ESSAY

ON

THE GENERATIVE PRINCIPLE

OF

POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF

M. LE COMTE JOSEPH DE MAISTRE,

AUTHOR OF EVENINGS AT ST. PETERSBURG, &C.

FILII HOMINUM USQUEQUO GRAVI CORDE? UT QUID DILIGITIS VANITATEM, ET QUÆRITIS MENDACIUM. Ps. iv. 3.

BOSTON:

LITTLE AND BROWN.

MDCCCXLVII.

BOSTON:
PRINTED BY ALFRED MUDGE,
No. 21 School Street.

NOTICE BY THE TRANSLATOR.

It has been frequently noticed as a uniform tendency of the sciences of the last period, to limit or exclude the Divine agency, in the several departments to which they relate. This tendency has been no less obvious in political, than in physical science. In the political theories of the last century, the origin of Civil Institutions has been uniformly traced to some social compact, or some other act, more or less deliberate, of merely human arrangement, to the exclusion of the Divine agency. It is this error, so repugnant to the religious spirit, though sanctioned by the highest names in modern political science, so fraught with pernicious consequences, though seemingly a

harmless speculation, which it is the object of this Essay to expose. The great name of the Author is a sufficient pledge of the ability of the work. The extent and variety of learning displayed in it, the depth of its political reflections, the light cast by it upon very many associated topics of the greatest importance, the eloquence to which it rises in occasional passages, and the tone of moral earnestness by which the whole is pervaded, cannot fail to be acknowledged, even by those who may not be convinced by its arguments.

In transferring to our language, a work of such a nature, the Translator has felt bound to do what he could to represent the exact meaning of the Author with the utmost fidelity, even when it might be necessary, in so doing, to sacrifice something of beauty or harmony of style. He has added a few notes, always included in brackets,

designed to explain and illustrate such historical allusions, and other matters of the text, as might not, in themselves, be sufficiently intelligible.

The work is submitted to the candour of the thoughtful reader, in the hope that it may lead to a more just recognition of the Hand of God in the History of the World.

Boston, June 12, 1847.

PREFACE.

Political Science, which is, perhaps, the most thorny of all sciences, by reason of the difficulty perpetually arising, of discerning what is stable or changeable in its elements, presents a very strange phenomenon, well calculated to make every wise man, called to the administration of states, to tremble; it is this, that whatever good sense perceives, at first view, in this science, as an evident truth, is almost always found, when experience has spoken, not only false, but pernicious.

To begin at the foundation. If we had never heard governments spoken of, and men were called upon to deliberate, for example, on hereditary or elective monarchy, we should justly regard one who should decide for the former, as a madman: the arguments against it appear

so naturally to reason, that it is useless to repeat them. History, however, which is experimental politics, demonstrates, that an hereditary monarchy is the government which is the most stable, the happiest, and most natural to man ; and an elective monarchy, on the contrary, is the worst form of government known.

With respect to population, commerce, prohibitive laws, and a thousand other important subjects, the most plausible theory is almost always found to be contradicted and annulled by experience. Let us cite a few examples.

What method must be adopted to render a state powerful ? "It is necessary, first of all, to favour population by every possible means." On the contrary, every law, tending directly to favour population, without regard to other considerations, is bad. It is even necessary, to endeavour to establish in the state a certain moral power, tending to diminish the number of marriages, and to render them less hasty. The proportion of births over deaths, as ascertained by tables, only proves, ordinarily, the number of the wretched. Etc., etc.

French economists had sketched the demonstration of these truths: the excellent work of MALTHUS has completed it.

How shall scarcity and famine be prevented? "Nothing is more simple. It is necessary to prohibit the exportation of grains." On the contrary, a premium must be allowed to those who export them. The example and authority of England have constrained us *to swallow* this paradox.

How shall exchange be maintained in favour of a particular country? "It is unquestionably necessary to prevent the specie from going out of it, and consequently to see to it, by severe prohibitory laws, that the state buys no more than it sells." On the contrary, these means have never been employed without lowering the exchange, or, what amounts to the same thing, without augmenting the indebtedness of the nation; and never can the opposite course be taken without raising it, that is to say, without making it evident that the credit of the nation over its neighbours is increased. Etc., etc.

But the observation we are now considering recurs most frequently in that which is most substantial and fundamental in politics ; I mean in the very constitution of empires. It is said that the German philosophers have invented the word *Metapolitics* to be to *Politics*, what *Metaphysics* is to *Physics*. This new term appears to be very happily invented to express the *Metaphysics of Politics*, for there is such a thing ; and this science deserves the profound attention of observers.

An anonymous writer who has been much occupied with speculations of this nature, and who has endeavored to fathom the hidden foundations of the social edifice, believed himself to be in the right when, nearly twenty years ago, he advanced, as so many incontestable axioms, the following propositions, diametrically opposed to the theories of that time.*

* [The work of our author from which these propositions are taken, contains a fuller and more comprehensive statement of his views ; and the translator has thought it worth while to add so much as would serve to elucidate, more distinctly, the author's meaning. Such additions will be included in brackets.—Trans.]

1. No constitution results from deliberation; the rights of the people are never written, or never except as simple declarations of pre-existing rights not written, of which nothing more can be said, than that they exist because they exist.*

2. Human action in such cases is so far circumscribed, that the men who act are only circumstances. [God not having judged it proper to employ in this matter supernatural means, at least circumscribes human action to such a degree, that circumstances do all. It is even very common that in pursuing a certain end they obtain another, as appears in the English constitution.]

3. The rights of the *people*, properly so called, proceed almost always from the concessions of sovereigns, and then it is possible to trace them historically; but the rights of the sovereign and of the aristocracy, [at least the essential,

* [*It would be very foolish to ask, who gave liberty to the cities of Sparta, of Rome, etc. Those republics never received their charters from man. God and nature gave them to them.* Sidney's Disc. on Government, vol. I, §. 2. The author is not suspicious.

constitutive and *radical* rights, if it is permissible to express one's self thus,] have neither date nor known authors.

4. These concessions themselves have always been preceded by a state of things which rendered them necessary, and which did not depend upon the sovereign.

5. Although written laws are only the declarations of pre-existing rights, yet it does not follow that all these rights can be written. [There is always in every constitution, something which cannot be written,* and which must be left in a dark and venerable cloud, under pain of overturning the state.]

6. The more is written, the weaker the con-

* [The judicious Hume has often made this remark. I will cite only the following passage. *It is this circumstance in the English constitution*, (the right of remonstrance) *which it is most difficult, or rather altogether impossible, to regulate by laws; it must be governed by certain delicate ideas of propriety and decency, rather than by any exact rule or prescription.* Hume's Hist. of England, Chas. I, chap. iv, vol. vi, page 269 : note in Dove's Edit. London, 1822. Thomas Paine is of another opinion, as is well known. He pretends that a constitution does not exist unless one can put it into his pocket.]

stitution. [The reason is obvious. Laws are only declarations of rights, and rights are only declared when they are attacked ; so that the multiplicity of written constitutional laws, only evinces the number of shocks and the danger of destruction. The most vigorous and flourishing institution of profane antiquity was that of Lacedæmon, where nothing was written.]

7. No nation can give liberty to itself, if it has it not.* [When a nation begins to reflect upon itself, its laws are already made.] Human influence does not extend beyond the development of existing rights [but which were unacknowledged or disputed. If the imprudent overleap these limits by rash reforms, the nation loses what it had, without attaining what it wishes. Hence results the necessity of innovating only very rarely, and always with moderation and trembling.]

* Machiavel is appealed to here in evidence. *Un popolo uso a vivere sotto un principe, se per qualche accidente diventa libero, con difficultà mantiene la libertà.* [If a people accustomed to live under the dominion of a prince, should by any accident become free, they will find it a very difficult matter to maintain their liberty.] Disc. sopr. Tito-Livio, lib. I, cap. xvi.

8. Lawgivers, strictly speaking, are extraordinary men, belonging perhaps only to the ancient world and to the youth of nations. [When Providence has decreed the more rapid formation of a political constitution, there appears a man clothed with an indefinable power; he speaks, and he makes himself to be obeyed. These lawgivers *par excellence* possess one distinctive characteristic: they are kings, or eminently noble; in this point, there is and can be no exception. It was on this account that the institution of Solon, the most frail of antiquity, failed.* The flourishing days of Athens, which did not continue long,† were all the while interrupted by conquests and

* [Plutarch has clearly seen this truth. *Solon*, says he, *could not long maintain a city in union and concord, being only a commoner and of moderate estate.* See his life of Solon.]

† [*Hæc extrema fuit ætas imperatorum Athæniensium, Iphicratis, Chabriæ, Timothei; neque post illorum obitum quisquam dux in illa urbe fuit dignus memoriâ.* Corn Nepos. Vit. Timoth., cap. iv. From the battle of Marathon to that of Leucadia, gained by Timotheus, there elapsed 114 years. It is the *diapason* of the glory of Athens.]

tyrannies ; and Solon even saw the Pisistratidæ.*]

*[I have spoken of a principal characteristic of true lawgivers ; there is another which is very remarkable, and on which it would be easy to make a volume. It is, that they are never what we call *savans ;* they do not write; they act by instinct and by impulse, more than by reasoning ; and they have no other instrument to act with, than a certain moral force which bends the wills, as the wind bends the the field of grain.

In showing that this observation is only the corollary of a general truth of the highest importance, I could say interesting things; but I fear losing myself: I love better to suppress the intermediate steps, and hasten to results.

There is between theoretical politics and constitutive legislation, the same difference which exists between the theory of poetry and poetry. The illustrious Montesquieu is to Lycurgus, in the general scale of minds, what Batteux is to Homer or Racine.

More than that ; these two talents positively exclude each other, as we have seen by the example of Locke, who blundered awkwardly when he took it into his head to try to give laws to the Americans.

I have seen a great lover of the republic seriously lamenting that Frenchmen had not discovered in the works of Hume, the piece entitled, *Plan of a perfect Republic.— O cœcas hominum mentes !* If you see an ordinary man who may have good sense, but who may have never given, in any way, any outward sign of superiority, you cannot for all this be assured that he could not be a lawgiver. There is no reason for saying yes or no ; but if the question be of

9. These lawgivers even, notwithstanding their wonderful power, have only collected the pre-existing elements, [elements which existed in the customs and character of the people,] and have always acted in the name of the Divinity.

10. Liberty, in a sense, is the gift of kings; for all nations were constituted free by kings.* [This is the general rule, and the exceptions that might be indicated, would enter into the rule, if they were discussed.†]

Bacon, of Locke, of Montesquieu, etc., say *no*, without hesitation; for the talent that he has, proves that he has not the other.]

* This ought to be deeply considered in modern monarchies. As all legitimate and sacred immunities of this kind proceed rightfully from the sovereign, every thing that is extorted by force is smitten with anathema. *To write a law*, Demosthenes has very well said, *is nothing;* TO MAKE IT TO BE WILLED *is every thing.* (Olynth. III.) But if this is true of the sovereign in respect of the people, what shall we say of a *nation*, that is to say, to employ the mildest term, of a club of heated theorists, who would propose a constitution to a legitimate sovereign, as we propose a capitulation to a besieged general? That would be indecent, absurd and, more than all, futile.

† [*Neque ambigitur quin Brutus idem, qui tantum gloriæ, superbo exacto rege, meruit, pessimo publico id facturus fuerit, si libertatis immaturæ cupidine priorum regum alicui*

11. There never has existed a free nation which had not, in its natural constitution, germs of liberty as old as itself; and no nation has ever successfully attempted to develope, by its fundamental written laws, other rights than those which existed in its natural constitution.

12. No assembly of men can give existence to a nation. An attempt of this kind ought even to be ranked among the most memorable acts of folly * [exceeding in folly what all the *Bedlams* of the world might produce most absurd and extravagant.]

regnum extorsisset, etc. Tit.-Liv. II, i. The entire passage is well worthy of being contemplated.]

* Machiavel is again cited here. E debbesi pigliare questo per una regola generale, che non mai,o di rado, occorre che alcuna repubblica o regno sia da principio ordinato bene, o al tutto di nuovo fuori degli ordini vecchi riformato, se non è ordinato da uno ; *anzi è necessario che uno solo sia quello che dia il modo, e dalla cui mente dipenda qualunque simile ordinazione.* Disc. sopr. Tit. Liv., lib. I, cap. ix. [For it must be laid down as a general rule, that it very seldom or never happens, that any government is either well founded at first, or thoroughly reformed afterwards, except the plan be laid and conducted *by one man only*, who has the sole power of giving all orders and making all laws that are necessary for its establishment.—Trans.]

It does not appear that, since the year 1796, the date of the first edition of the work we quote,* there has anything passed in the world to induce the author to abandon his theory. We believe on the contrary, that it may be useful at this moment to develope the theory fully, and to trace it to its ultimate results; the most important of which is, doubtless, the one that is found announced in these terms, in the tenth chapter of the same work, viz. :

"Man cannot create a sovereign. At the utmost, he may be the instrument in dethroning the sovereign, and delivering his kingdom to another sovereign already royal...[and even the manner in which human power is employed in these circumstances, is well fitted to humble it. It is here especially that we may address to man these words of J. J. Rousseau ; *montre-moi ta puissance je te montrerai ta faiblesse*]...*Moreover there never has existed a royal family to whom a plebeian origin could be assigned. If such a phenomenon should appear, it would create an era in the world.*"†

* Considérations sur la France, chap. vi.

† Ibid, chap. x, §. iii.

With respect to this proposition we may reflect, that the *divine judgment* has just now sanctioned it in a manner sufficiently solemn. But who knows whether the ignorant levity of our age will not seriously say, *if he had willed it, he would still be in his place!* just as is now repeated after two centuries ; *if Richard Cromwell had possessed the genius of his father, he would have fixed the protectorate in his family ;* which is precisely the same as to say, *if this family had not ceased to reign, it would reign still.*

It is written, By me kings reign.* This is not a phrase of the church, a metaphor of the preacher ; it is a literal truth, simple and palpable. It is a law of the political world. God *makes* kings in the literal sense. He prepares royal races ; maturing them under a cloud which conceals their origin. They appear at length *crowned with glory and honour ;* they take their places ; and this is the most certain sign of their legitimacy.

* *Per me Reges regnant.* Prov. viii. 15

The truth is, that they arise as it were of themselves, without violence on the one part, and without marked deliberation on the other : it is a species of magnificent tranquillity, not easy to express. *Legitimate usurpation* would seem to me to be the most appropriate expression, (if not too bold,) to characterize these kinds of origins, which time hastens to consecrate.

Let no one, then, permit himself to be dazzled by the most splendid human appearances. Who has ever concentrated in himself more of them than the extraordinary personage whose fall still resounds throughout Europe ? Has there ever been a sovereignty outwardly so well fortified, a greater consolidation of means, a man more powerful, more active, more formidable ? For a long time we saw him trample under foot twenty nations silent and frozen with dread ; and his power at length had struck certain roots which might have led even *hope to despair*. Yet he is fallen, and so low, that Pity while contemplating him, draws back for fear of being *touched* by him. We may observe, moreover,

in passing, that for a reason *somewhat* different, it has become equally difficult to speak of this man, and of his august rival who has rid the world of him. The one escapes insult, and the other praise. But to return.

In a work known only to a few persons at St. Petersburgh, the author wrote in the year 1810, "*If, when two parties encounter each other in a revolution, on one side precious victims are seen to fall, we may rest assured that this party will triumph at last, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary.*"

The truth of this assertion has also just been verified in a manner the most striking, and the least expected. The moral order has its laws as well as the physical, and the investigation of these laws is altogether worthy of occupying the meditations of a true philosopher. After an entire age of criminal trifling, it is high time to recall to mind what we are, and to trace all knowledge back to its source. It is this that has induced the author of this little work to permit it to escape from the timid portfolio which has retained it

for five years. He permits the date of it to stand,* and gives it to the world, word for word, just as it was written at that time. Friendship has called forth this publication, which perhaps is so much the worse for the author; for this good dame is, on certain occasions, as blind as her brother. Be this as it may, the mind which has dictated the work enjoys a privilege well understood; he may doubtless be mistaken sometimes on indifferent points; he may exaggerate, or speak too confidently; he may, in fine, offend against language or taste; and in this case, so much the better for the evil disposed, *if perchance there be any such:* but there will always be left to him the well founded hope of not displeasing any one, since he loves all the world; and, moreover, he will enjoy the perfect assurance of interesting a numerous and very estimable class of men, without the possibility of injuring a single person!—a *confidence* altogether tranquilizing.

* *May*, 1809.

ESSAY.

ESSAY

ON

THE GENERATIVE PRINCIPLE

OF

POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONS,

ETC., ETC.

I. One of the grand errors of an age, which professed them all, was, to believe that a political constitution could be written and created *à priori;* whilst reason and experience unite in establishing, that a constitution is a Divine work, and that that which is most fundamental, and most essentially constitutional, in

the laws of a nation, is precisely what cannot be written.

II. It has been often supposed to be an excellent piece of pleasantry upon Frenchmen, to ask them *in what book the Salic law was written?* But Jérôme Bignon answered, very apropos, and probably without knowing the full truth of what he said, *that it was written* IN *the hearts of Frenchmen.* Let us suppose, in effect, that a law of so much importance existed only because it was written; it is certain that any authority whatsoever which may have written it, will have the right of annulling it; the law will not then have that character of sacredness and immutability which distinguishes laws truly constitutional. The essence of a fundamental law, is, that no one has the right to abolish it: now, how can it be above *all*, if *any one* has made it? The agreement of the people is

impossible; and even if it should be otherwise, a compact is not a law, and binds nobody, unless there is a superior authority by which it is guarantied. Locke endeavours to discover the characteristic feature of law in the expression of united wills; but has thus happened to hit upon the characteristic which exactly excludes the idea of *law*. In fact, united wills form the *regulation*, and not the *law*, which manifestly and necessarily supposes a superior will that makes itself to be obeyed.* "In the system of Hobbes," (the same that has had such currency in our day, under the pen of Locke,) "the force of civil laws reposes only upon a convention; but if there is no natural law which requires the execution of

* "Man in the state of nature had only rights.....On entering into society, I give up my private will in order to conform myself to law *which is the general will.*" Le Spectateur Français, tom. I, p. 194, has justly ridiculed this definition; but he might have observed, further, that it belonged to the age, above all to Locke, who has opened this century in a manner so pernicious.

laws that are made, of what use are they? Promises, engagements, oaths, are mere words: it is as easy to break this frivolous bond as to form it. Without the doctrine of a Divine Lawgiver, all moral obligation is chimerical. Power on one side, weakness on the other, constitutes the whole bond of human societies." *

What a wise and profound theologian has here said on moral obligation, applies with equal truth to political or civil obligation. Law is not properly *law*, nor does it possess the true sanction of law, unless it emanates from a superior will; so that its essential character is, *that it is not the will of all:* otherwise laws, as we have just remarked, will be *only regulations;* and, as the author just cited further observes: "Those who have had the liberty of

* Bergier, Traité historique et dogmatique de la Religion, in-8vo, tome III, chap. iv, §. xii, pp. 330, 331. (After Tertullian, *Apol.* 45.)

making these conventions have not taken away from themselves the power of revoking them; and their descendants, who had no part in making them, are still less bound to observe them." *

Hence it is that the good sense of antiquity, happily anterior to sophisms, has sought, on every side, the sanction of laws, in a power above man, either in recognizing that sovereignty comes from God, or in revering certain unwritten laws as proceeding from him. †

* Bergier, Traité historique et dogmatique de la Religion, in-8vo, tome III, chap. iv, §. xii, pp. 330, 331. (After Tertullian, *Apol.* 45.)

† [A striking instance of the error here combatted may be found, not to look *elsewhere*, in what occurred in France during the Revolutionary period. When the *National Assembly*, which framed the Constitution of 1791, dissolved itself and gave place to the succeeding *Legislative National Assembly*, which had been elected according to the rules prescribed by that Constitution, the new legislature showed so little attention to formalities, and so much less regard for a constitution which they themselves had not framed, and which was not protected by the venerable sanction of antiquity, that it had been hardly a year in existence, before, by

III. The compilers of the Roman laws have placed, unpretendingly, in the first chapter of their collection, a very remarkable fragment of Greek jurisprudence. *Among the laws which govern us*, says this passage, *some are written, others are unwritten.* Nothing can be more simple or profound. Is there any Turkish law which expressly permits the sovereign to pass sentence of death upon a man immediately, without the decision of an intermediate tribunal? Are we acquainted with any *written* law, even religious, which prohibits the sovereigns of Christian Europe from doing this?* Yet the

its own acts, it had become necessary for it to invite the nation, to elect a *National Convention* to determine the nature of its future government. This body framed a new Constitution, under which the *Directory* was installed; this last in its turn was superseded by Buonaparte as Consul under another *new* Constitution; and so on indefinitely.—Trans.]

* *The Church prohibits her children, still more strongly than the civil laws, from being their own judges; and it is by its spirit that Christian kings abstain from doing this, even in cases of high treason, and that they deliver criminals into the hands of judges, that they may be punished accord-*

Turk is no more surprised at seeing his master pass sentence of immediate death upon a man, than at seeing him go to the Mosque. He believes with all Asia, and even with all antiquity, that the right to inflict death immediately, is a legitimate appendage of the sovereignty. But our Princes would tremble at the bare idea of condemning a man to death; for, according to our view, this condemnation would be an atrocious murder. And yet, I doubt whether it would be possible to prohibit them from doing this by a fundamental written law, without producing greater evils than those we might wish to prevent.

IV. Ask Roman history what was precisely the power of the Senate: she is silent, at least as to the exact limits of that power. We see,

ing to laws and forms of justice.—(Pascal, Lettres Provinciales, Lettre xiv.) This passage is very important, and should be found elsewhere.

indeed, in general, that the power of the people and that of the Senate mutually balanced each other, and that the opposition was unceasing; we observe also that patriotism or weariness, weakness or violence, terminated these dangerous struggles: but we know no more about it.* In looking upon these grand historical scenes, we are sometimes tempted to believe that affairs would have gone on much better, if there had been special laws defining these powers; but this would be a great errour: such laws, always being compromitted by unexpected cases and forced exceptions, would not have

* I have often reflected upon this passage of Cicero :— *Leges Livæi præsertim uno versiculo senatûs puncto temporis sublatæ sunt.*—(De Leg. II, 6.) By what right did the Senate take this liberty? and why did the People permit it to be done? It is surely not easy to answer; but at what can we be astonished in matters of this sort, since after all that has been written on history and Roman antiquities, it has been necessary in our day to write dissertations in order to know how the Senate recruited itself.

lasted six months, or they would have overturned the Republic.

V. The English Constitution is an example nearer to us, and, therefore, more striking. Whoever examines it with attention, will see *that it goes only in not going* (if this play upon words is permissible.) It is maintained only by the exceptions. The *habeas corpus*, for example, has been so often and for so long time suspended, that it is doubted whether the exception has not become the rule. Suppose for a moment that the authors of this famous act had undertaken to fix the cases in which it should be suspended; they would *ipso facto* have annihilated it.

VI. At the sitting of the House of Commons, June 26, 1807, a lord cited the authority of a great statesman to show that the King had no right to dissolve Parliament during the

session ;* but this opinion was contradicted : Where is the law ? Attempt to make a law, and to fix exclusively *by writing* the case where the King has this right, and you will produce a revolution. *The King*, said one of the members, *has this right when the occasion is important ;* but what is an *important* occasion ? Try to decide this too by writing.

VII. But, there is another fact still more singular. All the world remember the great question agitated, with so much earnestness, in

* [Lord Holland, in his speech against the Address to the King, said, on the late dissolution of Parliament, "is there no difference between dissolving Parliament in the recess, and in the midst of a session ? The opinion of one of the greatest men this Country boasts, I mean Lord Somers, was, that to dissolve a Parliament in the midst of a session, was, if not absolutely, at least almost, illegal ; and I will not allow, for a moment, that a prorogation for a day, followed by a dissolution, can make the slighest difference." See Cobbett's Parl. Reports, which state the majority for the original Address as very large, sustaining the King's prerogative.—Trans.]

England, in the year 1806. The question was, *whether the holding of a judicial employment, together with a place as member of the Privy Council, was or was not in accordance with the principles of the English Constitution?* At the sitting of the same House of Commons, on the third of March, a member observed: *England is governed by a body* (the Privy Council) *not known by Legislature. Only*, he added, *it is connived at.**

There is, then, in this wise and justly famous England, a body, which governs, and in truth does everything, but *which the Constitution does not recognize.* Delolme has overlooked this feature, which I could corroborate by many others.

* See *London Chronicle* of March 4, 1806. Observe that this word *Legislature*, includes the three powers; it follows, from this assertion, that even the King *is ignorant of such a body as the Privy Council.* Yet I believe that he at least has an inkling of it.

After this can any one talk to us about written constitutions and constitutional laws made *à priori*. We cannot conceive how a sensible man could imagine the possibility of such a chimera. If any one should undertake to make a law in England, in order to give a constitutional existence to the Privy Council, and subsequently to regulate and rigorously circumscribe its privileges and attributes, with the precautions necessary for limiting its influence and preventing its abuse, he would overturn the State. *

* [We think that Count de Maistre has here fallen into a verbal error, which seems to us to deserve correction. "The constitution," says Nat. Bacon, "knows of no other counsel than the Privy Council. The sense of state once contracted into a Privy Council is soon recontracted into a Cabinet Council, and last of all into a favourite or two." The case referred to in the text is that of Lord Ellenborough, who was Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench, Privy Counsellor, and member of the Cabinet, at the same time. The question, so far as can be gathered from the debates, was, whether Lord E. could, constitutionally, hold his seat as member of the *Cabinet* to which he had been summoned

The true *English Constitution* is that admirable, unique, and infallible public spirit, beyond all praise, which guides every thing, preserves every thing, saves every thing. That which is written is nothing. *

by the King. The deliberations of the Cabinet were not like those of the body of the Privy Council, from which it is generally selected, confined to proceedings of a judicial nature, but embraced all the political concerns of the country of every description. The members of the Cabinet Council were deemed to be the confidential advisers of the Crown in the exercise of all its functions; it was not responsible as a Cabinet, and not at all, under that appellation and description, recognized by the Constitution; the law knowing nothing of its members, but as Privy Counsellors. To be a member of the Cabinet, then, was necessarily to be a party to all the measures of the administration, and to be associated and identified with the interests of the executive government. It was this intimate connection between a judge and the King's ministers, this association and identification of a judge with the executive government, which was the thing objected to, though finally carried. To the *Cabinet*, then, and not to the *Privy Council*, the matter in the text should be referred.—Trans.]

* *The turbulent government of England*, says Hume, *ever fluctuating between privilege and prerogative, would afford a variety of precedents which might be pleaded on both sides.*—(History of England, James I, chap. xlvii, A. D.

VIII. Towards the end of the last century, a great outcry was made against a Minister, who had conceived the project of introducing this same English Constitution (or what was called by that name) into a kingdom which was convulsed, and which demanded a constitution of some kind, with a sort of frenzy. *

1621.) Hume, in thus speaking the truth, is not wanting in respect to his Country ; he declares both what is, and ought to be.

["Il est une erreur très-funeste, de s'attacher trop rigidment aux monumens anciens. Il faut sans doute les respecter, mais il faut surtout considérer ce que les jurisconsultes appellent *le dernier état*. Toute constitution libre est de sa nature variable, et variable en proportion qu'elle est libre; vouloir la ramener à ses rudimens, sans en rien rabattre, c'est une entreprise folle." De Maistre, Considérations sur la France.

Hume says again, on this point, "All human governments, particularly those of a mixed frame, are in continual fluctuation."—Hist. Eng., Chas. I, chap. l.—Trans.

* [M. Neckar, who was one of the Ministers of Louis XVI, during a short period of the troublous times of the French Revolution, is the person referred to in the text. "*A spirit of innovation*," says Alison, "the exciting cause, as physicians would say, the immediate source of the convulsion, had spread like a disease throughout the kingdom.

He was wrong, if you please, so far at least as one can be wrong when he acts in good faith; which here may well be presumed, and which I believe with all my heart. But who at that time had the right of condemning him? *Vel duo, vel nemo.* He did not declare that he desired to destroy any thing of his own accord; he merely wished, he said, to substitute one thing which appeared to him reasonable, for another which had ceased to be wanted, and which, for that very reason, no longer existed. And besides, if the principle is granted, (and it was in effect,)

It seized all classes, embraced all subjects, overwhelmed all understandings. M. Neckar conceived the idea of forming the States into two Chambers, similar to the House of Lords and Commons in England; and to meet the increasing dangers, he was preparing the plan of a constitution, calculated to satisfy all classes, and tranquillize the public mind. His measures were designed to form a government very similar to the limited monarchy of England; and such as engrafted on a feudal monarchy offered the fairest prospect of stability." Etc., etc.—Alison's Hist. of French Revolution, vol. I, chap. III, London, 1833.—Trans.]

that man can create a constitution, this Minister (who was certainly a man) had the same right to make his own as well as another, and more than another. Were the doctrines on this point doubted? Was it not believed, on all sides, that a constitution was the work of intelligence, like an ode or tragedy? Had not *Thomas Paine* declared, with a profoundness that charmed the Universities, *that a constitution does not exist, so long as one cannot put it into his pocket?* The eighteenth century, which distrusted itself in nothing, as a matter of course, hesitated at nothing; and I do not believe that it has produced a single tyro of any talent, who has not made three things on leaving college,—a system of education for youth, a Constitution, and a World. If, then, a man in the maturity of his age and talent, profoundly versed in economical science and in the philosophy of the time, had attempted only the second of these things, I

should then have regarded him as exceedingly moderate; but I confess that he appears to me a real prodigy of wisdom and modesty, when I see him, substituting (at least as he believes) experience for foolish theories, ask respectfully of the English a constitution, instead of making one himself. You say, *even this was not possible.* I know it: but he did not, and how could he have known it? Name to me the man who had advanced this opinion.

IX. The more we examine the influence of human agency in the formation of political constitutions, the greater will be our conviction that it enters there only in a manner infinitely subordinate, or as a simple instrument; and I do not believe there remains the least doubt of the incontestable truth of the following propositions:—

1. That the fundamental principles of political constitutions exist before all written law.

2. That a constitutional law is, and can only be, the developement or sanction of an unwritten pre-existing right.

3. That which is most essential, most intrinsically constitutional, and truly fundamental, is never written, and could not be, without endangering the state.

4. That the weakness and fragility of a constitution are actually in direct proportion to the multiplicity of written constitutional articles. *

X. We are deceived on this point by a sophism so natural, that it entirely escapes our attention. Because man acts, he thinks he acts alone; and because he has the consciousness of his liberty, he forgets his dependence. In the physical order, he listens to reason; for although he can, for example, plant an acorn, water it, etc., he is convinced that he

* This may serve for a commentary on the celebrated remark of Tacitus: *Pessimæ Reipublicæ plurimæ Leges.*

does not make the oaks, because he witnesses their growth and perfection without the aid of human power; and moreover, that he does not make the acorn: but in the social order, where he is present, and acts, he fully believes that he is really the sole author of all that is done by himself. This is, in a sense, as if the trowel should believe itself the architect. Man is a free, intelligent, and noble being: without doubt; but he is not less an *instrument of God*, according to a happy expression of Plutarch, in a beautiful passage which here introduces itself of its own accord:

We must not wonder, he says, *if the most beautiful and greatest things in the world are done by the will and providence of God; seeing that in all the greatest and principal parts of the world there is a soul: for the organ and tool of the soul is the body, and the soul is the* INSTRUMENT OF GOD. *And as the body has of itself many movements, and as the greater*

*and more noble are derived from the soul, even so it is with the soul; some of its operations being self-moved, while in others it is directed, disciplined, and guided, by God, as it pleases Him; being itself the most beautiful organ and ingenious instrument possible: for it would be a strange thing indeed that the wind, the water, the clouds, and the rains, should be instruments of God, with which He nourishes and supports many creatures, and also destroys many others, and that He should never make use of living beings to perform any of His works. For it is far more reasonable that they, depending entirely on the power of God, should obey His direction, and accomplish all His will, than that the bow should obey the Scythians, the lyre and flute the Greeks.**

No one could write better: and I do not believe that these beautiful reflections could be

* Plutarch's Banquet of the Seven Sages.

more justly applied, than to the formation of political constitutions, where it may be said, with equal truth, that man does every thing, and does nothing.

XI. If there is any thing well known, it is the comparison of Cicero, on the subject of the Epicurean system, which proposed to build a world with atoms falling at random in space. *I would rather believe*, says the great Orator, *that letters, thrown into the air, would, on falling, arrange themselves in such a manner as to form a poem.* A thousand voices have repeated and commended this thought; yet, so far as I know, it has not occurred to any person to give it the completeness which it wants. Let us suppose that printed characters, scattered plentifully in the air, should, on coming to the ground form the Athalie of Racine; what would be the inference? *That an intelligence had directed the fall and the arrangement of*

the characters. Good sense will never conclude otherwise.

XII. Let us now consider some one political constitution, that of England, for example. It certainly was not made *à priori.* Her Statesmen never assembled themselves together and said, *Let us create three powers, balancing them in such a manner, etc.* No one of them ever thought of such a thing. The Constitution is the work of circumstances, and the number of these is infinite. Roman laws, ecclesiastical laws, feudal laws; Saxon, Norman, and Danish customs; the privileges, prejudices, and claims of all orders; wars, revolts, revolutions, the Conquest, Crusades; virtues of every kind, and all vices; knowledge of every sort, and all errors and passions;—all these elements, in short, acting together, and forming, by their admixture and reciprocal action, combinations multiplied by myriads of

millions, have produced at length, after many centuries, the most complex unity, and happy equilibrium of political powers that the world has ever seen. *

* Tacitus believed this form of government would never be other than an ideal theory or transient experiment. "The best of all governments," says he, (after Cicero as we know,) [*esse optime constituam rempublicam, quæ ex tribus generibus illis, regali, optimo, et populari, sit modice confusa,*] "would be that which should result from the mixture of three powers, balancing each other; *but this government can never exist, or if it should exhibit itself, would never endure.*" (Ann. iv, 33.) English good sense, however, can make it last a much longer time than could be imagined, by subordinating continually, but more or less, the theory, or what are called *the principles*, to the lessons of experience and moderation: which would be impossible, if the *principles* were written.

[The *germ* of this form of government appears, according to Plutarch, in his Life of Lycurgus, to have been first included by this Lawgiver, in his establishment of the Senate. "For the State," says he, "which before had no firm basis to stand upon, but leaned one while towards an absolute monarchy (when the King had the upper hand,) and another while towards a pure democracy (when the people had the better of it,) finding in this establishment of the Senate a counterpoise, which always kept things in a just *equilibrium*, preserved a firm order and settlement. For the Senate adhered to the King, so far as to oppose a demo-

XIII. Now since these elements, thus projected into space, have arranged themselves in such beautiful order, without a single man, among the innumerable multitude who have acted in this vast field, having ever known what he had done relatively to the whole, nor foreseen what would happen, it follows, inevitably, that these elements were guided in their fall by an infallible hand, superior to man. The greatest folly, perhaps, in an age of follies, was in believing that fundamental laws could be written *à priori*, whilst they are evidently the work of a power above man; and whilst the very committing them to writing, long after, is the most certain sign of their nullity.

eracy, and on the other side assisted the people to prevent tyranny."

The celebrated Mr. Fox, once Prime Minister of England, remarked, in a speech in the House of Commons, "that he always thought any of the simple, unbalanced governments bad; simple monarchy, simple aristocracy, simple democracy; he held them all imperfect or vicious; all were bad by themselves; the *composition alone* was good."—Trans.]

XIV. It is very remarkable, that God, having condescended to speak to men, has Himself unfolded these truths, in the two revelations which, through His abounding goodness He has given to us. A very able man, who has made, in my opinion, a kind of epoch in our age, by reason of the desperate conflict which he exhibits in his writings, between the most frightful prejudices of the age, of sect, of habit, etc., and the purest intentions, the most virtuous emotions, and the most valuable knowledge ;—this able man, I say, has decided, "*that a teaching coming immediately from God, or given only by His direction,* OUGHT *primarily to certify to men the existence of this* BEING."*

* [It is very probable that reference is here made to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. See *Collection complete des œuvres, tom.* ix, *Liv.* iv, *d'Emile. Prof. de foi du Vicaire Savoyard.* He was one of the most dangerous sophists of his age, "et cependant le plus dépourvu de véritable science, de sagacité et surtout de profondeur, avec une profondeur apparente qui est toute dans les mots." As to his intrinsic merit, La Harpe says, *Tout, jusqu' à la vérité, trompe dans ses écrits.*—Trans.]

The opposite of this is the truth; for the primary character of this instruction is not to reveal directly the existence or the attributes of God, but to suppose the whole already known, without our understanding why or in what manner. Thus, it says not, *There is*, or *you shall believe in only one God, eternal, almighty*, etc. It says, (and it is its first word,) under a form purely narrative, *In the beginning, God created*, etc., which supposes that the dogma is known before the writing.

XV. Let us pass on to Christianity, the greatest of all imaginable institutions, since it is wholly Divine, made for all men and every age: we shall find it subjected to the general law. Its Divine Author was certainly able to write Himself, or to cause His doctrines to be written; yet He did neither one nor the other, at least in a legislative form. The New Testament, porterior to the death of the Law-giver,

and even the establishment of His religion, exhibits a narration of admonitions, moral precepts, exhortations, commands, threats, etc.; but in no wise a collection of dogmas expressed in an imperative form. The Evangelists, in describing that last supper where God loved us EVEN UNTO THE END, had there a good opportunity of commanding our belief by writing; they guard themselves, however, from declaring or ordaining any thing. We read, indeed, in their admirable history, *Go, teach!* but not at all, *teach this* or *that.* If doctrine appears under the pen of the sacred historian, he simply expresses it as a thing already known.*

* It is very remarkable, that even the Evangelists did not take the pen until a late period, and principally to contradict the false histories published in their times. The canonical epistles originated in accidental causes. Scripture never entered into the primitive plan of the founders. Mill, though protestant, has expressly recognized this. (Proleg. in Nov. Test. Græc. p. I, No. 65.) And Hobbes had already

The symbols, which appeared afterwards, are professions of faith for its own recognition,

made the same observation in England. ["When a man cometh to look into those transcendent writings, he finds them to be works of a sort of innocent, harmless men, that had little acquaintance or familiarity with the world, and consequently not much interested in the troubles and quarrels of several countries ; *that though they are all but necessary, yet were they written occasionally, rather than out of design.*"—Hobbes' Tripos, in three discourses, Disc. III. See Molesworth's Ed. of his works, vol. iv.—Trans.]

[The following passage from Paley, may be cited in confirmation, incidentally at least, of the view taken in the text : "Whilst the Apostles were busied in preaching and travelling, in collecting disciples, in forming and regulating societies of converts, in supporting themselves against opposition ; whilst they exercised their ministry under the harassings of frequent persecutions, and in a state of almost continual alarm, it is not probable that, in this engaged, anxious, and unsettled condition of life, *they would think immediately, of writing histories* for the information of the public or of posterity. But it is probable, that *emergencies might draw from some of them occasional letters upon the subject of their mission*, to converts or to societies of converts, with which they were connected ; or that they might *address written discourses and exhortations* to the disciples of the institution at large, which would be received and read with a respect proportioned to the character of the writer. Accounts in the mean time would get abroad of the extraordinary things that had been

or for contradicting the errors of the moment. In them, we read, *we believe;* never, *you shall*

passing, written with different degrees of information and correctness. The extension of the Christian society, which could no longer be instructed by a personal intercourse with the Apostles, and the possible *circulation of imperfect or erroneous narratives*, would soon teach some amongst them *the expediency of sending forth authentic memoirs* of the life and doctrine of their Master. When accounts appeared, *. . . . found to coincide with what the Apostles and first preachers of religion had taught, other accounts would fall into disuse and neglect.*" "This," he proceeds to say, "seems the natural progress of the business; and with this the records in our possession, and the evidence concerning them, correspond. . . . But as these letters were not written to prove the truth of the Christian religion, in the sense in which we regard that question; *nor to convey information of facts, of which those to whom the letters were written had been previously informed;* we are not to look in them for any thing more than incidental allusions to the Christian history."—See *Evidences of Christianity*, Chap. viii.

Eusebius may also be cited, to the same effect. "*Nor were the Apostles of Christ greatly concerned about the writing of books, being engaged in a more excellent ministry, which is above all human power.*" Eccles. Hist. L. III. c. 24.

A passage of Anthony Grant's is to the point. "Wherever the Gospel took root, there a church was formed—was formed, not round a doctrine, but round a commissioned teacher; . . . . . who taught what had been imparted to him. . . . . But at length, writings became necessary to preserve the

believe. We recite them individually ; we chant them in the temples, on the lyre and

truth so intrusted to man from being either lost, or mutilated, or corrupted, etc. . . . The Sacred Writings themselves, especially the Epistles, bear the mark of being adapted to those *who had already been instructed in the Christian faith.* They are composed in an unsystematic manner, especially ill suited to minds unacquainted with the outlines of that doctrine which they treat of ; fundamental tenets and inferences are mixed together ; *and many portions of them are designed to supplement, or correct, or limit, what had been before communicated.*" See Bampton Lectures, 1843, Lect. III.

The same idea may be still further illustrated by the same author. "That in order to the perpetuation and transmission of principles, or religious truths, it seems necessary that these should be embodied in certain institutions and outward forms, and conveyed through a definite channel. Thus, *laws have ever been connected with a settled mode of administration ; religious tenets have been joined to external ceremonies and rites, and transmitted by a separate order,* as well as preserved in writing . . . . .That the Church, as the visible institution of Christ, is the divinely ordained instrument for propagating Christianity in the world ; . . . . . *that the promise of success in this work is not engaged* (Rom. x. 14, 15) *to the mere distribution of the written word, but to the preaching of the Gospel by living witnesses ;* . . . . that the place held by the Holy Scriptures in the economy of instruction, is that of proving and confirming the previous elementary teaching of the Church, conveyed through its formularies, and the oral exposi-

organ,* as true prayers, because they are formulas of submission, of confidence, and of

tions of its messengers ;" may be clearly shown "from reasonable probability, from the revealed will of God, and from Apostolic practice .... To this method all historical records of the propagation of the Gospel bear witness and it is illustrated by the well-known and striking passage of Irenæus, who wrote, that 'many nations of barbarians, without paper and ink, had, through the Holy Spirit, the words of salvation written in their hearts.'—Adv. Hæres. III. chap. iv.) In reality, this process is only in accordance with the method pursued in the communication of all knowledge; in imparting which, a teacher, speaking with authority, and claiming the confidence of the instructed, is a condition upon which alone it can be received."—Ibid.

Richard Baxter may be cited to the same point. "Therefore the Church had a summary and symbol of Christianity, as I said before, about twelve years *before any book of the New Testament was written*, and about sixty-six before the whole was written; and this of God's own making : and which was agreed on when many books of the New Testament were not agreed on." Catholic Theology, Introduction, 1675, Fol. See Wordsworth's Institutes, vol. I, p. 272.

Our last authority confirming the same view, shall be the New Testament itself. Not to say any thing of the "faithful sayings" and "traditions" to which occasional allusions are made, we will refer our readers to the introduction to St. Luke's Gospel.—Trans.]

* In chordis et organi, Ps. cl., 4.

faith, addressed to God, and not ordinances addressed to men. I should be glad to see the *Confession of Augsburgh*, or the *Thirty-nine Articles*, set to music; this would be diverting.*

The first symbols are far from containing the announcement of *all* our dogmas; on the contrary, Christians then would have regarded the announcement of them *all* as a great sin. The same is true of the Holy Scriptures: there never was an idea more shallow than that of seeking in them for the totality of the Christian doctrines; there is not a line in these writings which declares, or even allows us to discover, the design of making from them a code or

* Reason can only *speak;* it is love which *chants;* therefore we chant our symbols; for *faith* is only a *belief, through love:* she resides not merely in the understanding, she penetrates further and takes root in the will. A philosophical theologian has said, with much truth and ingenuity, "There is a difference between believing, and judging what it is necessary to believe." *Aliud est credere, aliud judicare esse credendum.* Leon. Lessii *Opuscula*, Lugd. 1651, in fol., pag. 556, col. 2. (De predestinatione.)

dogmatic declaration of all the articles of faith.*

XVI. More than this: if a people possess one of these *codes of belief*, we may be sure of three things:

1. That the religion of this people is false.

2. That it has written its religious code in a paroxysm of fever.

3. That this code will be ridiculed in a little while among this very nation, and that it will possess neither power nor durability. Such are, for example, those famous ARTICLES, *which are signed by more than read, and read by more than believe them.*† Not only is this catalogue of dogmas counted for nothing, or next to nothing, in the country which gave them birth; but furthermore, it is manifest,

*[" Nor were the Sacred Writings intended to supersede, even afterwards," after the completion of the sacred canon, " *other concurrent and authoritative teaching.*" Grant's Bampton Lect. 1843. Lect. III.—Trans.]

† See Gibbon's Memoirs [by Milman, Chap. III. Ed. 1840.]

even to a foreign eye, that the illustrious possessors of this sheet of paper are greatly embarrassed with it. In fact, they wish themselves well rid of it, because the national mind, enlightened by time, has grown weary of it; and besides it recalls to them an unhappy origin: but the *constitution is written.*

XVII. The English doubtless, would never have asked for the *Great Charter*, had not the privileges of the nation been violated; nor would they have asked for it, if these privileges had not existed before the Charter. What is true of the State, in this respect, is also true of the Church: if Christianity had never been attacked, there never would have been any writings to settle the dogmas; nor would the dogmas have been settled by writing, had they not pre-existed in their natural state, which is the *oral.*

The real authors of the Council of Trent were the two grand innovators of the sixteenth

century.* Their disciples having become more calm, have since proposed to us to expunge this fundamental law, because it contains some hard words for them ; and they have endeavoured to tempt us, by indicating to us the possibility of a reunion, on that condition, which would make us accomplices instead of rendering us friends ; but this demand is neither theological nor philosophical. They themselves formerly introduced into religious language those words which now weary them. Let us desire that they should now learn to pronounce them. Faith, if a sophistical opposition had never forced her to write, would be a thousand times more angelic : she weeps over these decisions which revolt ex-

* The same observation might be made on going back to the times of Arius. The Church has never sought to write her dogmas, she has always been forced to do it.

["The only variations in respect of Christian doctrine the Catholic admits are, as Father Perrone," the present Professor of Theology at Rome, "says, new modes of expression adopted on the occasion of novel errors."—Trans.]

torted from her, and which were always evils, since they all suppose doubt or aggression, and could only arise in the midst of the most dangerous commotions. The state of war raised these venerable ramparts around the truth: they undoubtedly protected her, but at the same time concealed her: they rendered her unassailable; but by that very means less accessible. Ah! this is not what she craves, she who would embrace the whole human race in her arms.

XVIII. I have spoken of Christianity as a system of belief; I will now consider it as a sovereignty, in its most numerous association. There it is monarchical, as all the world know; and this is as it should be, since monarchy becomes, by the very nature of things, the more necessary, in proportion as the association becomes more numerous. We do not forget that an observation from an impure

mouth has met with approval in our day, affirming *that France was geographically monarchical.* It would be difficult indeed to express this incontestable truth in a manner more happy. But if the extent of France repels the very idea of every other form of government, much more this sovereignty, which, by the essential nature of its constitution, will always have subjects on every part of the globe, requires that it should be only monarchical ; and experience is found on this point in perfect accordance with theory. This admitted, who would not believe that such a monarchy would be found more strictly defined and circumscribed than all others, in the prerogative of its chief ? It is however altogether otherwise. Read the innumerable volumes conceived and brought forth by foreign war, and even by a species of civil war which has its advantages as well as inconveniences, you will see on every side that facts only are

cited ; and it is a very remarkable thing especially, that the supreme tribunal should constantly allow dispute upon the question which presents itself to every mind as the most fundamental of the constitution, without ever having wished to determine it by a formal law ; and thus it should be, if I am not greatly deceived, by reason of the very fundamental importance of the question.* Some men without authority, and rash through weakness, attempted to decide it in 1682, in spite of a great man ; and it was one of the greatest acts of folly which has ever been committed in the world. Its monument which remains to us, is doubtless to be condemned in every respect ; but it is especially so from one feature

* I know not whether Englishmen have remarked that the most learned and ardent defender of the sovereignty which is here referred to, entitles one of his chapters thus : *A mixed monarchy tempered by aristocracy and democracy is better than a pure monarchy.* (Bellarminus, de summo. Pontif. cap. III.) Not bad for a fanatic !

which has not been considered, although it invites assault from enlightened criticism more than every other. The famous Declaration dared to decide, by writing, without even apparent necessity, (which carried the fault to excess,) a question which ought ever to be left to a certain practical wisdom, enlightened by the UNIVERSAL conscience. This is the only point of view which at all coincides with the design of this work; but it is altogether worthy of the meditations of every just mind and upright heart.*

* [In the year 1678, Pope Innocent XI. became engaged in the controversy of his three predecessors with Louis XIV. The subject of it was the extension of a right called in France the *régale*, by which the King claimed the collation to all benefices which became vacant in the diocese of a deceased bishop before the nomination of his successor, and likewise, the granting of the investiture to every new bishop, and requiring him on the occasion to swear allegiance to him as his liege lord. These claims had been vigorously opposed by the predecessors of Innocent, and maintained with no less vigour by the King. Innocent, though observing the same general line of policy as his predecessors, opposed a stronger resistance to the

XIX. These ideas (taken in their general sense) were not unknown to the ancient phi-

measures of Louis. The Pope admonished even to the third time; but his admonitions were not regarded by the King. He sent forth bulls and mandates, and the monarch opposed their execution by the terror of penal laws, and the authority of severe edicts against all who should dare to treat them with the smallest regard. Innocent, who possessed a high spirit, and pursued all his purposes with inflexible firmness, did not lose courage at the sight of these vigorous proceedings; but threatened to make use of every weapon which God had placed in his hands. These proceedings on the part of the Pope at length determined Louis to summon the famous Assembly of Bishops, which met at Paris in 1682, and drew up the four celebrated propositions, as a manifesto of the *Gallican Liberties.*

1. That the temporal power is independent of the spiritual, and that the authority of the Pope is merely spiritual.

2. That general councils are superior to the Pope.

3. That the rules, institutions, and observances of the Gallican Church are inviolable, and that the power of the Pope ought to be ruled by canons.

4. That the principal authority belongs to the Pope in questions of faith, but his decisions are subject to amendment, so long as they have not received the assent of the Church.

These propositions were adopted by the whole Assembly, and proposed to the whole body of the clergy, and to all the Universities throughout the kingdom, as a sacred rule of

losophers: they keenly felt the impotency, I had almost said the nothingness, of writing, in great institutions; but no one of them has seen this truth more clearly, or expressed it more happily, than Plato, whom we always find the first upon the track of all great truths. According to him, "the man who is wholly

faith. At the same time the King issued an edict, commanding all his subjects to receive them, with a strict prohibition against asserting or maintaining the contrary doctrine. —See Aikin's General Biography, vol. v. and Chaudon et Delandine Dictionaire Historique, art. Louis XIV.

The first three articles are a repetition of principles declared and maintained before; but the fourth, it will readily be perceived, is the one referred to in the text, and the most important, since it *limits not only the temporal but the spiritual authority of the Pope.*

"Jamais peut-être on ne commit d'imprudence plus fatale; jamais la passion n'aveugla davantage des hommes d'ailleurs très éclairés. Il y a dans tous les gouvernements des choses qui doivent être laissées dans une salutaire obscurité, qui sont suffisamment claires pour le bon sens, mais qui cessent de l'être du moment où la science entreprend de les éclaircir davantage, et de les circonscrire avec précision par le raisonnement et surtout par l'écriture."—See J. De Maistre, de l'Église Gallicane, in-8vo. Chap. III. p. 127. Lyon, 1838.—Trans.]

indebted to writing for his instruction, *will only possess the appearance of wisdom.** The word, he adds, is to writing, what the man is to his portrait. The productions of the pencil present themselves to our eyes as living things; but *if we interrogate them, they maintain a dignified silence.*† It is the same with writing, *which knows not what to say to one man, nor what to conceal from another.* If you attack it or insult it without a cause, it cannot defend itself; *for its author is never present to sustain it.*‡ So that he who imagines himself capable of establishing, clearly and permanently, one single doctrine, by writing alone, IS A GREAT BLOCKHEAD. § If he really possessed the true

* *Δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν.*—Plat. in Phœdr. Opp. tom. x, Edit. Bipont, p. 381.

† *Σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ.*—Ibid. p. 382.

‡ *Τοῦ πατρος ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ.*—Ibid. p. 382.

§ *Πολλῆς ἂν εὐηθείας γέμει.*—Ibid. p. 382. Word for word, *he is surfeited with folly.* Let every body, in our country, take care that this species of *plethora* does not become endemic.

germs of truth, he would not indulge the thought, that *with a little black liquid and a pen** he could cause them to germinate in the world, defend them from the inclemency of the season, and communicate to them the necessary efficacy. As for the man who undertakes to write *laws or civil constitutions*,† and who fancies that, because he has written them, he is able to give them adequate evidence and stability, whoever he may be, a private man or legislator,‡ he disgraces himself, whether we say it or not;‖ for he has proved thereby that he is equally ignorant of the nature of inspiration and delirium, right and wrong, good and evil. Now, this ignorance is a reproach, though the entire mass of the vulgar should unite in its praise." §

* *Ἐν ὕδατι μέλανι διὰ καλαμοῦ.*—Plat. in Phœdr. Opp. tom. x, Edit. Bipont. p. 384.

† *Νόμους τιθείς, σύγγραμμα πολιτικὸν γράφων.*—Ibid. p. 386.

‡ *Ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ.*—Ibid.

‖ *Εἴτέ τις φησὶν, εἴτε μή.*—Ibid.

§ *Οὐκ ἐκφεύγει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὐκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ ἄν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ.*—Ibid. p. 386, 387.

XX. After having heard the *wisdom of the Gentiles*, it will not be useless to listen further to Christian Philosophy.

"It were indeed desirable for us," says one of the most eloquent of the Greek fathers, "never to have required the aid of the written word, but to have had the Divine precepts written only in our hearts, by grace, as they are written with ink in our books; but since we have lost this grace by our own fault, let us then, as it is necessary, seize *a plank instead of the vessel*, without however forgetting the pre-eminence of the first state. God never revealed any thing in writing to the elect of the Old Testament: He always spoke to them directly, because He saw the purity of their hearts; but the Hebrew people having fallen into the very abyss of wickedness, books and laws became necessary. The same proceeding is repeated under the empire of the New Revelation; for Christ did not leave a single writing

to his Apostles. Instead of books, he promised to them the Holy Spirit: *It is He*, saith our Lord to them, *who shall teach you what you shall speak.* But because, in process of time, sinful men rebelled against the faith and against morality, it was necessary to have recourse to books." *

* St. Chrysost. Hom. in Matth. I, i.

["Lycurgus would never reduce his laws to writing; for he thought that the most material points, and such as most directly tended to the public welfare, being *imprinted* on the hearts of their youth by a good education, and, by a constant and habitual observance of them, becoming a *second* nature, would supply the place of *law* and a lawgiver in them all the rest of their lives. . . . . *Plato*, *Diogenes*, *Zeno*, and *Chrysippus*, who have written well on politics, took Lycurgus for their model, as appears by their writings: but these great men left *only vain projects, in writing and words*, behind them; whereas *Lycurgus*, *without writing any thing*, did actually produce a real government, which had never been thought of before him; . . . . . and the city of Lacedæmon continued, both in respect of good government at home and reputation abroad, for the space of five hundred years, mainly by their strict observance of *Lycurgus's* laws; . . . . . and he deserves the preference before all other statesmen of Greece, be-

XXI. The whole truth is found united in these two authorities. They show the profound imbecility (it is certainly permissible to speak like Plato, who never loses his temper,) the profound imbecility, I say, of those poor men who imagine that lawgivers are men,* that

cause he put that in practice of which they only had the idea."—See Plutarch's Life of Lycurgus.

Plutarch in his Life of Numa, says, "But he (Numa) having in his life time perfectly taught the priests all that he had written, and habituated them to a perfect skill and practice of every particular, commanded that the sacred books, which he had written in the same manner as some legislators among the *Greeks* wrote their tables of laws, should be buried with his body, as if he thought such secret mysteries could not be kept and conveyed with sufficient respect in *lifeless writings*. For this very reason, they say, the *Pythagoreans* would not commit their precepts [or constitutions] to writing, but imprinted them upon the memory, and by way of unwritten instruction, to such as were worthy to receive them."

Such passages as these justify the commendation of Plutarch found in another work of our author. "*There is not a single idea, sound in morals and politics, which has escaped the good sense of Plutarch.*"—Trans.]

* Among a multitude of admirable passages with which the Psalms of David sparkle, I distinguish the following :

laws are a piece of paper, and that nations may be constituted *with ink.* They show, on the contrary, that scripture is invariably a sign of weakness, ignorance, or danger; that in proportion as an institution is perfect, it writes less; so that what is truly divine, has nothing at all written for its establishment; in order to make us feel that all written law is only a necessary evil, engendered by infirmity or human malice; and that it is of no authority whatever, unless it has received a previous, unwritten sanction.

XXII. We cannot but lament here over the fundamental fallacy of a system which has so unhappily divided Europe. The partizans of this system have said, *We believe only in the Word of God.* What abuse of words! what a strange and melancholy ignorance of Divine

"*Constitue Domine legislatorem super eos, ut sciant Gentes quoniam homines sunt;* that is to say,—Appoint, O Lord, a lawgiver over them, that the nations may know themselves to be *but* men. It is a beautiful sentence.

things! We alone *believe in the Word*, whilst our *dear enemies* are obstinately resolved to believe only *in scripture;* as if God could or would change the nature of things of which He is the Author, and impart to scripture the life and efficacy which it has not! The Holy Scripture — is it not then *a writing?* Has it not been traced *with a pen and a little black liquid? Does it know what it is needful to say to one man, and what to withhold from another?** Did not Leibnitz and his maid servant read in it the same words? Can this Scripture be any thing else than the *image of the Word?* And though infinitely venerable in this respect, if we should interrogate it, *must it not keep a divine silence?*† If it should be attacked or insulted, *can it defend itself in the absence of its Author?* Glory to the truth! If *the Word*, eternally living, does

* Vide page 66, et suiv.

† *Σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ.*—Plat. in Phœdr. Opp. tom. x. Edit. Bipont. p. 382.

not quicken the scripture, it will never become the *word*, that is to say, *the life*. Let others invoke then, as much as they please, THE SILENT WORD; we will smile peacefully at this *false god;* always expecting, with a tender impatience the moment when its partisans, undeceived, will throw themselves into our arms, opened to embrace them for three centuries past.

XXIII. Every right mind will convince itself on this point, by a little reflection upon an axiom equally striking by its importance and by its universality. It is this, THAT NOTHING GREAT HAS GREAT BEGINNINGS. There will not be found in the history of all ages a single exception to this law. *Crescit occulto velut arbor ævo*, is the immortal device of every great institution; and hence it is, that every false institution writes much, because it feels its weakness, and seeks support. From the truth just expressed, follows the unalterable

consequence, that no institution, truly great and real, could be founded on a written law, since the men themselves, the successive instruments of its establishment, know not what it will become, and since insensible growth is the true sign of durability, in every possible order of things. A remarkable example of this kind, may be found in the power of the sovereign Pontiffs, which I do not intend to consider here in a dogmatic way. A multitude of able writers, since the sixteenth century, have employed a prodigious amount of learning, in order to establish, by going back to the cradle of Christianity, that the Bishops of Rome were not, in the first centuries, what they afterwards became ; thus supposing, as a point conceded, that every thing which is not found in primitive times, is an abuse. Now I say, without the least spirit of contention, and without the design of offending any body, they manifest in this as much

philosophy and true knowledge, as they would do in seeking, in an infant in swaddling clothes, the true dimensions of a full-grown man. The sovereignty, of which I am speaking at this moment, was born like others, and has grown like others. It is lamentable to see excellent minds taking such immense pains, to prove by infancy that manhood is an abuse; whilst any institution whatever, adult at birth, would be the grossest of absurdities, a true logical contradiction. If the enlightened and generous enemies of this power (and there are undoubtedly many of this class) will examine the question in this point of view, as I affectionately pray them to do, I do not doubt that all these objections, drawn from antiquity, will disappear as a light mist from before their eyes.

Concerning abuses, I ought not to employ myself here. I will say, however, since I have already had occasion to refer to them,

that there is much to abate the declamatory invectives which the last century has compelled us to read on this great subject. A time will come, when the Popes, against whom the most clamour has been made, such as Gregory VII, for example, will be regarded, in every country, as the friends, guardians, and saviours of the human race,—as the true constitutive genuises of Europe.*

*[The following passage, from a Protestant writer, taken in connection with the statement in the text, cannot be devoid of interest. Speaking of the extension of the Gospel before the 16th century, he says, "We must admit that the fact of such a power" (that of the sovereign Pontiffs) "having been established, proves at least the prevalence of a conviction that Christianity was a system, that Christians were a body, and that unity was a token of that body; —and further, a dispassionate judgement will conclude that such a power . . . became a channel of God's providences to the world; that it was still the means whereby the idea of a spiritual rule on earth was tangibly impressed on minds which would have been unaffected by the purer and simpler garb which the Gospel wore in primitive ages ; that it did overcome the cruelty and tyranny of monarchs, before which weaker and less compacted bodies might have fallen ; did

No person will doubt it, when learned Frenchmen shall be Christians, and when learned Englishmen shall be Catholics;—which will yet come to pass.

XXIV. But by what penetrating word can we at this moment make ourselves heard, by an age infatuated with Scripture, and at variance with the Word, to such a degree, as to believe that men can create constitutions, languages, and even sovereignties?—by an age, for which all realities are dreams, and dreams realities; which sees not even what is passing before its eyes; which feasts itself upon books, and asks for the equivocal lessons of Thucydides or Livy, altogether shutting their eyes to the truth which beams in the gazettes of the times?

frequently check the career of guilty power, and uphold the cause of justice and of virtue."—Grant's Bampton Lectures, 1843. Lect. iv. London. Trans.]

If the desires of a mere mortal were worthy of obtaining of Divine Providence one of those memorable decrees which constitute the grand epochs of history, I would ask Him to inspire some powerful nation, which had grievously offended Him, with the proud thought of constituting itself politically, beginning at the foundations. And if, notwithstanding my unworthiness, the primitive familiarity of one of the Patriarchs were permitted to me, I would say, "Grant to this people every thing! Give to her genius, knowledge, riches, consideration, especially an unbounded confidence in herself, and that temper, at once pliant and enterprising, which nothing can embarrass, nothing intimidate. Extinguish her old government; take away from her memory; destroy her affections; spread terror around her; blind or paralyze her enemies; give victory charge to watch at once over all her frontiers, so that none

of her neighbours could meddle in her affairs, or disturb her in her operations. Let this nation be illustrious in science, rich in philosophy, intoxicated with human power, free from all prejudice, from every tie, and from all superior influence; bestow upon her every thing she shall desire, lest at some time she might say, *this was wanting*, or *that restrained me:* let her, in short, act freely with this immensity of means, that at length she may become, under Thy inexorable protection, an eternal lesson to the human race."

XXV. We cannot, it is true, expect a combination of circumstances which would constitute literally a miracle; but events of the same order, though less remarkable, have manifested themselves here and there in history, even in the history of our days; and, though they may not possess, for the purpose

of example, that ideal force which I desired just now, they contain not less of memorable instruction.

We have been witnesses, within the last twenty-five years, of a solemn attempt made for the regeneration of a great nation mortally sick. It was the first experiment in the great work, and the *preface*, if I may be allowed to express myself thus, of the frightful book which we have been since called upon to read. Every precaution was taken. The wise men of the country believed it their duty to consult the modern divinity, in her foreign sanctuary. They wrote to Delphi, and two famous pontiffs answered in due form.* The oracles which they pronounced, on this occasion, were not, as in olden times, light leaves, the sport of the breezes; they were bound:

. . . . . Quidque hæc sapientia possit,
Tunc patuit. . . . . .

* Rousseau and Mably.

It is but just, however, to acknowledge, that in whatever the nation was indebted merely to its own good sense, there were many things which excite our admiration at this day. Every qualification was, doubtless, united on the head of the wise and august person called to take the reins of government; the chief men interested in maintaining the ancient laws, voluntarily made a noble sacrifice to the public; and in order to fortify the supreme authority, they lent themselves to change an epithet of the sovereignty.—Alas! all human wisdom was at fault, and all ended in death.*

* [The following condensed statement, from an authentic source, respecting the times referred to in the text, may help us to apprehend it more clearly.

"The National Assembly of France were engaged in framing their celebrated declaration of the *Rights of Man*, which was to form the basis of the new constitution, when the whole nation was agitated by suspicion and alarm from the accounts, received from all quarters, of the state of anarchy into which the kingdom was falling, obliging them suddenly to turn their attention to objects of practical necessity; thus anticipating, in a sudden and unexpected

XXVI. *But*, it will be said, *we know the causes which prevented the success of*

manner, the changes which the new constitution was intended to confirm. The privileged orders found themselves become the objects of universal jealousy and hatred; and that something must instantly be done to save their families and property, which were menaced, on every side, with persecution and pillage. Regarding the popular torrent as now become irresistible ; to save something, they resolved to sacrifice a part. On the afternoon sitting of the fourth of August, 1789, the Viscount de Noailles, seconded by the Duc d'Aiguillon, opened one of the most important scenes in the French Revolution, or in the history of any country. These noblemen stated, that the true cause of the commotions which convulsed the kingdom existed in the misery of the people, who groaned under the double oppression of public contributions and of feudal services. 'For three months, (said M. de Noailles,) the people have beheld us engaged in verbal disputes, while their own attention and their wishes are only directed to things. What is the consequence? They are armed to reclaim their rights, and they see no prospect of obtaining them but by force.' He therefore proposed to do justice, as the shortest way of restoring tranquillity ; and, for that purpose, to decree, that henceforth every tax should be imposed in proportion to the wealth of the contributors, and that no order of the state should be exempted from the payment of public burdens; that feudal claims should be redeemed at a fair valuation; but that such as consisted of personal services on the part of the vassal, should be abolished without compen-

that enterprise. How then? Do you wish that God should send angels under human

sation, as contrary to the imprescriptible rights of man. The extensive possessions of the noblemen who made these proposals, added much lustre to the disinterested sacrifice which they offered. Their speeches were received with the most enthusiastic applauses, by the Assembly and by the galleries, and their proposals were decreed by acclamation, without a vote. The patriotic contagion now spread fast through every heart, and a contest of generosity ensued. The hereditary jurisdictions possessed by the nobles within their own territories, were next sacrificed. All places and pensions granted by the Court were suppressed, unless granted as the reward of merit or of actual services. The game laws, which were supposed to be severe grievances to the peasantry, were renounced, with many other exclusive rights. The sale of offices was abolished, and the rights of casual emoluments, and of plurality of benefices, were relinquished by the clergy. The deputies of the *Pais d'Etat*, or privileged provinces, with the deputies of Dauphiné at their head, next came forward, and offered a surrender of their ancient privileges, requesting that the kingdom might no longer remain parcelled out among Dauphinais, Bretons, Provençaux, &c., but that they should all form one great mass of French Citizens. They were followed by the representatives of Paris, Marseilles, Lyons, Bourdeaux, Strasbourg, &c., who requested leave to renounce all their separate privileges as incorporations, for the sake of placing every man and every village in the nation upon a footing of equality. Thus the Assembly pro-

guises commissioned to destroy a constitution? It will always be necessary to employ second

ceeded, till every member had exhausted his imagination upon the subject of reform. To close the whole, the Duc de Liancourt proposed that a solemn *Te Deum* should be performed, that a medal should be struck in commemoration of the events of that night; and that the title of Restorer of Gallic Liberty should be bestowed upon the reigning monarch. A deputation was accordingly appointed, to wait upon the King, respectfully to inform him of these decrees.

"Several succeeding days were necessary to form into laws the decrees of the fourth of August, and committees were appointed to make out reports for that purpose. Soon after this, the King gave his sanction to the important decrees, but not without some hesitation, and expressing doubts of the wisdom of many of them in a letter to the Assembly. At the same time, the *inviolability* of the person of the Monarch was decreed, the indivisibility of the throne, and its hereditary descent from male to male in the reigning family."

The proceedings of this night changed entirely the political condition of France. It was probably the greatest moral shock the world has ever known, and was followed by consequences proportionably disastrous. The clergy, the Nobles, and the King, though possessing their former titles and nominal dignity, were now at the mercy of the Commons, who speedily dismissed them at their pleasure. We will only add one passage, from Alison, in reference to these precipitate measures.

causes; this or that, what does it signify? Every instrument is good in the hands of the great Artificer; but such is the blindness of men, that if, to-morrow, some constitution-monger should come to organize a people, and to give them a constitution made *with a little black liquid*, the multitude would again hasten to believe in the miracle announced. It would be said, again, *nothing is wanting; all is foreseen, all is written;* whilst, precisely because all could be foreseen, discussed, and written, it would be demonstrated, that the constitution is a nullity, and presents to the eye merely an ephemeral appearance.*

"When rights, which had withstood the tyranny of Richelieu and Lauvois were renounced, all the monuments of freedom which the patriotism of former times had erected, were swept away; and the liberty, erected in its stead, was founded on an imaginary and inexperienced basis. Those whom you hope to disarm by concessions, are only led, by them, to still bolder attempts, and more extravagant demands."—Trans.]

*[Modern Philosophy is altogether too material and too presumptuous, to perceive the true jurisdiction of the politi-

XXVII. I believe I have read, somewhere, *that there are few sovereignties in a condition to vindicate the legitimacy of their origin.* Admitting the reasonableness of the assertion, there will not result from it the least stain to the successors of a chief, whose acts might be liable to some objections; the cloud, which might conceal from view, more or less, the origin of his authority, would be only a dis-

cal world. One of its follies, is that of believing that an assembly can constitute a nation; that a *constitution*, that is to say, the *ensemble* of fundamental laws which are suited for a nation, and which give to it some definite form of government, is a performance, like another, which requires intelligence, knowledge, and practice; that one may learn his trade of *constituting;* and that men, at the moment they imagine the necessity of it, can say to other men, *make us a government*, just as is said to an artisan, *make us a fire engine, or a stocking loom.*

Yet it is a truth, as certain, in its kind, as a mathematical proposition, that *no great institution results from deliberation*, and that human works are fragile, in proportion to the number of men who engage in them, and to the amount of science and reasoning *à priori*, employed about them.—Considérations sur la France, p. 112, A Lyon, 1834. Trans.]

advantage, — a necessary consequence of a law of the moral world. If it were otherwise, it would follow, that the sovereign could not reign legitimately, except by virtue of a deliberation of all the people, that is to say, *by the grace of the people;* which will never happen: for there is nothing so true, as that which was said by the author of the *Considerations on France,—that the people will always accept their masters, and will never choose them.* It is necessary that the origin of sovereignty should manifest itself from beyond the sphere of human power; so that men, who may appear to have a direct hand in it, may be, nevertheless, only the circumstances. As to legitimacy, if it should seem in its origin to be obscure, God explains Himself, by His prime-minister in the department of this world,—Time. It is true, nevertheless, that certain contemporary signs are not to be mistaken, when we are in a condition to

observe them; but the details, on this point, belong to another work.*

* [This principle is so beautifully illustrated in the work referred to, that we cannot refrain from introducing the entire passage. Speaking of the manner in which counter-revolutions are effected, having the case of France particularly in view, the author proceeds to say, "En politique, comme en mécanique, les théories trompent, si l'on ne prend en considération les différentes qualités des matériaux qui forment *les machines*. Au premier coup-d'œil, par exemple, cette proposition paraît vraie : *Le consentement préalable des Français est nécessaire au rétablissement de la Monarchie.* Cependant rien n'est plus faux. Sortons des théories, et représentons nous des faits.

Un courrier arrivé à Bordeaux, à Nantes, à Lyon, etc., apporte la nouvelle que *le Roi est reconnu à Paris; qu'une faction quelconque* (qu'on nomme ou qu'on ne nomme pas) *s'est emparée de l'autorité, et a déclaré qu'elle ne la possède qu'au nom du Roi, qu'on a dépêché un courrier au Souverain, qui est attendu incessamment, et que de toutes parts on arbore la cocarde blanche.* La renommée s'empare de ces nouvelles, et les charge de mille circonstances imposantes. Que fera-t-on? Pour donner plus beau jeu à la République, je lui accorde la majorité, et même un corps de troupes républicaines. Ces troupes prendront, peut-être, dans le premier moment, une attitude mutine; mais ce jour-là même elles voudront dîner, et commenceront à se détacher de la puissance qui ne paie plus. Chaque officier qui ne jouit d'aucune considération, et qui le sent très-bien, quoi qu'on en dise, voit tout aussi clairement, que le

XXVIII. Every thing brings us back to the general rule, — *man cannot create a con-*

premier qui criera : *vive le Roi*, sera un grand personnage : l'amour-propre lui dessine, d'un crayon séduisant, l'image d'un général des armées de *Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne*, brillant de signes honorifiques, et regardant du haut de sa grandeur ces hommes qui le mandaient naguères à la barre de la municipalité. Ces idées sont si simples, si naturelles, qu'elles ne peuvent échapper à personne : chaque officier le sent ; d'où il suit qu'ils sont tous suspects les uns pour les autres. La crainte et la défiance produisent la délibération et la froideur. Le soldat, qui n'est pas électrisé par son officier, est encore plus découragé : le lien de la discipline reçoit ce coup inexplicable, ce coup magique qui le relâche subitement. L'un tourne les yeux vers le payeur royal qui s'avance ; l'autre profite de l'instant pour rejoindre sa famille : on ne sait ni commander ni obéir ; il n'y a plus d'ensemble.

C'est bien autre chose parmi les citadins : on va, on vient, on se heurte, on s'interroge : chacun redoute celui dont il aurait besoin ; le doute consume les heures, et les minutes sont décisives : partout l'audace rencontre la prudence ; le vieillard manque de détermination, et le jeune homme de conseil : d'un côté sont des périls terribles, de l'autre une amnistie certaine et des grâces probables. Où sont d'ailleurs les moyens de résister ? où sont les chefs ? à qui se fier ? Il n'y a pas de danger dans le repos, et le moindre mouvement peut être une faute irrémissible : il faut donc attendre. On attend ; mais le lendemain on

stitution ; and no legitimate constitution can be written. The collection of fundamental

reçoit l'avis qu'une telle ville de guerre a ouvert ses portes ; raison de plus pour ne rien précipiter. Bientôt on apprend que la nouvelle était fausse ; mais deux autres villes qui l'ont crue vraie, ont donné l'exemple, en croyant le recevoir, elles viennent de se soumettre, et déterminent la première, qui n'y songeait pas. Le gouverneur de cette place a présenté au Roi les clefs *sa bonne ville de . . . . .* C'est le premier officier qui a eu l'honneur de le recevoir dans une citadelle de son royaume. Le Roi l'a créé, sur la porte, maréchal de France ; un brevet immortel a couvert son écusson *de fleurs de lis sans nombre ;* son nom est à jamais le plus beau de la France. A chaque minute, le mouvement royaliste se renforce ; bientôt il devient irrésistible. VIVE LE ROI! s'écrient l'amour et la fidélité, au comble de la joie : VIVE LE ROI ! répond l'hypocrite républicain, au comble de la terreur. Qu' importe ? il n'y a qu' un cri.———Et le Roi est sacré.

Citoyens ! voilà comment se font les contre-révolutions. *Dieu, s'étant réservé la formation des souverainetés, nous en avertit en ne confiant jamais à la multitude le choix de ses maîtres. Il ne l'emploie, dans ces grands mouvemens qui décident le sort des Empires, que comme un instrument passif. Jamais elle n'obtient ce qu'elle veut : toujours elle accepte, jamais elle ne choisit,* On peut même remarquer une *affectation* de la Providence (qu'on me permette cette expression), c' est que les efforts du peuple pour atteindre un objet, sont précisément le moyen qu'elle emploie pour l'en éloigner. Ainsi, le peuple Romain se donna des maîtres en croyant combattre l'aristocratie à la suite de

laws, which must essentially constitute a civil or religious society, never has been written,

César. C'est l'image de toutes les insurrections populaires. Dans la révolution française, le peuple a constamment été enchaîné, outragé, ruiné, mutilé par toutes les factions ; et les factions, à leur tour, jouet les unes des autres, ont constamment dérivé, malgré tous leurs efforts, pour se briser enfin sur l'écueil qui les attendait.

Que si l'on veut savoir le résultat probable de la révolution française, il suffit d'examiner en quoi toutes les factions se sont rénuies : toutes ont voulu l'avilissement, la destruction même du Christianisme universel et de la Monarchie ; *d'où il suit* que tous leurs efforts n'aboutiront qu' à l'exaltation du Christianisme et de la Monarchie."— Considérations sur la France, Chap. ix. p. 157–161. A Lyon, 1834.

Burke, in remarking on Dr. Price's doctrine, "that His Majesty of England, was almost the *only* lawful king in the world, because the *only* one who owes his crown to *the choice of the people*," says, "that it is either nonsense, or it affirms a most unfounded, dangerous, illegal, and unconstitutional position. If ever there was a time, favourable for establishing the principle, that a King of popular choice was the only legal King, without all doubt it was at the Revolution of 1688. Its not being done at that time, is a proof that the nation was of opinion, it ought not to be done at any time ; and their *accepting* King William, *was not properly a choice :* — but to all those who did not wish to recall King James, it was an act of *necessity*, in the strictest moral sense in which necessity can be taken ;

and never will be, *à priori*. It is only when society finds itself already constituted, without being able to say how, that it is possible to make known, or explain, in writing, certain special articles; but in almost every case these declarations or explanations are the

and though Parliament departed from the strict order of inheritance, in favour of a Prince who was very near in the line of succession, yet all that could be found in this act of necessity, to countenance the idea of an hereditary succession, is brought forward, and fostered, and made the most of, whilst a politic, well-wrought veil was thrown over every circumstance tending to weaken the rights, which in the meliorated order of succession they meant to perpetuate. They declare that they consider it as a marvellous providence, and merciful goodness of God to this Nation, to preserve their Majesties' *Royal* Persons, most happily to reign over us *on the throne of their ancestors*, for which, from the bottom of their hearts, they return their humblest thanks and praises.''—See Works of Edmund Burke, vol. III, pp. 30–34, Boston, 1826.

We have extended this note beyond the point of illustration, for which it was introduced, in order that it might be seen, in this connection, how much care was had to perpetuate the *hereditary succession*, a thing of the highest importance in a monarchy, and to which every other consideration ought to yield.—Trans.]

effect or cause of very great evils, and always cost the people more than they are worth.

XXIX. To this general rule, *that no constitution can be made or written, à priori,* we know of but one single exception; that is, the legislation of Moses. This alone was *cast*, so to speak, like a statue, and written out, even to its minutest details, by a wonderful man, who said, FIAT! without his work ever having need of being corrected, improved, or in any way modified, by himself or others. This, alone, has set time at defiance, because it owed nothing to time, and expected nothing from it; this alone has lived fifteen hundred years; and even after eighteen new centuries have passed over it, since the great anathema which smote it on the fated day, we see it, enjoying, if I may say so, a second life, binding still, by I know not what mysterious bond, which has no human name, the differ-

ent families of a people, which remain dispersed without being disunited. So that, like attraction, and by the same power, it acts at a distance, and makes one whole, of many parts widely separated from each other. Thus, this legislation lies evidently, for every intelligent conscience, beyond the circle traced around human power; and this magnificent exception to a general law, which has only yielded once, and yielded only to its Author, alone demonstrates the Divine mission of the great Hebrew Lawgiver, much better than the entire work of that English Prelate, who, with the strongest powers of mind, and an immense erudition, has nevertheless had the misfortune to support a great truth by a miserable fallacy.

XXX. But, since every constitution is divine in its principle, it follows, that man can do nothing in this way, unless he reposes

himself upon God, whose instrument he then becomes.* Now, this is a truth, to which the whole human race in a body have ever rendered the most signal testimony. Examine history, which is experimental politics, and we shall there invariably find the cradle of nations surrounded by priests, and the Divinity constantly invoked to the aid of human weakness.† Fable, much more true than ancient

* We may even generalize the assertion, and pronounce, without exception, *that no institution, whatever, can endure, if it is not founded on religion.*

† Plato, in an admirable fragment, wholly Mosaic, speaks of a primitive time, *when God had confided the establishment and the administration of empires, not to men, but to genii;* then he adds, in speaking of the difficulty of creating durable constitutions, *the truth is, that if God does not preside at the establishment of a city, and it should have only a human beginning, it could not escape the greatest evils. We must endeavour, then, by every imaginable means, to imitate the primitive regimen; and trusting ourselves in that which is immortal in man, we ought to found houses as well as states, by holding sacred as law the will of the* (supreme) *intelligence. If a state* (whatever may be its form) *is founded on vice, and governed by a people who trample justice under foot, there remains for it*

history, for eyes prepared, comes in to strengthen the demonstration. It is always an oracle, which founds cities; it is always an oracle, which announces the Divine protection, and successes of the heroic founder. Kings, especially, the chiefs of rising empires, are constantly designated, and, as it were, *marked*, by Heaven, in some extraordinary manner.* How many thoughtless men have ridiculed the *Saint-Ampoule*, [*holy oil*,] without ever dreaming that the Saint-Ampoule is a hieroglyph, and that it is only necessary to understand it.†

no means of safety (Οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρίας μηχανή). Plat. de Leg., tom. VIII., edit. Bip. pag. 180, 181.

* Great use has been made in controversy of the famous rule of Richard de Saint-Victor : *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.* But this rule is general, and can, I think, be expressed thus : *all belief constantly universal is true; and whenever, in separating from a belief some certain articles peculiar to different nations, there remains something common to all, that residuum is a truth.*

† Every religion, by the very nature of things, *puts forth*

XXXI. The coronation of kings belongs to the same principle. Never was there a ceremony, or, to speak more correctly, a profession of faith, more significant and more respectable. The finger of the Pontiff has always touched the brow of the rising sovereignty. The numerous writers who have seen in these august rites only ambitious views, and even an express conspiracy of superstition and tyranny, have spoken against the truth, and most of them, even against their own consciences. This subject merits a thorough examination. Sometimes, sovereigns have sought the coronation, and sometimes, the coronation has sought the sovereign. Others have rejected the coronation, as being a

a mythology, which resembles itself. That of the Christian religion is, for this reason, always chaste, always useful, and often sublime, while (by a peculiar privilege) it is not possible to confound it with the religion itself. So that no Christian *myth* can do harm, and often it merits the whole attention of the observer.

sign of dependence. We are acquainted with a sufficient number of facts, to enable us to form a correct judgement; but it would be necessary to distinguish carefully the men, the times, the nations, and the forms of worship. It is sufficient, here, to insist on the general and perpetual opinion, which invokes the Divine power at the constitution of empires.

XXXII. The most famous nations of antiquity, especially the most serious and wise, such as the Egyptians, Etruscans, Lacedæmonians, and Romans, had precisely the most religious constitutions; and the duration of empires has always been proportioned to the degree of influence which the religious principle had acquired in the political constitution: *the cities and nations most addicted to Divine worship, have always been the most*

*durable, and the most wise; as the most religious ages have also ever been most distinguished for genius.**

XXXIII. Never have nations been civilized, except by religion. No other known instrument has power over savage man. Without recurring to antiquity, which is very decisive on this point, we see a sensible proof of it in America. For three centuries, we have been there with our laws, our arts, our sciences, our civilization, our commerce, and our luxuries; what have we gained over the savage state? Nothing. We destroy these unfortunate beings, with sword and brandy; we drive them gradually into the interior of

* ["How is it, Aristodemus, thou rememberest, or remarkest not, — that the Kingdoms and Commonwealths, most renowned, as well for their *wisdom* as antiquity, are those whose piety and devotion hath been most observable?" Xenophon, Memor. Socr. I, IV, 16. — Trans.]

the wilderness, until, at last, they disappear entirely, victims of our vices as well as cruel superiority.

XXXIV. Has any philosopher ever thought of forsaking his country and its pleasures, to go into the forests of America in pursuit of savages, for the purpose of exciting in them disgust at the vices of barbarism, and giving them a moral system?* They have indeed done better; they have composed fine books to prove that the savage is man in his *natural state*, and that we could desire nothing better than to resemble him.† Condorcet has said,

* Condorcet has promised us, it is true, that philosophers should take upon themselves, without intermission, the civilization and welfare of barbarous nations.—(*Esquisse d'un Tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain.* In-8o., p. 335.) We wait for them to begin.

† ["J. G. Rousseau a constamment pris le sauvage pour l'homme primitif, tandis qu'il n'est et ne peut être que le descendant d'un homme détaché du grande arbre

*the missionaries have carried into Asia and America nothing but shameful superstitions.**

de la civilisation par une prévarication quelconque, mais d'un genre qui ne peut plus être répété, autant qu'il m'est permis d'en juger ; car je doute qu'il se forme de nouveaux sauvages.

Par une suite de la même erreur on a pris les langues de ces sauvages pour des langues commencées, tandis qu'elles sont et ne peuvent être que des débris de langues antiques, *ruinées*, s'il est permis de s'exprimer ainsi, et dégradées comme les hommes qui les parlant. En effet, toute dégradation individuelle ou nationale est sur-le-champ annoncée par une dégradation rigoureusement proportionelle dans le langage. Comment l'homme pourrait-il perdre une idée ou seulment la rectitude d'une idée sans perdre la parole ou la justesse de la parole qui l'exprime ; et comment au contraire pourrait-il penser ou plus ou mieux sans le manifester sur-le-champ par son langage ?''—*Les Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg*, tom. I. Ch. II.

"The error of the moderns has arisen from their supposing that the savage state was the original condition of men, and that the social or civilized state is the result of compact or experience ; whereas, on the contrary, it is this latter which presents the original condition of the human race, and what is termed the savage or natural state is the result of corruption and accident, which has destroyed the original and natural order of human society."—Trans.]

* Esquisse d'un Tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain. In-8o, p. 335.

Rousseau has said, with an extravagance of folly truly inconceivable, *that the missionaries appeared to him scarcely more wise than the conquerors.** In fine, their Corypheus has had the face to cast the grossest ridicule (but what had he to lose?) on those pacific conquerors whom antiquity would have deified.†

XXXV. It is they, however, it is the missionaries, who have accomplished this wonder, so much above human power, or even

* Lettre à l'archevêque de Paris.

† *Well! my friends, why do you not remain in your country? You would not have found more devils, but you would have found altogether as much folly.*—Voltaire, Essai sur les Mœurs et l'Esprit, etc., introd. *De la Magie.*

Seek elsewhere for more nonsense, more indecency, more bad taste; you will not find it. It is however this book, of which very few chapters are exempt from similar passages, it is this *showy gewgaw*, that modern enthusiasts have not hesitated to call, *a monument of the human mind:* without doubt, like the chapel of Versailles, and the pictures of Boucher.

the human will. They, alone, have traversed the vast continent of America, from one extremity to the other, in order to create there MEN. They, alone, have done what the civil power had not even dared to imagine. But nothing of this kind equals the missions of Paraguay: it is there we have seen, in a manner the most marked, the authority and exclusive power of religion for the civilization of man. This prodigy has been celebrated, but not sufficiently: the spirit of the eighteenth century, and another spirit its accomplice, have possessed the power of stifling, in part, the voice of justice, and even that of admiration. At some future day, perhaps, (for we do hope that these great and generous labours will be resumed,) in the heart of an opulent city, founded on some old *savannah*, the father of these missionaries will have a statue. One may read on the pedestal:

TO THE CHRISTIAN OSIRIS,

Whose envoys have traversed the earth,
to pluck men from misery,
from brutishness, and ferocity,
by teaching them agriculture,
by giving them laws,
by teaching them the knowledge and service of God;
thus taming the hapless savage,

NOT BY FORCE OF ARMS,

of which they never had need,
but by mild persuasion, and moral songs,

AND THE POWER OF HYMNS,

*insomuch that they were thought to be angels.**

* *Osiris, reigning in Egypt, raised the Egyptians speedily from a needy, miserable, and savage life, by teaching them to sow and plant; by giving them laws; by instructing them to honour and revere the gods: and afterwards going through all the world, he reclaimed it, also, without employing for this purpose any force of arms, but conciliating and gaining the greater part of the people by mild persuasions and remonstrances, couched in songs and in every kind of music* (πειθοῖ καὶ λόγῳ μετ' ᾠδῆς πάσης καὶ μουσικῆς). *The Greeks were of opinion that Osiris was Bacchus himself.*—Plutarque, *d'Isis et d'Osiris*, edit. de Vascosan, tom. III, p. 287, in-8o. Edit. Henr. Steph., tom. I, p. 634, in-8o.

XXXVI. Now when we consider that that legislating Order, which ruled in Paraguay by

There has been found lately, on an island in the Penobscot *river, a colony of savages, who still chant a great number of pious and instructive canticles in Indian to the music of the Church, with a precision that would hardly be found in the best constituted choirs; one of the most beautiful airs in the Church in Boston came from these Indians,* (who had learned it of their masters forty years before,) *although from that time these unfortunate beings had enjoyed no kind of instruction.* Mercure de France, 5 juillet 1806, No. 259, p. 29 et suiv.

Father *Salvaterra,* (a beautiful name for a missionary !) justly called the *Apostle* of *California,* visited savages more intractable than any of whom we have ever had knowledge, without other arms than a lute upon which he played in a superior manner. He began to chant : *In voi credo o Dio mio!* etc. Men and women collected in circles around him, and listened in silence. Muratori said, in speaking of this wonderful man, *Pare favola quella d'Orfeo; ma chi sà che non sia succeduto in simil caso ?* [This seems like the fable of Orpheus ; but who knows that he would not have succeeded in a similar case ?] The missionaries, alone, have understood and demonstrated *the truth of that fable.* We see, too, that they had discovered the kind of music worthy of being associated with these grand creations. "Send us," they wrote to their friends in Europe, "send us the airs of the great masters of Italy , *per essere armoniosissimi, senza tanti imbrogli di violini obbligati,* etc.," [to be most harmo-

the simple influence of virtue and talent, without deviating from the most humble submission towards the legitimate authority, even the most misguided; that this order, I say, at the same time was braving in our prisons, in our hospitals, in our lazarettos, the most hideous and repulsive forms of misery, disease, and despair; that these men, who ran, at the first call, to lie upon straw by the side of indigence, had no outlandish airs in the most polished circles; that they ascended the scaffold *to speak the last words* to the victims of human justice, and, from these scenes of horror, threw themselves into pulpits to thunder before kings;* that they held the *pencil* in China, the telescope in our observatories,

nious without the complicated accompaniment of the *violini obbligati.*]—Muratori, Cristianesimo felice, etc. Venezia, 1752, in-8o, chap. XII, p. 284.

* *Loquebar in testimoniis tuis in conspectu Regum; et non confundebar.* Ps. CXVIII, 46. This is the inscription placed under the portrait of Bourdaloue, and which many of his colleagues have merited.

the lyre of Orpheus in the midst of savages, and that they elevated the entire age of Louis XIV; when, in short, we consider that a detestable coalition of perverse ministers, raving magistrates, and despicable sectaries, have been able, in our day, to destroy this admirable institution, and to applaud themselves for the deed, we think we see that madman, who placed his foot exultingly upon a watch, exclaiming, *I will stop your noise.* But what do I say? A madman is not responsible.*

* [Those aspects of the Society of Jesus, which elicited this eulogy from our Author, have been freely conceded by the more impartial Protestant writers. The following, from the "English Review," is but a specimen of much of the same kind.

"What a strange Society it is, of which we can hardly believe the best, even while we admit its greater probability!

"Whatever may have been the origin of the Jesuits' policy, it cannot be denied, that they fell while defending a glorious position, and fighting in a good cause. Their enemies, were the enemies of all religion and right, except where they were actuated by mere party rancour. Their friends, were the friends of all decency and virtue, and they

XXXVII. I have felt it proper to dwell principally on the formation of Empires, as

had few supporters on any other grounds. On one side, were the infidel philosophers, the spiteful concubine, the unscrupulous minister, and the savage parliaments. On the other, were the pious queen, and the good old Stanislaus, the devout dauphin, and his quiet wife, all the princesses, and all the nobles of the court, who were *not* living a life of licentiousness and extravagance. However it might so have happened, it is certain that they were identified, at this time, with all the virtue that was left at Versailles. Nor had they altogether fallen from their high estate. It is true, they were relaxed in doctrine, ambitious in their views, unscrupulous in their means. It is true, that they now toiled less for the Church, than for the Order. But they still showed an imposing front to the world. They were still unmatched in wealth and wisdom. They had won the sovereignty of an empire, which, in many respects, put European kingdoms to shame. They had succeeded in what all other colonists, up to that time, had failed in doing, and up to this time have failed still. They had imparted civilization to savages. They had come in contact with the red-skinned race, and had *not* destroyed them. They had landed on their shores, and made them happier than they were before. They had taught them European virtues, and *not* taught them European vices.—Under their guidance, the Indians built cities, and amassed wealth, and increased and multiplied into a vast population. Has the London Missionary Society ever done more? or the United States as much? No doubt they overlooked the leading principles of civil and religious liberty; but a reflecting

being the most important object; but all human institutions are subjected to the same rule, and all are equally null or dangerous,

Wesleyan will admit, that popery and priestcraft are elements of less immediate destructiveness than grooved rifles and gin, and that the Jesuits may be excused for introducing submission where no other European had introduced any thing but the small-pox. The Order might well be an object of suspicion, of fear, or of avoidance; but it must have necessarily commanded admiration and respect. If its purity was gone, its energy remained. For some purpose or other, its members were still making converts in every corner of the earth. They were still preaching in islands that none but Anson's crew had ever heard of, and teaching in tongues that no philosopher could understand. To some end or other, they were still pressing onward with determined will; and their bearing would not be the less awful and impressive from the belief that even justice, or mercy, or truth, might oppose their progress in vain.

"The sudden ruin of this powerful body is matter both for reflection and surprise. The combinations which destroyed them were all fortuitous. There was no deep strategy employed against them; they fell from a series of accidents. . . . . No parties were more astounded at the catastrophe than the enemies of the Order. D'Alembert can scarcely believe in the reality of the occurrence, even while relating the circumstances. After all, says he, *c'est un beau chapitre à ajouter à l'histoire des grands événemens par les petites causes.*"—See English Review, No. III, Oct. 1844.—Trans.]

unless they repose on the foundation of all existence. This principle being incontestable, what shall we think of a generation, which has cast all to the winds, even to the foundations of the social edifice, by rendering education purely scientific? It was impossible to be deceived in a manner more dreadful; for every system of education that does not rest upon religion, as its basis, will fall in a trice, or will only diffuse poison through the state; *religion being*, as Bacon has well said, *the aromatic which prevents science from becoming corrupt.**

* [What shall be said in excuse for the man who could utter so profound a truth, and yet assign to physical sciences a precedence which belongs of right to theology, ethics, and politics. Bacon, indeed, has contradicted this truth, at every step of his philosophical speculations, in endeavouring, by every possible means, to separate science from religion.

"L'esprit," Malebranche has said, "devient plus pur, plus lumineux, plus fort et plus étendu à proportion que s'augmente l'union qu'il a avec Dieu, parceque c'est elle qui fait toute sa perfection.—"Recherche de la Vérité. Paris, 1721, in-4o. Préface p. VI.—Trans.]

XXXVIII. The question is frequently asked: *why there is a school of theology attached to every University?* The answer is easy: *It is, that the Universities may subsist, and that the instruction may not become corrupt.* Originally, the Universities were only schools of theology, to which other *faculties* were joined, as subjects around their Queen. The edifice of public instruction, placed on such a foundation, has continued even to our day. Those who have subverted it among themselves, will repent it, in vain, for a long time to come. To burn a city, there is needed only a child or a madman; but to rebuild it, architects, materials, workmen, money, and especially time, will be required.

XXXIX. Those who are content to corrupt ancient institutions, while at the same time preserving the exterior forms, have done

as much evil to the human race. Already the influence of modern Universities on manners and the national mind, over a considerable portion of the continent of Europe, is perfectly well known.* The English Universities have preserved, in this respect, more reputation than the others, perhaps for the reason that the English know better how to be silent, or to

* I will not allow myself to publish notions which are peculiar to me, however precious they may be ; but I believe that it is lawful for every one to reprint what has been printed, and make a German speak on Germany. A man whom no person will accuse of being infatuated with old ideas, thus expresses himself on the Universities of his Country.

"All our German Universities, even the best, have need of great reform, in respect to morals. . . . . The best, even, are a gulf where innocence, health, and the future well being of a multitude of young people are irretrievably lost ; and from whence go out beings ruined in body and soul, more burdensome than useful to society, etc. . . . . Would that these pages might be a preservative for young people ! Would that they might read over the gate of our Universities : *Young man ! it is here that many of thy equals have lost happiness with innocence.*"—M. Campe, Recueil de Voyages pour l'instruction de la jeunesse, in-12, tome II, p. 129.

praise themselves at the right moment: perhaps, also, because the public spirit, which has an extraordinary power in that Country, has been able to defend, better than elsewhere, these venerable schools from the general anathema. However, they must succumb, and from the bad heart of Gibbon, we have obtained certain strange disclosures on this point.* In short, not to go out of generalities, if we do not return to the old maxims, if education is not restored into the hands of priests, and if science is not every where placed in the second rank, the evils which await us are incalculable: we shall become

* See his Memoirs, where, after having made some singular revelations on the Universities of his Country, he says, in particular, on that of Oxford, *she will as cheerfully renounce me for a son, as I am willing to disclaim her for a mother*. I do not doubt that this tender mother, sensible as she ought to be, to such a declaration, may have ordained a magnificent epitaph for him: LUBENS MERITO.

Sir William Jones, in his letter to M. Anquetil, goes to the other extreme; but this extreme does him honour.

brutalized by science, and this is the lowest degree of brutality.*

XL. Not only does it not belong to man to create institutions, but it does not appear that his power, *unassisted*, extends even to change for the better institutions already established. If there is anything evident for man, it is the existence in the universe of two opposing forces, which are in continual conflict. There is nothing good, that evil does

* ["What has not been said, during the last century, against a religious education? What has not been done to render science and even morality purely human? The French, especially, struck the grand blow in 1763. The effect is known; it was manifest, immediate, incontestable, and that epoch will forever be memorable in history."

Malebranche, indeed, has reason for saying, "que les hommes peuvent regarder l'astronomie, la chimie et presque toutes les sciences comme *les divertissemens d'un honnête homme*, mais qu'ils ne doivent pas se laisser surprendre à leur éclat, ni les préférer à la science de l'homme." —Recherche de la Vérité. Paris, 1721 in-4o. Préface p. VI.—Trans.]

not sully or alter; there is no evil, that goodness does not repress and attack, by impelling continually all existence towards a more perfect state.* These two forces are every where present: we behold them equally in the vegetation of plants, in the generation of animals, in the formation of languages, and of empires, (two things inseparable,) etc. Human power extends only perhaps to removing or combatting the evil, in order to

* A Greek would have said: *Πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν.* We might say, towards *restitution en entier*,—an expression which philosophy can very well borrow from jurisprudence, and which will enjoy, under this new acceptation, a wonderful fitness. As to the opposition and the balancing of the two forces, it is sufficient to open our eyes. *Good is set against evil, and life against death. . . . . Consider all the works of the Most-High. Two and two, and one against another.*—Eccles. XXXIII. 15.

We may say, in passing, it is thence that arises the rule of the *beau-idéal.* Nothing in nature being what it ought to be, the true artist,—he who can say, EST DEUS IN NOBIS, —has the mysterious power of discerning traits the least altered, and of assembling them, in order to form a whole which only exists in his understanding.

disengage the good, and restore to it the power of developing itself according to its nature. The celebrated Zanotti has said, *It is difficult to alter things for the better.** This thought contains much sound sense, under the guise of extreme simplicity. It accords perfectly with another thought of Origen, which is alone worth a volume. *Nothing, says he, can be changed for the better among men, without God.*† All men have a consciousness of this truth, without being in a state to explain it to themselves. Hence that instinctive aversion, in every good mind, to innovations.‡

* *Difficile est mutare in melius.* Zanotti, cited in the *Transunto della R. Accademia di Torino.* 1788—89, in-8o. p. 6.

† *ΑΘΕΕΙ*: or, if we would express this thought in a manner more laconic, and disengaged of all grammatical licence, WITHOUT GOD, NOTHING BETTER.—Orig. adv. Cels. 1. 26. ed. Ruœi. Paris. 1733. In-fol., tom. p. I. 345.

‡ ["The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught *à priori*. Nor is it a short experience that can instruct as in that practical science ; because the

The word *reform*, in itself, and previous to all examination, will be always suspected by

real effects of moral causes are not always immediate ; but that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter operation ; and its excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces in the beginning. The reverse also happens ; and very plausible schemes, with very pleasing commencements, have often shameful and lamentable conclusions. In states, there are often some obscure and almost latent causes, things which appear at first view of little moment, on which a very great part of its prosperity or adversity may most essentially depend. The science of government being therefore so practical in itself, and intended for such practical purposes, a matter which requires experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be, it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree, for ages, the common purposes of society, or on building it up again, without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.—''See Works of Edm. Burke, vol. III. p. 79. Boston, 1826.

"History affords no example of an era, in which innovation was so hastily pursued, and ambition so blindly worshipped ; when the experience of ages was so haughtily rejected, and the fancies of the moment so rashly adopted; in which the rights of property were so scandalously violated, and the blood of the innocent so profusely lavished, as in the French Revolution.

wisdom, and the experience of every age justifies this sort of instinct. We know too well what has been the fruit of the most beautiful speculations of this kind.*

XLI. To apply these general maxims to a particular case, it is from the single consideration of the extreme danger of innovations founded upon simple human theories, that,

"The great danger of setting the ideas of men afloat upon political subjects, consists in the multitude of men who can think, compared to the few who can think correctly; in the rapidity with which the most stable institutions can be overturned, compared with the excessively slow rate at which they can be restored. Every man can speak of politics; there is not one in ten who can understand them: every man flatters himself he knows something of history; to be qualified to reason on it correctly, requires the incessant study of twenty years. But, unfortunately, the knowledge of the difficulty of the subject, and of the extensive information which it requires, is one of the *last* acquisitions of the human mind; none are so rash as those who are least qualified to govern; none so really worthy of the lead, as those who are least desirous to assume it."—Alison's Hist. of French Revolution, vol. I, chap. III. Lond. 1833.—Trans.]

* *Nihil motum ex antiquo probabile est.*—Tit.-Liv. XXXIV, 53.

without believing myself to be in a state to have a decided opinion, in the way of reasoning, upon the great question of parliamentary reform, which has agitated minds in England so powerfully, and for so long a time, I still find myself constrained to believe, that this idea is pernicious, and that if the English yield themselves too readily to it, they will have occasion to repent.* *But*, say the par-

* ["The danger of political innovations arises not from their immediate, but from their ultimate consequences; not from those who originate, but those who follow them up. Changes once rashly commenced, cannot easily be stopped; the fever of innovation seizes the minds of the energetic part of mankind, and the prudent become unable to stem the torrent. The prospect of gain rouses the ambitious and the reckless; they issue from obscurity to share the spoil, and in the struggle rapidly acquire an ascendency. They do so, because they are not restrained by the scruples which influence the good, nor by the apprehensions which paralyze the opulent. Having nothing to lose, they are indifferent as to the consequences of their actions; having no principles, they accommodate themselves to those of the most numerous and least worthy of the people."—Alison's Hist. of French Revolution, vol. I, p. 194. Lond. 1833.—Trans.]

tizans of reform, (for it is the grand argument,) *the abuses are striking and incontestable: now can a formal abuse, a defect, be constitutional?* Yes, undoubtedly, it can be; for every political constitution has its essential faults, which belong to its nature, and which it is impossible to separate from it; and, that which should make all reformers tremble, is that these faults may be changed by circumstances; so that in showing that they are new, we cannot prove that they are not necessary.* What prudent man, then, will not

* *It is necessary*, says one, *to recur to the fundamental and primitive laws of the state, which an unjust custom has abolished;* and it is a game to lose all. *Nothing will be just in this balance. Yet the people lend a ready ear to these discourses.*—Pascal, Pensées, prem. part., art. VI. Paris, Renouard, 1803, p. 121, 122.

No one could speak better; but, see what man is! The author of this observation, and his hideous sect, have not ceased playing *this infallible game to lose all;* and indeed the *game* has perfectly succeeded. Voltaire, besides, has spoken on this point like Pascal: "*It is a very vain idea*, says he, *a very ungrateful labour, to desire to trace back every thing to ancient usage, etc.*"—Essai

shudder in putting his hand to the work? Social harmony, like musical concord, is subject to the law of *temperament in the general key*. Adjust the *fifths* accurately, and the *octaves* will jar, and conversely. The dissonance being then inevitable, instead of excluding it, which is impossible, it must be *qualified* by distribution. Thus, on both sides, *imperfection is an element of possible perfection.* In this proposition there is only the form of a paradox. *But*, it will perhaps still be said, *where is the rule by which you may distinguish the accidental defect, from that which belongs to the nature of things, and which it is impossible to exclude?*—Men to whom nature has given only ears, ask questions of this kind; and those who have an ear shrug their shoulders.

sur les Mœurs et l'Esprit, etc., Chap. 85. Hear him afterwards speak of the Popes, you will see how he remembers his maxim.

XLII. When it is a question of abuses in political institutions, it is necessary to take great care to judge of them only by their constant effects, and never by any of their causes, of whatever kind, which signify nothing ;* still less by certain collateral inconveniences (if I may so express myself) which men of limited views readily lay hold of, and are thus prevented from seeing the whole together. Indeed, the cause, according to the hypothesis which seems to be proved, not having any logical relation to the effect ; and the inconveniences of an institution, good in itself, being only, as I have just said, *an inevitable dissonance in the general key ;* how can we judge of institutions by their causes and inconveniences ?— Voltaire, who spoke of every thing, during an age, without having so much as penetrated be-

* At least, with regard to the merit of the institution ; for, under other points of view, it may be very important to employ one's self with them.

low the surface,* has reasoned very humorously on the sale of the offices of the magistracy which occurred in France; and no instance, perhaps, could be more apposite to make us sensible of the truth of the theory which I am setting forth. *That this sale is an abuse,* says he, *is proved by the fact, that it originated in another abuse.*† Voltaire does not mistake here as every man is liable to mistake. He shamefully mistakes. It is a total eclipse of common sense. *Everything which springs from an abuse, an abuse!* On the contrary; one of the most general and evident laws of this power, at once secret and striking, which acts and makes itself to be felt on every side, is, that the

* Dante said to Virgil, in doing him, I must avow it, too much honour: *Maestro di color che sanno* [Master of those who know]. Parini, although he had his head absolutely turned, has, however, had the courage to say to Voltaire, in parodying Dante: *Sei Maestro . . . . . di coloro che credon di sapere* (Il Mattino,) [Master of those who think they know]. The saying is very just.

† Précis du siècle de Louis XV, chap. 42.

remedy of an abuse springs from an abuse, and that the evil, having reached a certain point, destroys itself, as it ought to do ; for evil, which is only a negation, has, for measure of dimension and duration, that of the being to which it is joined, and which it destroys. It exists as an ulcer, which can only terminate in self-destruction. But then a new reality will necessarily occupy the place of that which has disappeared ; *for nature abhors a vacuum*, and the Good. . . . . But I diverge too far from Voltaire.

XLIII. The error of this great writer proceeds from the fact, that, *divided between twenty sciences*, as he himself somewhere confesses, and constantly occupied in communicating instruction to the world, he rarely gave himself time to think. "A dissipated and voluptuous court, reduced to the greatest want by its foolish expenses, devises the sale of the offices of the

magistracy, and thus creates" (what it never could have done freely, and with a knowledge of the cause,) "it creates," I say, "a rich magistracy, irremovable and independent; so that the infinite power *playing in the world** makes use of corruption for creating incorruptible tribunals" (as far as human weakness permits).† There is nothing, indeed, so plausible to the eye of a true philosopher; nothing more conformable to great analogies, and to that incontestable law, which wills that the most important institutions should be the result not of deliberation, but of circumstances.‡ Here

* Ludens in orbe terrarum.—Prov. VIII, 31.

† [The extract from Burke, contained in a note on page 116, 117, may be referred to in this connection.—Trans.]

‡ ["But I cannot stand forward, and give praise or blame to any thing which relates to human actions, and human concerns, on a simple view of the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour, and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what render every

is the problem almost solved when it is stated, as is the case with all problems. *Could such a country as France be better judged than by hereditary magistrates?* If it is decided in the affirmative, which I suppose, it will be necessary for me at once to propose a second problem which is this: *the magistracy being necessarily hereditary, is there, in order to constitute it at first, and afterwards to recruit it, a mode more advantageous than that which fills the coffers of the sovereign with millions at the lowest price, and which assures, at the same time, the opulence, independence, and even the nobility* (of a certain sort) *of the supreme judges?* If we only consider venality as a means to the right of inheritance, every just mind is impressed with this, which is the true point of view. This is not the place to enter

civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind. —See Works of Edm. Burke, vol. III., p. 24. Boston, 1826.—Trans.]

fully into this question; but enough has been said to prove that Voltaire has not so much as perceived it.*

XLIV. Let us now suppose a man like him at the head of affairs, uniting, by a happy agreement, frivolousness, incapacity, and rashness: he will not fail to act in accordance with his foolish theories of laws and of abuses. He will borrow at six and two thirds per cent. to reimburse his nominal incumbents, creditors at two per cent.: he will prepare minds by a multitude of paid writings, which will insult the magistracy and destroy public confidence in it. Soon Patronage, a thousand times more foolish

* [Next to the Nobles, and as a privileged order, possessing a secondary kind of nobility of their own, were the parliaments. These were large bodies of men, in different provinces, appointed as courts of law for the administration of justice. In consequence of the corruption of the officers of State, the members purchased their places which they held for life; but the son was usually preferred when he offered to purchase his father's place.—Trans.]

than Chance, will open the long list of his blunders: the distinguished man, no longer perceiving in the right of inheritance a counterpoise to oppressive labours, will withdraw himself, never to return; and the great tribunals will be abandoned to adventurers without name, without fortune, and without consideration; instead of that venerable magistracy, in which virtue and science had become as hereditary as its dignities, —that true priesthood, which foreign nations might envy France, up to the moment when False Philosophy, having excluded Wisdom from all the places to which she was accustomed to resort, terminated such splendid achievements by driving her away from her own territory.

XLV. Such is the natural picture of most reforms; for, not only creation belongs not to man, but reformation even, belongs to him only in a secondary way, and with a multitude of terrible restrictions. Starting from

these incontrovertible principles, each man can judge of the institutions of his country with a perfect certainty; he can especially appreciate all those *Creators*, those *Lawgivers*, those *Restorers* of nations, so dear to the eighteenth century, and whom posterity will regard with pity, perhaps even with horror. Card castles have been built in Europe and out of Europe. The details would be odious; but certainly we are not wanting in respect to any person in simply entreating men to consider and judge by the event, if they absolutely refuse every other kind of instruction. Man in relation with his Creator is sublime, and his action is creative: on the contrary, so soon as he separates himself from God, and acts alone, he does not cease to be powerful, for this is a privilege of his nature; but his action is negative, and tends only to destroy.

XLVI. There is not in the history of all ages a single fact which contradicts these maxims.

No human institution can endure unless supported by the Hand which supports all; that is to say, if it is not especially consecrated to Him at its origin. The more it is penetrated with the Divine principle, the more durable it will be. How strange is the blindness of men in our age! They boast of their knowledge, and are ignorant of everything, since they are ignorant of themselves. They know not what they are, nor what they can do. An invincible pride bears them on continually to overthrow every thing which they have not made; and in order to work out new creations, they separate themselves from the source of all existence. Jean-Jacques Roussseau has, however, very well said, *Little, vain man, show me thy power, and I will show thee thy weakness.* It might be said, with as much truth and more profit, *Little, vain man, confess to me thy weakness, and I will show thee thy strength.* Indeed, as soon as man has acknowledged his

nothingness, he has taken a great step; for he is very near seeking a support with which he can do all things. It is precisely the opposite to this, that has characterized the age which has just terminated. (Alas! it has only ended in our almanacks.) Examine all its enterprises, all its institutions, whatsoever, you will find it constantly intent upon separating them from the Divinity. Man has believed himself an independent being, and he has professed a true practical atheism, more dangerous, perhaps, and more culpable, than that of theory.*

* [When we reflect upon the facts attested by entire history; when we consider that, in the chain of human establishments, from those great institutions which constitute epochs in the world, even to the most inconsiderable social organizations,—from the Empire to the Brotherhood,—all have a divine basis, and that human power, whenever it is isolated, can only give to its productions a fictitious and transient existence; what shall we think of the new French edifice, and of the power which has produced it? For my part, I never will believe in the fecundity of NOTHING. . . .

"Whenever a man brings himself, according to his powers, into close relation with the Creator, and produces any institution, whatsoever, in the name of the Divinity;

XLVII. Withdrawn, by his vain sciences, from the single science which truly concerns

whatever, in other respects, may be his individual weakness, his ignorance, his poverty, the obscurity of his birth, in a word, his absolute destitution of all human means, he partakes, in some way, of Omnipotency, of which he is made the instrument ; he produces works, the strength and duration of which astonish reason.

"I entreat every reader to look attentively around him ; he will find, in the least objects, a demonstration of these great truths. It is not necessary to go back to the *Sons of Ismael*, to Lycurgus, to Numa, to Moses,—all of whose legislations were religious ; a popular fête, a rustic dance, suffices to the observer. He will witness, in some Protestant countries, certain gatherings, certain popular rejoicings, which have no apparent causes, and which originated in Catholic usages absolutely forgotten. Festivals of this kind have, in themselves, nothing moral, nothing respectable : no matter ; they belong, though very remotely, to religious ideas : this is enough for perpetuating them. Three centuries have passed, and still they are not neglected.

" But attempt, O you lords of earth ! Princes, Kings, Emperors, powerful Majesties, invincible Conquerors ! attempt, I say, only to bring the people, on some particular day of each year, to an appointed place, for A DANCE. I ask very little of you, but I dare gravely defy you to succeed in it, whilst the humblest missionary will attain to it, and make himself obeyed two thousand years after his death.

him, has man believed himself endowed with power *to create*, whilst he does not so much as possess that of *giving names*. He has believed,—he who has not the power of producing a single insect or a sprig of moss,—that he was the immediate author of Sovereignty, the most important, the most sacred, the most fundamental thing in the moral and political world ; * and that such a family, for example,

Each year, in the name *Saint* John, of *Saint* Martin, *Saint* Benedict, etc. the people meet around a rustic temple : they come, animated with boisterous yet innocent mirth. Religion sanctifies the joy, and the joy embellishes religion : they forget their pains ; they think, on retiring from the spot, of the pleasure they will have, on the same day, the following year, and this day is, for them, a date.''—*Considèrations sur la France.*

Among the *festivals*, of the kind alluded to, by our Author in the above note, the *Eton Montem* may be mentioned, to which, of late, great interest is attached, on account of the recent attempt, on the part of authority, to suppress it. We will venture to express the hope, that Eton scholars, young lords and old, gentlemen and all, will never be deprived of their *salt*.—Trans.]

* *The principle, that all legitimate power springs from the people, is noble and specious in itself, yet is belied by*

reigns, because such a people wills it; while there are numerous and incontestable proofs, that every sovereign family reigns because it is chosen by a superior power. If he does not see these proofs, it is because he shuts his eyes, or looks too closely. He has believed, that it was himself who invented languages; while, again, it belongs to him only to see that every human language is *learned* and never invented, and that no imaginable hypothesis, within the circle of human power, can explain,

all history and experience. Hume's Hist. of Eng. Charles I, chap. LIX, vol. VII, p. 131 : Dove's Edit., London, 1822.

[" The idea of *Sovereignty* in the people, of the natural equality of mankind, only proves how ignorant legislators are of the real character of mankind, and how little they are aware of their inherent depravity."—" Dumont, the principal composer of the '*Rights of Man*,' at a later period, justly asked,—' are men all equal? where is the equality? Is it in virtue, talents, fortune, industry, situation? So far from it, they are born in a state of complete dependence on others, from which they are long being emancipated.' " Alison's Hist. of French Revolution, vol. I, chap. III.—Trans.]

with the least appearance of probability, either the formation or the diversity of languages. He has believed that he could constitute nations; that is to say, in other terms, *that he could create that national unity, by virtue of which one nation is not another.* Finally, he has believed that, since he had the power of creating institutions, he had, with greater reason, that of borrowing them from other nations, and transferring them to his own country, all complete to his hand, with the name which they bore among the people from whom they were taken, in order, like those people, to enjoy them with the same advantages. The French papers have furnished me with a singular example on this point.

XLVIII. Some years ago, the French people took it into their heads to establish, at Paris, certain courses, which were gravely called, in some writings of the day, *Olympic*

Games. The reasoning of those who invented or revived this beautiful name, was not complicated. *Men raced*, they said, *on foot and on horse, by the banks of the Alpheus; and they race on foot and on horse, by the banks of the Seine: then it is the same thing.* Nothing can be more *simple;* but, without asking them why they did not call these games *Parisian*, instead of *Olympic*, I shall proceed to make other observations. In order to institute *Olympic* games, the Oracles were consulted: gods and heroes participated in them; they were never commenced without the offering of sacrifices, and the performance of other religious ceremonies; they were regarded as the great *Comitia* of Greece, and nothing was more august. But did the Parisians, before establishing their courses *revived from the Greeks*, go to Rome *ad limina apostolorum*, to consult the Pope? Before jumping the break-neck, for the amusement of tradesmen, did

they celebrate High-Mass? With what great political considerations did they associate these courses? What were the names of the Institutors?—But enough: the most ordinary common sense feels instantly the nothingness, and even the ridiculousness, of this imitation.

XLIX. Yet, in a Journal conducted by men of intelligence, whose only fault or misfortune was in professing modern doctrines, somebody wrote, a few years since, on the subject of these courses, the following passage, dictated by the most amusing enthusiasm:

I predict it: the Olympic games *of the French will one day attract all Europe to the Champ-de-Mars. What frigid souls have those, and little susceptible of emotion, who see here only the course! For myself, I behold a pageant, such as the world has never witnessed since those of Elis, where Greece was a spec-*

*tacle to Greece. No, the Roman circus, the tournaments of our ancient chivalry, did not approach it.**

And for myself, I *believe*, indeed, I *know*, that no human institution can endure, if it has not a religious basis, *and, besides*, (I entreat the most undivided attention to this,) *if it bears not a name taken from the national language, originating itself, without any anterior and public deliberation.* †

* Déeade Philosophique, Octobre 1797, No. I, p. 31. (1809.) This passage, brought near by its dates, has the double merit of being eminently amusing, and suggestive of thought. We see in it, with what ideas these children amused themselves at that time, and what they knew of that which man ought to know before all. Since that time, a new order of things has sufficiently refuted these fine conceits ; *and if all Europe is at this day attracted to Paris*, it certainly is not to see there the *Olympic games.* (1814.)

† [We should be glad to know what the Author would say to the objection to this doctrine suggested by the names of *Alexandria*, *Constantinople*, *St. Petersburgh*, *and Washington*.—Trans.]

L. The theory of names is still an object of great importance. Names are in no wise arbitrary, as so many men have affirmed, *who had lost their names.* God calls Himself, I AM; and every creature calls itself, *I am that.* The name of a spiritual being is necessarily relative to its action, which is its distinctive quality; hence it happens, that among the Ancients, the highest honour for a Divinity, was *polyonomy*, that is to say, *having a plurality of names*, indicative of that of functions or extent of power. Ancient Mythology exhibits to us Diana, while an infant, asking this power from Jupiter; and in the verses attributed to Orpheus, she is greeted under the name of *Démon polyonyme* (Genius of many names).*

* See note on the seven verses of the hymn of Diana, by Callimachus, (Edit. of Spanheim;) and Lanzi's *Saggio di letteratura etrusca*, etc., in-8o, tom. II, p. 241, note. The hymns of Homer are in reality only a collection of epithets; which belong to the same principle of *polyonomy.*

This is substantially the same as to say, that God alone has the right of conferring a *name.* Indeed, He has *named* all things, since He has created all things. He has given names to the stars,* and to spirits, and of these last names, Holy Scripture utters only three of them, but these three names are all relative to the destination of these ministers. It is the same with men, whom God himself has thought proper to name, and whom Holy Scripture has made us acquainted with, in a sufficiently great number: the name always relates to the function.† Has He not said, that in His future kingdom, He would give to them who overcome, A NEW NAME,‡ expressive of their *exploits?* and have men, *made in the image of God*, discovered a

* Isaias, XL, 26.

† Let us remember the greatest name divinely and directly given to man. The reason of the name was given, in this case, with the name ; and the name expresses precisely the destination, or what amounts to the same thing, the power.

‡ Apoc. III, 12.

more impressive mode of rewarding conquerors, than that of conferring upon them a *new name*, the most honourable of all, in the judgment of men, that of the nations vanquished ?* As often as man is reputed to have altered his course of life, and received a new character, he very commonly receives a *new name.* This is seen in Baptism, in Confirmation, in the enlistment of soldiers, on entering a religious Order, at the manumission of slaves, etc.; in a word, the *name* of every being expresses what it is, and in this matter there is nothing arbitrary. The common expression, *he has a name, he has no name*, is very just and very significant ; no man being able to be ranked among those *called to assemblies, and who have*

* This observation has been made by the anonymous, but well known, author of the German book, entitled, *Die Siegsgeschichte der Christlichen Religion, in einer gemeinnützigen Erklarung der Offenbarung Johannis*, in-8o. Nuremberg, 1799, p. 89. There is nothing to be said against this page.

a name,* unless his family is marked by a sign which distinguishes it from others.

LI. It is with nations as with individuals; there are some *which have no name.* Herodotus observes, that the Thracians would be the most powerful people in the world, if they were united: *but*, he adds, *this union is impossible, for they all have a different name.*† It is an excellent observation. There are also some modern people, *who have no name*, and there are others, who have many; but *polyonomy* is as unfortunate for nations, as it has been thought honourable for the *genii.*

LII. Names having then nothing arbitrary, and originating, like all other things, more or less immediately in God, it must not be believed that man has the right of naming,

* Num. XVI, 2.

† Herod. Terpsic. V, 3.

without restriction, even those things of which he has some right to regard himself as the author, and of imposing on them names according to the idea which he forms of them. God has reserved to Himself, in this respect, a species of immediate jurisdiction which it is impossible to misunderstand.* *O my dear* Hermogenes! *the imposition of names is a great affair, which cannot belong to a bad man, nor even to an ordinary man. . . . . This right belongs only to a creator of names* (onomaturgos), *that is to say, as it appears, to the lawgiver alone; but the rarest of all human creatures is a lawgiver.*†

LIII. However, man loves nothing so much as to give names. He does this, for example, when he applies expressive epithets

* Orig. Adv. Cels. I. 18, 24, p. 341, et in Exhort. ad. martyr., No. 46, et in not. edit. Ruœi, in-fol., tom. I, p. 305, 341.

† Plato. in Crat. Opp., tom. III, p. 244.

to things, a talent for which the great writer is distinguished, especially the great poet. The happy application of an epithet dignifies a substantive, which becomes illustrious under this new sign.* Examples may be found in every language; but, to confine myself to that of a people who have themselves so great a name, since they have given their own name to *franchise*, or rather *franchise* has received its name from them, what literary man is ignorant of *the greedy Acheron*, *the attentive coursers*, *the shameless bed*, *the timid supplications*, *the silvered trembling*, *the rapid destroyer*, *the pale flatterers*, etc.?† Man will never forget his primitive rights: it may be

* "So that, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus has observed, if the epithet is *distinctive* and *natural*, (οἰκεῖα καὶ προσφυῆς,) it weighs in the discourse as much as a name." (*On the Poetry of Homer*, chap. 6.) It may even be said, in a certain sense, that it is of more value, since it has the merit of creation, without having the fault of neologism.

† I do not remember any illustrious epithet from Voltaire, it is, perhaps, on my part, a pure defect of memory.

said, even, in a certain sense, that he will always exercise them; but how much has his degradation curtailed them! The following law is as true as God who made it:

Man is prohibited from giving great names to things of which he is the author, and which he thinks great; but if he has proceeded legitimately, the vulgar name of the thing will be rendered illustrious by it, and become great.

LIV. The rule is the same, whether it concerns material or political creations. There is nothing better known in Greek history, for example, than the word *Ceramicus:* Athens possessed nothing more magnificent. A long time after she had lost her great men, and her political existence, Atticus being at Athens, wrote with a flourish to his illustrious friend, *finding myself, the other day, in the Ceramicus*, etc., and Cicero replied to him playfully.* What however does this word,

* [*While I was in my Tusculanum.*] This is in return

so celebrated, signify? *Tuilerie* [*tile-kiln*].* There is nothing more vulgar; but the ashes of heroes, mingled with the earth, have consecrated it, and the earth has consecrated the name. It is singular enough, that, at so great a distance of times and places, this same word Tuileries, famous, formerly, as the name of a place of burial, has been dignified anew, under the name of a palace. The power which came to inhabit the *Tuileries*, did not undertake to give to them some imposing name which might have a certain proportion to itself. If it had committed this fault, there was no reason that, the following day, this place should not have been inhabited by pick-pockets and courtesans.

LV. One other reason which has its value, though it be drawn from a lower source,

for that of yours,—— *While I was in the Ceramicus*, etc. Cic. ad Att. I, 10.

* With a certain latitude which still includes the idea of *Pottery*.

should also induce us to distrust every pompous name imposed *à priori.* It is, that the conscience of man, almost always admonishing him of the imperfection of the work which he has just produced, his revolted pride, which cannot itself be mistaken, seeks at least to deceive others, by inventing an honourable name which supposes precisely the contrary merit; so that this name, instead of really attesting the excellence of the work, is a clear acknowledgement of the vice which characterizes it. The eighteenth century, so rich in every thing which can be imagined as false and ridiculous, has furnished a multitude of curious examples on this point, in the titles of books, epigraphs, inscriptions, and other things of this sort. Thus, for example, if you read at the head of one of the principal works of this age,

Tantum series juncturaque pollet :
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris ;

efface the presumptuous epigraph, and boldly substitute, before having even opened the book, and without the least fear of doing injustice,

Rudis indigestaque moles ;
Non bene junctarum discordia semina rerum.

Indeed, chaos is the image of this book, and the epigraph eminently expresses what is, in the highest degree, wanting in the work. If you read at the head of another book, *Histoire Philosophique et Politique*, you may know, before having read the history announced under this title, that it is neither *philosophical* nor *political;* and you will know, besides, after having read it, that it is the work of a phrenetic. Does any man dare to write under his own portrait, *Vitam impendere vero?** do

*[This was the motto of J. J. Rousseau. It was inscribed on his tomb, as well as under his portrait. On the monument erected to his memory by the Marquis de Girardin, in a grove of poplars, in his beautiful gardens at Ermenon-

not hesitate to lay a wager, without information, that it is the portrait of a liar, and he himself will avow it to you some day, when he may take a fancy to speak the truth. Can any one read under another portrait, *Postgenitis hic carus erit, nunc carus amicis*, without recollecting immediately that verse so happily borrowed from the original itself, to represent him in a manner a little different, *I had adorers, but not one friend?* And indeed, there never perhaps existed a man, in the literary class, less fitted to feel friendship, and less worthy of inspiring it. Works and enterprises of another kind afford matter for the same observation. Thus, for example, if

ville, about ten leagues from Paris, the traveller reads the following inscription :

Ici repose
L'Homme de la Nature
Ès de la Vérité!

Vitam impendere Vero.

Hic jacent Ossa J. J. Rousseau.—Trans.]

music, among a celebrated nation, all at once, becomes an affair of state; if the spirit of the age, blind on all points, bestows upon this art a false importance and a false protection, very different from what it needs; if, in fine, a temple is erected to music under the antique and high sounding name of ODEON; it is an infallible proof, that the art is on the decline; and no one ought to be surprised at hearing, in that country, a celebrated critic avow, soon after, in a style sufficiently vigorous, that nothing prevents one from writing on the pediment of the temple, A ROOM TO LET.*

* "The same pieces, executed at the *Odeon*, are far from producing in me the same sensation which I experienced at the old *Théâtre de Musique*, where I heard them with transport. Our artists have lost the tradition of this master-piece (the *Stabat* of Pergolèse); it is written for them in a foreign language; they say its notes, without comprehending its spirit; their execution is cold, void of soul, of sentiment, and of expression. The Orchestra itself plays mechanically, and with a feebleness which destroys the effect. . . . . Ancient music (*which?*) is the rival of

LVI. But, as I have said, all this is only an observation of the second order; let us return to the general principle, *that man has not, or has no longer, the right of naming things* (at least in the times referred to). Let one give great attention to this, that the most venerable names, in all languages, have a vulgar origin. The name never bears any proportion to the thing; the thing always dignifies the name. It is necessary that the name *germinate*, so to speak; otherwise the name is false. What does the word *throne* signify, in its origin? *seat* or even *stool.* What does *sceptre* signify? a *staff* to lean upon.* But the

the highest poetry; ours is only the rival of the warbling of birds. Let modern virtuosos cease then . . . . . from dishonouring sublime compositions . . . . .; let them play no more (especially) *à Pergolèse;* it is too hard for them."—Journ. de l'Empire, 28 mars 1812.

* In the second book of the Iliad, Ulysses desires to prevent the Greeks from basely renouncing their enterprise. If he meets, in the midst of tumult excited by malcontents, a king or a noble, he addresses him in mild words to per-

staff of Kings was soon distinguished from all others, and this name under its *new* signifi-

suade him; but if he finds under his hand a *man of the people*, (δήμου ἄνδρα) (a remarkable gallicism,) he bangs him *with heavy blows of the sceptre*.—Iliad. II, 198, 199.

It was formerly considered a crime in Socrates, to have made himself master of the verses which Ulysses pronounced on this occasion, and for having cited them in order to prove to the people, that they knew nothing, and that they were nothing.—*Xenophon*, *Memor. Socr.* I. II, 20.

["Each Prince of name, or chief in arms approv'd,
He fir'd with Praise, or with persuasion mov'd :—
'Warriors like you, with thought and wisdom blest,
By brave examples should confirm the rest :'

"But if a clam'rous vile plebeian rose,
Him with reproof he check'd, or tam'd with blows :
'Be still, thou slave ! and to thy betters yield ;
Unknown alike, in Council and in Field !' "—*Pope.*

"These words, it was alleged, Socrates would explain in such a manner, as if the Poet hereby meant to recommend roughness, severity, and stripes, as the only proper arguments to be made use of against the vulgar and the indigent. But Socrates was not absurd enough to draw such conclusions ;—for how then could he have complained, if he himself had been rudely treated? But he asserted, and might strengthen his assertion with these lines from Homer, 'that such as could neither *counsel* nor *execute*,—equally *unfit*, whether for the city, or the

cation, has subsisted for three thousand years. What is there more illustrious in literature, and more humble in its origin, than the word *tragedy?* and the almost odious name of *drapeau*, raised and ennobled by the lance of warriors, what fortune has it not had in our language? A multitude of other names might be mentioned, confirming more or less the same principle, such as these, for example, *Senate*, *Dictator*, *Consul*, *Emperor*, *Church*, *Cardinal*, *Marshall*, etc. We will conclude with those of *Constable* and *Chancellor*, applied to two eminent dignities of modern times:

camp;—these, and such as these,—and more especially when insolent and unruly,—ought to be reduced to reason, without any regard to the extent of their possessions.'" —Xenophon, Memor. Soc. I. II, 20.—Trans.]

Pindar can also be cited for the history of the sceptre, in the place where he relates to us the anecdote of the ancient King of Rhodes, who killed his brother-in-law on the spot, by striking him, in a moment of vivacity and without malice, *with a sceptre which was found unfortunately to have been made of too hard wood.*—Olymp. VII. v. 49—55. A fine lesson for making sceptres lighter!

the first signifies, in its origin, merely the *master of the stable*,* and the second, *the man who stands behind a railing* (that he might not be overwhelmed by the multitude of suppliants).†

LVII. There are then two infallible rules for judging all human creations, of whatever

* Constable is only a gallic contraction of COMES STABULI ; the *companion*, or *the minister of the prince for the department of the stables.*

† [*Cancelli* is a term which was applied to the rails or balusters, in the ancient Basilicas, that enclosed all persons who participated in the honours of the tribunal, or in the duties of judgement, and which served to guard them from the intrusion of the inferior orders, who occupied the aisles and hall. Hence the word *cancellarius* or chancellor, who was at first only a chief notary under the Emperors, and was so called, because he sat behind the *cancellus*, or lattice, to avoid being crowded by the people. The term *chancel* has the same origin, and is applied to the portion of the Church enclosed by the *cancelli*. The Germans give the name of *Kanzell* to the pulpit standing on the *cancelli*, and all the languages of Europe give the title of Chancellor, or *Cancellarius*, to the successor of the *officer* who stood within the *cancelli*. For much interesting matter relating to the ancient Roman Basilicas, and

kind they may be, the *basis* and the *name;* and these two rules well understood, relieve all odious application. If the basis is purely human, the edifice cannot stand; and the more men there shall be, who engage in it, the more deliberation, learning, and *writing especially*, they shall have employed about it, in fine, the more human means, of every kind, the more *frail* will the institution be. It is principally by this rule, that we must judge of whatever has been attempted by sovereigns or assemblies of men, for the civilization, institution or regeneration of nations.

LVIII. On the contrary, the more divine the institution is in its basis, the more durable it will be. It is well even to observe, for greater clearness, that the religious principle is,

their internal adaptation for the purposes of Christian worship, see Article III, of London Quarterly Review for March, 1845.—Trans.]

in its own essence, creative and conservative in two ways. In the first place, as it acts with greater power than any other principle upon the human mind, it draws from it prodigious efforts. Thus, for example, if a man be persuaded by his religious dogmas, that it is of great advantage for him, that after his death his body be preserved in all possible integrity, safe from the approach of any inconsiderate or profane hand; this man, I say, after having exhausted the art of embalming, will finish by constructing the Egyptian Pyramids. In the second place, the religious principle already so strong by what it does, is again infinitely more so by what it prevents, in consequence of the veneration with which it invests every thing which it takes under its protection. If a simple pebble is consecrated, there is all at once a reason for its escaping from hands which might pervert or desecrate it. The earth is covered with proofs of this truth.

The Etruscan vases, for example, *preserved by the religion of tombs, have come down to us, notwithstanding their fragility, in greater numbers, than the monuments of marble and of bronze of the same epoch.** Would you then *preserve* every thing, *dedicate* every thing.

LIX. The second rule, that of names, is not, I think, less clear, nor less decisive, than the first. If the name is imposed by an assembly; if it is established by previous deliberation, so that it precedes the thing; if the name is pompous;† if it has a grammatical proportion to the object which it is to represent; in fine, if it is taken from a foreign language, especially an ancient language; all

* Mercure de France, 17 juin 1809, No. 413, page 679.

† Thus, for example, if a man, other than a sovereign, should call himself *legislator*, it is a certain proof that he is not one; and if an assembly should venture to call itself *legislative*, not only is it a proof that it is not so, but it is a proof that it has lost its wits, and that, in a little while, it will be abandoned to the scorn of the universe.

the characteristics of nullity are found united, and we may be sure that the name and the thing will disappear in a very little while. The contrary suppositions reveal the legitimacy, and consequently, the permanancy of the institution. We must take good heed not to pass over this subject lightly. A true philosopher should never lose sight of language, the true barometer, whose variations announce infallibly *good and bad times*. To confine myself to the subject which I am now treating, it is certain that the unlimited introduction of foreign words, applied especially to national institutions of every kind, is one of the most infallible signs of the moral degradation of a people.

LX. If the formation of all empires, the progress of civilization, and the unanimous agreement of all history and tradition do not suffice still to convince us, the death of empires will complete the demonstration commenced

by their birth. As it is the religious principle which has created every thing, so it is the absence of this same principle which has destroyed every thing. The sect of Epicurus, which might be called *ancient incredulity*, corrupted at first, and soon after destroyed every government which was so unfortunate as to give it admission. Every where *Lucretius* announced *Cesar*.

But all past experience disappears before the frightful example afforded by the last century. Still intoxicated with its fumes, men are very far from being, at least in general, sufficiently composed to contemplate this example in its true light, and especially to draw from it the necessary conclusions. It is then very important to direct our whole atttention to this terrible scene.

LXI. There have always been some forms of religion in the world, and there have

been wicked men who have opposed them: impiety also has always been regarded as a crime; for, as there cannot be a false religion without some mixture of the true, so there cannot be any impiety which does not oppose some divine truth more or less disfigured; *but real impiety can only exist in the bosom of the true religion;* and, by a necessary consequence, impiety has never produced in past times, the evils which it has committed in our day; for its guilt is always in proportion to the light by which it is surrounded. It is by this rule that we must judge the eighteenth century; for it is under this point of view that it is unlike every other. We commonly hear it said, *that all ages resemble each other, and that men are ever the same;* but we must be careful not to believe in these general maxims which indolence or levity have invented to save themselves the trouble of reflection. All ages, on the contrary, and all nations, manifest a

peculiar and distinctive character which must be attentively considered. Undoubtedly vice has always existed in the world; but it may differ in quantity, in nature, in its ruling quality and in intensity.* Now, though impious men have always existed, there never was, before the eighteenth century, in the heart of Christianity, *an insurrection against God;* never especially had there been seen, before this, a sacrilegious conspiracy of all the faculties against their Author: now, this has been witnessed in our day. The *vaudeville* has blasphemed as well as the tragedy, and romance as well as history and natural philosophy. Men of this age have prostituted genius to irreligion, and according to the admirable

* It is necessary also to have regard to the mixture of virtues, the proportion of which vary infinitely. When one has pointed out the same kind of excesses at different times and places, he thinks himself entitled to conclude magisterially *that men have always been the same.* There is no sophism more gross or more common.

expression of the dying St. Louis, THEY HAVE WAGED WAR AGAINST GOD WITH HIS GIFTS.* Ancient impiety never gives itself trouble; sometimes it reasons; ordinarily it jests, but always without asperity. Lucretius even never comes to insult; and though his sombre and melancholic temperament might lead him to look upon the dark side of things, even when he accuses religion of having produced great evils, he does it with perfect *sang-froid.* The ancient religions were not considered of sufficient importance for contemporaneous incredulity to quarrel with them.

LXII. When the *good tidings* were first published to the world, the attack became more violent: nevertheless its enemies always observed a certain moderation. They showed themselves in history only at great intervals,

* Joinville, dans la collection des Memoires relatifs à l'Histoire de France, In-8o, tom. II, p. 160.

and constantly isolated. There never was a union or formal league among them; they never abandoned themselves to the rage of which we have been witnesses. Bayle even, the father of modern incredulity, was wholly unlike his successors. In his most censurable deviations, we do not find in him any great desire for proselyting, still less the tone of irritation or the spirit of party: he denies less than he doubts; he speaks on both sides; oftentimes he is more eloquent for the good cause than the bad.*

LXIII. It was then only in the first part of the eighteenth century, that impiety became really a power. We see it at first extending itself on every side with inconceivable activity. From the palace to the cabin, it insinuates itself every where, and infests every thing;

* See, for example, with what power of logic he has combatted materialism in the article LEUCIPPE of his Dictionary.

it has invisible ways, a concealed but infallible action, so that the most attentive observer, witness of the effect, is not always able to discover the means. By an inconceivable delusion, it gains the affections of those even of whom it is the most mortal enemy; and the authority which it is on the point of immolating, thoughtlessly embraces it before receiving the blow. Soon a simple system becomes a formal association, which, by a rapid gradation, changes into a confederacy, and at length into a grand conspiracy which covers Europe.

LXIV. Then that character of impiety which belongs only to the eighteenth century, manifests itself for the first time. It is no longer the cold tone of indifference, or at most the malignant irony of scepticism; it is a mortal hatred; it is the tone of anger, and often of rage. The writers of that period, at least the most distinguished of them, no

longer treat Christianity as an immaterial human error; they pursue it as a capital enemy; they oppose it to the last extreme; it is a war to the death: and, what would seem incredible, if we had not sad proofs of it before our eyes, is, that many of those men, who call themselves *philosophers*, advanced from hatred of Christianity to personal hatred of its Divine Author. They hated Him as really as one hates a living enemy. Two men especially, who will forever be covered with anathemas by posterity, distinguished themselves by this form of flagitiousness which would appear to be above the power of the most depraved human nature.*

* [*D'Alembert* and *Voltaire* distinguished themselves in this particular, and are, very probably, the persons alluded to in the text. "This frightful stroke of force is not necessary in order to render the greatest constitutive efforts useless: forgetfulness of the great Being (I do not say contempt) is an irrevocable anathema on human works, which are blasted by it. All imaginable institutions repose on a

LXV. However entire Europe having been civilized by Christianity, and its ministers

religious idea, or they quickly pass away. They are strong and durable in proportion as they are *divinisées*, if I may so express myself. Not only human reasons, or what one calls *philosophy*, without knowing what is said, cannot supply those bases, that are called *superstitious*, always without knowing what one says ; but philosophy is, on the contrary, essentially a disorganizing power. In a word man cannot reflect the Creator except in placing himself in near relation with Him. Senseless as we are, if we would reflect the image of the sun with a mirror, do we turn it towards the earth ?

"These reflections are addressed to all the world, to the believer as well as to the sceptic : it is a fact which I advance, and not a thesis. Let one laugh at religious ideas, or venerate them, no matter ; they form not the less, true or false, the only true basis of all durable institutions.

"Rousseau, the man perhaps who is most deceived, has, nevertheless, happily hit upon this observation, without having wished to draw the conclusions from it.

"*The Jewish law*, says he, *ever subsisting ; that of the child of Ismael, which ruled half the world for ten centuries ; proclaim still at this day the great men who dictated them. . . . . Proud philosophy, or the blind spirit of party, sees in them only fortunate impostors.*

"It remained with him to draw the proper conclusion, instead of descanting to us of *this great and powerful genius who presides over durable establishments:* as if this poetry explained anything !"—*Considérations sur la France.*]

having obtained high political consideration in every country, the civil and religious institutions were blended, and, as it were, amalgamated in a surprising manner; so that it might be said of all the states in Europe, with more or less of truth, what Gibbon has said of France, *that this kingdom was made by the Bishops.** It was then inevitable that the

* [The following passage, from another work of our Author, illustrates and *limits* the sentiment of the text. —"A peculiar feature of this monarchy is, that it possesses a certain theocratic element which particularly belongs to it, and which has given it fourteen hundred years of duration: there is nothing so national as this element. The Bishops, successors of the Druids in this respect, have only aimed to perfect it.

"I do not believe that any other European monarchy, has employed, for the good of the state, a greater number of Pontiffs in the civil government. I go back in thought from the pacific Fleury to those St. Ouens, those St. Legers, and so many others distinguished in the night of their age, —true Orpheuses of France, who tamed tigers and made the oaks to follow them. I doubt if a similar series can be shown elsewhere.

"But whilst the priesthood was in France one of the three columns which sustained the throne, and played in

philosophy of the age should unhesitatingly hate the social institutions, from which it was

the assemblies of the nation, in the tribunals, in the ministry, in the embassies a part so important, one cannot perceive, or if at all very slightly, its influence in the civil administration; and at the time even that a priest was Prime Minister, there was not in France a *government of priests.*

"All the powers were well balanced, and every one was at his post. It is, in this point of view, that England resembles France the most. If she ever banishes from her political language these words, CHURCH AND STATE, her government will perish like that of her rival."—*Considérations sur la France.*

A striking passage from Alison, in reference to France, at the time when the ascendency of the priesthood referred to by our Author was suppressed, may be cited in this connection.

"The Prelates sounded the alarm in the strongest terms on this portentous state of things. The torrent of irreligious opinions with which France had lately been deluged, had awakened a general belief amongst the reflecting part of the community that some terrible national catastrophe was at hand. The ex-Jesuit Beau Regard, when preaching before the court in Lent, pronounced with an emphatic voice these remarkable words, which subsequent events rendered prophetic:—'Yes! thy temples, O Lord, shall be destroyed; thy worship abolished; thy name blasphemed. But what do I hear, great God! To the holy strains which

impossible to separate the religious principle. This has taken place: every government, and all the establishments of Europe, were offensive to it, *because* they were Christian; and *in proportion* as they were Christian, an inquietude of opinion, an universal dissatisfaction, seized all minds. In France, especially, the philosophic rage knew no bounds; soon a single formidable voice, forming itself from many voices united, is heard to cry, in the midst of guilty Europe,

LXVI. "Depart from us!* Shall we then

beneath sacred roofs arose in Thy praise, shall succeed profane and licentious songs: the infamous rites of Venus shall usurp the place of the worship of the Most High; and she herself sit on the throne of the Holy of Holies, to receive the incense of her new adorers.'—(*Lacretelle*, VII., 11.) Who could have imagined, that this was literally to be accomplished, in four years, within the Cathedral walls of Nôtre-Dame?''—Alison's Hist. of French Revolution. Vol. I. chap. IV.—Trans.]

* *Dixerunt Deo;* RECEDE A NOBIS! *Scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus.* Job XXI, 14.

forever tremble before the priests, and receive from them such instruction as it pleases them to give us? Truth, throughout Europe, is concealed by the fumes of the censer; it is high time that she come out of this noxious cloud. We shall speak no more of Thee to our children; it is for them to know, when they shall arrive at manhood, whether there is such a Being as Thyself, and what Thou art, and what Thou requirest of them. Every thing which now exists, displeases us, because Thy name is written upon every thing that exists. We wish to destroy all, and to reconstruct the whole without Thee. Leave our councils, leave our schools, leave our houses: we would act alone: Reason suffices for us. Depart from us!"

How has God punished this execrable madness? He has punished it, as He created the light, by a single word. He spake, Let it be done!—and the political world has crumbled.

See, accordingly, how the two kinds of demonstration are united, to force conviction upon the least discerning. On the one hand, the religious principle presides at all political creations; and on the other, every thing disappears, as soon as this is withdrawn.

LXVII. Europe is guilty, for having closed her eyes against these great truths; and it is because she is guilty, that she suffers. Yet she still repels the light, and acknowledges not the arm which gives the blow. Few men, indeed, among this material generation, are in a condition to know the *date*, *nature*, and *enormity*, of certain crimes, committed by individuals, by nations, and by sovereignties; still less to comprehend the kind of expiation which these crimes demand, and the adorable prodigy which compels Evil to purify, with its own hands, the place which the eternal Architect has already measured by the eye for

His marvellous constructions. The men of this age have taken their side. *They are sworn to set their eyes always bowing down to the earth.** But it would be useless, perhaps even dangerous, to go into further details: it is enjoined upon us *to profess the truth in love.*† It is necessary, besides, on certain occasions, to profess it only with respect; and, notwithstanding every imaginable precaution, the step would be slippery, even for the most calm and best minded writer. The world, moreover, comprises always an innumerable multitude of men, so perverse, so profoundly corrupt, that if they should bring themselves to suspect the truth of certain things, their wickedness would be redoubled, and they would render themselves, so to speak, as

* *Oculos suos statuerunt declinare in terram.*—Ps. XVI, 11.

† Ἀληθεύοντες ἐν ἀγάπῃ.—Ephes. IV, 15. The expression cannot be translated. The Vulgate, loving better, with reason, to speak justly, than to speak Latin, has said, *Facientes veritatem in charitate.*

guilty as the rebel angels. Ah! rather than this, let their brutishness become greater still, if it be possible, to the end that they may not become as guilty as even men can be. Blindness is without doubt a terrible chastisement; sometimes, however, we may see love in it: this is all that it can be useful to say at this time.

FINIS.