

Why the Futile Crusade?

by LEONARD P. LIGGIO

Sidney Lens, by his analysis of the roots of the Cold War in The Futile Crusade, Anti-Communism as American Credo, challenges observers of American politics to a total re-examination of the American political scene. Lens demolishes the anti-Communist crusade's claim to be the preserver of individual liberty by contrasting the claim with its actual policy of Cold War militarism and political control "which subvert the individualist elan which is the mainspring of democracy."

But since we are only in a "half-war", a Cold War, we stand mid-point between the values of individualism and those of the garrison state, continuing to manifest characteristics of the former, but yielding to the demands of the latter. In this Cold War the central government inevitably gains more power over its citizens. Countervailing checks and balances by the people are reduced, and "participative" democracy is subtly transformed into "manipulative" democracy. Citizens are remade in the image of foreign policy--in the image, that is, of militarism. . . The curbing of dissent and individualism is therefore neither an accident nor an incidental feature of modern America, but a *sine qua non* of Anti-Communist strategy. . . Anti-Communism, though it pays ceaseless obeisance to the virtues of freedom, has made us less, rather than more, free.¹

This statement by Sidney Lens marks a milestone in the American political scene. That a widely recognized spokesman of the American left should find the Cold War not only evil in itself, but evil because it centralizes political power, destroys constitutional limitations on government, and relies upon control and regulation by government, all of which "subvert the individualist elan which is the mainspring of democracy," alters the contemporary American political spectrum to an extent which may have fundamental and radical significance.

It is difficult to determine which is more striking: that individualism has such basic importance for Lens, or that he has said what few if any so-called individualists have said during the last decade or more. While the spokesmen of American liberalism, individualism, and constitutionalism, not to mention those who use the word "liberty" as a facade to gain the illiberal ends of anti-Communism, have blessed the Cold War deprivations of constitutional rights and civil liberties, it has been spokesmen of the American left, stigmatized for their use of centralization and government power to eliminate injustices, who have defended the Constitution and struggled to preserve individual rights against the government, and who proclaim individualism as a good in itself. Although sterile rhetoric and false categories have established unreal divisions between libertarians, casting them left and right, it is

1. Sidney Lens, The Futile Crusade: Anti-Communism as American Credo (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), pp. 143-45.

nothing new that the current American left leads in the struggle to maintain constitutional rights and civil liberties in America. What is new is that spokesmen for American liberalism, individualism, and constitutionalism are not beside them in the forefront of the struggle. Here is a major contrast between the post-World War I period with its relative freedom and relatively limited government, and, as Lens indicates, the current post-World War II era with its suppressions and deprivations of freedom and its increasingly total government. For, in the present epoch, leading liberals and individualists have betrayed their principles and have entered the service of their historic statist and militarist enemies. When the reasons for this phenomenon are clearly understood, much will have been contributed to answering the question posed by Linus Pauling in the introduction to Lens' book:

Why did our national leaders decide upon this policy of increased nuclear militarism?...And why did the sensible American people permit it to be done?²

In his contribution to the solution of that question, Lens provides the answer to this fundamental problem; that the Cold War, the anti-Communist crusade, may have its roots not in European radical thought or Soviet military power or non-Western movements of national liberation, but in a deep flaw in Western society, in the absence of a basic perfection, of which Soviet strength, radical thought and national liberation movements are only the reflection and result.

Is it possible that somewhere along the way America had taken the wrong fork in the road? Has its analysis of world problems, perhaps, been faulty? Is it possible that communism has been misjudged as the cause of Western travail, when in fact it has been its effect?³

The class conflict between European peoples and their rulers, between the exploited and the exploiters, was based on the idea of liberty, on eliminating exploitation to permit capitalism, progress, and freedom to flourish. The capitalist revolutions, culminating in the late eighteenth century American-European revolutions, although sustained by the strength of nationalism against counter-revolutions supported by foreign powers, remained far from achieving completion. Instead of the radical reorientation of society implicit in capitalism, the application of capitalism was circumscribed within a narrow range by the pre-capitalist institutional instruments of exploitation which continued in force. Thus, not only was the capitalist revolution thwarted in Western Europe and America, but their ruling classes were able to exploit the feudal conditions existing in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America through the system of imperialism. The imperialist power of the Western countries prevented the overthrow of feudalism by capitalist revolutions in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America and imposed on the world's peoples a double or reinforced system of exploitation--imperialism--by which the power of the Western governments maintains the local ruling class in exchange for the opportunity to superimpose Western exploitation upon existing exploitation by local states. Imperialism or double exploitation has caused the twentieth century struggle against feudalism and for progress to take a form different from the earlier Western European struggle against feudalism. Lens describes the

2. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

legacy of the thwarted progress of the capitalist revolutions: Had this process continued without interruption, it is more than likely that the world would never have known either Leninist, Stalinist, or Khrushchevist communism. But the very nations which liberated themselves during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries prevented the spread of nationalism and capitalism to other areas--China, India, Russia, Egypt, etc.--during the nineteenth century. This self-aggrandizing folly, in which Britain was to play the major role, has become known in history as "imperialism". In their own interests, the Western nations restored the power of feudal lords when that power was tottering. If it were not for the throttling effect of imperialism, the nationalist revolutions we confront in the twentieth century might very well have been completed in the nineteenth.⁴

But, due to the development of imperialism, the twentieth century capitalist revolutions could not be successful in ending either imperialism or feudalism. Success was thwarted by the incompleteness of capitalist ideology among the nationalist leaders and the publics of the imperialist countries. Thus, the earliest twentieth century nationalist revolutions; in Mexico in 1910 and China in 1911, were unsuccessful under leaders possessing the spirit though not the ideology of revolutionary capitalism.

In place of the thwarted capitalist revolutions, the Soviet Revolution provided the model and support for successful nationalist revolutions, including the partial one in Mexico and the ultimately complete one in China. The Soviet Revolution achieved immediate and complete success because the socialists under the leadership of Lenin supplied both the objectives and the methods of revolutionary capitalism; that destruction of feudalism and imperialism which is the precondition for freedom and progress. Lens indicates that the twentieth century revolutions pursue the same objectives as did the European and American revolutions, and are motivated by the same revolutionary hatred of exploitation:

The communist upsurge, good or bad, aborted or not, is not an isolated phenomenon but an intrinsic link in a chain of events that began four hundred years ago, and is part of the same chain as capitalism itself.

... in point of fact the communist revolution has been a movement away from feudalism, slavery, and tribalism, just as the early Capitalist revolutions and the present nationalist revolutions are links on the same historical chain....it is a medicine for the same type of social disease...it is a response to the same challenge as the French Revolution of 1789, or the British Revolution of 1642, or the Indian Revolution of 1947. It is part of a cycle much broader than itself, and if it had not occurred under Bolshevik leadership it would have found some other radical force to guide it to its destiny.⁵

The Soviet Revolution was successful because it alone combined the two necessary revolutionary principles of destruction of feudalism, especially by distribution of feudal land and state industries to the peasants and workers, and of imperialism, by establishing peace and withdrawing from the World War.

The Russian Revolution created not just another strong nation changing the balance of power among the Great Powers, but also a new phenomenon in the twentieth century--a completely successful

4. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

revolution dedicated to assisting the world-wide eradication of imperialist and feudal exploitation. As Lens notes, this has created a profound fear of communism:

The fact is that communism has caused so pervasive an anxiety because it has altered not only the balance of power among nations, but the very character of our epoch. . .

The Russian Revolution added a new dimension to international affairs--much as the American and French Revolutions did in the nineteenth century. Here, finally, was an organized state that could--and did--offer moral encouragement, material aid, and organized support to radical nationalists.... By its very nature it came to be a "third force" in class and colonial conflicts. Whether it gave direct aid to rebellious forces or played a passive role as an example to be emulated, it was an inevitable encouragement to revolutionary aspiration. . . . The emergence of a leftist regime in Russia was not just another problem for Western statesmen, but a problem of a different kind.⁶

The immediate effect of the revolution was Russian withdrawal from the World War and the attempt of the Soviet government to induce the Western powers to negotiate a general peace by making concessions to their adversaries. Rather than make peace, and thus tend to prevent further revolutions, the Western powers determined to meet the revolutionary threat to their world dominance as they had met the threat of the central powers. In fact, they classified the Soviet government as an ally of the central powers and Lenin as a German satellite. The challenge posed by the Soviet Union to imperialist world domination had to be destroyed by the ultimate imperialist weapon; military intervention, including the forces of the American army.

The first reaction of the West to Soviet communism revealed little new insight. In its frustration it could think of no more imaginative policy than the one it had used so frequently in the colonies, military intervention. From 1918 to 1920, fourteen foreign armies occupied parts of the Soviet Union, and Britain and France donated hundreds of millions of dollars to former Czarist officers engaged in civil war against the red regime. It proved, after two and a half years, a futile effort. Equally inept was the wave of repression in the United States that followed the Bolshevik Revolution.⁷

Already, for more than six months before the Soviet Revolution, the United States had experienced suppression of civil liberties and deprivation of constitutional rights through conscription, economic controls, government censorship, propaganda, elimination of freedom of speech, and espionage and sedition acts against opponents of American intervention into World War I. Randolph Bourne, horrified at the support of the war by so-called liberals and progressives, had insisted that an unconditionally defeated Germany would become a greater menace to European peace; the war itself, he charged, was the only real enemy of American freedom. Oswald Garrison Villard, the publisher of the Nation, had warned businessmen against supporting conscription and the war since "militarism is the best friend of the Socialist. . . ."⁸ But, it was precisely

6. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

7. Ibid., p. 15.

8. Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Decline of American Liberalism

the socialists in America led by Eugene Debs who, like European socialists from Jaures in France to Lenin in Russia, opposed the war and assumed the leadership of the struggle to preserve civil liberties and constitutional rights, and who suffered most gravely from the war tyranny of persecution, censorship and imprisonment for this commitment to liberal principles. The crucifixion of the socialist bearers of American liberalism was intensified following the Soviet Revolution. The Post Office Department completely excluded socialist journals from the mails as pro-German by definition, and banned single issues of other journals for what was called "pro-Germanism, pacifism, and 'high-browism'".⁹ The Nation's September 18, 1918 issue was banned for Albert Jay Nock's editorial attacking the government's use of AFL president Samuel Gompers as an agent in Europe. The government insisted that no attacks on Gompers would be permitted because he had aided the government in preventing American workers from seeking their rights during the war. At the end of the World War the United States, of all the belligerents, alone refused amnesty to political prisoners; rather it increased the suppression of American liberties in revenge for the defeats inflicted by the Russian people on the foreign invaders, including the American army.

However, the unity of the American left--individualist and socialist--made this domestic violence only temporary. Lens contrasts the suppression of liberties during the deep conflict over American intervention into World War I followed by post-war restoration of traditional freedoms, with the general conformity to American intervention into World War II and the post-war deprivation of constitutional rights during the Futile Crusade of the Cold War. He emphasizes that this unusual development has been accompanied by the expansion of the anti-Communist right and the disappearance of an American left which would have opposed the right and the Cold War.

It is all the more striking, therefore, that today - when there is so little challenge from the left - there should be so continuing a state of repression. . . . Never has there been less pressure from radicalism.¹⁰

However, in his necessary concentration upon the Cold War, and especially its international developments, Lens does not present a detailed consideration of why a wave of domestic repression followed World War II accompanied by a disappearance of the American left; whereas following World War I, constitutional rights were restored under the influence of a strong and united American left-socialist and individualist. Certainly, the separation of American libertarians into mutually excluding socialist and individualist groupings was an important factor in weakening the American left, in contrast to its strength after World War I. Yet, as indicated by Lens' views quoted at the beginning of this article, this separation is entirely artificial and unreal. The clear commitment to individualism by spokesmen of the American left requires a re-evaluation of recent American political developments as interpreted by scholars representing individualism and the American left. Although these groups have been assumed to have conflicting views of recent political developments, Lens indicates

(New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1955) p. 212.

9. D. Joy Humes, Oswald Garrison Villard (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1960), pp. 37-38.

10. Lens, op. cit., p. 148.

that they may in fact have corresponding or identical comprehension of the meaning and results of the recent past. Lens' work suggests a method for such a re-evaluation in his references to the leading historians of the two points of view, William Appleman Williams and Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr. Their analyses of the crucial developments in recent American history provide important guides to the destruction of mythical stereotypes contributing to the divisions among libertarians that have weakened the American opposition to the Cold War. As with Lens and the American left, Cold War policies have awakened American individualists anew to the basic causes of the loss of American liberty, as indicated most clearly in the works of Ekirch.

In our own era it is difficult to reconcile the militarism left in the wake of two world wars and the prospect of a third, with a philosophy of liberalism.¹¹

Senator Robert M. LaFollette, as Ekirch indicates, had recognized that war and militarism would contribute to a decline of American liberalism. Thus, he opposed American intervention both in World War I and in the Russian Revolution, for which he was dubbed the "Bolshevik spokesman in America." In a war declared under the excuse of democratic aims, LaFollette had questioned whether Germans were less free than Americans if popular support of the war were measured by the violence of the espionage and conscription laws. And LaFollette had asked: "Are we seizing upon this war to consolidate and extend our imperialistic policy?"¹² American intervention, as LaFollette had predicted, lengthened the war by substituting concepts of total war and total victory for a negotiated and reasonable peace. The American left then united in opposition to the peace treaty dictated at the Versailles conference from which Germany and the Soviet Union were excluded. The treaty was recognized as the foundation for an inevitable second world war. The New Republic said of the treaty:

THIS IS NOT PEACE. Americans would be fools if they permitted themselves to be embroiled in a system of European alliances.¹³

Even greater disquiet was caused by the creation of a League of Nations with the power to threaten the use of force in the preservation of the status quo established under the treaty for the benefit of the major imperialist founders of the League. Villard, the publisher of the Nation, wrote to Senator LaFollette on the treaty and the League:

The more I study it, the more I am convinced that it is the most iniquitous peace document ever drawn, that it dishonors America because it violates our solemn national pledge given to the Germans at the time of the Armistice and because it reeks with bad faith, revengefulness and inhumanity. It is worse than the Treaty of Vienna.

... it not only retains the old and vicious order of the world, but makes it worse and then puts the whole control of the situation in the hands of four or five statesmen--and, incidentally, of the international Bankers. To my mind it seals the ruin of the modern capitalistic system and constitutes a veritable Pandora's Box out

11. Ekirch, American Liberalism, p. xi.

12. Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., ed., Voices in Dissent, An Anthology of Individualist Thought in the United States (New York: Citadel Press, 1964), p. 218; Ekirch, American Liberalism, pp. 215-20.

13. Ibid., p. 228.

of which will come evils of which we have not as yet any conception.¹⁴

Villard believed that the League would encourage the imperialist powers to refuse to solve international problems by peaceful means because the League would give the imperialist powers the sanctity of legality when countries such as Germany would seek to terminate such deprivations as Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and prohibition of union with Austria. And, for Villard, the League not only contributed to the prevention of peaceful settlement of the injuries of the Versailles system in Europe, but also enshrined the whole imperialist system which the national liberation movements in China, India, Egypt, Africa and Latin America were striving to destroy.¹⁵

The American left was triumphant in defeating the Versailles treaty and American participation in that guarantor of the imperialist status quo which Lenin trenchantly described as the "League of Bandits". Williams presents a penetrating analysis of the leadership in the Senate by the American left:

At the other extreme was an even smaller group of men who were almost doctrinaire laissez-faire liberals in domestic affairs and antiempire men in foreign policy. Led by Senator William E. Borah, they made many perceptive criticisms of existing policy The argument advanced by Borah and other antiempire spokesmen was based on the proposition that America neither could nor should undertake to make or keep the world safe for democracy.

. . . . And even if it were possible to build such an empire, they concluded, the effort violated the spirit of democracy itself. Borah provided a classic summary of these two arguments in one of his speeches attacking the proposal to clamp a lid on the revolutionary ferment in China after 1917. "Four hundred million people imbued with the spirit of independence and of national integrity are in the end invincible." . . . He concluded that a rapprochement with the Soviet Union was "the key to a restored Europe, to a peaceful Europe." In addition, he thought that the United States could play a crucial role in creating the circumstances in which there could "emerge a freer, a more relaxed, a more democratic Russia." ". . . So long as you have a hundred and fifty million people outlawed in a sense, it necessarily follows that you cannot have peace." . . . Of all Americans, the group around Borah most clearly understood the principle and practice of self determination in foreign affairs. For that reason, as well as other aspects of Borah's criticism, President Wilson singled out Borah as his most important critic--as the man who might turn out to be right.¹⁶

Borah's insights constituted the basic principles of the American left in the post-war period; the attempts of the great imperialist powers, victorious in World War I, to oppose and suppress the movements for national liberation, especially the successful Russian Revolution, were resolutely opposed and exposed by American liberalism. Support of the Soviet Union against the attacks of the imperialist powers and opposition to the concepts and provisions of

14. Humes, op. cit., p. 227; Ekirch, American Liberalism, pp. 226-27.

15. Humes, op. cit., pp. 223-28.

16. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 118-22.

the Versailles treaty, were the inter-connected bases for the unity of the American left. This unity was especially accomplished through revisionist studies of the origins of World War I, to which the Soviet Union had made a major contribution by making public the secret records and agreements of Imperial Russia's Western allies. Liberal journals, such as the Nation, the New Republic, and the Freeman, and such liberals as John Maynard Keynes, Harry Elmer Barnes, H. L. Mencken, Francis Neilson and Albert Jay Nock provided perceptive studies of the imperialist origins of the war and its imperialist conclusion in the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations.

Despite the American rejection, the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations remained very much in force, and the American left was dedicated to the complete abolition of the horrors of the Versailles system in order to insure a peaceful world. The foundations of the position of the American left on the treaty and the League were established by John Maynard Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920), in which he described the role of the League as an instrument of the major imperialist powers to protect the status quo that they had created in the Versailles treaty. The requirement to preserve the existing borders of the members, protected against peaceful change by the prescription of unanimity, insured the undisturbed maintenance of the status quo. According to Keynes:

These two Articles together go some way to destroy the conception of the League as an instrument of progress, and to equip it from the outset with an almost fatal bias towards the status quo. It is these Articles which have reconciled to the League some of its original opponents, who now hope to make of it another Holy Alliance for the perpetuation of the economic ruin of their enemies and the Balance of Power in their own interests which they believe themselves to have established by the Peace.¹⁷ The Versailles treaty had created or maintained local exploiting groups in the countries of Eastern Europe. As clients of the imperialist powers, these allies of the West preserved their exploitation against the movements for national liberation in Eastern Europe through special economic privileges which, to the exclusion of Russian and German economic and political interests, were granted to the West. Keynes demonstrated that there could not be peace if the major imperialist powers did not negotiate revisions of the treaty, especially with Germany and Russia. Excluded from Eastern Europe by the political and economic privileges of the Western powers, Russia and Germany would become natural allies and the leaders of the movements of national liberation seeking to end the yoke of exploitation exercised by the major imperialist powers and their allies, the Versailles-formed governments.¹⁸

After two decades during which the Western imperialist powers sought to intensify rather than rectify the evils of the status quo, the events which Keynes and the American left had foreseen did transpire. Germany, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, substituted nationalist governments for the imperialists' client regimes in Eastern Europe. As indicated by the liberal analysis of the world

17. John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), pp. 259-60.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 267-68, 290-95; Howard K. Smith, The State of Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 271-73.

situation, the alliance of Germany and the Soviet Union was neither an accident nor a great betrayal by one or the other. Rather this alliance was the necessary and natural development of the struggle between the forces of world imperialism defending their status quo, and the revolutionary forces of national liberation and anti-imperialism. Williams provides a clear description of this world-wide revolutionary challenge to the imperialist system:

However they distorted or misused the upsurge of dissatisfaction with the status quo, the leaders of Germany, Japan, and Italy were working with the most powerful weapon available--the determination, born equally of desperation and hope, of large numbers of people to improve, radically and immediately, the substance and tone of their daily lives.¹⁹

In Asia, the movement against the imperialist status quo was not only newer and more radical but also of more immediate concern to the American government; for more than half of America's imports of raw materials was derived from exploitation of the colonies of England, France and the Netherlands, and of China, which was viewed as the major growth-area for American imperialism. The system of exploitation of China through privileges and monopoly concessions to American corporations and banks was threatened, both by the desire of the Japanese for free and equal competition in the China market and by the Chinese revolution, which had begun in 1911 by the declaration of a republic. American interests wished to maintain their privileges by "working with and through Chinese conservative nationalists who were dependent upon American aid"²⁰ to prevent the completion of the Chinese revolution by liberal-radical or left-wing Chinese nationalists. Japan was invited to share in the China market subject to the primacy of American privileges and concessions in China, and in access to colonial raw materials subject to the control of the Western powers. In the struggle of the Japanese against the conservative Chinese government which protected American monopoly privileges and concessions, the United States increasingly applied economic restrictions to Japan and granted loans and military assistance to the conservative government of China. Opposition to American government support of the privileged economic interests in China and of the conservative government attempting to suppress the movement for national liberation in China, was continued by such traditional leaders of the American left as Senator Borah. But they were unsuccessful in the contest with the "China lobby", which propagandized the glories of the imperialist puppet regime of the Chiang dictatorship.²¹

19. Williams, American Diplomacy, p. 163.

20. Ibid., pp. 143, 190-92; William L. Neumann, "Ambiguity and Ambivalence in Ideas of National Interest in Asia," in Alexander DeConde, ed., Isolation and Security (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1957), pp. 157-58.

21. Williams, American Diplomacy, pp. 162-200; Marian C. McKenna, Borah (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961), pp. 355-85; Orde S. Pinckney, "William E. Borah: Critic of American Foreign Policy," Studies on the Left (Vol. 1, No. 3, 1960), pp. 54-61; William L. Neumann, America Encounters Japan (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 228-89; William L. Neumann, "Determinism, Destiny and Myth in the American Image of China," in George L. Anderson, ed., Issues and Conflicts, Studies in Twentieth Century American Diplomacy (Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kansas Press, 1959), pp. 1-20.

Of fundamental importance for the history of the Cold War was the development of the Asian movements of national liberation through Japan's challenge to the Western imperialist powers and its encouragement of anti-imperialist objectives, a challenge described by Lens and others. The Burmese nationalists, influenced by socialism, enlisted the aid of the Japanese to form a Burma Independence Army, and, when the English colonialists were expelled, the Japanese formed a Burmese national government. The radical and socialist elements of the Indian Congress party under the leadership of Subha Chandra Bose looked to Japanese liberation from English imperialism; and when Bose was forced out of the Congress party presidency in favor of the weaker Nehru, the radicals in Bengal assisted the Japanese invasion while Nehru merely declared against cooperation with the English army. In the Philippines, the Japanese granted independence to the government formed by the pre-war nationalist party led by Jose P. Laurel and Claro R. Recto, both formerly justices of the supreme court and post-war members of the Philippine senate; this nationalist party won the presidential election of 1953, and Jose P. Laurel, Jr., who had represented his father's wartime government in Tokyo, became speaker of the house of representatives. In Indochina the Japanese protected Vietnamese engaged in nationalist activities and ultimately abolished French colonialism and recognized the independence of Vietnam. The Japanese encouraged the national liberation movement in the Dutch East Indies by promising independence and by establishing local and national Indonesian councils in which a leading figure was the pro-Japanese nationalist, Achmed Sukarno. With the completion of independence plans, Sukarno became president of the Indonesian Republic before Japanese rule came to an end.²²

The function of the Atlantic Charter issued by Churchill and Roosevelt was to counter the rising tide of anti-imperialism and to gain the adherence of the peoples of the world, a role emphasized by Lens as an early aspect of the events that culminated in the Cold War. While for Churchill, the Atlantic Charter's call for self-government had more than propagandistic application only to England's allies in Western Europe and their client states in Eastern Europe, President Roosevelt considered the charter a binding commitment to end much if not all of the imperialist status quo, especially in Asia, which had contributed so greatly to the war and to American involvement. For the prosecution of the war this situation further emphasized the primacy of Europe.

Most of the energy of the government in India was devoted, however, not to the prosecution of the war but to the maintenance of British rule. What military strength India could spare for the war against the Axis was diverted to the war against Germany, in which there was little danger that Indian troops would be contaminated by dangerous ideas. The British in India, like Chiang K'ai-shek in China, put most of their strength behind maintaining internal stability. . . . The British were fighting two separate wars. In Europe they stood with all honor for the

22. Lens, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-99, 113-19, 126-39; Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 272. Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1946), pp. 82-96.

freedom of humanity and the destruction of the Nazi slave system; in Asia, for the status quo, for the Empire, for colonialism.²³ Roosevelt had realized that the assault on imperialism, represented by the Second World War and the movements of national liberation which the war intensified, could not be prevented or destroyed by force. For conservatives, like Churchill, the war was the means to restore the status quo of exploitation by the traditional imperialist states. To bulwark the imperialist status quo against the spirit of national liberation, which would receive the encouragement of the major center of anti-imperialism, the Soviet Union, Churchill hoped to contain the Soviet Union's influence by threatening it in Eastern Europe with recreation of the "cordon sanitaire" of Western client states. But Roosevelt intended to gain a permanent peace through the peaceful liquidation of the war-shattered imperialist system by means of American pressure. This would eliminate any threat from the Soviet Union, since the basic revolutionary urge to national liberation would be satisfied, while the security of the Soviet Union from the traditional threat of Western aggression would be protected by the natural development of Eastern European governments friendly to Soviet Russia. Roosevelt concluded that peace could be maintained by a permanent Soviet-American alliance supporting national liberation to replace the imperialist system. "Roosevelt, like most Americans, disliked Stalin's communism, but he had no pathological fear of it. He recognized its pliability."²⁴

Unfortunately, in the absence of Roosevelt's personal policy of Soviet-American collaboration in furthering the movements of national liberation, his concept of American leadership in the world could easily be perverted into opposition to the national liberation movements and to the Soviet Union in defense of the conservative policies of imperialism. Indeed, the Second World War policies of Roosevelt established foundations on which such a perversion of his own post-war aims could thrive. Robert M. Hutchins echoed LaFollette's criticisms when he noted that America's growing involvement in World War II was based upon the ability of the President to create military commitments without Congressional approval and to dramatize external forces as the cause of world difficulties. Instead of countering the materialism at the root of world difficulties by the peaceful example of American progress, Hutchins declared, an America that persecuted radicals, whether labor, communists, racial minorities or teachers as did the Nazis was making a scapegoat of Hitler just as Hitler had made a scapegoat of the Jews.²⁵ In this way the proponents of American intervention on the American left separated themselves by a wide gulf from that public which had continued its support of the American left's traditional anti-imperialist and isolationist policy. This split in the American left permitted revived attacks on civil liberties when the national and state legislatures initiated violations of constitutional rights to destroy those who still defended traditional American neutrality. The peacetime sedition or Smith Act with its guilt-by-association clause, although unsuccessfully applied in suits against pro-German opponents of the war, was the successful basis for general persecution of the American left, beginning with the neu-

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 150-52; Lens, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-26.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

25. E. Kirch, Voices in Dissent, pp. 275, 281.

tralist leaders of the CIO Minneapolis Transport Workers Union.²⁶ Norman Thomas, answering the question "Who are the Liberals?", noted that many who called themselves liberals had forgotten that "war is the enemy of liberalism," and had caused violations of civil liberties in opposition to the very essence of the liberal creed.

In recent years those Americans who most stridently proclaimed their liberalism were usually the most vociferous preachers of a peace of vengeance against Germany and Japan. . . They were far better able to discover seditionists at home than the FBI, and far surer than the Supreme Court that foolish speech constituted sedition.²⁷

Thus, insisted Thomas, while so-called liberals in Congress and the press supported or were silent over America's militarism, conscription, and deportation of one hundred thousand Americans of Japanese ancestry to American concentration camps, the burden of the civil libertarian struggle was borne by such isolationists as "Senator Taft who spoke out most openly concerning various aspects of conscription and the treatment of the Japanese Americans."²⁸

But the domestic violations of civil liberties could be continued, as the post-World War I period had demonstrated, only through the maintenance of a war mentality by failure of the American left to re-unite on its traditional principles. Unfortunately, that disunity was intensified by the long-term economic and political conditions and policies created by the war, especially by the interrelation of economic concentration and the government's contracts and economic aid programs, and the significant role in decision-making assumed by the military.

While it has long been a commonplace that New Deal policies were shelved in favor of a war economy, recent scholarship holds that the pre-war New Deal benefited big business through government privileges and concentration of economic power as much as had Hoover's policies, of which the New Deal was basically a continuation. However, the most significant result of the war economy was the increased concentration of economic power which big business derived from government contracts, and the establishment of a close relationship between big business and the military, as has been indicated by Ekirch and by C. Wright Mills.²⁹ Ekirch describes the importance which American foreign aid, under the guise of internationalism, has played in the post-war economic concentration of big business:

Nationalism in the guise of internationalism was most attractive to the postwar group of business, political, and military leaders whom C. Wright Mills dubbed "the sophisticated conservatives." . . . the foreign aid program, with its stimulation to American industry, became the "spinal nerve" of the sophisticated conservatives' postwar plans for the expansion of American export markets. . . . Admirably suited to the conservatives' purposes were the solid ties forged among industry, armed forces, and State Department - ties that were constantly being strengthened under the duress of the cold war and the policy of a permanent

26. *Ibid.*, p. 357; Ekirch, American Liberalism, pp. 299-301; Lens, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-48.

27. Norman Thomas, "Who Are The Liberals?", American Mercury (November, 1947), pp. 550, 553.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 552; Ekirch, American Liberalism, p. 316.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 308, 327-31; Ekirch, Voices in Dissent, pp. 368-76.

war economy. Aided by the widespread propaganda in behalf of a bipartisan foreign policy, these new-type conservatives were able to assume a dominant position in both major political parties.³⁰

Similarly, Lens examines the basis for the post-war development of conservatism in America:

Self-interest drove the military-industrial complex, after the war to upgrade the menace of communism and communist Russia. The points of conflict between East and West were enlarged to give the impression of an immediate war danger. To its surprise, this power complex found an ally among certain ex-radicals and . . . among certain liberals who came to Anti-Communism from other motivations. Together with the ultra-Right, which had been relatively dormant, this conjunction of forces pushed the center of gravity in American political life to the right, to a barren defense of the status quo.³¹

Ekirch examines the motivations of those liberals who became allies of the anti-Communism of the new conservatism in the post-war American government:

Accustomed to power and office, New Deal liberals had lost the capacity of self-criticism and vigorous opposition, qualities that might have served them in good stead in the postwar years of hysteria and reaction. . . .

One of the ironies of the postwar period was that anti-revisionist liberals, in their anxiety lest the United States return to a post-World War I intellectual pattern of isolationist pacifism, came to condone and even to abet a resort to the opposite extreme of a militant, interventionist nationalism, masquerading as idealistic internationalism. At the same time, talk of bipartisanship often concealed the essentially conservative nature of American postwar foreign policy. In what was really a turn to the right in American diplomacy, war liberals, who had formerly shared in many a leftist cause or program, now vied with conservatives for leadership in the crusade against communism.³²

Thus, some liberals became either complete or partial allies of the new conservative establishment on the basis of anti-Communism. Other liberals, eschewing this anti-Communism, became critics of varying effectiveness of the new conservatism in the American government, as did the isolationists who continued to pursue consistently the traditional program of American liberalism.

In his very valuable chapter, "The Alliance of Conservatives and Ex-Radicals," Lens provides an incisive analysis of the fundamental importance in the development of the Anti-Communist Crusade of the former communists and socialists. The disintegration of the liberal position in America was paralleled by the "concomitant emergence of a segment of ex-radicals as savants of Anti-Communism."

Perhaps the most interesting development in the United States since World War II, in terms of power alignment, has been the simultaneous decline of the Left and the conversion of some of its adherents into an Anti-Communist phalanx. . . many ex-radicals, whose impact was negligible when they were associated with the Left, have gained a new and impressive status by becoming the most fervid proponents of Anti-Communism. . . . Old

30. Ekirch, American Liberalism, p. 333.

31. Lens, op. cit., p. 78.

32. Ekirch, American Liberalism, pp. 317-20.

friends of the Soviet Union with socialist, communist, Trotskyist, or liberal backgrounds, such as Max Eastman, J. B. Matthews, Eugene Lyons, James Burnham, Sidney Hook, and Jay Lovestone, became the intellectual leavening for Anti-Communism and, in some cases, for ultra-right organizations. Many of these men reflected the factional struggles within the Soviet Union, between Stalin and Trotsky, for the most part, but also between Stalin and Bukharin. . . . But in recoiling from such transgressions, many American leftists went far in the opposite direction, centering their new dogma in the primacy of communism as the enemy of mankind, and joining with certain rightists, on occasion, whom they would have eschewed in the past. The establishment, instead of finding resistance to its negative, Anti-Communist policy, was thus reinforced. Where in the first postwar period the establishment's hysteria was counteracted by liberals and radicals, in the second postwar period it was aided and abetted by many radical defectors. The ex-radical, like the civilian militarist, found a new and exciting place in the sun. The phenomenon was so widespread it prompted the witticism from Ignazio Silone that the next war would be fought between communists and ex-communists.³³

Like the socialists who moved comfortably into the establishment's new conservatism, "the nucleus of the ADA was a group of dissident former socialists."³⁴ Led by ex-socialists such as Walter Reuther and James Loeb, the Americans for Democratic Action sought to maintain their channels to government power through participation in the Anti-Communist Crusade. Ekirch sketched the dangers of that policy:

What many anti-communist liberals overlooked, in the zeal of their often new-found faith, was that a society could create a class of political untouchables only at the peril of being itself affected by the very virus it sought to isolate. The danger in the anti-radical and anti-communist crusade after World War II did not stem primarily from the irresponsible tactics of the various Congressional investigating committees or individuals like Senator Joseph McCarthy, reprehensible though their methods were. "McCarthyism," after all, was a result or a symptom, not a cause. The danger rather lay in the assumption that there was a minority class or group of political lepers guilty of so-called wrong thinking. The contention, popular with some liberals, that communism was not heresy but conspiracy, even if true, overlooked the fact that all heresy which went beyond mere academic protest contained the seeds of possible conspiracy and subversion.³⁵

In contrast to the socialist-oriented ADA, those New Dealers who had come from a liberal or reform tradition - businessmen and leaders of farmer, labor and civil rights groups - naturally took a position more firmly based on the traditional principles of American liberalism. Important segments of the business community at the end of World War II considered American capitalism's prosperity dependent on peace and American - Soviet friendship; and the major business figures of the Roosevelt cabinet, Harold Ickes, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and Henry Wallace led in the founding of

33. Lens, *op. cit.*, pp. 65, 72-74.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

35. Ekirch, *American Liberalism*, p. 343.

the Progressive Citizens of America. The PCA sought to act on the principles of American capitalism and to cooperate with the Soviet Union to achieve world peace and prosperity through the liquidation of imperialism and feudalism, and the development of international trade. The ex-radical and anti-communist crusader, Eugene Lyons, recognized the socialist basis of anti-communism and the capitalist basis of Soviet-American cooperation when he noted that "organized labor, being more consciously anti-Communist than some capitalists, has gone sour on Wallace."³⁶ However, the enthusiasm of these New Deal businessmen carried them dangerously close to condoning American imperialism through its vanguard, the government's foreign aid program. Williams directs attention to this flaw in his examination of the opposition to Henry Wallace's desire to expand his role as secretary of commerce to gaining direct government subsidies for American corporations:

Wallace's version of the expansionist outlook won him sharp criticism from Senator Robert A. Taft. Along with his repeated warnings that American policy might well provoke the Soviets into even more militant retaliation, and perhaps even war, Taft's attack on Wallace serves to illustrate the misleading nature of the popular stereotype of the Senator. Taft immediately spotted the contradiction between the rhetoric of the New Deal and the reality of its policies. "Dollar diplomacy is decried," he commented very pointedly in 1945, "although it is exactly the policy of Government aid to our exporters which Mr. Wallace himself advocates to develop foreign trade, except that it did not (in its earlier forms) involve our lending abroad the money to pay for all our exports."

Yet despite the perceptiveness of his analysis, Taft stood virtually alone.³⁷ As indicated by Williams, if the stereotypes of American politics are discarded for the reality, Senator Taft and the isolationists remained the most consistently committed to the traditional principles of American liberalism. This is seen in their opposition to American imperialism and to American support of imperialist regimes abroad through foreign aid, as well as to the American provocations to the Soviet Union which created the Cold War and could cause World War III. Taft strongly opposed the almost four billion dollar loan to Great Britain which permitted the maintenance of its colonial system and of its military interventions in support of Greek rightists and of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. In addition, American capabilities for imperialism would have been drastically reduced by Taft's proposals for ending the draft, limiting executive power, reducing government revenues, and recalling American troops from centers of friction in Asia and Europe. The American occupation armies particularly provided an excuse for continuing the war-time importance of the military in decision-making and for keeping American forces on the threshold of the Soviet Union.

The World War II policy of total war had given the military unprecedented power. The American conduct of the war repeated the World War I policy of total war, unconditional surrender and application of the concept of "guilty" nations. This policy, including the indiscriminate strategic bombing of civilian populations

36. *American Mercury* (August, 1947), p. 137.

37. Williams, *American Diplomacy*, p. 238.

culminating in the first and only use of atomic weapons in warfare, could not but alienate those who consistently maintained the values of American liberalism. But after the killing ended, more basic military developments continued into the post-war era, especially their new-found role in decision-making and in holding key ambassadorial posts. Along with Lens, Ekirch has emphasized that the very continuation after the war of the military role in decision-making markedly altered American policy:

Such vast military expenditures naturally gave the armed forces increasing influence within the government, and top military men moved into key positions in federal agencies. Admiral William D. Leahy stayed on at the White House as President Truman's personal military adviser or private chief of staff. General Marshall replaced James Byrnes as Secretary of State, and the department itself came more and more under military control. Abroad in overseas posts, General Walter B. Smith, United States Ambassador to Russia, General Lucius Clay, High Commissioner of the American occupied zone in Germany, and General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commissioner for Japan, gave a militarist cast to our postwar policy. At home, unification of the armed forces in a single department and establishment of the National Security Council enabled the Secretary of National Defense to work with the State Department in determining foreign policy.

The practical results of the new integration of American foreign and military policy was the continued acceptance of the doctrine of peace through strength. The first step in this direction had been the wartime Allied insistence on the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers and the military occupation of their territory. ... Military control of American foreign policy, as a wide variety of critical observers pointed out, involved not only a sharp break with the American past but also posed a strong threat to peace and democracy. The military's lifelong identification with the use of force and contempt for the workings of diplomacy was viewed in the long run as likely to lead the United States into war. Even if such a contingency were avoided, there was the danger that the almost exclusive reliance on armed power in the conduct of American foreign relations would go far to stifle the workings of democracy at home.³⁸

As indicated by Ekirch, the total war policy led directly to the post-war policy of occupation by large forces of American troops as the first step to postwar military participation in decision-making. Not only did military government involve a confusion of military and political roles inconsistent with American traditions, but American military leaders gained important influence since American occupation forces were located at the very edge of the Soviet Union's security zones. To insure proper coordination between the military and civilian authorities, State Department officials came to be trained by the National War College. And American foreign policy was partially determined by the Secretary of Defense in the National Security Council advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as a special national security staff and central intelligence agency which were beyond the regular diplomacy of the State Department.³⁹

38. Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 273-75.

39. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 244-45.

The role of the military was further aggrandized by the uncritical admiration for military leaders of the first post-war presidential incumbent. Ekirch notes:

Even before relations with Russia descended to the point of an avowed cold war, the armed forces began to exert their influence upon American foreign policy. Somewhat paradoxically, this influence became greater in peace than it had been in war, when President Roosevelt and his civilian advisers had exercised a large measure of control over military strategy as well as over general foreign and domestic policy. In contrast to his predecessor, President Truman seemed peculiarly susceptible to military influence and advice. "No President since Grant," as Sumner Welles later wrote with some malice, "has had such childlike faith in the omniscience of the high brass as the present occupant of the White House." "The truth is," Oswald Garrison Villard wrote to Charles Beard, "we have a highly militaristic, lower middle class, back-slapping American legionnaire in the White House who has given free rein to the Militarists, and we are being made over under our own eyes into a tremendous military imperialistic Power--exactly what we went to war with Germany to prevent their becoming!"⁴⁰

This was borne out on March 5, 1946 when, at the instigation and in the applauding presence of President Truman, Winston Churchill proclaimed America's world primacy on the basis of its overwhelming military power. Through a theory of racial superiority by which the English-speaking nations were destined to determine the fate of the world's peoples, Churchill called for the maintenance of the special alliance among the English-speaking states founded on America's military dominance. This alliance would intervene to prevent conflict and insure the existence of regimes conforming to the rules issuing from the master English-speaking race. Except in English-speaking countries benefiting from this *status quo*, opposition parties and revolutionary movements had arisen against privilege, feudalism and imperialism (as President Roosevelt had foreseen). In the absence of Roosevelt's intended liquidation of imperialism under the leadership of the United States with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, the resistance to national liberation by English military intervention supported by American aid, caused these opposition and revolutionary movements to seek the diplomatic guidance and material aid of the Soviet Union (as President Roosevelt had also foreseen). According to Churchill, timely action would defeat the challenge to Christian civilization by the revolutionary movements under absolute obedience to the orders of international Communism, and the Soviet Union in turn would be forced to accept a world system dominated by Anglo-American strength. Since America's interests in Asia insured its continued attention to China, Churchill emphasized Europe and the Middle East. The English-speaking alliance had to maintain its control of Greece, Turkey and Iran, which dominated the invasion routes to southern Russia and the approaches to the Anglo-American oil concessions in the Middle East. The popularly supported communist parties of Western Europe had to be checked.

However, it was events in Central and Eastern Europe that most aggravated Churchill, and he sought to have the United States

40. Ekirch, American Liberalism, p. 323.

reverse the policy of President Roosevelt of recognizing Russia's security needs in Eastern Europe through the formation of friendly governments in that area. His suggestion that "an iron curtain has descended across the Continent" over the security zone granted to the Soviet Union under the Three Power accords, echoed almost to a year Joseph Goebbels' similar outburst at the temporary failure of the German generals to gain American support of German power aimed at the Soviet Union. On February 23, 1945 Goebbels had lashed out at the Allied unity established at Yalta:

the agreement between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin would allow the Soviets to occupy all Eastern and Southeastern Europe, together with the major part of the Reich. An iron curtain would at once descend on this territory which, including the Soviet Union, would be of tremendous dimensions. Behind this curtain there would then begin a mass slaughter of peoples, probably with acclamation from the Jewish press in London and New York.⁴¹

Churchill had only begrudgingly accepted the World War II alliance with the Soviet Union; he had reminded Russia that he considered her an evil equal to the German threat which had to be destroyed, and that he had been a leader in the intervention in Russia and the creation of the "cordon sanitaire" states in Eastern Europe. Churchill knew that his harsh words were supported by more than America's general military superiority. The American forces of occupation in Germany were located on the very edge of the security zone granted to the Soviet Union and in the very midst of the European cockpit from which the two world wars had been spawned. American military commanders had direct charge of the most significant diplomatic negotiations affecting the vital security of the Soviet Union, and their crucial changes in American policies in Germany immediately following Truman's applause of Churchill's speech, were major steps in the development of the Cold War. Williams has described this development:

... on May 3, 1946, the United States abruptly and unilaterally announced that it was terminating reparations to Russia from the Western zones of occupied Germany. These reparations, never large, had been arranged as part of interzone economic rehabilitation after the Potsdam Conference.

This decision, apparently taken on his own responsibility by General Lucius Clay, the Military Governor of the American zone, very probably had a crucial effect on the deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. ... By cutting off reparations so soon thereafter (Churchill's speech) from the western, industrial zones of Germany, Clay in effect put real and positive, as well as verbal and negative, pressure on the Russians.⁴²

Already General Clay had assumed the lead in the creation of a huge radio station in Germany to broadcast American propaganda to Russia and Eastern Europe, when the State Department decided to launch the Voice of America as the continuation of Elmer Davis' OWI and Nelson Rockefeller's OIAA. When the Russians criticized Clay's German policies, Clay encouraged Secretary of State Byrnes

41. John Lukacs, Decline and Rise of Europe (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), p. 47; Smith, op. cit., p. 270.

42. Williams, American Diplomacy, pp. 259-61; Smith, op. cit., pp. 117-21.

to make a major policy declaration in support of his actions in Germany. Clay provided an impressive setting for Byrnes' Stuttgart speech delivered before the American occupation forces in Germany on September 6, 1946. Byrnes' proposals added up to an American attempt to use Germany for American military purposes while excluding Russian influence. He rejected controls to prevent German remilitarization based on the Ruhr industries, and declared that American forces would "remain in Germany for a long period" after the end of the occupation. Byrnes received immediate personal congratulations for his Stuttgart ultimata from Winston Churchill.⁴³

Within a week, Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace made a general criticism of American foreign policy, including the German policy of Byrnes and Clay and the growing American support of the British military intervention in the Greek civil war. And the debate on foreign policy quickly became nation-wide when President Truman forced Wallace to resign. Professor Clyde Eagleton suggested that the United States should act properly before complaining about Russia, and that the American government should learn not to seek foreign scapegoats to blame for world problems, especially when the United States had contributed to the development of those problems. He noted that the United States was creating a global sphere of influence extending to Europe and Africa and the Far East. By MacArthur's monopolization of Allied control in Japan and American intervention in the Chinese civil war, and by the demand that American influence in Europe be increased by joint Allied controls, the United States was creating the conditions for a response from Russia in the form of greater security along its borders in Eastern Europe and Manchuria. Of the major post-war interventions--England in Greece and Indonesia, the United States in China, and Russia in north-western Iran only the Russians in Iran had withdrawn, and in response the Americans might be forced out of their influence in China.⁴⁴ In his article, "Isolationism and the Middle West", Professor William Carleton predicted that the traditional supporters of an American alliance with England would support American imperialism--the natural ally, partner and heir of the objectives and concessions of English imperialism, as for example in the Middle East oil cartel. In contrast, the Americans who were committed to the traditional liberal principles of anti-imperialism and isolationism would continue to oppose the American alliance with England; in this way they would aid rather than combat the inevitable movements of national liberation whose struggles to end imperialist exploitation by allied American and English interests would otherwise turn America away from cooperation with the Soviet Union and toward a possible World War III. Thus, the choice for American foreign policy was whether or not America would accept Churchill's policy and become for the rest of the world the "citadel of reaction," supporting through American military and foreign aid the exploitation of the world's peoples by the feudal landlords, monopolists and war lords.⁴⁵

On October 5, 1946, a month before the important post-war

43. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-96, 242, 253.

44. Ekirch, *Voices in Dissent*, pp. 294-95, 299.

45. William Carleton, "Isolationism and the Middle West," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (December, 1946), pp. 377-90.

Congressional elections, Senator Taft delivered a widely-publicized speech at the Kenyon College symposium on English-speaking peoples. Under the title "Equal Justice under Law", Taft offered a strong attack upon the premisses that had formed the basis for Churchill's declaration of the Cold War and his proclamation of world rule. Taft questioned whether the English-speaking peoples had in fact maintained the traditional principles of liberty and justice, an assumption on which was based the Truman Administration's adoption of Churchill's policies. Instead, in domestic and foreign affairs the American government had greatly restricted or denied fundamental civil liberties, and a new philosophy of increased government power had been substituted for traditional liberty and justice:

Of course the new philosophy has been promoted by two world wars, for war is a denial both of liberty and of justice.⁴⁶

An immediate example of the denial of international justice was the ex post facto war trials in Germany and Japan, which had been anticipated by General MacArthur's summary trial and execution of General Yamashita in which the United States Supreme Court had refused to intervene.⁴⁷ But the Truman foreign policy had generally abandoned international law and substituted naked power politics as a so-called world policeman; here it followed in the footsteps of English imperialism, which had also claimed to be the world policeman. Taft noted that the Truman policy had lost sight of the basic truth that the policeman is incidental to the law, and that without adherence to domestic or to international law a domestic or so-called world policeman is a tyrant and creator of disorder or anarchy.

This whole policy is no accident. For years we have been accepting at home the theory that the people are too dumb to understand and that a benevolent Executive must be given power to describe policy and administer policy ... Such a policy in the world, as at home, can only lead to tyranny or to anarchy.⁴⁸

Thus, an Administration which denied the capacity of Americans for self-government would certainly deny the capacity for self-government of other peoples in the world and would intervene to support the paternalism of feudal landlords, monopolists, bureaucrats and war lords. Taft emphasized that the existing problems and American reactions were the direct results of the American intervention in World War II. The American opposition to neutralism during the war had created the attitude that no country could be neutral in the Cold War. The barbarism during the war and the year after its end had caused the grave crisis in American attitudes which had launched the Cold War:

Our whole attitude in the world, for a year after V-E Day, including the use of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, seems to me a departure from the principle of fair and equal treatment which has made America respected throughout the world before the second World War.⁴⁹

Taft concluded with the hope that the English-speaking peoples would recover from the post-war disillusionment caused by the

46. Ekirch, Voices in Dissent, p. 312.

47. Ibid., p. 321; 1946 Britannica Book of the Year (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1946), p. 852.

48. Ekirch, Voices in Dissent, p. 319.

49. Ibid., p. 321.

barbarity of World War II and would replace the Churchill-Truman foreign policy of force and imperialist world policeman with a restoration of justice and liberty.

Although the Republicans won the 1946 Congressional elections, the well-known division in that party between the internationalists and the isolationists permitted the Truman Administration to gain the support of the internationalist Republicans for a bipartisan foreign policy and to frustrate attempts to restrict American imperialism. With the power and publicity facilities of the Executive Department, President Truman was able to seize the initiative by declaration of the Truman Doctrine of aid to the Greek and Turkish governments, on March 12, 1947. In place of English imperialism's collapsing effort to impose an oppressive rightist government and suppress the movement for Greek national liberation, American money, arms, planes and military "advisers" would be rushed to Greece. Lens notes the varied reactions in America to Truman's challenge to national liberation movements by dividing the world into two camps:

The decisive moment for the pragmatic liberal came in 1947 when Harry Truman promulgated the Truman Doctrine. The Cold War was now formalized. The Progressive Citizens of America immediately denounced the plan as an "invitation to war," replacing the "American policy based on one world" for one which "divides the world into two camps." The Nation decried the Doctrine as "a plain declaration of political war against Russia," and the New Republic said "the U. S. is now ready to excuse unholy alliances of its own by adopting the apology that the end might justify the means." But the ADA ... endorsed the Doctrine. ... On this, the decisive issue of our time, the gap between the ADA and the conservatives narrowed to derivative and peripheral issues, such as the extent of economic aid.⁵⁰

Against this bipartisan unity of the ADA and the conservatives, the isolationists alone offered an effective challenge in Congress; they opposed American military assistance to support the Truman Doctrine because they viewed it as the formal launching of a war against the Soviet Union. Senator Taft denounced Truman's intention "to make a loan to set up armies in Greece and Turkey against Russia,"⁵¹ and Truman's "policy of dividing the world into zones of political influence, Communist and non-Communist."⁵² The isolationists feared that Truman's program would create a cartelized, monopolistic American economy based on government contracts which, whether or not a Cold War remained, would create an undemocratic domestic atmosphere. Representative George Bender, leading Taft spokesman in the House and later his successor in the Senate, maintained a consistent critique of Truman's launching of the Cold War against the Soviet Union. In an attack on the corrupt Greek government and the fraudulent elections which had kept it in power, Bender declared, on March 28, 1947:

I believe that the White House program is a reaffirmation of the nineteenth century belief in power politics. It is a refinement of the policy first adopted after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 designed to encircle Russia and establish a "Cordon

50. Lens, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32; Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-40.

51. Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, p. 3031.

52. Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), pp. 174-75.

Sanitaire" around the Soviet Union. It is a program which points to a new policy of interventionism in Europe as a corollary to our Monroe Doctrine in South America. Let there be no mistake about the far-reaching implications of this plan. Once we have taken the historic step of sending financial aid, military experts and loans to Greece and Turkey, we shall be irrevocably committed to a course of action from which it will be impossible to withdraw. More and larger demands will follow. Greater needs will arise throughout the many areas of friction in the world.⁵³

Bender was among the few Congressional defenders of Henry Wallace when the latter was widely attacked for his proposals, made in England and France, that Europe oppose the Truman Doctrine's division of the world into two camps and instead act as a balance between them. Wallace's speeches in Europe led to a bipartisan demand for the revocation of his passport; and in answer to such attacks as Representative Kenneth Keating's accusation of treason against Wallace, Bender lashed out at the open season on Wallace. Bender replied to Churchill's attack on Wallace for speaking abroad, that if Churchill could seek to launch the Cold War by speeches in America, Wallace could seek to prevent that war by speeches in Europe.⁵⁴

What appears to be an impossible unity of 'left' and 'right', a unity contrary to the whole system of stereotypes created for America's recent history, was well and fearfully understood by the Truman Administration. For the Administration knew that the success of its bipartisan foreign policy depended on division among the groups opposed to American imperialism. Joseph M. Jones, who played an important role in the development of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, has revealed such understanding:

Most of the outright opposition came from the extreme Left and the extreme Right of the political spectrum; from a certain school of "liberals" who had long been strongly critical of the administration's stiffening policy toward the Soviet Union, and from the "isolationists" who had been consistent opponents of all foreign-policy measures that projected the United States actively into World affairs. Thus Henry A. Wallace, Fiorello La Guardia, Senators Claude Pepper and Glen H. Taylor found themselves in the same bed with Colonel Robert McCormick, John O'Donnell, Representatives Harold Knutson and Everett M. Dirksen; and the Marshall Field papers (P. M. and the Chicago Sun), the Chicago Daily News, the Nation, the New Republic and the Christian Century found themselves in the same corner with the McCormick-Patterson press. The opposition of the Left emphasized that American aid to the existing Greek and Turkish governments would not promote freedom but would protect anti-democratic and reactionary regimes; and that the proposed action by-passed the United Nations and endangered its future. The opposition of the Right emphasized that the President's policy would probably, if not inevitably, lead to war; and that the American economy could not stand the strains of trying to stop Communism with dollars. But both Right and Left used the full range of arguments in a bitter attack. "Power politics," "militarism," "intervention," were charged against the adminis-

53. Cong. Record, 80th Congress, pp. 2831-32.

54. Ibid., pp. 3350-54.

tration. "You can't fight Communism with dollars," "the new policy means the end of One World," "the Moscow Conference will be undermined," "We should not bail out the British Empire" --these were among the arguments used.⁵⁵

The military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey engendered the strongest partisanship of any foreign policy bill before the Congress in that session. While receiving almost unanimous Democratic support, it met the strongest opposition from a deeply divided Republican party. The only comparably strong isolationist action in the Eightieth Congress was the even larger Republican vote against the bipartisan reimposition of Selective Service in 1948; this vote came after the Republicans had honored their campaign commitment to end the draft by letting it expire despite Truman's militaristic appeals for renewal.

An over-all criticism of the bipartisan foreign policy was presented by Rep. Bender, on June 6, 1947, during the debate on Representative Karl Mundt's attempt to give a cover of legality to the Voice of America program which the State Department had been operating. Bender said:

The Voice of America broadcasts are just one piece of the Truman Doctrine.

The pieces are beginning to fall into place, and the pattern is becoming clear. It is not a pretty pattern; it is not a pattern which the people of the United States can look on with confidence or with a sense of hope for the future.... But we have learned to look behind the titles or labels of measures prepared by the Truman administration.

The Greek-Turkey-aid bill was presented to this Congress as a humanitarian measure, designed to relieve hunger and suffering. The Truman administration attempted to conceal and disguise its true character, which was admitted only after the measure was subjected to searching examination on the floor of the House. Then it was admitted that all of the so-called aid to Turkey was to be military aid, and most of the aid to Greece was to be military aid. The humanitarian purpose turned out to be hypocrisy. No, we must look behind the high-sounding title in the present bill about the interchange of knowledge and seek out the true character of this measure. Its true character is not difficult to discover. The Voice of America program is nothing more or less than the propaganda arm of the Truman Doctrine. It is just one more piece in the pattern of the Truman adventure in international relations.

What are some of the other pieces in the Truman program which have become apparent in the past few days?

On May 26, Mr. Truman urged the Congress to authorize a program of military collaboration with all the petty and not so petty dictators of South America. Mr. Truman submitted a draft bill which would authorize the United States to take over the arming of South America on a scale far beyond that involved in the \$400,000,000 hand-out to Greece and Turkey.

Mr. Truman continued his campaign for universal peacetime military training in the United States

But military control at home is a part of the emerging Truman program. The Truman administration is using all its propaganda resources in an attempt to soften up the American people to accept this idea.

55. Jones, op. cit., p. 177.

Yes; the Truman administration is busy in its attempt to sell the idea of military control to the people of America. And hand in hand with the propaganda campaign go secret meetings for industrial mobilization.

This is the kind of thing which is taking place behind barred doors in the Pentagon Building, about which the people of the United States learn only by accident. This is a part of the emerging Truman program.

It is against this background that the Voice of America program must be considered. This vast foreign propaganda machine prepared by the administration is a part of this program. It is a part just as Mr. Truman's friendship with the dictator Peron of South America is a part. It is a part just as Mr. Truman's eagerness for universal military training in the United States is a part. It is a part just as Mr. Truman's proposal for arming every South American country to the teeth is a part. It is a part of the whole Truman doctrine of drawing off the resources of the United States in support of every reactionary government in the world.

I am opposed to the Voice of America just as I am opposed to every part of the dangerous and irresponsible Truman doctrine.⁵⁶

Against Rep. Bender and in favor of Rep. Mundt's Voice of America bill, Representative Walter Judd declared that it was absolutely necessary to combat the belief of the Chinese people that there were still one hundred thousand American troops aiding Chiang's armies; instead, there were now only about ten thousand American troops in China. Another common belief held that Chiang's 'China Lobby' in Washington had granted privileges and concessions to Americans who had helped Chiang get American foreign aid; also, that the Sino-American commercial treaty of November, 1946, had opened China to American economic exploitation. From Judd's wide contacts inside the Chiang regime, he suggested that the Chinese people had been asking such embarrassing questions as:

Is it true that American troops in China number 100,000?....

Is it true that the new Sino-American commercial treaty makes China a vassal of America?⁵⁷

But Rep. Bender and the isolationists in Congress were not unprepared; they had already experienced the strength of the China Lobby in gaining the American loans, American foreign aid, and American economic sanctions against Japan which had led to American intervention in World War II. Rep. Bender, in an attack on Truman's support of the fascist Greek dictatorship, indicated that this aid would become a precedent for the support of other fascist dictatorships, especially the reactionary Chiang regime. Already, the powerful China Lobby in Washington was seeking to get the Administration to struggle against the Congressional isolationists who had slashed foreign aid to Chiang. On May 7, 1947 Rep. Bender warned the Congress of the China Lobby's "intense pressure placed upon our State Department:"

I charge here on the floor of the House that the Chinese Embassy here has had the arrogance to invade our State Department and attempt to tell our State Department that the Truman Doctrine has committed our Government and this Congress to all-out

⁵⁶ Cong. Record, 80th Congress, pp. 6562-63.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 6547-6551.

support of the present Fascist Chinese Government.⁵⁸

Early in 1947, the Internationalist Republicans, led by Senator Arthur Vandenburg and State Department Adviser John Foster Dulles, initiated a campaign for heavy American aid to the Nationalist Chinese and against the isolationist Republicans who had opposed aid to Chiang. At that time, American troops in China were being reduced to 12,000 men while an United States Military Advisory Group sought to develop a modern Nationalist army. But, at the end of the war in September, 1945, as an addition to the sixty thousand American troops already in China another fifty-three thousand American marines were sent into North China where the Chinese Communists had wrested control of the countryside from the Japanese. The United States air-lifted and shipped a half million Nationalist troops to North China and Manchuria, where the Russians turned over the cities they had occupied to the Nationalist forces. The Chinese Communists protested the involvement of over one hundred thousand American troops in the internal affairs of China, but withdrew before the American marines and the American-equipped Nationalist armies. It was not until one year later that the American marines began to be withdrawn from North China, and they turned over thousands of tons of their equipment to the Nationalist armies. The arms, however, were eventually lost to the Communists, who were generally equipped with American arms.⁵⁹ America's crucial role against the Chinese Communists in the civil war was described at the time by two American reporters, Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby:

Americans must realize now one of the hard facts of Chinese politics—that in the eyes of millions of the Chinese their civil war was made in America. We were the architects of its strategy; we flew government troops into Communist territory, we transported and supplied Kuomintang armies marching into the Communists' Yellow River basin and into the no man's land of Manchuria, we issued the orders to the Japanese garrisons that made the railway lines of the north the spoils of civil war. Our marines were moved into North China and remained there to support Chinag's regime - though fiction succeeded fiction to explain their continued presence in noble words. . . . When the Japanese began to leave and that fiction exploded, they remained to counter the Russian troops in Manchuria. When the Russians evacuated Manchuria and that fiction too exploded, it was announced that the marines were remaining indefinitely merely to "guard" supply lines from coal mines to the coast. These fictions hold only for the American people themselves; in China it is clear to all that the chief duty of our marines there is to preserve, protect, and defend Chiang K'ai-shek's government in the northern areas where he is under attack. Both parties in China realize this. . . . The Communists, too, realize it; all

58. *Ibid.*, p. 4694; Felix Greene, A Curtain of Ignorance (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1964), p. 48.

59. Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 448-49; O. Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 250-63, 276-79; Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 362-63, 396-401, 420-27.

60. White and Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 318-19.

North China and Manchuria might have been theirs long since had it not been for American intervention, and their bitterness has grown with each passing month.⁶⁰

When General George Marshall proposed the Marshall Plan in 1947 as an economic lever upon Western European governments to create the basis for a military system directed against the Soviet Union, Senator Taft undertook a campaign to defeat it.

Taft said that he was "absolutely opposed" to extending \$2,657 million in additional foreign aid. . . In his view, granting aid to Europe would only furnish the Communists with further arguments against the "imperialist" policy of the United States.⁶¹

Taft declared on September 25, 1947:

I have not believed that Russia intends or desires conquest by force of arms of additional territory.⁶²

Although the internationalist Republicans supported the bipartisan foreign policy and foreign aid, under the leadership of Senator Vandenburg and Governor Thomas E. Dewey they conditioned their support for the Marshall Plan upon the Administration's inclusion of aid to Chiang. Faced by a choice between the isolationists and the China Lobby, Truman did not hesitate to support the China Lobby and to commit his Administration to the support of the Chiang regime:

For the greatest danger confronting the global policy of the administration, of which the Marshall Plan was the key, came not so much from the China bloc in Congress, of which Judd and Vorys in the House and Bridges in the Senate were the leading figures, as from the combined forces of the economy bloc and the unreconstructed isolationists, of which Representative John Taber in the House and Taft in the Senate were the spokesmen. Subsequent events show that by making limited concessions to the China bloc, the administration succeeded in averting serious opposition from that quarter to its European program.⁶³

Nevertheless, the isolationists maintained their criticism of the Marshall Plan, and were not deterred by the claim that without foreign aid European peoples might elect governments that included Communists. Taft answered that this would only be proof that capitalism, well-developed in America, had hardly received application elsewhere and that America's granting of funds to the privilege-ridden, cartel-minded European bureaucrats and businessmen would not reduce Communist votes in Italy and France. For the non-capitalist mentality of such governments would prevent the peoples from receiving the benefit of foreign aid. In place of Truman's threat to use military aggression as it did in Greece to battle Communist opposition, Taft opposed the use of military intervention; he would limit American action to ending American aid when Communists had assumed power. Taft insisted that America's conflict with the Soviet Union was purely one of ideas and ideology for the minds of men, and not a physical battle as Truman claimed. Characteristic was Taft's response to the settlement by the leftist majority in the Czechoslovak government of the crisis caused by the resignation of the rightist minority.

61. Tang Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 465-66.

62. United Labor League of Ohio, A Speakers' Handbook on Robert Alphonso Taft, 1950, p. 166.

63. Tang Tsou, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

Taft held that this was "just a consolidation of the Russian sphere of influence," and that he "had no knowledge of any Russian intention for initiating aggression."⁶⁴ As Williams indicates, unlike the internationalist Republicans, Senator Taft opposed the attempts of the Truman Administration to proclaim a Russian menace and create a crisis atmosphere whenever it wished to rally support for foreign intervention against the isolationist opposition. When Truman attempted to use domestic political developments in Czechoslovakia to gain passage of the Marshall Plan, Taft declared, on March 12, 1948:

I do not quite understand the statements made yesterday by Secretary Marshall and President Truman. They do not imply that they believe that we do face a war question; and then they seem to use the concern which is aroused to urge the passage of this particular program. I do not believe that the two are connected. . . .

I believe that the tone of the President's statement that his confidence in ultimate world peace has been shaken is unfortunate. Certainly it is no argument for the passage of the present bill. . . . But let me say that I myself know of no particular indication of Russian intentions to undertake military aggression beyond the sphere of influence which was originally assigned to the Russians. The situation in Czechoslovakia is indeed a tragic one; but the Russian influence has been predominant in Czechoslovakia since the end of the war. The Communists are merely consolidating their position in Czechoslovakia; but there has been no military aggression, since the end of the war.⁶⁵

Charles A. Beard found that the good objectives by which "the advocates of war in the name of perpetual and durable peace" had justified American intervention in World War II remained unfulfilled. The development of a siege or fortress mentality in America, a permanent draft, high arms budgets, high taxes and a huge national debt--all of which the defeat of German dominance in Europe was supposed to prevent--were installed and institutionalized by the war.

Furthermore, it was now claimed by former advocates of war that huge armed forces were necessary in "peacetime" to "secure the fruits of victory" and "win the peace" by extirpating the spirit of tyranny in Germany and Japan, and by restraining the expansion of Russian imperial power. . . .

In 1947, under President Truman's direction, the Government of the United States set out on an unlimited program of underwriting by money and military "advice," poverty-stricken, feeble, and instable governments (around the Soviet Union). . . . Of necessity, if this program was to be more than a brutum fulmen, it had to be predicated upon present and ultimate support by the blood and treasure of the United States. . . . In short, with the Government of the United States committed under a so-called bipartisan foreign policy to supporting by money and other forms of power for an indefinite time an indefinite number of other governments around the globe, the domestic affairs of the American people became appendages to an aleatory expedition in the management of the world.⁶⁶

64. Labor League, *op. cit.*, p. 167; Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 343-48.

65. *Congressional Record*, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 2643-44.

66. Ekirch, *Voices in Dissent*, pp. 337-40.

The Truman Administration's next global intervention in its Anti-Communist Crusade, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was thoroughly criticized by American isolationists on the ground that America's re-arming of Europe against the Soviet Union, which had not shown aggressive intent, would increase world tension and would require Soviet moves in self-defense leading to a world war. Against the Truman Administration, Senator Taft insisted that the Soviet Union did not use war as an instrument of national policy; however, in self-defense against American interventions like the Truman Doctrine and NATO, the Soviet Union might be forced to use similar means. NATO "was likely to incite Russia to start a war because of the threat involved to its satellite countries and therefore to its own safety."⁶⁷ Sharing the views of such other critics of Truman's policies as Walter Lippmann, Taft said:

In Europe the building up of a great army surrounding Russia from Norway to Turkey and Iran might produce a fear of the invasion of Russia or some of the satellite countries regarded by Russia as essential to the defense of Moscow.⁶⁸

Taft shared the concern which President Roosevelt had shown to respect the fears of the Soviet Union about security in its vicinity. Although he did not care for the methods used at Yalta, Taft insisted that the United States was required to observe its international obligations under the Yalta agreement rather than compound the trouble by further treaty involvements in Europe. Along with the growing American tendency to disregard international law, such entanglement would lead to further American betrayals of its treaty obligations, this time to its European allies. The American government's insincere recourse to treaty built upon treaty was repugnant to Taft's sense of international law and justice. Taft said:

I voted against it (NATO) because I felt it was contrary to the whole theory of the United Nations charter . . . because I felt that it might develop aggressive features more likely to incite Russia to war than to deter it from war. . . (NATO was) a violation of its (UN's) spirit if not its language. The pact apparently is not made under Articles 52 to 54, inclusive, because we do not propose to consult the Security Council as there contemplated, we do plan to take enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council, and we do not plan to keep it fully informed. . . An undertaking by the most powerful nation in the world to arm half the world against the other half goes far beyond any "right of collective defense if an armed attack occurs." It violates the whole spirit of the United Nations Charter. That charter looks to the reduction of armaments by agreement between individual nations. The Atlantic Pact moves in exactly the opposite direction from the purposes of the charter and makes a farce of further efforts to secure international justice through law and justice. It necessarily divides the world into two armed camps. . . . This treaty, therefore, means inevitably an armament race, and armament races in the past have led to war.⁶⁹

In a major debate over NATO between Senators Taft and John Foster Dulles (July 11-12, 1949), Taft insisted that the alliance

67. Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1951), p. 91.

68. Ibid., p. 113.

69. Ibid., pp. 89-90.

was a rejection not only of the United Nations Charter and international law, but also of Soviet-American negotiations. It also reflected dominance over American policy of the soldiers and advisers of the Defense establishment rather than the diplomats and experts of the State Department. Taft said, in the debate of July 11, 1949:

I cannot vote for a treaty which, in my opinion, will do far more to bring about a third world war than it ever will to maintain the peace of the world.⁷⁰

Taft's speeches received the following welcome in the Daily Worker, July 13, 1949:

Senator Robert Taft's announced opposition to the Atlantic Pact is a political fact of real significance.⁷¹

Such support along with such statements by Taft as:

No Russian military attack is threatened in Western Europe. (The Russians) have not moved beyond the borders agreed to at Yalta (July, 1949),⁷²

or,

Does the Russian possession of the atomic bomb make a third world war likely? On the whole I do not think so. I certainly do not pretend to understand the Russian mind, but for four years they have shown no intention of making a military advance beyond the zones of influence in Central Europe and Manchuria allotted to them at Yalta (October, 1949),⁷³

led to Democratic charges during his re-election campaign in 1950 which renewed the question of Taft's loyalty that had been raised because of his opposition to intervention in World War II. Taft's loyalty was attacked because of his opposition to the Cold War against Russia, his refusal to consider the Soviet Union an enemy or a danger to the American people, and his insistence upon settlement of disputes with Russia through ordinary diplomacy rather than military encirclement. Taft was contrasted with Truman, who was praised for his so-called wisdom in torpedoing the Yalta agreement and in supporting the Chiang regime; Taft, on the other hand, was criticized for insisting on American fulfillment of its Yalta obligations and for his lack of support for aid to Chiang against the Chinese Communists.⁷⁴

More than three billion dollars were expended in military aid to Chiang, most of which came quickly into the hands of the Chinese Communists. (General Chu Teh said: "In these operations we have seized much United States equipment. It is very good. We hope to get more of it."⁷⁵) Yet, the Chiang regime, in December, 1949, fled from China to Formosa which, as a former Japanese possession, was occupied by China until formal settlement by the postponed Japanese peace conference. Preceded by the governments of India, Burma and Pakistan, Britain recognized the Chinese People's Republic on January 5, 1950, followed rapidly by the Scandinavian countries and some Asian governments (the Soviet bloc countries had done so during October, 1949). On January 8, the Chinese People's Republic requested the UN Security Council to accept its seating as the legal and effective govern-

70. Vital Speeches, 15 (August 1, 1949), 610-24.

71. Labor League, op. cit., pp. 168-69.

72. Ibid., p. 169.

73. Ibid., p. 170.

74. Ibid., passim.

75. Lens, op. cit., p. 110.

ment, and this was officially moved on January 10 by the Soviet Union. On January 11, Taft addressed himself to the question of America's relations with China and with Formosa. If the Truman Administration's commitment to an Anti-Communist Crusade in China was correct, why were huge sums sent to Europe, he asked, where there was never a threat of Russian military activity, but rather the creation of an American threat to Russian security? Taft agreed with the State Department that the United States should not establish American military bases on Formosa, but disagreed with the policy of supplying American aid to the French army suppressing the Indochinese nationalists. He noted the inconsistency of the State Department's providing aid to the French in Indochina and the Rhee regime in Korea, but not to Chiang on Formosa, after spending billions of dollars to support him in China. Taft warned that he would not support any Administration commitment to back Chiang in a war against the Chinese government, and he suggested that the Administration consider whether the American government had any special obligation to the people of Formosa, as former subjects of Japan with which no peace treaty had been negotiated, to maintain their free choice of government uninfluenced by the Communist or the Chiang governments. If such an obligation by America existed, Taft asked that the American fleet be placed between Formosa and the mainland, and that Chiang, his mainland bureaucrats, and his army of occupation be removed from Formosa to permit a free vote by the Formosan people on self-determination:

In recent months it has of course been very doubtful whether aid to the Nationalist Government could be effective, and no one desires to waste American efforts.... We can determine later whether we ever wish to recognize the Chinese Communists and what the ultimate disposition of Formosa shall be.... as I understand it, the people of Formosa if permitted to vote would probably vote to set up an independent republic of Formosa.... if, at the peace conference, it is decided that Formosa should be set up as an independent republic, we certainly have the means to force the Nationalists' surrender of Formosa.⁷⁶

The following day, Secretary of State Acheson answered Taft. He criticized Taft's rejection of American support for the French in Indochina and his disagreement with the Administration's direct commitment to maintain the Rhee regime in Korea. Acheson indicated that the American fleet was already in the Formosa Strait, and that he expected the Chinese Communists to espouse a nationalist course by preventing the Russian occupation of Manchuria, Sinkiang and other border regions which he claimed the Russians controlled. He felt that Sino-American relations would be restored on the basis of mutual opposition to the Soviet Union and on China's need for American economic aid, and, that until then, the United States would refrain from creating military positions on the borders of China. On January 13 the Security Council failed by one vote to seat the Communist delegate in place of Chiang's delegate, with the United States and France voting against the Communist delegation and Britain abstaining. Immediately, the Soviet delegate announced that he would boycott the Security Council for its failure to seat Communist China and he remained away until a month after the beginning of the Korean war. In response to American and

⁷⁶ White and Jacoby, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-25; Vital Speeches, 16 (February 1, 1950), 236-37.

French opposition in the UN, China seized their properties and, on January 18, recognized the Vietnamese nationalists under Ho Chi-minh as the government of Indochina. Within a month, the United States recognized the puppet government established in Indochina by the French and increased aid to the armies fighting Ho Chi-minh.

The Truman Administration assumed a non-committal policy with regard to Communist China. American policy was based on the assumption that China was a passive country on which American policy would be applied by degrees to bring it into line with American objectives through eventual American recognition and American economic aid. This was not necessarily an impossible goal; it was merely impossible in the context of the American role in China, especially after 1945, when American marines held cities and railroads for Chiang, American officers 'advised' American-equipped Chiang armies, and American planes and ships transported Chiang's troops against the Communists. Acheson's objectives in China could only be gained by America's seizing the initiative in recognizing China, as Britain had done, in seating China in the UN, and in offering aid without the strings of an anti-Soviet alliance attached. By refusing to seat the Chinese Communists in the UN and by continuing American recognition and aid to Chiang, Acheson only accomplished what his policy was aimed at preventing, namely, Chinese Communist acceptance, in February, 1950, of a Russian alliance. The Chinese, in short, had accepted Truman's policy of two world camps. China's fears were confirmed by United States opposition in the UN caused by the Administration's desire to keep internationalist Republican support for its foreign aid programs; and China responded with activity, instead of passivity, and recognized the government of Ho Chi-minh in Vietnam.⁷⁷

Many internationalist Republicans reacted to this non-committal China policy of Truman by opposing the Administration's sixty million dollar aid bill for South Korea on the ground that aid to that government was a complete waste and that Korea was beyond America's defense interest. The one point on which there was truly bipartisan support and a "phenomenal lack of disagreement"⁷⁸ between internationalists and isolationists was that American troops must never be used on the continent of Asia, especially within range of the frontiers of China.

The attack on the aid to Korea bill was so intense that Representative Judd, one of the most responsible and level-headed members of the China bloc, found it necessary to plead with his fellow congressmen.... Joined by economy-minded and non-interventionist Republicans and Southern Democrats, Vorys and his supporters defeated the bill by a margin of one vote. The Republicans opposed it six to one while only three out of four Democrats supported it. This was the first major setback in Congress for the administration in the field of foreign policy since the end of the war.⁷⁹

Judd acted so that American support of Korea would eventually involve the United States on the Asian mainland to the benefit of Chiang, and he was able to rally the internationalists against the isolationists and restore the Administration's aid to South Korea.

77. Tang Tsou, *op. cit.*, pp. 518-23, 534-36, 548.

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 358-59.

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 537-38.

Upon the outbreak of conflict between North and South Korea, Truman first ordered the American fleet to prevent military action across the Formosa Strait. Then he decreed the use of American naval and air power in Korea, increased aid to the French forces in Indochina, and finally the use of American troops in Korea, thus reversing the Defense Department's strategic planning as well as MacArthur's previous position that American troops must not be used on the continent of Asia. To the Chinese Communists, American actions appeared to be a repetition of China's invasion by Japan of whom the United States had become the heir in East Asia. The permanent American military position in Japan and Okinawa, followed by the extension of American military activity into Korea, Formosa, and Indochina indicated a pattern all too real for the Chinese to take lightly. For it was the Japanese control of Korea and Formosa, and their occupation of Indochina, which had permitted their invasions and bombardments of various parts of China.⁸⁰

Senator Taft criticized the Truman intervention in its totality. He insisted that Korea was not vital to the United States (as had been determined by American military authorities), while intervention could be a threat to the security of the Soviet bloc. And Taft appealed to the Soviet Union not to match Truman's Korean adventurism. In response to Acheson's criticism that his January 11th speech was adventurist, Taft said that Truman's Korean intervention was a more foolish adventure than his own proposal for an independent Formosa without Chiang, which he continued to deem wiser than Truman's involvement in Korea or Indochina:

It is fairly obvious that it is far easier to defend Formosa without becoming involved in war than it is to defend Korea or Indochina without becoming involved in war.⁸¹

In his attack on American involvement in the Indochinese war, the Korean war and in the affairs of Chiang, Taft raised basic constitutional questions about the power of the President to involve the American people in war without the prior and specific consent of Congress:

If the President can intervene in Korea without congressional approval, he can go to war in Malaya or Indonesia or Iran or South America.⁸²

Truman's intervention into the Korean conflict exposed the fundamental if often obscured divisions in recent American politics. The liberal opposition to the Truman Doctrine, such as embodied in the Nation and the New Republic, which had matched the traditional isolationists in the strength of its criticisms, had abandoned its rejection for the comfort of the 'vital center' and of the rhetoric of Truman's Fair Deal. Thus, in July, 1950 the New Republic and the Nation, despite occasional warnings about Korea's becoming a second Spain, welcomed Truman's intervention in Korea, as did such progressive businessmen as Henry Wallace and Harold Ickes, most especially because Truman's actions provided the UN with the army and force which the League had lacked. Even MacArthur was criticized for failure to keep the South Korean army modernized and to act without the delay of consultations. In addition, Senator Taft was attacked for his opposition to the Korean

80. Ibid., pp. 306, 558-64.

81. Vital Speeches, 16 (August 1, 1950), 613-17.

82. Taft. op. cit., pp. 32-33.

intervention, and the Chicago Tribune and the Daily Worker were singled out for their unity in defeatism.⁸³

The senatorial campaign of 1950 is well-known for the violence of the onslaught against Taft, and his emphasis on opposition to Truman's war in Korea was the basis for predicting his defeat. Taft's defense of the UN Charter against its abuse for such American policy objectives as the Korean intervention, his refusal to consider the Soviet Union an enemy of the American people, and his insistence that Truman's policies were increasing tension and threatening war by endangering the security of the Soviet Union, were used by the Truman Administration to question Taft's political value within the American bipartisan consensus and to imply his softness toward Soviet policy. The New Republic, in its September 4, 1950 analysis of the foreign policy votes of Congressmen, revealed that the Democrats were much more strongly anti-Communist (87%) than the Republicans, whose total was brought down to 62% by their isolationist members. Even this was deceiving, it was noted, since some Republicans exposed their lack of anti-communist commitment by voting for the final bill, like Senator Taft who had a 53% record, while undermining the measures by amendments; a more clear-cut indication of the isolationists failing the anti-Communist test was the 23% mark of the Republican Senate leader, Kenneth Wherry. Such charges, similar to those made against LaFollette for opposing America's invasion of Siberia, or against Borah and Taft for opposition to America's aid to Britain against the Soviet-German alliance, contributed to the unfortunate developments in American politics during the final years of Truman's Administration which resulted from Truman's adventure in Korea.⁸⁴

The monumental defeat administered by the Chinese to Truman's policy of Korean unification by means of MacArthur's and Rhee's forces, led to a Great Debate on the entire American foreign policy in Asia. For just as Truman's intervention in Korea had sanctified the previously dubious French campaign in Indochina, so the debacle of his attempt to occupy North Korea provided the vast amount of new American equipment, useless to the Russian-equipped Chinese, that permitted General Vo Nguyen Giap's Vietnamese forces to launch the final phase of the campaign against the French in 1951. Giap could do so in the confidence that ever-increasing American military assistance in Indochina would supply a never-ending source of ammunition, captured from the French forces, for the weapons captured by the Chinese in Korea.⁸⁵ The Truman Administration refused to make peace in Korea on the basis of the 38th parallel and condemned America to years of heavy casualties in challenging China's national security because negotiations might limit American military positions against China in Japan, Formosa and Indochina. In opposition, Senator Taft, Joseph P. Kennedy and Herbert Hoover insisted that Truman accept the reality, which the defeat of the attempt to unify Korea had exposed, that American military challenges to China in Korea and Indochina were doomed to defeat.

83. New Republic and Nation, July, 1950 numbers, *passim*.

84. New Republic (September 4, 1950), p. 9; (October 23, 1950), pp. 10-12.

85. Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1964), pp. 17, 33-36, 55.

Along with the Administration and such internationalist Republicans as Governor Dewey and John Foster Dulles, the Nation and New Republic intimated that the proposal of Hoover and Taft for negotiations and recognition of the security areas of Russia and China were suspiciously close to the Soviet offer to save America from the horrible casualties entailed in continuing the war in Korea. The Nation charged:

The line they are laying down for their country should set the bells ringing in the Kremlin as nothing has since the triumph of Stalingrad. Actually the line taken by Pravda is that the former President did not carry isolationism far enough.⁸⁶

The New Republic had thus summarized the isolationist position following its demonstration of popular support in the Congressional elections:

The Korean War was the creation not of Stalin, but of Truman just as Roosevelt, not Hitler, caused the Second World War.⁸⁷ It now continued the theme by describing the desire of Taft and Hoover to accept Soviet offers of negotiation as an opposition who saw nothing alarming in Hitler's conquest of Europe would clearly grab at the bait. Stalin, after raising the ante, as he did with Hitler, and sweeping over Asia, would move on until the Stalinist caucus in the Tribune tower would bring out in triumph the first Communist edition of the Chicago Tribune.⁸⁸

Whatever were the similarities of judgment of the international realities shown by Moscow and by Senator Taft and his "Stalinist caucus in the Tribune tower", it was not incorrect for the New Republic to emphasize Taft's "benign image of the Politburo."⁸⁹

At the opening of the newly elected Congress, the isolationists, led by Senators Wherry and Taft, launched a strong attack on Truman's interventionist policies by introducing a resolution forbidding the President's sending of troops abroad without Congressional approval. They attacked Truman's refusal to accept a cease-fire or to end the war in Korea and asked where the troops for a bloody stalemate in Korea would come from, as the United States had insufficient troops for a land war on the Asian mainland. Taft also attacked Truman's assertion of the right to use atomic weapons or to send American troops outside the country without direct approval of Congress. The isolationists "condemned US participation in Korea as unconstitutional and provided that the only funds available for overseas troops shipment should be funds necessary to facilitate the extrication of US forces now in Korea."⁹⁰ In short, the isolationists supplied an answer to the supposedly insoluble riddle of what to do once the President had insinuated American forces into a conflict in the area of Chinese or Russian national security: to have the simple courage to vote no further military funds except the boat fare home from the Asian mainland.

In conjunction with his criticism of Truman's intervention in Korea as a violation of the American Constitution, Taft protested

86. Nation (December 30, 1950), p. 688.

87. New Republic (November 20, 1950), p. 7.

88. Ibid. (January 1, 1951), p. 5.

89. Ibid. (January 15, 1951), p. 7.

90. Ibid. (January 15, 1951), p. 7.

that in so using the UN for purposes of American imperialism the Charter of the United Nations had been violated as well. For Taft, the essential role of the UN was to provide the means of mediation and conciliation between nations, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. But the American misuse of the UN had defeated this primary objective and was also illegal. Taft declared:

On June 28, 1950, I questioned the legality of the United Nations' action, because Article 27 of the charter clearly provides that decisions of the Security Council on all matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.... There was no concurring vote by Russia, but we overrode this objection.... We have tried to by-pass the limitation on the power of the Security Council by asking for action by the General Assembly when a veto has been exercised in the Council. Under the charter this body has never been intended to have any power to call on government for action or do more than recommend.... Those who are blaming the United Nations should much more blame the limitations of the charter and our own Government for forcing United Nations' action beyond its permanent power to perform.⁹¹

On the persistent and curious commitment of Taft and the isolationists to legality, whether in supporting the inviolability of the Supreme Court, protesting concentration camps for American citizens or ex post facto war trials, or opposing the violations of the American Constitution and UN Charter by intervention in Korea, the New Republic noted perceptively that:

there has historically been a working affinity between isolationists and legalists -- the former attacked Roosevelt's 1941 destroyer deal as warmongering, the latter as dictatorship. There are signs that this coalition is again tightening.⁹²

In his study of Dean Acheson's foreign policy through 1954, McGeorge Bundy noted that Taft had become the major antagonist of Acheson in a Great Debate: a re-examination of American foreign policy after the failure of the intervention in Asia. Taft's election victory in 1950 after a campaign of strong opposition to American interventionism, had indicated popular support for limiting the executive's tendency to insinuate the United States into conflict and then forcing Congressional approval of a fait accompli. Bundy disagreed with Taft's insistence on limiting foreign crises by eliminating areas of friction, and on refusing to engage in a grand global policy of struggle with Communism. Taft's preference for negotiations rather than wastage of American blood in military interventions, appeared to Bundy as a failure to assert America's global leadership against Communism and as a defective attitude of doubt, mistrust and fear toward America's national purpose in the world.⁹³ Taft had summarized his attitude toward diplomacy and foreign policy based on military strength as follows:

Nor do I believe we can justify war by our natural desire to bring freedom to others throughout the world.... There are a good many Americans who talk about an American century in which America will dominate the world.... If we confine our activities to the field of moral leadership we shall be successful

91. Taft. op. cit., pp. 42-43.

92. New Republic (January 15, 1951), p. 7.

93. McGeorge Bundy, The Pattern of Responsibility (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), pp. 83-89.

if our philosophy is sound and appeals to the people of the world. The trouble with those who advocate this policy is that they really do not confine themselves to moral leadership. They are inspired with the same kind of New Deal planned-control ideas abroad as recent Administrations have desired to enforce at home. In their hearts they want to force on these foreign peoples through the use of American money and even, perhaps, American arms the policies which moral leadership is able to advance only through the sound strength of its principles and the force of its persuasion. I do not think this moral leadership ideal justifies our engaging in any preventive war, or going to the defense of one country against another.... I do not believe any policy which has behind it the threat of military force is justified as part of the basic foreign policy of the United States except to defend the liberty of our people.⁹⁴

In two articles in the Reporter, "Appeasement, Provocation, and Policy" (January 9, 1951) and "The Private World of Robert Taft" (December 11, 1951), McGeorge Bundy presented his concept of the future of American foreign relations, a concept of which Senator Taft appeared to be the major foe. Bundy felt that the total war of World War II had failed in its objective of achieving peace but had led rather to a period of Cold War, and he agreed with Taft's criticism of America's World War II policies. Taft was necessarily less isolationist than in 1940 because America had become so deeply involved in world affairs by the interventions of the American government that Taft had to seek positive policies of disengagement. But he remained an isolationist nevertheless, and Bundy declared: "I for one have disagreed with him almost constantly on foreign policy."⁹⁵ Taft tended to deny Bundy's major premise that:

The major fact about our world is that it is in the throes of a great struggle for power between the Kremlin and the field.⁹⁶ Taft considered any struggle with the Soviets to be ideological, not military; a struggle for the minds of men, rather than for the control of people and wealth. Since America was strong in wealth and military force and weak in ideas while the Soviets were stronger in ideas and weaker in arms and resources, Taft wanted to reduce American troops and military expenses. For these only weakened America's long-term wealth and military position while at the same time undercutting whatever strength America had had in ideas. Taft's constant theme was warning of the grave danger that America would over-extend itself by too much political commitment and too much military intervention, and thereby destroy American liberty in the resulting militarization. Thus, Taft favored the reduction of the army and navy to eliminate temptation for intervention, and a concentration upon an Air Force which would be defensive if American ground forces were not spread about the world to create tension. Taft's basic aim was to remove power and the threat of military intervention from international relations and to emphasize ordinary defense, normal diplomacy and American respect for the rules of international law. According to Bundy:

They (Taft and the isolationists) do not arm to deal with power,

94. Taft. op. cit., pp. 17-18.

95. McGeorge Bundy, "The Private World of Robert Taft," The Reporter (December 11, 1951), p. 37.

96. Ibid., p. 38.

or even to use power (for Senator Taft is strongly opposed to the notion of preventive war); they arm rather to create a situation in which power is irrelevant and in which the American people can securely proceed to the better realization of the American dream. This is, I think, the basic pattern of thought from which Senator Taft advances to the tough problems of the present world.⁹⁷

For Bundy, however, the statesman's activity for peace must be discarded during the Cold War and replaced by the unique policy-maker who controls diplomacy and military power and applies them in the permanent struggle against Communism in limited wars and limited periods of peace. For him there was no such thing as too much force or too much domination by military factors; but his insistence upon permanent American intervention into the internal affairs of other countries naturally made him fear the American tendency to apply air power to minimize the loss of American life, a loss acceptable to the new policy-maker if not to the American public. While not opposing concessions, negotiations and withdrawals in principle, and accepting them if necessary to end over-commitment and being bogged down in the wrong parts of the world, Bundy considered it appeasement to think that such agreements constituted peace. Thus, while China's recognition by the United States and the United Nations was indeed a proper basis for peace, Bundy considered such actions "appeasement" if applied to the practical problem of ending the war in Korea. He considered Taft in error for his opposition to the encirclement of the Soviet Union by military alliances, his criticism of the hasty involvement of the United States and the United Nations in Korea, and his willingness to compromise in negotiations with the Chinese Communists to extricate America from the Korean debacle.⁹⁸

Bundy differed with Taft also on the role of public opinion and public debate in foreign policy. Bundy's concept of the man of policy manipulating diplomatic and military elements in a long-term series of periods of limited peace and limited war was basically an elitist approach which excluded a positive role for public opinion, and thus, for public debate. For the public was not committed to the rigid national purposes established by the policy-maker; it only reacted to the realities of given situations. Bundy insisted that there should be no recriminations or examinations of the decisions of the policy-makers, so that the public may accept their actions without question. It was in opposition to the government's desire to prevent open debate on an interventionist policy that threatened world war, that Senator Taft launched the Great Debate against which Bundy complained. Taft noted the policy-maker's tendency to insinuate the United States into other countries' affairs, followed by a conflict in which the President would demand unquestioning support:

After that, if anyone dared to suggest criticism or even a thorough debate, he was at once branded as an isolationist and a saboteur of unity and the bipartisan foreign policy.⁹⁹

97. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

98. McGeorge Bundy, "‘Appeasement,’ ‘Provocation,’ and Policy," *The Reporter* (January 9, 1951), pp. 14-16.

99. *Congressional Record*, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, p. 55.

Taft insisted that decision-making should be limited to elected officials, the President and the Congress, because they alone were responsible to the American people, and thus responsive to public opinion enlightened by public debate. Taft's strongly felt commitment to democracy and his belief in the soundness of the well-informed judgment of the American people led him to a basic distrust of policy based on military power or decision-making by military advisers and specialists in the Executive branch. Taft vigorously opposed their insinuation of the United States into commitments and interventions that present the President and Congress with a crisis in which they feel forced to support a military solution. Hence, Bundy was led to call Taft a "Reluctant Dragon" who would not be a President who would wage the permanent Anti-Communist Crusade.¹⁰⁰

On the eve of the 1952 Presidential elections, Bundy welcomed the nomination of Eisenhower over Taft because Eisenhower's career indicated a strong commitment, lacking in Taft, to oppose the Soviet Union.¹⁰¹ Eisenhower was also preferred for being dedicated to the principle that the United States must never undertake military action alone, without the cooperation and approval of its major allies. Taft's reasonable Asian policy, which ruled out hostilities with Communist China, had insured the lack of support for Taft's nomination by the China Lobby, especially in the south-western group including Senators Nixon and Knowland of California and Senatorial candidates Goldwater of Arizona and Hurley of New Mexico, all of whom voted against Taft's candidacy. In the elections, the American people rejected the party that had intervened in Korea, and elected Eisenhower on the basis of his promise--soon to be fulfilled--to end the war in Korea.

In the final statement of foreign policy made before his death, Taft presented, on May 26, 1953, the same criticism which he had directed at Truman, this time aimed at the policies being launched by Secretary of State Dulles: Extending the system of military alliances and aid around the world, especially in Southeast Asia. Not only were these activities "the complete antithesis of the UN Charter itself", and a threat to Russian and Chinese security, but they would be valueless for the defense of the United States.

Taft's last speech was particularly concerned with Dulles' South-east Asia policy because the United States was increasing to seventy per cent of the costs its support of the French puppet regime against the forces of Ho Chi-minh. Taft feared that Dulles' policy would lead, upon the eventual defeat of French imperialism, to its replacement in Vietnam by American imperialism and--the worst of all possibilities to Taft--the sending of American forces to Vietnam to fight the guerrillas.

I have never felt that we should send American soldiers to the Continent of Asia, which, of course, included China proper and Indo-China, simply because we are so outnumbered in fighting a land war on the Continent of Asia that it would bring about complete exhaustion even if we were able to win.... So today, as since 1947 in Europe and 1950 in Asia, we are really trying

100. Bundy, "Taft", op. cit., pp. 38-39.

101. McGeorge Bundy, "November 1952: Imperatives of Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs (October, 1952), pp. 2-4.

to arm the world against Communist Russia, or at least furnish all the assistance which can be of use to them in opposing Communism. Is this policy of uniting the free world against Communism in time of peace going to be a practical long-term policy? I have always been a skeptic on the subject of the military practicability of NATO.... I have always felt that we should not attempt to fight Russia on the ground on the Continent of Europe any more than we should attempt to fight China on the Continent of Asia.¹⁰²

In the months immediately following Taft's death, American support of the armies of France and its puppet government in Vietnam was increased heavily by Dulles with the backing of the China Lobbyists, such as Rep. Judd. While, early in 1954, two hundred U. S. Air Force technicians were sent to Vietnam as the conflict moved to its climax in defeat of France and its puppet government at Dien Bien Phu, Bernard Fall notes:

The President, at his press conference of February 10, declared that he "could conceive of no greater tragedy than for the United States to become involved in an all-out war in Indochina."... While the President had once more assured the country that American military intervention was unlikely, the Pentagon was feverishly working out the military implications of such an intervention.... With two American carriers, the Essex and the Boxer, already operating in the Gulf of Tongking, and with American aircraft stationed in Okinawa and Clark Field in the Philippines, a Guernica-type raid had the added advantage of being feasible on a few days' notice. It was also likely to be of doubtful military value. General Matthew B. Ridgway, then Army chief of staff, had sent his own team of experts to Vietnam, and their report had been negative; American intervention, to be of any value at all, would have to involve ground forces, and such an operation could very well unleash the Chinese Reds, just as it had done in Korea. Ridgway thus took the forthright position that the price of a Western victory in Indochina would be "as great, or greater than, that we paid in Korea."¹⁰³

In the face of the demands of Dulles and Nixon for American bombing of Ho Chi-minh's forces, Eisenhower, with the advice of the Taft supporters in the cabinet, insisted that there would be no direct use of American soldiers, naval forces or bombers without the prior approval of Congress, as Taft had consistently demanded. Moreover, America would intervene only with the approval and cooperation of its major allies, England and France, and of important Asian nations, exactly the way that Bundy had expected the American President to act. Neither England nor France, much less an important Asian nation, would approve or cooperate in the proposal to send American bombers or American troops against the Communist guerrillas in Vietnam. The consultation with Congress resulted in a Great Debate on Vietnam in the Senate, and, as Senator Taft had expected, this debate effectively paralyzed any attempt by the President's advisers to launch the United States into

102. Vital Speeches, 19 (June 15, 1953), 530-31.

103. Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 226-27, 243.

the civil war in Vietnam. Detailed examinations of the history of the conflict were presented by Senators Mike Mansfield and John F. Kennedy, the latter noting that the cause of the conflict was the unreasonable demands placed by the French in 1946 upon the independent national government of Vietnam, established by President Ho Chi-minh when the Japanese occupation had ended. These demands had led to French bombardment of Hanoi and to Ho Chi-minh's return to guerrilla warfare. Bernard Fall has described the general Congressional reaction:

And while Dirksen, along with Vice-President Nixon, and Senators Knowland and Jenner, did not, in his words, "share the anxiety and concern some feel about the danger of sending American troops to Indochina, other than technicians," Senator Alexander Wiley probably summed up the feelings of the majority of his Republican colleagues when he said: "Mr. Speaker, if war comes under this Administration, it could well be the end of the Republican Party." Non-interventionist feelings ran equally high among the often-burned Democrats. Senator Lyndon B. Johnson summed up the view of most of his party by saying that he was "against sending American GI's into the mud and muck of Indochina on a blood-letting spree to perpetuate colonialism and white man's exploitation in Asia."¹⁰⁴

Thus in death Senator Taft's influence on American foreign policy was greater than it had been in life. When faced with what may have been the crucial question of the decade--another American intervention on the mainland of Asia--President Eisenhower, influenced by the short but deep association he had developed with Senator Taft and by the Taft supporters in the cabinet whom the President respected, followed the Taft proposals of keeping military specialists from decision-making and withholding action until Congress had debated and given prior approval. As Taft realized, prior consultation of Congress for any commitment or intervention tended to prevent American involvement in conflicts short of direct attack on the United States and led to statesmanlike negotiations, which Taft admired. In this case negotiations led to the Geneva Agreement of 1954 by which foreign influences, other than that of France, were forbidden in Indochina; furthermore, general elections were to be held in two years, thus ending the Agreement's temporary division of Vietnam to allow the French army to evacuate its forces. Thus, Taft, head of the isolationist critics of America's post-World War II policy of interventions threatening the security of Soviet Russia and the Chinese Republic, might be singled out, as William notes that Borah, the leader of the isolationists and "almost doctrinaire laissez-faire liberals" who had criticized the post-World War I interventions against the revolutionary movements in Russia and China had been singled out, as "the man who might turn out to be right."¹⁰⁵

Thus, many on the American left failed to oppose, alongside isolationists like Senator Taft, America's post-World War II interventions and military adventures, in contrast to the unity alongside Senator Borah after World War I. Whatever the historical reasons for this failure, the unity of American liberals--individualists and socialists alike--is logically required for the

104. Ibid., pp. 227-28.

105. Williams, American Diplomacy, p. 122.

present and for the future, as Lens' fundamental intellectual breakthrough has demonstrated. In his conclusion to The Futile Crusade, Lens provides a standard for such unity:

The most important step we Americans can take to implement a positive strategy is to complete our own revolution begun in 1775. . . . Needless to say, nothing will change in America or in American policy unless there is a severe shift in the power structure, away from the military-industrial complex. Many communists and other leftists argue that this is impossible under the capitalist system, that indeed capitalism must be overthrown before any progress can be made. This is the subject for another book, but we are not convinced that the argument is valid. . . . The process is dual; insofar as a new insurgent impulse in America draws us to co-existence, to joining the world revolution, to completing our own revolution at home, so will the power relationship alter; and insofar as the power relationship changes, momentum will be available for more fulsome co-existence, for joining the world revolution and completing our own.

The United States, sidetracked and repressed by a negative Anti-Communism, is rapidly approaching the most critical moment in its history. It is being called on to respond to the most dire challenge it has ever faced. It can follow the principles of the past, toward futility and eclipse, or it can chart a new, positive course that will renew its vigor. If it chooses business-as-usual, the status quo, militarism, and all the other regressive features of Anti-Communism, there is little hope either for itself or for Western civilization. On the other hand, if it correctly analyzes the national, social, technological, and scientific revolutions now underway, and seeks the path based on this analysis, all of mankind will applaud.¹⁰⁶

106. Lens, op. cit., pp. 235-36.