with Ho's Vietminh, entered into a benevolent neutrality with the French. The sects had turned against the Vietminh, whose leadership in southern Vietnam had attempted to fight both the French and the sects. The autonomous political and military power which the sects exercised in the regions inhabited by their adherents made them both "a solid barrier against Viet-Minh infiltration" and "an element of instability" in a Westernized, bureaucratic state. The destruction of the political and military power of the sects by Diem in the spring of 1955, however, merely transformed the struggle to the swamps, jungles, and rice fields of the Mekong Delta where the sects' adherents lived. "The armed remnants of the sects are still able to carry on extensive harassing operations," Fall said in

July, 1955," . . . but it is unlikely that they will ever regain even part of their erstwhile political strength." Yet, the sects had "3,000 or more officers" whose political and military training formed a reservoir of leadership should full-scale popular opposition develop against the Saigon regime.

Previous to the Geneva Agreement Fall had written of the importance of the traditional autonomy of the Vietnamese peasants' village; although under Ho Chi-minh's leadership the old village notables were replaced by the "armed adolescents" who had joined the Vietminh,

> the very fact that village autonomy was so deeply rooted made an ideal breeding ground for the type of local administration found in the early postrevolutionary years in the Soviet Union. Indeed, the decentralizing policy practiced by the revolutionary government presented great analogies with that applied by the Communist government of Soviet Russia.

Following upon the defeat of the sect armies the Diem regime struck at this village autonomy; according to Fall, "South Viet-Nam had been converted into a full-fledged dictatorship at the village level -- where it is most keenly felt in that kind of society -- as early as 1956, when Diem abolished elected village government." Besides the maintenance of feudal taxes and the failure to introduce land reform, a series of presidential decrees threatened large numbers of people in the Vietnamese villages: January, 1956, indefinite detention in concentration camps; June, 1956, abolition of the elected village councils (both of these were preliminary to Diem's refusal to hold reunification elections as provided by the Geneva Agreement); and March, 1957, reprisals against "former resistance members" (former Vietminh guerrillas) contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Agreement. Thus, "faced with physical extermination along with the sect units, some of the former Viet-Minh guerrillas simply banded together for survival." In 1958 the U. S. Ambassador to Vietnam declared that "the Communists and sect remnants have regrouped" in the Mekong Delta. At that time Fall described the resurgence of guerrilla activity:

> Guerrilla activities in South Viet-Nam during 1957 and 1958 no longer represent a last-ditch fight of dispersed sect or Communist rebel remnants. On the contrary, they have taken on a pattern of their own which is

quite different from that followed by the Viet-Minh during the struggle against the French.

This unique pattern of operations and organization culminated in the formation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam on December 20, 1960. With understandable pride Bernard Fall notes that he was the first person to establish "the fact of the resurgence of revolutionary war in South Viet-Nam in 1957." With such credentials Fall is well-qualified to determine the real origins of the National Liberation Front. In 1965 he stated:

> It is, therefore, highly immaterial to attempt to trace back Communist intentions at subverting South Viet-Nam to a particular meeting of the North Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee in May, 1959, or to a particular resolution of the same party's Third National Congress, held in Hanoi in September, 1960. Long before those dates the Second Indochina War had assumed its basic pattern . . .

On his return from a visit to Hanoi in 1962 Fall noted the absence of any popular support for the Saigon regime: "Without that support, American helicopters and modern weapons cannot do very much." At the same time, on the basis of statements by administration spokesmen such as Walt W. Rostow, Fall concluded that "the present trend is to go so far as to say that popular support is not particularly relevant to the outcome of a guerrilla war." This attitude explains the United States military's carelessness about civilians in Vietnam, as well as the conscious implementation of a policy of genocide against the Vietnamese people. Fall's expert conclusion that popular support is vital and that modern military power is inadequate does not reduce or eliminate the responsiblity of Americans for confronting the destruction of the Vietnamese people sanctioned in their name.

# POSTSCRIPT:

# FIRST THOUGHTS ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DEATH OF BERNARD FALL

Like many who came to political consciousness during the second world war, Bernard Fall possessed a sixth sense about political issues. But, in the case of Fall this sense was enriched by his seizing upon an active political role--as a young guerrilla in the French Forces of the Interior. The French resistance produced a diverse group of post-war tendencies: careerists who entered government posts or the bureaucracy and parliamentary seats of the so-called Left in France, as well as some who maintained their principled independence. However, the latter phrased their opposition in terms of a politics of regret or disappointment -- misunderstanding the resistance to be a totally independent movement. The premises of such politics have been that the government has good intentions and is free to change its direction once the truth is presented to it. This has meant a search for dialogue with the 'Left' in the Surete and Foreign Legion, or in the CIA, State Department and Marines -- a dialogue with the officials who use revolutionary literature to give political meaning to their torturing, regroupment, napalming and extermination of the civilian population in the guerrilla conflicts with the Vietminh, the FLN in Algeria and the National Liberation Front of So. Vietnam.

The illusions of the resistance, especially the army as a revolutionary force, explain Fall's close ties to the military -- French and American. This tie brought him to the main world battle front -- Vietnam -- in 1953; and in the following year he wrote incisively about the significance of the Geneva Agreements. From that time he became the major, almost the sole, independent commentator in American periodicals about Vietnam. Yet, his view of such an

independent role was not to question the assumptions which were the foundation of the policies he analyzed.

Bernard Fall visited the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on several occasions; an unusual event for a scholar in America. His work on the DRV is according to the highest standards of contemporary professional political science: it is mechanical and his least valuable contribution. In South Vietnam, despite his anti-Communist and original pro-Diemist bias, or because of it, he was the earliest to realize that there was a renewal of popular insurgency. It was more with horror than hope that he described the evidence of the widespread popular support for the NLF. His negative or ambivalent attitude toward the NLF reflected his lack of comprehension of them. Familiar with Hanoi and Saigon, he never visited the liberated zones of South Vietnam, his information on the NLF (as his information on the Vietminh) came from printed materials, not observation and contact with the NLF leadership or rank-and-file. Do the requirements of professional academic standards -- travel grants from Nato, Seato or Asia Foundation, government-paid visiting professorships abroad, lectureships at the War College and the University strategy institutes -- preclude visiting and reporting about the single most important element in the Vietnam situation -- the popular insurgents?

Fall knew that the contemporary historian must confront contemporary events directly. But, he was drawn to confront contemporary events alongside the Foreign Legion and Marines, and not alongside the guerrillas. Although expressed in this manner, the crucial point is that Fall did have the courage to meet events directly, "to dare all, and then see." As a military historian, Fall would appreicate the analogy to the slogan of the wars of the French Revolution that in a revolutionary period every soldier carries a marshal's baton in his knapsack; the American public has awarded him a symbolic baton for the highest public service: independent criticism of government policy. Will his courageous confrontation with reality be an isolated event, or will scholars in America assume the tasks accepted by Fall and continue them in their logical direction whatever the consequences--"to dare all, and then see"?