THE GROTIUS SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS.

Texts for Students of International Relations.

No. 1.

ERASMUS'

"Institutio Principis Christiani."

CHAPTERS III—XI.

TRANSLATED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

PERCY ELLWOOD CORBETT, M.C.

Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford.

Price **2/6** net.

SWEET AND MAXWELL, LIMITED,

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

Erasmus was born at Rotterdam in 1467, son of Roger Gerard and a certain Margaret, daughter of a physician at Sieben Bergen.

At the age of nine he entered the school at Deventer, where he made the acquaintance of Adrian, destined to become successively tutor to Charles V., Cardinal-Regent of Spain, and Supreme Pontiff. At Deventer he gave some promise of future brilliance, showing a strong leaning to the classics and composing Latin verses.

In 1478 his father and mother died, leaving him and his elder brother under guardians. The latter, according to a letter written late in life to Grunnius, Papal Secretary (*Ep.* App. CDXLII.), either fraudulently made away with or negligently lost all the family property, and the brothers were prevailed upon by their relations to enter monasteries. Erasmus became an Augustinian Canon of St. Gregory's at Steyn. He was much too delicate for the alternate fasting and heavy feeding of the monks, and was most unhappy in this situation. His main consolation was the library at his disposal. After being ordained priest in 1492, he became, through the Prior of his house, Secretary to the Bishop of Cambrai.

The Bishop provided him with an allowance and permitted him to go to Paris, where he entered the " domus pauperum " in the College of Montague. Here he began studying Greek and teaching it to the pupils whom he took in to supplement his resources. It was in this way that he won the friendship of Lord Mountjoy, and also became acquainted with the Lord of Vere, whose wife, Anna Bersala, was to become his patron.

In 1497 he accompanied Mountjoy to England, where he met Thomas More, Colet, Grocyn, and Linacre, and spent some time at Oxford as the guest of Richard Charnock, Prior of St. Mary's College. At Oxford he found a warm welcome for his wit and learning.

His return from England to Paris, in 1500, was followed by the publication of the "Adagia," which sold rapidly enough to be a considerable help to his finances. This work, a collection of wise sayings gathered everywhere in his reading, also contains his first mild attacks on ecclesiastics and ecclesiasticism. Nevertheless, it won him the patronage of Warham, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury. To about the same time is assigned the "Encheiridion Militis Christiani" (Manual of a Christian Knight), which he wrote at the request of Anna Bersala in an attempt, apparently fruitless, to reform her husband.

We find him in England again in 1501—2, and in 1504 he went to Italy as tutor to the sons of Baptista Boerio, physician to Henry VII. It was during this visit that he received the degree of D.D. at Bologna, and made friends in the College of Cardinals at Rome. All this time he had been working at Greek, translating plays, Lucian, Plutarch. He was also engaged in writing a Commentary on St. Jerome, with the object of restoring to theology its original simplicity. He made his third visit to England in 1505, and lectured for some months at Cambridge. After this he made a second journey to Rome, but, on the invitation of Henry VIII., returned to England in 1509. Warham, now Archbishop and Chancellor, gave him the living of Aldington, in Kent, which he resigned after six months, receiving a pension of £60 in its stead. For some time he lived with More in London, and at More's instigation wrote the "Enconium Moriæ" (Praise of Folly), much of which was devoted to ridicule of the existing ecclesiastic regime. Again lectured on Greek at Cambridge. Printed his "Jerome" and completed his work on the New Testament—restoration of the Greek text and translation into Latin, with voluminous notes frequently attacking the licence of the priesthood and the excessive formality of church services.

About 1514 he left England for the last time, going to Brussels, where he was received at the court of the Archduke Charles. The latter offered him a bishopric in Sicily, which Erasmus did not want, and granted him an additional pension. It was at this time that he wrote the "Institutio Principis Christiani," dedicated to Charles, and the "Querela Pacis," dedicated to Philip of Burgundy, the new Bishop of Utrecht. Made Louvain his

headquarters, helping to found a "Collegium Trilingue," but went frequently to Bâle, where his books were being reprinted. Took sides in the controversy between the advocates of the new learning and the scholastic theologians, and was particularly active in the defence of Reuchlin, which won him the hatred of the Louvain doctors.

Erasmus long refused to write against Luther, for he, too, thought much reform necessary in the Church. However, he wished the reform to be effected without violence or schism, and feared the effect of the new dogma which Luther went on to develop. It was only when urged by Pope Adrian VI., and at a time when he saw that Luther's work was leading rapidly to division in the Church, that he wrote "De Libero Arbitrio" as a reply to the Lutheran theology of the unfree will, predestination, insufficiency of works, and justification by faith.

Meanwhile he had moved away from the strife of Louvain to live with Froben at Bâle, and had there published the "Colloquies," pictures of men he had met, events of the time, and his own experiences. He also collaborated in the Froben editions of the "Fathers." Later, when Bâle turned completely Lutheran, Erasmus left it for Freyburg, where he lived in complete retirement, corresponding with scholars, cardinals, and princes. Several times high office in the Church was offered him, once by Pope Paul III., but ill-health and, perhaps, unwillingness to take a definite stand in a struggle where both parties claimed his sympathy, made him refuse. In 1535 he found himself too weak to endure the climate of Freyburg, and returned to Bâle, where he died in the following year.

INTRODUCTION.

Throughout the whole of Erasmus' life, 1467—1536, there never was a time when Europe was at peace. In Holland his boyhood witnessed continual struggles between Hoeks and Cabeljaus, intermittent war between the Duke of Gueldres and the Bishop of Utrecht, and the ravages of German bands retained by the oppressive ducal governors. Flanders, Brabant, and Liège were the scenes of repeated revolts against the sovereignty of successive dukes of Burgundy, put down for a time by ruthless massacres of the towns and breaking out afresh at every accession of strength to the Guilds. Further afield were the expeditions of Charles the Bold against France, Alsace and Lorraine, ending in his death at the siege of Nancy in 1477, and resumed by Maximilian after his marriage with Charles' heiress, Mary. In 1494, the year in which Erasmus, by becoming secretary to the Bishop of Cambrai, took his first step into the world, Charles VIII. embarked on his expedition against Naples, thus beginning an ever-shifting series of wars, intrigues and leagues, which was to absorb all the Courts with which the scholar of Rotterdam became familiar in his wandering life. In 1517, Luther nailed his ninety-five theses on the church door at Wittenburg, and the Christian world was thrown into a struggle which, violent as it became during the twenty years left to Erasmus, was destined to involve more bloodshed and destruction than his darkest warnings foreshadowed.

No wonder if, in such a period, men who were able to detach themselves, in the precarious quiet of monastery or university, from the perils of the moment, pondered deeply on the nature and causes of war. This was particularly inevitable in the case of Erasmus, who, through his acquaintance with many courts and princes, temporal and ecclesiastical, had the widest information possible in that day, and who, because he would never bind

himself to person or party, could think and speak with complete independence and detachment.

There was already a vast amount of literature on war. In theory, at least, the Church had always been opposed to conflict between the faithful. From the beginning of our era, churchmen had wrangled on the nature of war, some of them, like Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, and Lactantius, denying that it could ever be just, while others distinguished between just and unjust war. St. Augustine belongs to the latter school. He admitted all the evils of war, and preached moderation in the profession of arms, but maintained, nevertheless, that to fight in defence of the State and for the general good was no sin. To be just, a war must satisfy three conditions—it must be authorised by a prince (thus St. Augustine excludes private war from the "just" category), it must be undertaken in a good cause, and must be waged with right intention—*i.e.*, to do good or avoid evil.

Augustine's distinctions were repeated and developed by Canonists like St. Isidore of Seville (560—636), Raymond de Peñaforte (1175—1275), and Henry of Susa (— —1271). One of the more famous works dealing with the subject is "L'Arbre des Batailles," written by Henri Bonet, Prior of Selonnet, about the end of the fourteenth century. He was so strict in his limitation of just war that he went beyond most of his predecessors and contemporaries in denying the *ipso facto* justice of war against the infidel. Another work frequently quoted by the "Irenists" in England and on the Continent was the "Livre des faits et de Chevalerie," written by Christine de Pisan in the first half of the fifteenth century, a book which brings us close to the time of Erasmus.

The civilians also discussed the question of just and unjust war. Baldus and Jean de Legnano repeat and elaborate the definitions of the canonists, supporting them with reasons drawn from the Roman Codes and Institutes. The subject also finds a place in the important Spanish legal collection, the "Siete Partidas," compiled in the thirteenth century.

Of these and the numerous other disquisitions on war, the great majority maintained that it was not essentially incompatible

with justice. On the other hand, there were out-and-out pacifists, like Wicliffe and the Lollards generally, who condemned it as an unmitigated evil.

Erasmus several times refers to the controversy, though to him the distinction is a matter of entirely secondary interest. He is uncertain, though rather inclined to hold that no war is just, and leaves the question to dwell on the ever-present fact of the horrors of war. He will not concern himself with nice definitions, nor with the scholastic and mystical classifications of war. Even against the Turks he would not rashly take up arms, for he doubts whether Christ would approve of extending his Kingdom by such means. Too often he had seen the pretext of a Crusade used for the purpose of extorting contributions from the peoples (*a*). In Europe, as he saw it, war was almost invariably the result of pride, folly and selfish intrigue, and he made it his task to point out how, by proper instruction begun at the earliest age, the Sovereign and his Councillors might be led to abhor what was plainly the worst of all human calamities.

Laurens, in his "Etudes sur l'historie de l'humanité," vol. X., "Les Nationalités," p. 394, says:—"It is the feelings and ideas of antiquity, at the moment when antiquity is about to give place to a new era, that inspire the humanists of the sixteenth century; they speak indeed of Christian charity, but Seneca, rather than the Gospel, is their sacred book; the invectives of Juvenal against conquerors touch them more than St. John's words of love. It is an entirely literary movement, that is why it leaves out of account the demands of reality."

This may stand as a general characterisation of the leaders of the Renaissance, all of whom, says Laurens, were "partisans of peace." But it is impossible, though Erasmus obviously draws much of his thought from Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, Cicero and Seneca, not to except him from the generalisation. Not merely in "Institutio Principis," but in "Querela Pacis" (quoted again and again by the various peace societies), in the "Adages," and most of all in the "Letters," Erasmus speaks from the heart and on the basis of his own wide experience and knowledge of events, of the terrible sufferings and injustice involved in the wars into

(*a*) See "Institutio Principis Christiani," Opera Omnia IV., 610.

which heedless potentates plunged Europe. These are no mere elegant repetitions by a devotee of classical learning, they are cries of sad warning from one wholly alive to the perils of his time (*b*).

One may doubt, too, whether it was merely to carry on a "literary movement" that Colet braved the Court of Henry VIII. in England, preaching against the projected war with Louis XII. About the same time another voice for peace makes itself heard in England, that of Thomas More in the "Utopia." (See Chap. VIII.: "Warre or battel as a thing very beastelye, and yet to no kynde of beastes in so muche use as it is to man, they do detest and abhorre; and contrarye to the custome almost of all other natyons, they cownte nothing so much against glorie, as glory gotten in warre"—Ralph Robinson's translation, 1551). In what follows may be seen the reflection of the controversy as to *justæ causæ* . . . "they never to goo to battayle, but ether in the defence of their own cowntreye, or to dryve owte of theyr frendes lande the enemyes that be comen in, or by their powre to deliver from the yocke and bondage of tyrannye some people that be oppressed with tyranny."

Apart from such general discussions of war, there had been, before the time of Erasmus, various schemes for an organisation of States to secure peace.

In his "De Monarchia," Dante had advocated the centralisation of all the nations of the world in the Empire. The Emperor would be supreme arbiter in all disputes between States, and it would be his first task to achieve universal peace. (Dante, De Monarchia Lib. I. § xiii.).

Others would have made the Pope supreme overlord. Gerohus of Reigersperg, a German theologian of the twelfth century, who, says Ter Meulen (Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation in Seiner Entwicklung, 1300—1800), is erroneously called the first pacifist, held that no war should be undertaken without the consent of the Church. He was not against war in general, but the question of cause was to be settled by the Church, which,

(*b*) See, *e.g.*, letter to Antony of Bergen, 1514, No. 288 in Vol. I., P. S. Allen's edition of the letters; letter of 1521 from Anderlac, Froude, Life and Letters, p. 292; letter of March 18, 1528, Froude p. 348, to Herman, Archbishop of Cologne; "Querela Pacis," Opera Omnia IV., 636 (Leyden Edition, 1703).

when satisfied that one belligerent had a just claim, must encourage him with the sacrament and "sacerdotalibus tubis." Anyone offering armed resistance to a cause found just by the Church was to be punished by anathema and the refusal of Christian burial.

Pierre Dubois published in 1300 "Summaria brevis et compendiosa doctrina felicis expeditionis guerrarum ace litium regni Francorum," and in 1306 "De Recuperatione terre Sancte." In both he advocates the organisation of Christian States for the preservation of peace in Europe. He rejects any temporal supremacy of the Papacy, and in fact considers the whole idea of a universal monarchy absurd. His Federation of States would be governed by a Council of Prelates and Sovereign Princes, and all disputes between States would be settled by an International Court of Arbitration, composed of Judges elected by the Council. The Pope, though no sovereignty over the Princes is attributed to him, is to convoke and preside over the Council and to submit plans for general reform. But here, as in so many of the peace plans of this and later times, the ultimate purpose of organisation is not general peace, but an effective crusade against the infidels in possession of the Holy Land. (Ter Meulen, 101—107).

Another scheme for a League of States against the Turks brings us close to the age of Erasmus. George of Podebrad, King of Bohemia, and Antonius Marini of Grenoble, his adviser and ambassador, were its joint authors. The plan differs from its predecessors in having been actually proposed as the basis of a League between Germany, France, Venice, and Spain. Its alleged object was, as stated above, a crusade, though Podebrad's purpose was perhaps mainly to protect himself, by alliance with the other Powers, against the Pope. It provided for an Assembly (collegium) of Princes, and for a judicial body (consistorium) to settle disputes. No special place in the scheme was assigned either to Pope or Emperor. The omission of the former resulted in its rejection by two of the courts appealed to (Venice and Burgundy), and the only results of Marini's missions were friendly treaties with France and Hungary. One article in the draft submitted to Louis XI. is interesting as a forerunner of

Art. 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It provides that when only one of two conflicting parties belongs to the League, the confederated States shall try to settle the dispute by arbitration, and if this is unsuccessful, the whole League shall at the common expense take up the cause of the member attacked. Further, if both the conflicting States are outside the League, the latter shall intervene to restore peace by friendly means, or, if necessary, by arms.

With all his efforts to convince Popes and Princes of the iniquity of war, Erasmus devised no scheme for a Confederation of States. Like More's Utopians, he thought many alliances a danger rather than a safeguard for peace. In the "Institutio Principis Christiani," his doctrine is that war is incompatible with reason and morality. The book contains no specific antidote for war; it is rather an attempt to purify the whole system of government, to substitute the principles laid down by the ancient philosophers and the teachings of Christ for that political opportunism which found its most direct expression in an exactly contemporaneous work, Machiavelli's "Prince."

We find no suggestion, then, in Erasmus' writings, for a Council of Princes or for an International Court. The nearest approach he makes to plans such as those outlined above is in his repeated advocacy of arbitration (*c*). But the reference would be not to a previously constituted college of judges, but to popes, abbots, bishops, wise and upright men, summoned *ad hoc*. For such procedure there were ample precedents even in the Middle Ages. As early as 1176 we find a case of detailed provision for arbitration. The conflicting claimants were the Kings of Aragon and of Navarre, and the dispute was referred to Henry II. of England, with pledges for submission to the final verdict, and an arrangement by which the King of France was to be substituted for Henry in the event of the latter's death (*d*). Many other cases might be cited when the Sovereigns of the multitudinous kingdoms, principalities and duchies into which the Empire had broken up, called in the Pope, a foreign Prince, a Parlement, or

(*c*) Cf. "Querela Pacis," Opera Omnia IV., 636; "Letter to Antony of Bergen," 1514, No. 288, Vol. I., P. S. Allen's edition; "Institutio Principis," Opera Omnia IV., 609.

(*d*) See Nys, "Origines du Droit International," p. 52.

a University to settle questions of title. To quote perhaps the most famous instance, it was in 1493—that is, shortly before Erasmus became secretary to the Bishop of Cambrai—that Pope Alexander VI. made his famous award, adjudging new lands and ocean, to the east and west of a line drawn through the Atlantic, to Portugal and Spain respectively.

Erasmus could only attribute it to the folly, passions or ambitions of Princes that this method of establishing rights between States was not always adopted. Though the arbiters were the most corrupt and incompetent, he says in one passage (*e*), yet the result would be less harmful than recourse to arms, for "there can hardly be a peace, however unfair, that is not better than even the most just war." He repeatedly asks how it is that nations calling themselves Christian, united by the blood of Christ, can attack one another on the slightest infringement of a doubtful and negligible right, waging war with a cruelty that might horrify those very Turks whom they profess to despise as infidels and barbarians.

The fault lay not in the people. They knew well, from the poverty and sufferings to which it exposed them, all the vanity and iniquity of war. Those responsible were the rulers, their evil counsellors, and the bands of mercenaries, "dregs of humanity," whom they kept in their pay. And here Erasmus appeals to a political principle which was to be developed in various ways by Althusius and Bodin and Hobbes—princes originated in the choice of the people, government rested on the consent of the governed. How unreasonable, then, that those set up to guard the people's welfare should be the source of their greatest woes!

The ideal form of government, according to Erasmus, is absolute monarchy. But this is only best when the monarch is a man of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue. The State can scarcely hope for such a ruler—must generally, indeed, count itself fortunate in mediocrity. Therefore certain checks are necessary. Even in limited monarchy, however, the King is responsible for a great part of the government, and the best way to secure the common welfare is to train him from child-

(*e*) "Querela Pacis," Opera Omnia IV., 636.

hood, before he comes to the throne, in the real statecraft—truth, justice and wisdom.

Such is the purpose of the "Institutio Principis Christiani." It was dedicated to the Archduke Charles, afterwards the Emperor Charles V., when the latter, already ruler of the Netherlands, had just become King of Spain (1516). A letter of 1517 (to Fabricius Capito—Froude, p. 186) shows the author in high hopes that his dreams of peace are to be realised:—"I am now 51 years old, and may be expected to feel that I have lasted long enough. I am not enamoured of life, but it is worth while to continue a little longer with such a prospect of a golden age. We have a Leo X. for Pope; a French King content to make peace for the sake of religion when he had means to continue the war; a Maximilian for Emperor, old and eager for peace; Henry VIII. King of England, also on the side of peace; the Archduke Charles 'divinæ cujusdam indolis adolescens.'"

The peace was but a lull in the Italian wars, which were soon to break out again, intensified by the conflicts of the Reformation. Writing from Anderlac in 1521, Erasmus records the complete wreck of his hopes: "Oh, what a world! Christendom split in two and committed to a deadly struggle; two young Princes (*f*), each fierce and ardent, each bent on the destruction of the other. Immortal God! Where is the Pope? When anything is to be got for the Church he can command angels and devils, but he can do nothing to prevent his children from cutting each other's throats" (*g*).

Up to his death, in 1536, Erasmus continued counselling peace and moderation in letters addressed to Princes, Pope and Emperor. He has often been accused of indecision, even of cowardice, in his attitude to the Reformation. The question scarcely concerns us here, but it is not surprising that so ardent a lover of peace should have hesitated to identify himself with the violence of either party. Here, as elsewhere, his attitude was perhaps that of a man who exaggerated the effect of reason on human conduct, but it is difficult to dispute his thesis that,

(*f*) Charles V. and Francis I.
(*g*) Quoted from Froude's Life and Letters of Erasmus, p. 292.

of all differences, those relating to religious dogmas are least susceptible of settlement by arms.

The reasons which justify the great efforts for peace being made in the world to-day are broadly the same as those urged by Erasmus four centuries ago, and there is much in the "Institutio Principis," and in his other utterances on peace, that is neither trite nor of merely historical interest. Modern peace movements take the direction of international organisation, but there is still much to be said for the thesis, which formed the basis of Erasmus' work on the subject, that war can only be finally eliminated by the reform of "human nature."

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INSTITUTIO PRINCIPIS CHRISTIANI.

CHAP. III.—THE ARTS OF PEACE.

Although the old writers divided the whole system of State administration into the two arts of peace and war, the first and principal task is to instruct the Prince in matters pertaining to wise government in time of peace. During peace every possible effort should be made to render the arts of war forever unnecessary. In this connection I think the Prince should first be taught to know his kingdom, for which the three best means are geography, history, and frequent visits to country and cities. Let him endeavour then first of all to know the position of his districts and cities, their origin, character, institutions, customs, laws, annals and privileges. No one can heal the body before he knows it. No one can properly cultivate a field with which he is not familiar. In this respect even the Tyrant is most industrious; it is the intention and not the act which distinguishes the good Prince. The physician studies the body that he may more speedily heal it; the poisoner also studies it, but that he may more surely kill it. Then he should be taught to love the country over which he rules, feeling for it the same affection as a good husbandman feels for his ancestral farm, or a good paterfamilias for his household, and to make it his peculiar care to hand it over to his successor, whoever that may be, in a better condition than when he succeeded to it. If he is followed by his children, then he should be guided by a father's duty to his children, if not, by his duty to his country. Let him keep himself aflame with love for his subjects, reflecting that his kingdom is but a huge body of which he is the nobler member, and that they who have entrusted all their fortunes

and all their safety to the good faith of one man deserve consideration. Let him keep before his eyes Kings who considered the advantage of their citizens before their own lives, remembering that the Prince cannot do injury to the State without also injuring himself.

Furthermore he shall do his utmost to make himself loved by his subjects, so, nevertheless, that his authority shall be respected among them. Some there are who strive to win goodwill by incantation and magic rings, whereas no incantation is so efficacious as virtue itself, than which nothing can be more lovable, for not only is it in itself a real and immortal good, but it enlists for its possessor true and undying affection. For this the most appropriate philtre is the maxim that, as he should love who would be loved, so the Prince should bind the people to him, as God binds all to Himself, by His goodness to them.

They also are deceived who court the multitude with gifts, banquets, and vicious indulgence. What they win by such means is not affection, but a mere popular favour, which is neither true nor lasting. Meanwhile they encourage the people's cupidity, which, growing to immense proportions, as it often does, is satisfied with nothing, so that unless all their greed is glutted, there is revolt, and the people is corrupted, not won. Thus the Prince's position in relation to the people is like that of a husband who coaxes his wife's love by flattery, gifts and complaisance, not winning it by virtue and good deeds, as he ought. So at last he is not even loved, and instead of a virtuous and good-mannered spouse he has a disdainful and intractable shrew, who, far from that obedience she owes him, is discontented and rebellious. Thus, too, women who try to inflame men's love by drugs evoke madness rather than the sane passion they had hoped.

He who wishes his people to love him shall show that he deserves love; afterwards he shall consider how he may best win his way to their hearts. His first desire should be to make the best men think most highly of him, and to be lauded by those who have won the praise of all: these should be his intimates, these he should call to council and adorn with honours; these it is whom he should suffer to influence him most. In this way, everyone will soon conceive the highest esteem for the Prince,

and this is the beginning of all good will. Some princes, not so evil in themselves, have roused public hatred for the sole reason that they permitted too much to persons abhorred by the whole population, who judged the character of their ruler from the morals of his favourites. I should further wish that the Prince might be born and educated among the people which he is destined to rule, for friendship best germinates and flourishes when the origin of affection is nature itself. The multitude hates even good qualities when they are unfamiliar, whereas familiar vices are sometimes loved. When the Prince is born and brought up among his subjects, there is a double advantage, for he will be more affectionately inclined towards them, more disposed to regard them as his own people, and they in turn will look upon him with more favour and be more willing to recognise him as their Prince. It is for this reason that I do not like the accepted custom of allying the Prince by marriage with foreign, especially with remote, nations. Race and nationality, and the common spirit they engender, are great aids in winning affection. It is inevitable that part of this benefit will be lost if mixed marriages disturb the native and inherent tendency. But where nature has been the source of mutual affection, this should be strengthened by other means: when this is not the case, the greater effort should be made to court esteem by mutual benefits and by conduct worthy of respect. In marriages the wife begins by obeying her husband, while he sometimes makes concessions and indulges her humour, until, as each comes to know the other, love gradually grows up between them. Matters should be arranged in the same way when a Prince comes from a foreign land to take over the reins of government. Mithridates had learned the languages of all the peoples over whom he ruled, to the number of twenty-two, it is said. Alexander the Great, however barbarous the nations with which he had to deal, began by imitating their culture and customs, thus winning his way into their affections. Alcibiades, too, has been commended for the same thing. Nothing so alienates the affections of the multitude from the Prince as an inclination on his part to spend his time abroad, for they consider themselves neglected by the very person whose special care they wish to be. Moreover, when the taxes levied

are spent away from home, they are regarded as lost, and it seems not so much paying tribute to the Prince as offering booty to aliens. Finally, there is nothing more irksome or pernicious for the country, or more dangerous for the Prince, than distant peregrinations, especially if they are of long duration. It was this, as everyone thinks, that took Philip from us, and inflicted as much harm on his kingdom as the long war with the Guelders.

As the king of the bees is always in the midst of the swarm and never flies forth, like the heart in the centre of the body, so the Prince should always be seen among his people.

As Aristotle wrote in his "Politics," there are two things that more than any others overthrow empires: these are hatred and contempt. Affectionate esteem is the opposite of hatred, authority of contempt. The Prince must therefore study how the first are acquired and the second avoided. Hatred is incurred by cruelty, violence, insults, peevishness, captiousness, rapacity, and is more easily aroused than allayed. Therefore the good Prince must at all costs avoid falling out with his people. Believe me, to lose the favour of the people is to be deprived of a great safeguard. On the other hand, the multitude is captivated by those qualities which, to describe them in a general way, are most foreign to tyranny: clemency, courtesy, justice, civility, benignity, Benignity stimulates loyalty to duty, particularly if the Prince is seen to reward those who deserve well of the State. Clemency invites men conscious of their own defects to higher virtue, holding out hope of pardon to those who are trying to compensate by good deeds for the errors of their past life, and meanwhile provides the blameless with grounds for a pleasing contemplation of human nature. Civility everywhere arouses love, or at least softens hatred, and is indeed the quality in a great Prince which most appeals to the commonalty.

Contempt is incurred most speedily by devotion to sensual pleasures, lust, wine-bibbing, gluttony, gaming, by the encouragement of fools and clowns; in a word, by folly and indolence generally. Authority, on the other hand, is attained by the contrary qualities—wisdom, integrity, temperance, seriousness, and industry. These, therefore, are the attributes by which the Prince who desires to wield real authority among his people

commends himself. Some there are who foolishly imagine that they must inevitably win esteem by making a din and a great show of splendour and luxury. Who can credit the Prince with greatness simply because he decorates himself with gold and precious stones, when everyone knows that he has as many of these as he wants? Meanwhile, what else does he display but the misfortune of his subjects, who must provide the means for his extravagance? Finally, what is the effect of this sort of teaching but a hotbed of all vices? Let the Prince so live that in his life all his nobles and citizens may have an example of continence and frugality. Let him so act in his home as not to be discountenanced by any unexpected visitor. In public he should never be seen unoccupied with matters tending to the advantage of the State. His character is more clearly revealed by his speech than by his raiment. Anything that falls from the Prince's lips spreads abroad among the populace. Therefore he must see to it that what he says savours of virtue and reveals a mind worthy of a good Prince.

We should not disregard Aristotle's advice, that the Prince who desires to avoid odium and to inspire loyalty should delegate unpopular duties to others, and himself carry out tasks that will please. By this arrangement a great part of any inevitable unpopularity will fall upon his administrators, especially if they are otherwise out of favour with the people. On the other hand, gratitude for benefits will accrue to the Prince alone. Let me say this in addition: gratitude for a benefit will be double if it is conferred speedily, eagerly and spontaneously, and if it is further commended by friendly words. If, on the other hand, a request must be refused, it must be done gently and courteously. If punishment must be inflicted, the full penalty prescribed by law should be lessened, and the punishment so imposed that the Prince may appear driven to it against his will.

It is not enough that the Prince should keep himself pure and uncorrupted for the State. He must also endeavour to keep his whole household, his nobles, friends, ministers and magistrates, like himself: they are members of the Prince, and if their vices rouse hatred it will redound against him. But this is most difficult, one will say. It will be easier if he takes pains to

appoint the best people to his household: and if he makes it clear to them that the Prince is most pleased with conduct that tends most to the good of the people. Otherwise it frequently happens that, owing to the neglect or connivance of the Prince, the most vicious men tyrannise in his name over the people: and, while they ostensibly administer his affairs, do most harm to his reputation. Moreover, a bad Prince is less unbearable in the State than a Prince with vicious friends. We can somehow contrive to put up with one Tyrant. It may be comparatively easy for the people to satisfy the greed of one man; to sate one man's lust; to glut the ferocity of a single individual: but it is a grievous thing to content a multitude of Tyrants.

The Prince should, as far as possible, avoid all innovation. For though the change may be for the better, the innovation itself gives offence. The constitution of a State, the common custom of a city, laws once accepted, are never altered without disturbance. Anything, then, that can be endured should not be changed out and out, but either tolerated or turned to better use, as convenience permits. On the other hand, the intolerable should be corrected, but gradually and tactfully.

The goal which the Prince seeks to attain is of the utmost importance, for if he is wrong in his aims, he must inevitably wander far from the proper path. It must be his first principle not merely to guard the present prosperity of his State, but to hand it over more prosperous than when he assumed power. There are, however, three classes of good, to speak after the manner of the Peripatetics: first, that of mind; secondly, that of body; and, thirdly, external good; and he must beware inverting their order in such a way as to make external good the chief measure of his country's prosperity. For this should never be considered except in so far as it is consistent with the good of mind and body: therefore let him deem his subjects most blessed, not when they are richest, or in the best bodily health, but when they are most just and moderate, least covetous, arrogant and factious, and most at peace with one another. Let him beware, too, of false names applied to the fairest things, which, indeed, is the spring and source of most of the world's calamities. For it is no true felicity when the people abandons itself to ease and

luxury: nor true liberty when each may do what he will. On the other hand, it is no servitude to live in submission to upright laws. Yet the State cannot be called tranquil when the populace obeys the Prince's every nod, but rather when it obeys good laws and a Prince who governs himself in accordance with them. Nor do the same advantages, the same rights, the same honour for all, mean equality: nay, sometimes this entails the greatest inequality. The Prince about to take over the government should be advised that the best hope of the State lies in the proper education of its boys, as Xenophon wisely taught in his Education of Cyrus. Youth yields to any system of training. Therefore particular attention should be paid to public and private schools and to the instruction of girls. Children should be placed at the outset under the most estimable and uncorrupt teachers, in order that they may acquire knowledge of Christ and at the same time that enlightened learning which is to the best interest of the State. If this is done, there will be no need for many laws or penalties, for citizens will of their own accord do what is right.

Such is the effect of education, that a man, according to Plato, rightly instructed becomes almost a divine being, but, if wrongly educated, degenerates into the most savage beast. Now there is nothing so important for the Prince as that he should have the best possible subjects. They should then at once be made familiar with the best influences, for any music is sweet to the accustomed ear. And nothing is more difficult than to root out of man what from long use has become second nature. None of these things, however, will be too difficult if the Prince's own conduct is always irreproachable. It is tyranny and trickery to treat the common people as trainers deal with a savage beast; first observing how it is soothed or angered, then, as Plato says, enraging or soothing it as they desire. This is but taking evil advantage of the mob's impulses, not attempting its betterment. But when the people are intractable and rebel against their own good, then you must wait your time and win them gradually to your purpose by art or well-intended ruse,—as wine, which is at first easily controlled, softly glides throughout the veins, and ends by bringing the whole man under its dominion.

If the tumult of affairs or public opinion diverts the Prince from his plan and compels him to serve the time, he must never give up while he has strength for a new effort, ever trying to effect by other methods what has not at first succeeded.

CHAP. IV.—ON TRIBUTES AND TAXES.

Turning over the old histories, we find that many seditions have risen from immoderate taxation. Therefore the good Prince will vex the people as little as possible with such measures. Let him rule, if he can, with no expense to the State. The office of Prince is too sublime to be made a mercenary one. And if they love him, the Prince himself has whatever his subjects possess. There were Pagans who won successes for their States, yet brought nothing but glory home to their palaces. Two, indeed, despised even that —Fabius Maximus and Antoninus Pius. How much more should the Christian Prince be content with the knowledge of doing right, especially as he serves One who most amply rewards every good deed! There are some whose every effort in the service of Princes is to find ever new pretexts for extortion, and who, so doing, think they are furthering the Sovereign's interests, as though Princes were their subjects' enemies. To listen freely to such men is to be guilty of conduct most incompatible with the royal title.

The Prince's task should be to reduce to a minimum his demands on the people, and it is to this that he should devote his thought. The best way of increasing revenue is to put a stop to needless expenditure, to abolish idle ministries, to avoid wars and the travels which are most like them in their effects, to restrain the rapacity of officials, and to strive for the proper administration, rather than the extension, of the kingdom. Otherwise, if the Prince measures his levies by his avarice or ambition, what end or limit will there be to his exactions? For cupidity is infinite, and it forever presses and extends what it has begun, until, as the old proverb has it, the taut rope snaps, and the people, its patience exhausted, breaks out into that sedition which has overthrown some of the most flourishing kingdoms. But when necessity urges a levy, then it is for a good Prince to effect it in such a way as to inflict the least possible suffering on the poor.

For it may be good to summon the rich to frugality, but to reduce the poor to famine and slavery is both inhuman and unsafe.

The good King, when he desires to increase his retinue, to secure a magnificent marriage for his grand-daughter or sister, to make all his children peers, to enrich his nobles, to show off his wealth to the nations by travelling, will pause long to reflect how inhuman it is that, to make these things possible, so many thousands of men with wives and children should run into debt, be driven to despair, even die of famine at home. I should not count among human beings those who extort from paupers what they lavish on prostitutes or gaming. Yet there are some who think even this their right.

He will also bear in mind that measures which have once been introduced by taking advantage of temporary circumstances, and which seem to profit Prince or nobles, can never be abolished; though when the necessity for the demand is past, not only should the burden be lifted from the people's shoulders, but the earlier expenditure should as far as possible be replaced. Therefore he who loves his people will guard against the introduction of a harmful precedent. As for one who rejoices in their ruin or is indifferent to it, he could not be less a Prince, whatever his title.

He should endeavour, meanwhile, to avoid excessive inequality of riches, not that I should wish anyone to be forcibly deprived of his goods, but steps should be taken to prevent the riches of all the people being concentrated in a few persons. Plato wants his citizens neither too rich nor very poor, for a pauper is no asset, and the rich man refuses to turn his ability to the public account.

At times, indeed, Princes are not even enriched by exactions. To realise the truth of this, think how much less our ancestors levied on their subjects, how much more beneficent they were, yet how much greater was their abundance. For a great deal of revenue melts away between the tax-gatherer and the Treasury, and only the smallest portion of it reaches the Prince.

A good Prince will tax least commodities used by the humblest of the people, such as corn, bread, beer, wine, clothing, which are indispensable for the support of life. These are the very things which are now most burdened, and that in several ways, first by

the heavy extortions of the tax-farmers, then by import duties, which have also their contractors, and lastly by the monopolies, which condemn the poor to pay in order that the Prince may realise a trifling gain.

Therefore, as I have said, the Prince's chest is best enriched by restricting expenditure, and the old proverb holds that "Parsimony is great tribute." But if some taxation is inevitable for the people's good, tax barbaric and foreign goods which are not wanted as necessities of life but as luxuries and dainties; and such as are used only by the wealthy, like fine linen, silks, purple, pepper, spices, ointment, gems and everything else of this nature. Thus, only those will be inconvenienced whose fortunes are able to bear it; they will not be reduced to indigence by the loss, but may be taught frugality, so that the loss of money may be balanced by the improvement of their mode of living.

In minting his coinage the Prince will keep the faith which he owes to God and the people, not permitting himself acts which in others he visits with the severest penalties. Here there are four ways of robbing the people, as we had sufficient occasion to see after the death of Charles, when a long anarchy, more deplorable than any tyranny, afflicted your realm. These are mixing the metal of the coinage with base material, lessening the weight of coins, clipping them, and raising or lowering their value as either operation is thought likely to profit the Treasury.

CHAP. V.—ON PRINCELY BENEFICENCE.

Since the proper glory of good Princes lies in good deeds and kindness, with what countenance can they claim the title whose every thought is to better themselves at the expense of the commonwealth? The Prince will therefore employ his ingenuity and astuteness in discovering how he can deserve well of all, which is not merely a question of giving. He will aid some by liberal gifts, encourage others with his favour, deliver others from oppression, and hearten others with sympathy, counting that day lost on which he has not done someone a service.

But the Prince must not be rash in his liberality. There are some who mercilessly extort money from worthy citizens to pour it out upon fools, informers and panders. Let the people see that the Prince is liberal rather to those who have given of their best in the public service. Let your rewards go to the virtuous, not to favourites. The benefits which the Prince confers should not be accompanied by loss or injury to anyone. For to rob one in order to enrich another, to tread on one in order to raise up another, so far from beneficence, is rather double evil, especially when it is the unworthy who gain what the worthy lose.

We may recall here that in the poets the gods never came without doing some great good to those by whom they were received. When, on the visit of a Prince, his subjects hide their more elegant furniture, shut up daughters who are fair, send away their young sons, conceal their wealth, and in every way reduce their establishments, does not this show what opinion they hold of the Prince, since they adopt the same measures as against an enemy or brigand, since on his coming they fear for themselves the very dangers which it would be his duty to guard them from in the event of conspiracy or revolt? From others they fear trickery, but from him they fear violence as well; one man has a beating to complain of, another a virgin daughter abducted, another a wife seduced, another the refusal of his wretched wages.

How far, forsooth, is such a visit from the poets' picture of the coming of the gods! Here the most flourishing cities have most reason to distrust their Prince; on his coming, the baser sort push themselves forward, whereas the best and wisest citizens take precautions and restrict themselves, showing clearly by their acts, though they say nothing, their estimate of the monarch. "But," the Prince may reply, "I cannot restrain all my servants; I am doing all that I can." Make your servants understand that you insist on moderation on their part. Your people will only believe that excesses are against your will if you do not suffer them to be committed with impunity.

For a Pagan ruler it was perhaps enough that he should be kind to his own and merely just to strangers, but a Christian Prince should regard no one as a stranger, except such as are alien to Christ's sacraments, and should not even inflict injury upon these. He will consider his own subjects first, of course, but do good to all whom he can serve.

Though it must be the Prince's unceasing study that all shall have justice, yet in Plato's opinion he should protect strangers even more carefully than his subjects. For visitors are far from their friends and relations, whence they were thought to have Jupiter (called *Xenius* for this reason) as their avenger.

CHAP. VI.—ON ENACTING OR AMENDING LAWS.

The best laws under the best Prince are what render a city or kingdom most prosperous, for the State is then most happy when the Prince is obeyed by all, when he himself obeys the laws, and when the laws themselves are based on the standard of justice and truth, and aim only at the benefit of the commonwealth.

A good and wise Prince is indeed a kind of living law. He will therefore endeavour to enact not many but the best possible laws, most calculated for the welfare of the State. For a well-ordered State under a good Prince and pure magistrates very few laws will suffice: under other conditions, no number will be enough. It is not the best treatment for a sick man to have an untrained physician prescribing drug on drug.

In the enactment of laws the first precaution is to see that they do not savour of gain to the Treasury, or of private profit to officers of State, but that they are blameless in motive and tend to the public welfare, a welfare judged not by vulgar opinion but by that standard of wise discernment which must be ever present in the King's councils: otherwise they will not even merit the name of law, for even the Pagans admit that the word implies justice, equality, and regard for the universal good. The mere decisions of a Prince are not *ipso facto* law; law is what has been approved by a good and prudent Prince who hates all that is not straightforward and for the good of the State. But if the standard to be observed in correcting irregularities is a distorted one, with laws so made, how can you escape perverting even what was good? Plato also would have laws as few as possible, especially on minor matters such as agreements, trade, taxes.

For the safety of the State is no more secured by a multitude of laws than by a multitude of medicines. When the Prince is a righteous man, and the magistrates perform their office, there is no need for many laws: when this is not so, the laws are abused and made the bane of the State, since even where wisely made they are turned to evil use by dishonest administrators.

Just censure has been passed on Dionysius of Syracuse, whose tyrannical plan it was to heap law on law, and then to permit the people to break them, and so render them all liable to his penalties. But that was not making laws, but laying traps.

Epitades, too, is deservedly condemned for passing a law permitting all to leave their property as they chose, in order that he might disinherit the son whom he hated. At first the people did not understand the ruse, but in the end the law was the cause of great damage to the State.

The Prince should make such laws as not merely decree penalties for the guilty but exert a persuasive influence against crime. Therefore they err who think that statutes should be briefly worded, to convey an order only and not to teach; their real object is to deter from crime by appealing to reason more than by punishment. It is true that Seneca does not accept Plato's view on this question, but this is boldness rather than discernment.

Moreover, young men should not be permitted to discuss the justice of a law, and older men but sparingly. Yet, though it is not for the commonalty rashly to criticise the laws of Princes, those passed should be such as will meet the approval of all good men, for even the humblest have understanding. M. Antoninus Pius has been commended for never adopting a measure which he did not try to recommend to everyone by letters setting out the reasons why he judged it expedient for the State.

Xenophon, in his Economics, has pertinently said that the other animals were taught to obey chiefly by two methods: by giving them food, if they were of the less intelligent sort, or petting them, if of nobler nature, like the horse, and by blows, if they were stubborn, like the ass. But as man is the noblest of all animals, he should be induced to obey the laws not so much by

threats and punishment, as by rewards. Let laws, then, not merely assign penalties for delinquencies, but also by the offer of reward tempt men to conduct themselves as good citizens. Such, we observe, were many of the enactments of the ancients. Anyone who had fought bravely in war hoped for reward, and if he fell his children were nurtured at the public expense. Anyone who saved the life of a citizen, drove an enemy from the walls, or served the State with prudent counsel, was rewarded for his good offices.

Although it is the duty of a good citizen, even when no reward is offered, to follow what is best, it is nevertheless expedient to hold out such inducement, in order to inspire those not yet confirmed in this direction with zeal for virtue. Men of noble mind are most attracted by honour; those of base desires, by gain. All these sanctions, then, will find their place in a law—honour and ignominy, gain and loss. Of course, any that are utterly servile or beastly in nature must be taught obedience by chains and lashes.

Teach your subjects from childhood this sense of honour and ignominy, bringing it home to them that rewards are to be won, not by wealth or high birth, but by right deeds. Above all, let not the Prince direct all his vigilance to punishing offences committed; let his arm be rather to guard against the commission of any offence deserving punishment. For as the man who prevents disease is a better physician than he who cures it with medicines after it has been contracted, so it is far more excellent to prevent crimes than to punish them. This will be accomplished if he can remove, or at least diminish, the causes from which he has observed most misdeeds to spring. First, then, as I have already said, it is from depraved opinions, as from poisoned wells, that the greatest part of villainy flows. Therefore it is most important that your subjects should be instructed in the best views of things, then that your magistrates should be not only wise but pure. Plato is right when he says that no effort should be left untried, no stone, as they say, unturned, before recourse is had to the supreme penalty. Strive to conquer the will to evil by teaching, then deter the would-be criminal with the fear of the Divinity who takes vengeance on malefactors, and with the threat of

penalties. If these measures are of no avail, punishment must be inflicted, but milder forms of it, such as remedy the evil without destroying the man. Finally, if this course fails, then, as a hopelessly incurable limb is cut off lest the sound parts be infected, so the recalcitrant must be visited with all the rigour of the law.

A skilled physician never operates or cauterises if he can drive out the infection with plaster or potion, and never employs even these unless compelled by the course of the disease; so the Prince will try every remedy before resorting to capital punishment, remembering that the State is a body, and that no one amputates a member if there be any other means of restoring it to health.

And as an honest doctor preparing his medicines has no thought but how the disease may be conquered with least danger to the invalid, so the good Prince, in enacting his laws, will make the public advantage his sole aim, striving to remedy with as little damage as possible abuses to which the people is subject.

A great number of crimes are due to the fact that everywhere a premium is put upon wealth, while poverty is despised. The Prince will therefore see to it that his subjects judge one another by the virtue of their lives rather than by their possessions. He and his household must provide the first example. For if the people see the Prince making show of his riches, and know that with him the richest man wins most favour, and that money opens a clear path to magistracies, honours and offices, is there any wonder that they will be incited to the acquisition of wealth, be the means honest or dishonest?

And, to speak more generally, most of the rabble in every State owe their condition to idleness, which everyone seeks in different ways, while those who have once become accustomed to it will resort to any evil device rather than lose the means of supporting it. The Prince, therefore, will strive to have as few idlers as possible about him, either forcing his followers to work or banishing them from the kingdom.

Plato would drive all beggars out of his State. But any that are broken with age or disease and have no relatives to support them should be cared for in public institutions for the aged and

infirm. No one who is in good health and content with little has any reason to beg.

The Massilians refused to admit into their city priests who bartered their so-called relics from town to town, winning ease and luxury under the cloak of religion. It would perhaps be well for the State to limit the number of monasteries. For here also is a sort of idleness, especially in the case of monks who, leading by no means blameless lives, pass their days in slothful inactivity. What I have said about monasteries applies also to colleges.

To this class also belong contractors, hucksters, usurers, brokers, procurers, caretakers, gamekeepers, and the whole flock of servants and attendants that some maintain merely to advance their ambitions. These, when they have not enough of all things to satisfy the clamourings of extravagance, companion of sloth, resort to evil practices. In military service also there is a busy sort of idleness, which is much the most pestilential of all, being at once the destruction of all good things and the source of the vilest perversions. If the Prince excludes such seed-beds of crime from his dominions, there will be much less for the laws to punish. I would therefore point out in passing that honour should be attributed to useful employments, and slothful ease not endowed with the title of nobility. Not that I would deprive the high-born of their honours, provided they are made in the image of their fathers and excel in the virtues which first won their nobility. But if, like so many we see to-day, they give themselves up to lazy inactivity and to effeminate pleasures, unskilled in any useful vocation, pleasant gluttons, strenuous gamesters, to go no further into their obscenities, why, I beseech you, should this sort of man be set above the shoemaker or the farmer? For in the old times the patricians were granted leisure from the meaner trades not that they might play the fool, but to learn the science of government.

Let it, then, be no slur for wealthy citizens or patricians to teach their children a sedentary occupation. Engaged in study of the sort, young men will be restrained from many a vice; even if there is no need for them to practise their trade, it burdens no one. But if (such is the instability of human affairs) they should

come to want, then, as the proverb has it, skill will find sustenance in any soil or station.

The ancients well knew that most evils sprang from extravagance, and passed sumptuary laws against it, appointing censors to restrain immoderate expenditure on banqueting, raiment, or building. If it be thought a hardship that any man should be restrained from using or abusing his own possessions at pleasure, reflect that it is far worse to let extravagance so undermine morality as to make capital punishment necessary, and that it is more humane to compel frugality than to wink at vices which end in ruin.

There is nothing more pernicious than a system which makes offences a source of profit to the magistrates. For who will do his utmost to prevent crime when, the more criminals there are, the more money he puts into his pocket? It is a fair dispensation, and one frequently adopted in former times, that fine-money should go in part to the person injured, in part to the public chest, and, in the more odious crimes, partly to the informer. Odiousness, however, is not to be measured by any private prejudice, but in proportion to the damage to the State. The first object of law is that no man, poor or rich, noble or plebeian, slave or free, magistrate or private person, should suffer injustice. But it should lean rather to the side of protection for the weak, because it is the lot of the humble to be more exposed to wrongs. Therefore let what is wanting in the protections of fortune be compensated for by the humanity of your laws. Let the penalty for an outrage on a poor man be greater than that for an offence against the rich, for corruption in a magistrate greater than that for perfidy in a plebeian, for the misdeeds of a patrician greater than that for the sins of a commoner.

There are, according to Plato, two sorts of punishment. In the first the penalty must not be out of proportion to the offence (and this is another reason why the supreme punishment should not lightly be inflicted); nor should the gravity of the act be estimated on the basis of our cupidity, but by just and pure standards. Why is simple theft everywhere punished with death, whereas adultery goes almost scot free, and that in contravention of all ancient law, unless it be that everyone puts too high a value on money,

estimating the loss of it rather by his emotions than by its real effects? But this is not the place to account for the fact that the adulterer is now treated so leniently, whereas under the laws of former times he suffered the supreme penalty.

The second class, which he calls exemplary, should rarely be employed, and the method should be to deter others, not so much by the savage nature of the penalty, as by its novelty. For there is nothing so terrible that familiarity will not breed contempt of it, and nothing could be more disastrous than to make the people familiar with punishment.

As new remedies for diseases are not to be tried if there are old ones to meet the case, so new laws should not be enacted if old ones already exist for remedying the evils of the State.

Useless laws, which it would be difficult to abrogate at once, should be allowed to fall into desuetude, or should be amended. For though it is a dangerous thing to alter the laws, yet, as it is necessary to fit the treatment to the condition of the body, so the laws must be brought into harmony with the present condition of the State. Institutions wisely established may now be wisely abolished.

Many laws good in their inception have been adapted by dishonest officials to the most unworthy purposes. Nothing is worse than a just law bent to serve corrupt designs. The Prince, therefore, should not be deterred by possible loss to the fiscus from abolishing or amending such laws. For that is no gain which is inseparable from a loss of honour, especially when the laws in question are of such a character that their abrogation will be greeted with applause. Nor let the Prince be deceived by the fact that laws of this sort have become an established institution in many places and have taken root in long-standing custom. For no measure is a just one merely because many men accept it; on the contrary, the more inveterate a wrong is, the more zealously it should be attacked. To quote one or two examples, it is the law in some places for a prefect to take over, in the name of the King, the possessions of a stranger dying within his jurisdiction: this rule was useful when it was established, for it prevented persons with no right from claiming the goods of a foreigner, and they remained in the hands of the prefect until

legal heirs appeared; but now this has been villainously abused, so that, whether or not an heir appears, the foreigner's property escheats to the fiscus.

That also was once a beneficial enactment which ordained that the Prince, or a magistrate on his behalf, should seize anything found in the possession of a thief, obviously to exclude an indiscriminate right of claiming it, which might result in its being fraudulently appropriated by some person other than the real owner. As soon as it was established to whom the property really belonged, it was restored. But there are some now who consider anything they find in possession of a thief as much their own as if it had come to them as part of their patrimony. They understand well enough that such a practice is insolently unjust, but knowledge of what is right is overcome by greed.

The same may be said regarding the rule established long ago of having prefects on the frontiers of kingdoms to superintend imports and exports, and to make it possible for the merchant or traveller to pass to and fro unmolested by brigands. So, if a robbery occurred within the limits of his territory, every Prince saw to it that the merchant should not have to bear the loss nor the robber go unpunished. It was perhaps as a mere courtesy that the merchants began giving small sums of money for this protection. But now for this sort of impost the traveller is everywhere held up, foreigners are harassed, traders robbed, and, though the tax grows every day, nothing is said about protection. The whole object of the usage as it was first introduced has been forgotten, and though it was a wholesome measure in the beginning, it has been transformed by vicious administration into absolute tyranny.

There was an old law that things cast up from a shipwreck should be taken over by the prefect of the sea, not that they might come into his or the Prince's ownership, but as a provision against their being seized by persons advancing unjust claims. They became public property only if no one appeared with good title. But nowadays in some places the Prince takes as his own everything lost at sea in any manner whatsoever, thus proving himself more implacable than the sea itself, for he comes like a second tempest to snatch away what the first has left to its

wretched victims. See, then, how everything has gone awry! The thief is punished for having taken what was another's; but the magistrate appointed for the very purpose of preventing it does the same thing, and the owner is twice robbed, the second time by one the whole object of whose position is to prevent loss to anyone. Traders, again, are most vexed and despoiled by officials set up for the purpose of protecting the traveller from molestation and brigandage. Property is held back from its owners by officials whom the law has set up to stop its appropriation by the unentitled. There are many institutions of this sort, existing in many nations, not less iniquitous than iniquity itself. It is not my purpose to censure any particular State; I have mentioned the above abuses, common to almost all nations and condemned by all, merely as instruction. Some of them, indeed, cannot be abolished without difficulty, but their abolition wins favour for the Prince, and, what should never be considered second to mere gain, a reputation for fair dealing.

As we have said of the Prince, so, too, of the law—it should be thoroughly democratic and just; otherwise, as has been so well said by the wise Greek, laws are nothing but spider webs, easily broken through by the greater birds, ensnaring only flies.

Like the Prince, the law should always be more ready to forgive than to punish, both because this is more generous in itself and more nearly approaches the law of God, Whose wrath is but slowly roused to vengeance; and because if a guilty person escapes, he may be brought back for punishment, whereas one wrongly condemned is beyond assistance. For even when he does not perish, who can estimate another's suffering?

We read that there have been, not Princes, but Tyrants (may their example be shunned by the Christian Prince) who estimated crimes by their own inconvenience; to them it was merely a trifling theft when a poor man was stripped of his goods and driven with his wife and children into chains or beggary, but a heinous outrage meriting the worst tortures when the royal chest or a rapacious quæstor was defrauded of a single coin. And they cried out "lèse majesté" if anyone murmured against the most tyrannous Prince, or spoke but a little too freely of a corrupt magistrate, though Hadrian, a Pagan Emperor, not otherwise

entitled to a place among good rulers, would not hear an accusation of lèse majesté, and even the savage Nero paid little attention to delations under this head. There was yet another, who abandoned all such charges, saying: "In a free State tongues should also be free." There are no offences, therefore, which the good Prince will more readily pardon than those constituting a private wrong to himself. Who can more easily despise such pin-pricks than the Prince? Vengeance is easy for him, therefore it is hateful and inglorious. Moreover, as it is proof of a weak and base mind, nothing is less in keeping with the princely character, which should be nobly magnanimous. Yet it is not enough for the Prince to abstain from all baseness; he must also be free of the suspicion or appearance of it. Therefore he will consider, not merely what the offender against the Prince deserves but what others will think of the Prince, and out of respect for his dignity and regard for his good name will sometimes forgive one unworthy of pardon.

This, you exclaim, shows too little consideration for the majesty of Princes, a quality which it is most important for the State to keep sacrosanct and inviolate. On the contrary, there is no better way of adding to their greatness, if the people understand that they are so alert that nothing escapes them: so wise that they understand wherein lies the true majesty of a Prince: so merciful that they will avenge no wrong to themselves unless the interest of the State demands it. The pardon granted to Cinna where so many punishments had been of no avail added lustre and security to the majesty of Cæsar Augustus. He alone is guilty of lèse majesté who weakens what constitutes the Prince's true greatness; that is to say, his moral virtues and the prosperity which his wisdom has won for the people. It shows complete misunderstanding of the true majesty of a Prince, to imagine it augmented by weakening the laws and diminishing public liberty, as though the Prince and the State were two different things. But if those things which nature has joined are to be set off against one another, let not the Prince compare himself with any one of his subjects, but with the whole body of the State. Thus he will see how much more important is the State, embracing as it does so many excellent men and women,

than the single person of the Prince. Even if there were no Prince, the State would still be a State. The greatest have flourished without a Prince, for example the Roman and Athenian democracies. But there can be no Prince without a State; in a word, the Prince presupposes the State, the State does not presuppose the Prince. What is it that alone makes the Prince, if not the consent of those who obey him? The man who is great in himself, that is, great in virtue, remains great even when the throne is taken from him. It is clear then, that it is only the most perverted judgment that measures the dignity of a Prince in terms unworthy of his high position. Men call him a traitor (for they would make this the most hated epithet) who, seeing the Prince turn aside to practices which are neither honourable nor safe for himself, nor beneficial to the State, calls him back with outspoken counsel. But is it true that the man who corrupts the Prince with plebeian notions, urges him to sordid indulgences, to gluttony, gaming and other disgraceful occupations, is thereby ministering to the dignity of the Prince? They call it loyalty when, to flatter him, his stupidity is humoured; treason, when anyone opposes their evil designs. None is so little a friend to the Prince as the man who by base flattery deludes him, turns him away from the right, involves him in wars, induces him to rob the people, teaches him the art of tyranny and makes him an object of hatred to every honest man: this is the true treason, worthy of the severest punishment. Plato would have his *νομοφύλακας*, his officers appointed to enforce the laws, the most uncorrupt of men. There is no one whom the Prince should punish with more severity than corrupt guardians of the laws, though he himself is first guardian. The laws should therefore be few, just, and pertinent to the good of the State; they should also be thoroughly well known to the people, for which reason the ancients exhibited them in public written out upon white tables, that they might be visible to all. It is a vile practice to use the laws as nets, as some do, enmeshing as many as they can, not thinking of serving the State, but, as it were, trapping game. Finally, let them be expressed in open and clear language, that there may be no great need of that most avaricious breed of men who call themselves

jurisconsults and advocates. This profession was once indeed confined to the best men, offering, as it did, much honour and little profit, but now it also has been corrupted by that covetousness which vitiates all things. Plato says that whereas the law is most supreme under the best Prince, the worst enemy is the despot who subordinates it to a single will.

CHAP. VII.—ON MAGISTRACIES AND OFFICES.

That same integrity which the Prince himself exhibits, or something very close to it, he should demand from his officials. Merely to appoint magistrates is not enough; it is of the greatest significance how he appoints them; and he must be vigilant that they perform their office with no taint of corruption. Aristotle leaves us the prudent and authoritative warning that it is vain to enact good laws if there is no one to carry them out, for the best enacted laws are sometimes turned by corrupt magistrates to the ruin of the State.

Though the magistrate should not be selected for his wealth or birth or age, but rather for his discernment and integrity, yet it is more fitting that men of advanced years should be called upon to fill offices upon which the safety of the State hangs, not only because old men, owing to their experience, have more prudence and more control over their desires, but also because age wins for them a certain authority with the masses. It is for this reason that Plato would not have a priest under sixty; nor appoint custodians of the law under fifty, or, on the other hand, over seventy. For after the prime, there is a decline of life, which is entitled to discharge and release from all public duties. The dance is a thing of beauty when it is measured and harmonious, but an absurd spectacle when it becomes a chaos of voice and gesticulation—so a city or kingdom is a magnificent object, if every man has his place assigned to him and performs the duty attached to it, that is to say, if the Prince follows a policy worthy of himself, the magistrates do their part, and the people, granted good laws and upright magistrates, obey them. But when the Prince seeks only his own interest, and the magistrates do nothing but prey on the people, and when the latter do not obey just laws, but obsequiously bow to every whim

of Prince or magistrate, then there can be nothing but the most shameful disorder.

The first and most ardent study of the Prince must be to serve his State, and there is no better way of doing this than by appointing as magistrates and officers men who excel at once in purity and in zeal for the public service.

What is the Prince but the physician of the State? But it is not enough for a physician to have skilled apprentices if he also is not skilful and alert. So too, the Prince must not only have honest magistrates; he himself must be above reproach, that he may both choose and correct them.

The divisions of the mind are not all of equal importance; some rule, some obey; as for the body, it obeys only. So it becomes the Prince, as the highest part of the State, to be wisest of all and freest from gross passions. Next to him are the magistrates, who obey in part and rule in part, obeying the Prince and ruling the people.

The happiness of the State, therefore, lies chiefly in the uncorrupt appointment of magistrates and officials. Let there be, further, a legal action for corruption in office, just as in old time there was an action for extortion. Finally, let the severest kind of retribution be decreed for convicted officials.

The uncorrupt appointment of magistrates means that the Prince chooses not the persons who pay most, who bribe most unscrupulously, who are most closely related to himself or most suited to his habits, desires and lusts, but those who are most blameless in life and most fitted for the duties of the office. When the Prince's sole object is to sell offices at the highest price, what can he expect of his officials but that they will sell them again, patching up their loss by the first means at hand, and trafficking in administration just as they have in commerce! Nor should this be considered a whit less harmful for the State, because by most deplorable custom it has become the accepted practice in many countries. Even among the Pagans it was condemned, and imperial laws were passed assigning princely salaries to the presidents of Courts in order to deprive them of any excuse for seeking their own profit.

Formerly a corrupt judgment was a serious crime; but how can a Prince punish a judge who has been bribed to pronounce a decision or to refrain from doing so, when he himself has sold the judgeship, thus giving his judge the first lesson in corruption? He must treat his magistrates as he wishes them to treat the people.

Aristotle in his Politics warns us that the first thing to be avoided is making the magistracies a source of profit to those who hold them. Failure in this respect involves doubly regrettable consequences, for the most avaricious will always bribe or force their way into office, and the people are subjected to the twofold calamity of being excluded from honours and deprived of their wealth.

CHAP. VIII.—ON TREATIES.

In concluding treaties, as in other things, the good Prince will look only to the public advantage. When the Prince thinks it more profitable to injure his people's interests, his agreements are not treaties but conspiracies. Such a Sovereign makes two peoples of one, distinguishing governor and governed, one losing where the other gains. Where this occurs, you have no State. Between all Christian Princes there is the closest and most holy bond of union in the very fact that they are Christians. Why then conclude so many treaties daily, as if everyone were the enemy of everyone else, and we must effect by conventions what Christ cannot achieve? When business must be carried on by incessant written agreements, it is proof that good faith is lacking, and we see many law-suits on contracts entered into for the very purpose of avoiding suits. When there is good faith, and the parties to a transaction are honest men, there is no need of hard-and-fast bonds; on the other hand, when the matter is one between rascals, their very bonds provide the materials for litigation. So between good and wise Princes, even where there is no treaty, there is steadfast friendship: but where Sovereigns are foolish and evil-inclined, the treaties which were designed to make war impossible are the cause of war, for someone is always complaining that one or another of their innumerable articles has been violated. The usual purpose of a treaty is to end war, but nowadays the name is applied to an agreement to carry it on. Such leagues are but war measures; wherever expediency beckons, there an alliance is formed.

Such should be the good faith of Princes in the fulfilment of their obligations, that their simple promise is more sacred than any oath by another. How base then not to abide by a treaty

accompanied by forms of the utmost solemnity among Christians! Yet we see this happening every day; it is not for me to say whose the fault, but assuredly someone is to blame. If some portion of a treaty is violated, we should not forthwith consider the whole instrument annulled, lest we seem to catch at an opportunity of withdrawing from the alliance. Rather should we try to mend the breach with the least possible damage: it may even at times be expedient to connive at trifling infringements, for an arrangement even among private persons cannot long survive if the parties insist upon the letter of every term. You must not at once take the course dictated by anger; the public interest is to be considered. The good and wise Prince will make every effort to keep peace with all men, but especially with his neighbours, who, if incensed, can do most harm, but as friends are most useful; nay, without mutual intercourse with them, the State cannot even continue to exist. Moreover, it is easy to establish and maintain friendship between peoples who are linked by community of language, propinquity of territory and similarity of character and customs. Between some nations there is so great a difference in all things, that it is much wiser to abstain from all commerce with them than to be bound by too close an alliance. Some are too far away to be of service even if so disposed. Finally, there are some so captious, so perfidious and insolent, that, even as neighbours, they are useless for purposes of friendship. The wisest course with these will be neither to make war against them, nor to join in any very close league or alliance with them, for war is always ruinous, and alliance with some peoples is scarcely more sufferable than war.

This, therefore, will be one part of the royal wisdom, to know the character and customs of all peoples, a knowledge which he will acquire partly from books, partly from the accounts of scholars and experts; he need not travel like Ulysses over all lands and seas. For the rest, it is difficult to lay down any definite rules. This in general may be said, that he should not enter into too close alliance with peoples estranged by an alien faith, like the heathen, nor with those whom natural divisions, such as mountains or seas or vast distances, separate from us. Such we should neither join with nor attack. Many examples

might be cited in support of this principle, but one, close at hand, will suffice. France is assuredly in all respects the most flourishing of States; but its prosperity would be infinitely greater had it never attacked Italy.

CHAP. IX.—ON THE MARRIAGE ALLIANCES OF PRINCES.

In my opinion it would be most expedient for the State if Princes sought their marriage alliances within the limits of their own kingdoms, or, if they must cross the frontier, with neighbours, and only those neighbours who are likely to be faithful friends. But it is not fitting, they say, for the daughter of a King to marry any but a King, or the son of a King. This is merely the personal desire to advance one's kin, and should be furthest from a Prince's thoughts. Suppose his sister marry one less powerful, —if this be for the common good, what then? His disregard for the rank of his sister's marriage should bring him more honour than if he had set the desire of a mere woman above the interests of his people.

A Prince's marriage is really his own concern, yet it is made the most vital of human affairs, and we see frequent modern repetitions of Helen's story. If you would make a choice worthy of a Prince, choose your consort from among all women for uprightness, modesty and wisdom, one who will be an obedient wife to her Prince, and bear him children worthy both of their parents and the State. Whatever her birth, the woman who will make a good wife for the Prince is good enough. It is admitted that nothing is so universally important as that the Prince should love his people and be loved by them. In this the prime factors are common nationality, similitude of body and mind, and a certain fragrance springing from an inborn affinity of spirit; but much of this sympathy perishes when its elements are destroyed by a marriage between unlikes. It can hardly be possible either for the State completely to recognize those born of such a marriage, or for those so born to devote themselves whole-

heartedly to the State. Yet such alliances are commonly regarded as the adamantine chains of general peace, though experience itself shows that they are the sources of our greatest woes. One party complains that a term of the betrothal pact has been disregarded, or, taking some offence, withdraws the bride; the other, changing his mind, repudiates his first betrothal and marries another: there is always some ground for dispute. But what is all this to the State? If Princes could secure peace for the world by marriage alliances, I could wish each of them six hundred wives. But of what importance was the marriage-pact when James of Scotland a few years since invaded England? Sometimes after long and violent hostilities and innumerable disasters, a marriage is arranged which settles the conflict, but only because both sides are worn out by their sufferings. The duty of Princes is lasting and general peace; to this purpose let them combine their councils. Though marriage may win peace, it assuredly cannot win perpetual peace. One party dies, and the chain of concord is broken. But if peace were concluded on the proper basis, it would be solid and lasting. Some, however, will say that the union may be made eternal by the propagation of children. Is it not true that the closest relations are those who fight most? Nay, from this very propagation spring changes in kingdoms; the right to rule shifts from one to another, something is taken away in one place and added in another, all of which gives rise to the gravest disorders. These, then, so far from being the means of preventing wars, make them more frequent and terrible. For while kingdom is linked with kingdom by marriage contracts, whenever one party takes offence, he appeals to his rights of relationship to draw others in, and so on the slightest offence Christendom moves to arms, and the displeasure of a single man is assuaged with a deluge of Christian blood. I refrain from examples, to avoid offence. To sum up, though this sort of alliance may perhaps strengthen the Prince, it weakens and afflicts his people. But a good Prince can never judge himself prosperous while his subjects suffer. . I shall say nothing here of the cruelty of sending girls to remote regions, to husbands who differ from them in tongue, character, manners and disposition, condemning them to exile, though they would be

happy to forgo splendour and remain with their own people. Though this custom is so widely accepted that I cannot hope to uproot it, yet I have thought good to point out its evils, on the chance that my warnings may have an effect beyond my hopes.

CHAP. X.—ON THE OCCUPATIONS OF THE PRINCE IN TIME OF PEACE.

The Prince, then, instructed in Christ's commandments, and fortified by wisdom, will hold nothing so dear as the happiness of his people, all of whom, as one body, he must love and cherish. He will devote every thought and effort to such an administration of the kingdom entrusted to him as will be approved by Christ when He demands an account, and leave his memory most honoured by all men. Let him, at home and abroad, imitate the illustrious Scipio, who said that he was never less alone than in solitude nor less idle than when unoccupied, because whenever he rested from the business of the State, he turned his thoughts to some question pertaining to the State's safety or dignity. Let him follow the example of Virgil's Æneas, whom the wise poet often shows grappling with problems while others slept, that he might better direct the fortunes of his followers. I could wish to see inscribed on the walls of palaces, or, better still, in the minds of Kings, Homer's admonition that he must not spend the whole night in sleep to whose care are entrusted peoples and affairs.

When in public, let him always busy himself with something concerning the common welfare, that is, let him be always the Prince. And it is more fitting that the Prince should take part in public duties than lead a life apart. When he goes forth, however, let him see to it that his looks, his bearing, and particularly his speech, are such as encourage virtue in the people, mindful that all his words and acts are observed and known by all. No wise man has approved the custom, observed by the Persian kings, of staying at home and living like hermits, endeavouring to win acclaim from their subjects by remaining inconspicuous and rarely appearing before the people. Whenever they did go forth, however, they displayed barbaric arrogance and

an immodest splendour won at the people's expense. The rest of their life they spent in games or in mad campaigns, as though in time of peace there were nothing for an illustrious Prince to busy himself with, whereas a harvest of golden deeds lies open to him if only he has a soul worthy of his estate.

There are some even to-day who think participation in public duties, the one course most honourable in a King, beneath his dignity; just as there are bishops who consider nothing less their duty than their most proper office, namely teaching the people, and with perverse contempt depute the task to others, preferring to claim for themselves the meanest occupations. Yet Mithridates, a sovereign noble in learning as he was in government, was not ashamed to declare the law to his people from his own lips and without interpreter, a purpose for which he is said to have mastered twenty-two languages. Nor did Philip, King of the Macedonians, deem it beneath a King to sit every day and hear causes. The same is true also of his son, Alexander the Great, though he was in truth ambitious to the point of madness. He is said to have stopped up one ear with his hand while hearing pleadings, saying that he kept it fresh for the other party. It is to be attributed to the perverted education of Princes that some abhor such occupations. For, says the old proverb, everyone practises gladly the art which he knows, shunning those in which he is conscious of incompetence. How then can anyone who has been surrounded by flatterers and vain women, corrupted first by depraved opinions and then by sensual indulgence, wasting his early years in gaming, dancing and hunting, take pleasure afterwards in duties which require the most diligent meditation? Homer says the Prince has not leisure enough to spend the whole night in sleep, but after such a training he aims at nothing all his life but to cheat time, the enemy, by pleasures ever new, as though there were no work in the world for a Prince. A good paterfamilias never lacks occupation in a single house, and must the Prince be idle in his vast domain?

Evil practices are to be met with good laws, faulty statutes amended, bad ones abrogated, good magistrates appointed and bad ones punished or corrected. Means must be sought out

for relieving the burdens of the masses, freeing the land, without bloodshed, from robbery and crime, and for establishing perpetual peace among the people. Other tasks there are, less important than these, yet fit for the greatest Prince, such as visiting and improving the cities, strengthening all that is insecure, embellishing them with public buildings, bridges, porticos, temples, river-walls, aqueducts, and driving out pestilence by altering buildings or drying up swamps. He should change the course of streams flowing in inconvenient places, let in or shut out the sea, as expediency demands, see to the cultivation of neglected fields in order in increase the food supply, and order new methods of cultivation where land is not being profitably farmed, forbidding vineyards, for example, in places where the wine is not worth the labour but where corn could be grown. Six thousand such tasks there are, meet for a Prince, even pleasant for a good Prince; busied with these he need never look about for wars to vary the tedium of idleness, nor shorten the night in gaming. In affairs of State, for instance in his public buildings and games, or in his reception of delegates coming to submit matters concerning the people, the Prince should not be immoderate nor extravagant, but magnificent. In his personal affairs he will be more frugal and restrained, partly that he may not have to regard himself as living at the public expense, partly that he may not teach his subjects luxury, the parent of so many woes.

I observe that many of the ancients made the mistake (would that it never occurred to-day) of directing all their efforts towards aggrandising their kingdom, not to making it better; and we know that while they strove to extend their frontiers, they often lost what they had. Not irrelevant here is that much-quoted saying of Theopompus, that he cared not how much greater he left his kingdom to his children, but how much better and more secure. And I think the Laconic commandment worthy to be written on the insignia of every Prince: "You have been given Sparta,—adorn her."

The good Prince must know that he can do nothing finer than to give back, more prosperous and in all respects more beautiful, the kingdom that fate has assigned to him. The most noble men have commended the spirit of Epaminondas, who, when an

unimportant magistracy, despised by the rabble, had through jealousy been assigned to him, so bore the office that it was afterwards held one of the most honourable and was sought after by the greatest men. For, as he said, it is not the office that confers dignity upon the man, but the man who dignifies the office. This the Prince will achieve if he occupies himself most with such things as add to the strength and beauty of his country, and shuns those that weaken it. The State is most strengthened by the example, the wisdom and the vigilance of a good Prince, by the integrity of magistrates and officials, by the holiness of priests, by the careful choice of schoolmasters, by just laws and measures conducing to virtue. Let his whole task be to encourage and develop these qualities. The vices opposed to them are most noxious, and may best be excluded from the State by tearing out the roots from which they spring. Zeal and efficiency in these matters are the philosophy of a good Prince. To combine for this wholesome purpose is the one thing worthy of Princes who are Christians.

Just as the slightest disorder among celestial bodies, the least divergence from their proper courses, involves humanity in grave disasters. as we plainly observe in eclipses of the sun or moon, so ruling Princes, if they wander from the straight and narrow way, sinning from ambition, passion, or folly, inflict ruin upon the world. No eclipse ever so afflicted mankind as the conflict between Pope Julius and Louis, King of the French, which we have so lately seen and wept.

CHAP. XI.—ON GOING TO WAR.

The Prince should never be hasty in counsel, but above all he must be deliberate and circumspect in entering upon war, for while other things have their attending evils, war is the shipwreck of all that is good in a sea of all iniquity. No calamity prolongs itself with more tenacity—war springs from war, the greatest from the least, two wars from one, fierce and bloody war from a tourney; and the plague, rising in one place, spreads its infection to the neighbouring peoples, nay, to the most remote.

A good Prince will never make war until every method has been tried in vain to avoid it. If we adopt this policy, war will scarcely ever occur. But if there is no escaping so dire a calamity, the Prince's first care shall be to carry on the struggle with as little suffering for his people and as little shedding of Christian blood as may be, and to bring it to the speediest possible end.

The Prince who is truly Christian will first weigh the difference between men, born for peace and good will, and beasts, born to prey upon one another; then the difference between man and Christian man. Let him further reflect how desirable, how beautiful, how wholesome is peace; how calamitous and accursed, war: remembering what a host of sufferings even the most just war (if any war can be called just) brings in its train. Lastly, let him set aside impulse, calling reason to council long enough to compute accurately what the war will cost and whether—even if victory be certain, not always the case even with the best cause—its object is worth so much. Weigh the anxiety, the expense, the danger, the long and laborious preparation. You must assemble the barbarous and abandoned dregs of mankind, and, to appear more generous than your enemy, bribe and coax that most abject and execrable class of humanity, mercenaries! The good Prince's fondest wish is to have subjects of the highest

worth. But where is there so thorough and instantaneous a corrupter of manners as war? He would see his people secure and prosperous. But while he learns to campaign, he is compelled to expose his young men to every danger, and often in one hour makes multitudes of orphans, widows, childless old men, beggars and mourners.

Royal wisdom will cost the world too dear if Princes persist in learning by experience how vile a thing war is, only to say in their old age, "I did not believe that war was such a pestilence." Immortal Gods! with what unnumbered calamities to the whole universe have you learned such wisdom! The Prince will understand some day that nothing was gained by extending the frontiers of his kingdom, that what seemed at first an advantage has been the greatest loss; but in the meantime thousands of human beings have been killed or left desolate. These things should be learnt from books, from the stories of old men, from the calamities of neighbours. "For many years this or that Prince has fought a life and death struggle for this or that dominion: how much more loss it was than profit!" The good Prince will cleave to those things which are a lasting pleasure. What we undertake on impulse seems good while the impulse lasts: but what we undertake on good judgment satisfies us in age as it pleased us in youth. Nowhere is this truth more to be heeded than in declaring war.

Plato calls it sedition, not war, when Greeks fight Greeks: if this comes to pass, he bids them fight with all restraint. What then can we name the conflict when Christians wage war with Christians, united as they are by so many bonds? What, when the cause of a cruel, age-long struggle is some mere title, some private grudge, some silly and childish ambition?

There are some Princes who deceive themselves, imagining that assuredly war is just, and that they have a just cause. Leaving unsettled the question whether war is ever just, who does not think his cause just? And among all the shifting vicissitudes of human affairs, with so many covenants and treaties now concluded, now rescinded, who can lack cause, if any cause whatever is good enough to go to war on? But the Pontifical laws do not condemn all war. Even Augustine in some cases approves of it.

Saint Bernard also praises certain soldiers. But Christ himself and Peter and Paul everywhere teach the contrary. Is their authority less with us than that of Augustine or Bernard? Augustine, in one or two places, does not disapprove of war, but the whole philosophy of Christ condemns it. The Apostles everywhere abhor it, and how often do those same holy Doctors, who, it is said, accept war in one or two passages, condemn and detest it! Why do we gloss over all these, and seize upon what condones our sins? Moreover, if you look carefully into the matter, you will find that no one has approved the sort of war in which we now commonly engage.

Certain arts are condemned by the laws because they are too nearly related to imposture, and are commonly carried on by deceit—for instance, astrology and the so-called alchemy, though sometimes these are honestly practised. This course might with even greater justice be adopted with regard to wars. Some wars may perhaps be just, though in the present state of human affairs I know not whether I could cite one of which the cause has not been ambition, wrath, ferocity, lust, or avarice. It often happens that leaders more spendthrift than their private means warrant deliberately stir up war in order to augment their own resources by despoiling their followers. Princes, in fact, sometimes conspire together, devising fictitious reasons for war in order to diminish their peoples' power and strengthen their own positions by the public calamity. Accordingly, the good and Christian Prince should regard every war, however just, as a thing suspect. But, men insist, you must not abandon your right. I answer that any right conferred by relationship concerns chiefly the Prince's private affairs. How unjust it would be to enforce a right of this sort at the cost of such terrible suffering to the people, and, in order to secure some trifling addition to your dominion, first to despoil the whole kingdom and then involve it in a death struggle. Suppose one Prince offends another in some trifle, some private matter, one of hereditary right or something of the sort, for example, what is this to the people as a whole? A good Prince measures all things in terms of the public good, otherwise he would not be even a Prince. There is no such right over men as there is over cattle. An important part of government is the

consent of the people, which was the origin of kings. If a dispute arises between Princes, why do they not resort to arbiters? There are many bishops, many abbots and learned men, many worthy magistrates, whose judgment, rather than butchery, robbery, and universal calamity, should settle the matter.

First the Prince should distrust the reality of his right, then, if it appears quite certain, consider whether it ought to be vindicated at the cost of world-wide suffering. Wise men sometimes prefer losing a thing to gaining it, because they see that the former is less costly. Cæsar, I think, would prefer to surrender his right rather than claim the ancient monarchy and the power offered him in the letter of the jurisconsults. But what security will there be, it is asked, if no one insists on his right? Insist, indeed, if it profits the State, but beware lest the Prince's right cost his subjects too dear. What security is there now, though every man insists on the very letter of his rights? We see war following war, and no limit or end to the tumult. It is clear enough, then, that such reasoning leads to nothing. We must therefore try different remedies There can be no commerce even between friends if they do not make some mutual concessions. For the sake of harmony the husband often yields to his wife. What does war breed but war? Civility, on the other hand, invites civility, fairness invites fairness. A righteous and merciful Prince will also bear in mind that the great sufferings which every war entails fall in great part to the lot of persons who have no concern in the conflict, and who have done nothing to merit calamity.

After the Prince has reckoned up the total of all the evils involved (if this can ever be done) then let him ask himself, Shall I, one man, be the author of so many catastrophies? Shall so much human blood, so many widows, so many houses of mourning, so many childless old men, so many persons undeservedly impoverished, such a destruction of morals, laws, religion, be put down to my sole account? Must I atone for all these to Christ? No Prince can punish his enemy without first attacking his own subjects. The people must be robbed, the soldier, whom Maro, with good reason, calls impious, must be courted. Subjects must be driven out of districts which they have long enjoyed for their profit. In other places they must be shut

in, that you may shut in the enemy. And often the sufferings you inflict on your own are more cruel than those you inflict on the enemy. How much more difficult and how much finer it is to build a fair city than to demolish it. But we see flourishing cities, built by the common people, demolished by the wrath of Princes. Yet often it requires more labour and expense to destroy a town than to found a new one, and we wage our war with such extravagant waste, such zeal and devotion, that a tenth of our exertions could have preserved the peace.

Let the good Prince strive always for that glory which is neither stained with blood nor built on another's downfall. In war, at the best, the fortune of one side is ruin for the other, and often even the victor weeps too dear a victory.

If we are not moved by patriotism nor by world-calamity, at least let us respect the honour of the name Christian. What can we think the Turks and Saracens say of us, when for so many centuries they have seen no agreement between Christian Princes, no treaties capable of founding a lasting peace, no limit to bloodshed, and less tumult among the heathen than among those who, in accordance with Christ's teachings, profess perfect concord?

How brief and fugitive is the life of man, how open to calamity, assailed as it is by infinite maladies, continual accidents, falling ruins, shipwreck, earthquakes, thunderbolts. No need was there of war to inflict suffering, yet the sufferings of war are more than all the others. The preachers should have expelled discord from the hearts of the multitude. But now Angle hates Gaul and Gaul hates Angle for no other reason than that he is an Angle. The Scot, only because he is a Scot, hates the Briton; the Italian hates the German, the Suevan the Helvetian, and so on for the rest; region hates region, and city city. Why are we divided by these stupid names, rather than bound together by the common name of Christ?

Even assuming that some war may be just, yet since all mortals go mad over this pestilence, surely the priests should summon the thoughts of Prince and plebs to other things. As it is, we sometimes see the divine acting as the firebrand of war. Bishops are not ashamed to go about in camps: there you will find the Cross and body of Christ; there they mingle His heavenly

sacraments with tumult worse than Tartarean, and in such bloody discord use the symbols of supreme charity. And, what is more absurd, Christ is in both camps, fighting, as it were, against Himself. It was not enough that war should be tolerated among Christians; it must also be considered the highest glory.

If the whole doctrine of Christ is not everywhere opposed to war, if one instance can be cited where it is commended, then let us Christians fight. The Hebrews were permitted to wage war, but only on God's bidding. Our oracle, speaking in the Gospels, warns us against war, yet we battle more madly than they. David was pleasing to God for his other virtues, yet He would not have His temple built by him, merely because his hands were stained with blood,—he was a warrior. For this work He chose the pacific Solomon. If these things were true among the Jews, what should we Christians do? They had the shadow of Solomon, we the true Solomon, the peace-loving Christ conciliating all things in Heaven and earth. Even against the Turks, I think we should not go thoughtlessly to war. We should first reflect that the kingdom of Christ was formed, extended and established by far other means. Perhaps, then, it should not be advanced by means different from those by which it rose and spread. And how often with this pretext for war has the Christian people been despoiled, and nothing more effected! If the matter is one of faith, that has been augmented and embellished by the sufferings of the martyrs and not by forces of soldiery: if the struggle is one for rule, wealth, possessions, we must ask ourselves again and again whether that is not all too alien to Christianity. Judging, too, by the usual character of those who now carry on these wars, it is more likely that we shall degenerate into Turks than that the Turks will be converted to Christianity. First let us see to it that we are truly Christian, and then, if it seems good, attack the Turks.

But we have written at length in another place on the evils of war, and must not repeat ourselves here. I would, however, exhort Princes bearing the name of Christian to set aside fictitious titles and false pretexts, and devote their whole hearts to the task of putting an end to the ancient and despicable war-madness of Christians, that peace and concord may flourish among peoples

linked by so many pledges. To this end let them display their genius, put forth their strength, combine in council, straining every nerve to reach the common goal. Those who would appear great, let them choose this way of proving themselves great. Achieving this, they will have done a far more glorious thing than if they had subdued the whole of Africa. Nor will this be too difficult, if everyone ceases clinging to his own cause, if we disregard our personal desires and devote ourselves to the common task, if we keep Christ and not the world in our councils. As it is, everyone seeks his own ends—Pontiffs and bishops worry about power and wealth, Princes are led headlong by passion and ambition, their subjects all follow them for gain, and it is no wonder that, under folly's leading, we run into tempests. But if with one mind we bent ourselves to the common task, even our own affairs would prosper more. Now we lose even that for which alone we fight.

I have no doubt, most illustrious of Princes, that this is your feeling: so you were born, so you have been instructed by the best and most upright men. For the rest, I pray that Christ may continue to bless your glorious efforts. He gave you a kingship unstained with blood. He would have it always free of blood. He rejoices in the name Prince of Peace. Do you likewise, that by your goodness and wisdom we may at length have holiday from these most senseless wars. The memory of past evils will commend peace to us, and the calamities of earlier times will double the appreciation of your good works.

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